DECISION BRIEF

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'BLESSED ARE THE PEACEMAKERS': TROOPS - NOT SANCTIONS - NEEDED TO HALT YUGOSLAV CARNAGE, MILOSEVIC'S AGGRESSION

(Washington, D.C.): For nearly a year, Serbian aggression against other former republics of Yugoslavia has met with studied indifference from the Bush Administration. This stance has translated into policy paralysis in — and an attendant absence of leadership from — Washington.

The practical effect of the U.S. stance on the Yugoslav crisis to date has been to enable Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic largely to achieve his goal of a "Greater Serbia" through brazen territorial conquest in the heart of Europe and through the fascistic practice of "ethnic cleansing." The latter is the pretext used to rid occupied areas of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina of non-Serb peoples. Fully one-third of Croatian territory and some 70 percent of Bosnia are now in the hands of Serbian forces or their wholly-owned "irregulars" loyal to the communist Milosevic.

More of the Same?

Tragically, it now appears that — even as the Bush Administration trumpets a new, more active approach involving the imposition of sweeping international economic sanctions against Serbia — the actual impact of this new policy at this juncture may well prove to be the same as the earlier U.S. approach. While the Center for Security Policy has called for economic and diplomatic sanctions against Serbia since hostilities began last summer, it is now clear that sanctions alone will be inadequate to arrest the current violence — and that yet to come.

Knowledgeable analysts currently believe that Milosevic only requires another 30 days (or less) to consolidate his annexation of most of Bosnia by the intimidation, forcible expulsion or execution of those Muslims and Croats still within the zone under Serbian military occupation. Worse yet, the Bush Administration has postponed any decision on the introduction of peacemaking forces — the only step remotely likely now to stem Milosevic's ongoing predations, let alone to roll-back those already accomplished — until the "sanctions are given a chance to work."

This is, of course, precisely the argument made by many congressional Democrats and other critics of President Bush's military response to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. It was an argument strenuously, and property, resisted by Mr. Bush in the fall of 1990. Waiting for sanctions to work makes no more sense in the case of Serbia than it did with respect to Iraqi aggression for the following reasons:

First, in the absence of military action against Serbian forces and paramilitary surrogates, sanctions may simply have the effect of shoring up Milosevic's waning popular support at home. He will be able to claim that the economic catastrophe he has wrought (for example, inflation estimated to be running at an annual rate of 48,000%) is the result of sabotage from external enemies — not his inept command economic practices and the debilitating drain of an offensive war.

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