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Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Of the contemporary three ethnic communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, prior to the Turkish invasion only two existed, the Serbian and Croatian communities. The Muslim community came to being during Turkish rule and by gradual islamization, perpetrated by state authorities, and adopted by a considerable part of the population, its motive being twofold: to avoid the hardships reserved for second-class Christian citizens and to receive the privileges enjoyed by members of the ruling muslim confession. In view of their key role in state and military authority, the Muslims generally inhabited cities and towns as well as fertile river valleys. This fact significantly determined the population distribution of Bosnia and Herzegovina even to this day.

A larger part of Bosnia and Herzegovina represents Serbian territory, inhabited by ethnic Serbs for centuries as the majority ethnic group, and despite islamization, they saw the end of Turkish rule as the largest ethnic and religious group. According to the census taken after Austro-Hungarian occupation in 1879, 1,158,164 people inhabited Bosnia and Herzegovina, of which 496,485 (42.87%) were of Orthodox confession (Serbs), 448,613 (38.73%) were muslims (current Muslims), 209,391 (18.08%) were Roman Catholics (Croats and other Catholics) and 3,675 belonged to other confessions, mostly Jews.

The Serbian population in Bosnia and Herzegovina represented a stable majority until World War II, when mostly due to the ustasha genocide, and partly due to deportation to Serbia, this majority was seriously upset. The relationship between Muslims and Serbs was reversed. It the Muslims who are the majority now.

The maps presented herein have been produced on basis of data on each settlement individually, taking into account even the small hamlets. This method is more precise and more realistic than investigating by administrative units (municipalities), which often contain members of other ethnic groups as well, and data obtained that way fails to reveal the true complexity of ethnic composition. The shares of respective ethnic groups in overall population as per census data from 1971 and 1981 are illustrated by Figures 1 and 2.




Figure 1. Population composition according to 1971 census data

We are obliged to note that the true number of Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina is actually greater than the one noted by the 1981 census data. Under strong pressure of ant-Serbian communist propaganda, many Serbs especially in cities started declaring themselves as "Yugoslavs". This is to say that among the "Yugoslavs" noted by the census, the majority is provided by Serbs. The "Ethnic composition of the Population of Bosnia and

Herzegovina" map shows such cities to be those in which none of the three ethnic groups has a clear majority, but in which the sum of Serbs and "Yugoslavs" would provide such a clear majority. In case of the "Territorial Distribution of Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina" map, the sum of Serbs and "Yugoslavs" would carry a significant number of settlements to the Serbian majority group of settlements.

The real ethnic composition of Bosnia and Herzegovina is illustrated by the fact that the sum of Serbs and "Yugoslavs" according to 1971 and 1981 census remained generally the same. In 1971, there were 37.19% Serbs and 1.17% "Yugoslavs", while in 1981 there were 32.02% and 7.91% "Yugoslavs". This is to say that a larger number of ethnic Serbs declared themselves as "Yugoslavs" in the 1981 census.




Figure 2. Population composition according to 1981 census data

Nevertheless, among the "Yugoslavs" there is a smaller part of those who are not ethnic Serbs. There are by and large people from mixed marriages. Given that the number of such people is not precisely known, the authors of the maps, respecting recognized scientific methods, left the entire Yugoslav category outside the Serb group.

In terms of settlements where it lives and the territory it inhabits, the Serbian population continues to hold the dominating place in the ethnic composition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the 1981 census data, the Serbs hold the absolute majority in 2,439 out of 5,857 settlements. Settlements with Serbs as the majority occupy 27,255.2 km² or 53.30% of the total territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina (51,129 km²). Settlements where Muslims and Croats represent the majority occupy considerably smaller areas, as illustrated by Figure III.




Figure 3 The territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina as defined by settlements occupied by an ethnic group majority

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Geneva; January 8, 1993

PROPOSAL

to all relevant factors in the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the world which are determining the introduction of an institutional system of international assistance and administration in the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Taking into consideration all factors which led to war on the territory of Bosnia-Hercegovina, all decisions and recommendations of international institutions, and especially the resolutions of the U.N. Security Council, as well as proposals for constitutional arrangements of B-H which were presented during the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia

IT IS PROPOSED

that there be considered the possibility of introducing an institutional system of international assistance and administration, as compatible with previous proposals, with the aim of normalizing the situation which is affected by warfare on the territory of B-H and with the aim of accelerating the return of normal conditions for the development of democracy in this state.

I. Legal Bases of the Proposal

1. The idea for an institutional system of international assistance and administration can be linked by analogy to provisions which deal with an international protectorate system as foreseen in Chapter XII (para. 75-85) in the U.N. Charter.

We are aware of the fact that this system was foreseen for other historical circumstances, but we believe that it can be applied by analogy to independent countries in which there is civil war with great consequences or in countries which derived as the consequence of the dissolution of communist rule and in which there are serious tensions which threaten peace.

2. The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is an internationally recognized state and a member of international organizations, such as the U.N.

We believe, therefore, that the proposed system cannot be introduced on the basis of decisions of international institutions (nor can the U.N. trusteeship system be directly applied). Rather, it should be based on an international agreement attained between the legitimate authorities of the Republic of B-H and an international institution prepared to offer this sort of assistance and administration.

3. The aims of the U.N. as outlined in Article 1 of the U.N. Charter, primarily the interest in maintaining peace and security in the world, as well as the need to ensure the application and observance of human rights on the basis of the right of a people to self-determination, but also on the principle of equal rights for all people with any kind of discrimination (on any basis), leads us to the consideration that the central role in this situation should be undertaken by the U.N.

4. All political parties in B-H have already demonstrated their willingness to incorporate international factors in the solving of internal problems, even to a considerable extent in the constitutional system of B-H.

II. Basic Elements of the Proposal

1. The decision of the U.N. Security Council concerning the idea of an institutional system of international assistance and administration opens the process of negotiating about the elements of an international agreement on which it would be based. The authority of the U.N. Security Council is necessary for carrying out this project. This institution should pass, according to Article 81 of the U.N. Charter, a decision on establishing administrative authority under the auspices of the U.N.

2. An international agreement between the Republic of B-H and the U.N. should be reached and should delineate the role and place of administrative authorities (including the issue of its mandate, immunities, payments, etc.), taking into consideration the existing legal system of the Republic of B-H.

3. Confirmation should be made that this agreement has the power of a constitutional act in the Republic B-H on the one hand, and on the other hand that every hindrance to its implementation committed by third-party states will be subject to sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council.

4. This international agreement would be in force until the holding of new democratic elections and the consolidations of institutions affected by those elections.

5. This international agreement in no way violates the international legal subjectivity of the Republic of B-H and its territorial integrity, nor does it in any way prejudice the constitutional arrangement of internal relations which would be determined by democratic means.

III. Basic Issues of Administrative Authority

A) Purposes of Establishing Administrative Authority

- stabilizing peace and security on the territory of B-H;
- providing for the political, economic, social and cultural welfare of all inhabitants of this region in compliance with the principles of equality of all people, and the prohibition of discrimination against individuals and the guaranteeing of their individual and collective rights;
- assistance to the development of a system of parliamentary democracy and democratic institutions, as well as accepting the importance of the role of procedure in the building of democracy;
- creating normal conditions for the expression of the will of all inhabitants of B-H concerning a model for the state in which they wish to live (by means of referendum or elections);
- development of a process of constitutional consolidation of B-H which would ensure the greatest possible degree of consensus among all political factors in the Republic of B-H, the normal life of all its citizens and solutions which would reduce or eliminate the possibility of further conflicts;
- elimination of possible influences and conflicts of interests of neighboring countries on the territory of B-H;

- creating conditions and guarantees for the return of all displaced persons and refugees to their pre-war places of residence;
- overcoming, with the help of neutrality and expertise, the hatred among various ethnic groups which developed as a consequence of the war;
- creating conditions, with the help of already existing international institutions and national courts, for establishing individual accountability for all war criminals on the territory of the Republic of B-H;
- development and rejuvenation of various vital sectors and the creation of legal and economic bases for normal economic development;
- monitoring, first of all, the legislative and administrative implementation of the international obligations of the Republic of B-H in the field of respect for human rights;
- control over the application of international obligations and agreements attained within the framework of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia.

Members of the administrative authority will accomplish these objectives primarily by influencing the decision-making process, but also by proposing initiatives and official proposals.

B) Composition of the Administrative Authority

-- The administrative authority will be comprised of citizens of permanent members of the U.N. Security Council which have a system of parliamentary democracy. (As an alternative: citizens of all permanent members of the UNSC or of European states which have a multi-national character -- Belgium, Switzerland, etc.)

-- Members of the administrative authority will be nominated in their personal capacity on the basis of professional criteria, at the request of countries of which they are citizens. They will be named by the U.N. Security Council with the consent of the Republic of B-H.

-- Members of the administrative authority will be responsible for their work to the U.N. Security Council. (As an alternative: they will be responsible to a separate body which will be established by agreement about this system and which will be composed of states which have nominated members of the administrative authority, together with representatives of the Republic of B-H.

-- Members of the administrative authority can be removed by the body to which they are responsible.

-- The administrative authority as a whole will not be placed above institutions of the Republic of B-H, but will function as a group of individuals who coordinate their work. The administrative authority will nevertheless have the capability of meeting specifically in order to present recommendations and opinions about general issues, with the aim of coordinating or resolving questions which are in the domain of the administrative authority as a whole. The coordinator of the administrative authority is the member of that body which has been named by the Presidency of the Republic of B-H.

-- Members of the administrative authority proceed within the framework of a general mandate and within the framework of general goals of the administrative authority. In special circumstances, they can receive instructions for their work from the U.N. Security Council.

-- Members of the administrative authority have the capability of presenting initiatives and the obligation to implement those initiatives.

C) Operational Elaboration of Administrative Authority

Members of the administrative authority will be placed in the following institutions of central authority of the Republic of B-H:

1) Presidency of the Republic of B-H

One member of the administrative authority will be named as a member of the Presidency of the Republic of B-H. He will not have the right to vote, but will have the right to participate actively in Presidency sessions, including in arriving at compromises, and will have the right to present proposals.

In case of disagreement with a decision of disagreement with the procedure behind a decision, he will have the right to veto the legality of the decision. Then the contentious decision will be turned over to a legislative body (parliament), which will make a final decision. He will be required to explain his veto before parliament.

2) Legislative body (parliament)

One member of the administrative authority will be named to the position of Vice President of Parliament. He will participate in all sessions and consultations which take place under the aegis of that institution. He will not have the right to vote, but he will have the right to participate in discussions, the right to propose legal acts, the right to convene this body, the right to criticize procedures and the right through his vote (a temporary veto) to postpone the legality of a decision until the following session of this body, when another discussion would be held on the contentious issue.

3. Executive body (government)

One member of the administrative authority will be named to the position of Vice President of the government of the Republic of B-H. He will not have the right to vote, but he will have the right to participate in discussions, the right to present proposals, the right to place items on the agenda and the right to veto the implementation of a decision, in which case the contentious decision will be brought before the legislative body for discussion. With regard to the formal character of the act, that body can either make a final decision or issue an opinion about the decision which will obligate the government.

4. Ministries

A member of the administrative authority will be named assistant minister in each of the following ministries (if they exist at the central level):

- internal affairs
- defense
- justice
- information
- transportation and communication
- commerce
- education and culture
- reconstruction

This member of the administrative authority will have the capability of monitoring the entire work of the ministry, the right to propose decisions and the right to veto decisions that are the responsibility of the ministry (including ones that deal with the internal organization of the ministry), in which case the contentious issue will be brought before the government which will make a final decision.

Besides members of the administrative authority in central institutions of the Republic of B-H, there will be named, with similar powers, members of institutions of a legislative and executive character in all provinces established in the Republic of B-H.

MISCELLANEOUS

In accordance with Article 84 of the U.N. Charter, the administrative authority would found its own police forces. Those forces would be organizationally and financially autonomous from the institutions of authority of the Republic of B-H, and would have the following mandate:

- possess the character of special police forces;
- control peace and order in regions into which they are dispatched;
- control and participate in the disarming of para-military units;
- conduct autonomous investigations in cases where the administrative authority deems it necessary;
- intervene in crisis situations;
- participate, as a guarantor, in the gradual return of displaced persons and refugees;
- control and secure specified roadways;
- coordinate its work with organs of the regular police and participate together with them in fighting criminality;
- move freely throughout the territory of the Republic of B-H; the agreement of local (or provincial) authorities is not required for their housing;
- conduct operations autonomously and under special identification symbols.

The commander of these forces will be a member of the administrative authority. Directives for his work will be coordinated by the administrative authority, to which he will be responsible for his activities.

The officers of these forces would be foreigners (from the same countries as the members of the administrative authority), and regular members would be local citizens. The national composition of the local citizens (who would be professionals) would have to correspond approximately to the percentage of national composition at the Republic level.

For all contentious issues which are essential for relations in the Republic of B-H and which cannot be resolved through normal channels of a legal or political nature, the administrative authority will form, as necessary and on the basis of its own assessment, groups of mediation experts composed of foreign and local specialists who fulfill the criteria of objectivity and neutrality.

48:14

[Text]

I thank you for listening to me, and I hope the questions and answers will further clarify.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Pasik. (PASIC)

Mr. Nicholas Pasik (President, Serbian Heritage Academy): I am President of the Serbian Heritage Academy. I've been in Canada for 40 years. As probably my friends here know, my grandfather was the Prime Minister who formed Yugoslavia. At that time the Croats joined in a joint constitution, and a monarchy was formed for democratic Yugoslavia. Then it was called Serbia and Croatia, Slovenia.

We didn't have at that time these ethnic problems, except for minority extremist groups who were mostly instigated from abroad. There were the Bulgarian extremists, the VMRO, and there were some Oustachi Croatian extremists. But generally these extremists didn't have the chance in Yugoslavia, before the Second World War, to create a revolution or the dismemberment of the country.

It's the objective belief of many historians that had we not had a war, and had that country continued, we would have worked out some federal system instead of a centralist system, which was a mistake. It would be a democratic system, and we would build up something like a multicultural community such as Canada has.

One of the problems with Yugoslavia is that it has all the world problems concentrated in one country. We have ethnic problems. We have the division of civilizations in that area, which goes back to Byzantine times. We have of course the church division, and we have minorities, ethnic groups. In fact, the subject you're discussing today, Bosnia-Herzegovina, is a leopard skin.

[Translation]

Je vous remercie de m'avoir écoutée et j'espère pouvoir donner d'autres précisions au cours des questions.

Le président: Merci.

Monsieur Pasik.

M. Nicholas Pasik (président, Serbian Heritage Academy): Je suis président de la Serbian Heritage Academy. J'ai habité le Canada depuis 40 ans. Comme mes amis ici le savent, mon grand-père était premier ministre lors de la création de la Yougoslavie. À cette époque, les Croates ont adhéré à ce régime en signant une constitution conjointe, la monarchie instaurée dans une Yougoslavie démocratique qui s'appelait à l'époque la Serbie et la Croatie.

À cette époque, les problèmes ethniques actuels n'existent pas, sauf pour quelques groupes minoritaires extrémistes qui étaient pour la plupart à la solde de l'étranger. Il y avait des extrémistes bulgares, les Véméraux et quelques extrémistes croates Oustachi. Mais avant la Première Guerre mondiale, ces extrémistes n'avaient pas la possibilité de provoquer une révolution ou de démembrer le pays.

Beaucoup d'historiens pensent très objectivement que si nous n'avions pas eu de guerre, un système fédéral aurait remplacé le système centralisateur qui existait et qui n'était pas une bonne idée. On aurait donc eu un système démocratique au sein duquel les différentes collectivités de diverses cultures pourraient vivre différentes collectivités de diverses cultures comme au Canada à l'heure actuelle.

Un des problèmes, c'est évidemment que la Yougoslavie connaît tous les problèmes que connaît le monde entier, de façon concentrée. Nous avons des problèmes ethniques et nous avons différents groupes qui remontent à l'époque byzantine. Nous avons évidemment les divisions religieuses, les minorités ethniques. En fait, la question dont vous discutez aujourd'hui, la Bosnie-Herzégovine, c'est une véritable peau de léopard.

• 1200

When External Affairs saw the picture, they just couldn't believe it. How can you work out a federal system in this leopard skin? I'll come back to the ambassador's suggestions of a compromise later on, if I may.

asked for/ The war broke out. I was at Oxford as a student. I came back and hell was there. The country was divided into 11 parts. All the neighbours, who were revenged against the loss in World War I, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Italians—the Italians occupied Kosovo, as you know, and there was a great persecution of Serbs. We really were reduced to a small little Serbia occupied by the Germans, in which they shot 100 Serbs for every German killed.

On the Croatian side, you had this enormous independent state of Croatia that gobbled up the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which a system of such terror developed that present-day Croatians are very embarrassed even to talk about their past. Of course, as you know, they fought on the Nazi side. They never signed a peace treaty with the Allies. They got off the hook by incorporating themselves into Tito's Yugoslavia, which was recognized by the Allies and victors of the war.

Quand le ministère des Affaires extérieures a vu le tableau, n'a pas pu en croire ses yeux. Comment pourrait-on avoir un système fédéral dans une telle situation? Je reviendrai plus tard aux suggestions concernant un compromis qu'a faites l'ambassadeur, si vous le voulez bien.

La grande guerre a éclaté pendant que j'étais à l'école en train de poursuivre mes études. Je suis revenu dans mon pays et je me suis rendu compte que c'était l'enfer. Le pays était divisé en 11 parties. Tous les voisins voulaient leur revanche à la suite des pertes essuyées au cours de la Première Guerre mondiale, les Bulgares, les Hongrois, les Italiens—les Italiens occupaient le Kosovo comme vous le savez—et les Serbes étaient fortement persécutés. Les Serbes nous avaient réduits à une petite Serbie et chaque fois qu'un soldat allemand était tué, ils tuaient 100 soldats serbes.

En ce qui concerne la Croatie, il s'agissait d'un État indépendant très important qui englobait toute la Bosnie-Herzégovine. On y avait établi un tel système de terreur que les Croates à l'heure actuelle sont embarrassés de repenser à leur passé. Comme vous le savez, les Croates ont combattu du côté nazi, ils n'ont jamais signé de traité de paix avec les alliés, mais n'ont pas dû rendre compte de leurs actions qu'ils se sont tout simplement intégrés à la Yougoslavie reconnue par les alliés et vainqueurs.

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[Texte]

In my specific case, I wasn't so lucky, because I joined what we call the loyalists, or nationalist royalists, General Mihailovic's army, and for reasons that are extremely complicated, which I have studied and which are still here in the archives in ~~Toronto~~ they haven't been touched yet—we lost and Tito won. So I came out to Canada to finish my studies, and I lived with all my family in this beautiful country.

We're crying when we hear these stories, because they apply to the Serbs as well as to the Muslims. One of the paradoxes is that Croatia has 1,200,000 refugees, which include nearly 20% of the Muslim population—you can check the figures later—and Serbia has over half a million refugees, which also include 20% of the Bosnian Muslim population.

So if ethnic cleansing is used now loosely and sounds horrible, and we're all against it—the Serbs have said officially they're against it. Why is it that both sides have the remainders of these cleansings? In fact, it's an extremely complicated civil war. It's easy for Mr. Weyman, who is there with his, no doubt, very humanistic group—I'd like to talk to him, because our problem of refugees in Serbia is absolutely catastrophic. We're getting no aid. Most of the aid, of course, is concentrated in any spot where there's publicity.

Sanctions are killing the population. They're losing their jobs, the children are without absolutely anything in the hospitals, anesthesia has disappeared for operations. We have 200,000 children, of whom 90,000 are orphans in Serbia, all from Bosnia and the Croatian side. I'm receiving horrible letters of appeal. We're trying to do the best we can, through the church, to help them. We don't have large organizations like the Catholics have and other organizations.

Because of this image that has been created of the Serbs, which I'd like to speak a little bit about, the west really doesn't understand the reality of the situation.

Canada has always stood for the rights of political freedom, national self-determination, and against religious and other political persecutions. That is why Canada has the respect and admiration of many nations, especially the smaller nations, and that is why its peacekeepers have been able to play such an important role in the conflict situations.

In Yugoslavia, one of the most colourful and most honest and most humanist men was General MacKenzie. But now you read—and you read it in *Saturday Night* last week—that the Bosnians, and that is both the officials and the Croat press, have started to lay charges against him, not only that he is a paid Serbian agent—it's as if we have all the money of the world, the biggest publicity, and we can even pay the Canadian peacekeepers—but that he may be even judged as a war criminal.

[Traduction]

Quant à moi, je n'ai pas eu autant de chance parce que j'avais rejoint le camp des loyalistes, les royalistes nationalistes, l'armée du général Mihailovic. Pour des raisons extrêmement complexes—que j'ai étudiées et dont l'explication se trouve encore dans les archives de ~~Toronto~~—nous avons perdu et le camp de Tito a gagné. J'ai donc immigré au Canada, j'y ai poursuivi mes études et j'ai vécu avec toute ma famille dans ce magnifique pays.

Nous pleurons lorsque nous entendons toutes ces histoires car elles s'appliquent autant aux Serbes qu'aux musulmans. Un des paradoxes est que la Croatie compte 1 200 000 réfugiés dont presque 20 p. 100 de la population musulmane—vous pourrez vérifier les chiffres plus tard—et la Serbie, plus d'un demi-million de réfugiés, ce qui comprend également 20 p. 100 de la population musulmane de Bosnie.

Par conséquent, si l'on a recours à l'heure actuelle facilement à l'épuration ethnique—et nous sommes contre une telle chose, les Serbes ont dit officiellement qu'ils n'étaient pas d'accord avec cette pratique. Pourquoi les deux factions ont-elles les personnes qui ont échappé à cette épuration? En fait, il s'agit là d'une guerre civile extrêmement compliquée. C'est très facile pour M. Weyman et son groupe qui poursuit un but d'humanisme—j'aimerais lui parler car le problème des réfugiés en Serbie est absolument catastrophique. Nous ne recevons aucune aide. Et l'aide que l'on reçoit se concentre dans les endroits au sujet desquels on veut faire de la publicité.

Les sanctions représentent un arrêt de mort pour la population: les gens perdent leur emploi, les enfants manquent de soins dans les hôpitaux, il est impossible de procéder à des anesthésies. Sur 200 000 enfants, 90 000 sont des orphelins d'origine bosniaque et croate en Serbie. La correspondance que je reçois est vraiment pathétique. Nous essayons de faire tout ce que nous pouvons par l'intermédiaire de l'église. Nous n'avons pas de grandes organisations comme les catholiques ou d'autres.

Étant donné l'image que l'on a donnée des Serbes et dont j'aimerais parler quelque peu, l'Occident ne comprend pas vraiment en quoi consiste la situation.

Le Canada a toujours été en faveur de la liberté politique, de l'autodétermination des peuples et a milité contre toute persécution religieuse ou politique. C'est la raison pour laquelle le Canada fait l'objet du respect et de l'admiration de nombreux pays, spécialement les plus petites nations, et que ses troupes de maintien de la paix ont pu jouer un rôle aussi important dans des conflits.

En Yougoslavie, le général MacKenzie a été une des personnalités les plus hautes en couleur, très honnête; il possédait un très grand sens humanitaire. Pourtant, à l'heure actuelle, et vous pourrez le lire dans le *Saturday Night* de la semaine passée, la presse de Bosnie et de Croatie l'ont accusé d'être un agent à la solde de la Serbie—comme si nous avions tout l'argent au monde pour faire un tel battage publicitaire et même payer les forces de maintien de la paix canadiennes—et on a dit également qu'il pourrait être jugé comme criminel de guerre.

[Text]

• 1205

Now, the accusations came from a miserable psychopath and mentally defective individual called Erak. He was taken prisoner by the Bosnian Muslims and was given wide publicity in the Canadian press, and you've all read about it through John Burns, a reputable *New York Times* journalist.

At that time, the reporter Mr. Burns had already given great publicity to a shooting that happened—and all the world saw it—at the funeral of a small child. It was alleged to have been committed by the Serbs, whereas in fact later on it was found that the child was Serb and that the whole thing had been perhaps even staged, which is a horrible thing to imagine in the west.

Now, Burns told Pamela Wallen at the CBC that it was—these are his conclusions as a journalist, and they're very widespread in their effect—clear to him that there were thousands of such Eraks who “in the plan for the creation of a Serbian nationalist republic in Bosnia”, were doing such dirty work, which means killing civilians, women and children.

After spending many hours with the prisoner—and it's unusual for a journalist to do so; perhaps he had the only privilege—he concluded that Erak, within the cause of Serbian nationalism, was “licensed, authorized and directed”—those are his words—in this work. Now it turns out that Erak was lying and spent most of the time covered by his history period in a Serbian prison as a petty criminal. Once the news gets out to the world, it is extremely powerful.

A classic example of staged publicity was the killing of Kuwaiti babies in incubators, staged by a PR firm, which was made just before the House of Representatives decided to go to war against Iraq. A similar staged PR event took place in Sarajevo when civilians were shot in bread lines and the United Nations voted, a day or two afterwards, for sanctions against Yugoslavia. The power of war propaganda is so effective that you can change the image of events completely, and the only real information that you could get is from your intelligence services, from the military, and from the diplomats. As far as I know, the Canadian diplomats have always been extremely objective.

So you have on the one hand this explanation of what is going on there, and on the other hand you have a propaganda that is extremely damaging, because it makes good-natured people, humanists, talk about the genocide of 3 million people as if it's absolutely a reality. Even the 400,000 starving in Sarajevo sounds horrible, but of course they'll open up the contacts. Serbia long ago opened up the lines of communication; they even gave the airport in order to get the communication. The fighting that's going on now is ethnic, it is religious, and it's vicious, and to try to represent it as a black and white situation is not only dangerous, but it leads many people to conclusions that may create an even worse situation.

[Translation]

Ces accusations proviennent d'un psychopathe, un homme misérable et mentalement malade du nom de Erak. Cet individu a été fait prisonnier par les musulmans de Bosnie, on lui a consacré pas mal de publicité dans la presse canadienne et John Burns, un journaliste de réputation du *New York Times*, en a parlé également.

Ce M. Burns avait déjà fait pas mal de publicité au sujet d'une fusillade qui s'était produite lors des funérailles d'un enfant. Tout le monde avait pu être témoin de ce qui s'était passé. Cette fusillade avait été attribuée aux Serbes, alors que plus tard on s'est rendu compte que l'enfant lui-même était serbe, que tout cet incident était une affaire montée.

M. Burns a dit à Pamela Wallen de CBC qu'il y avait des milliers d'autres Erak qui, afin de créer une république nationaliste serbe en Bosnie, s'acquittaient du sale travail qui consiste à abattre des civils, des femmes et des enfants. C'était la conclusion à laquelle était arrivé ce journaliste, conclusion qu'il avait claironnée partout.

Après avoir passé de nombreuses heures avec le prisonnier, ce qui est assez inhabituel pour un journaliste, il en a conclu que Erak avait reçu ses ordres des nationalistes serbes qui l'avaient autorisé à agir comme il le faisait. Or, il s'avère maintenant que Erak mentait, qu'il avait passé la plus grande partie du temps en question dans une prison serbe à purger des peines minables. Pourtant, quand ce genre de nouvelles est diffusée dans le monde entier, l'impact est considérable.

Un exemple classique de publicité montée est celui des prématurés que l'on a sorti des incubateurs pour les laisser mourir au Koweït. C'est une firme de relations publiques qui avait monté toute cette histoire cousue de fil blanc qu'on avait diffusée avant que la Chambre des représentants ne vote en faveur de la guerre contre l'Irak. Une autre manœuvre du même genre est celle des civils de Sarajevo descendus alors qu'ils faisaient la file pour obtenir du pain et qui a précédé d'un jour ou deux le vote de sanctions contre la Yougoslavie par les Nations Unies. L'efficacité de la propagande de guerre est telle que l'on peut de cette façon modifier complètement la perception des choses et que la seule information réelle que l'on puisse avoir provient des services de renseignements, des militaires et des diplomates. Pour autant que je sache, les diplomates canadiens ont toujours été extrêmement objectifs.

Ainsi donc, il y a ces deux réalités, avec cette propagande extrêmement néfaste qui permet à des personnes ayant des sentiments humanitaires de parler du génocide de 3 millions de personnes comme s'il s'agissait d'une réalité absolue. Quand on parle de 400 000 personnes qui meurent de faim à Sarajevo, cela semble terrible, mais évidemment on va finir par savoir ce qu'il en est. La Serbie a ouvert il y a longtemps les lignes de communication, elle a même cédé l'aéroport pour que les choses soient bien claires. Les luttes qui ont lieu à l'heure actuelle sont des luttes ethniques et religieuses, il s'agit d'une situation tout à fait viciée et le fait de vouloir en parler comme s'il s'agissait d'une situation en noir et blanc est non seulement dangereuse, mais pousse les gens à des conclusions qui pourraient aggraver encore la situation.

[Texte]

This is where I have to bring to your attention that any military intervention in that country will provoke not only a Lebanization locally, but will spread immediately to the other countries. He's quite right that it may blow up in Kosovo, and it might blow up in Macedonia, but that's not the way to do it—by military intervention.

In fact, the man who was on the spot there, General MacKenzie, knew in fact he was in hot water with some of the people of the United Nations. He suggested that we should not even introduce military intervention for humanist purposes. They are not talking about this other intervention or becoming peacemakers. They talk about peacemakers as if this is a situation where we are going to go to war against Serbia.

• 1210

The image of the foreign media has created this very simple picture you have had from all your other witnesses: Serbian communist dictator Milosevic using brute force to subjugate the new fledgling democracies, one-third Croat republic and two-thirds of Bosnia, and also subjugating former autonomous provinces of Kosovo, with nearly a million Albanians, and Voivodina, 300,000 Hungarians. It looks very simple.

The image is promoted mostly by anti-Serb lobbies, anti-Serb diplomats—we can call them whatever you like, but basically it is an anti-Serb movement by those countries and interests that are trying to camouflage this civil war into intervention against Serbia as such. It's quite true that the Serbian people are suffering, the children are suffering, and we have compassion for all of them.

Yesterday the Liberal caucus held a round table on this, and we are very pleased to say that they gave the chance to the Serbs at the last minute. I haven't even had time to prepare the papers because I was only notified about this thing yesterday afternoon.

But to bring anti-Serb—I don't want to use the word "anti-Serb"—to bring those views that distort reality because they believe in something that in our view is a fiction is extremely dangerous, and the Canadian government will have to make up its own mind as to what the reality is and have a balanced approach. The only way they can have a balanced approach is to hear both sides. I am extremely grateful that you have given me the chance to speak on the Serbian side. There is a story there that has not had publicity in the west, and it needs to be told. I hope in the questions I will be able to help you in finding that story.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Pasik.

I want to ask Mr. Pasik one question. I think, on behalf of the committee, that it might help.

Mr. Pasik, your case is that the argument is that somehow somebody will be making all of this an anti-Serbian case. Others are arguing that in order to bring this matter to some resolution it is time to put somebody military with

[Traduction]

C'est la raison pour laquelle je dois vous faire comprendre que toute intervention militaire dans ce pays provoquera non seulement une libanisation du pays, mais permettra au mal de s'étendre dans les pays voisins. La situation pourra devenir explosive au Kosovo et en Macédoine, mais il ne faut pas d'intervention militaire.

En fait, le général MacKenzie savait qu'il se trouvait dans une situation difficile avec certaines personnes aux Nations Unies. Il a dit que nous ne devrions pas intervenir militairement même pour des raisons humanitaires. Ils ne parlent pas de cette autre intervention ni de devenir des pacificateurs. Ils parlent de pacificateurs comme s'il s'agissait d'une situation où l'on allait faire la guerre à la Serbie.

L'image donnée par les médias étrangers a créé ce tableau très simpliste qui vous a été présenté par tous les autres témoins que vous avez entendus: le dictateur communiste serbe Milosevic utilise la force brute pour subjuguer les démocraties naissantes, le tiers de la République croate et les deux tiers de la Bosnie, ainsi que pour subjuguer les anciennes provinces autonomes du Kosovo, qui compte près d'un million d'Albanais, et de la Voïvodine, où vivent 300 000 Hongrois. Ça paraît très simple.

Ce sont principalement des lobbies anti-serbes, des diplomates anti-serbes, qui font la promotion de cette image—appelez-les comme vous voulez, mais il s'agit essentiellement d'un mouvement anti-serbe mené par ces pays et intérêts qui essaient de camoufler cette guerre civile en la présentant comme une intervention contre la Serbie en tant que telle. Il est vrai que le peuple serbe souffre, que les enfants souffrent, et nous avons beaucoup de compassion pour eux tous.

Hier, le caucus libéral a organisé une table ronde là-dessus et nous sommes très heureux de dire qu'ils ont donné une chance aux Serbes à la dernière minute. Je n'ai même pas encore eu le temps de préparer les documents, car je n'ai été averti qu'hier après-midi.

Mais faire intervenir des opinions anti-serbes—j'hésite à utiliser l'expression «anti-serbe»—qui déforment la réalité, parce qu'ils croient en quelque chose qui est, d'après nous, de la pure fiction, est extrêmement dangereux, et il faudra que le gouvernement canadien décide pour lui-même quelle est la réalité et qu'il ait une approche équilibrée. La seule façon pour lui d'avoir une approche équilibrée est d'entendre les deux côtés. Je vous suis extrêmement reconnaissant de m'avoir donné l'occasion de parler pour le côté serbe. Il y a là une histoire qui n'a pas fait l'objet de beaucoup de publicité dans le monde occidental, mais qui mérite néanmoins d'être racontée. J'espère que les questions que vous me poserez me permettront de vous aider à comprendre cette histoire.

Le président: Merci, monsieur Pasik.

J'aimerais vous poser une question, monsieur Pasik. Je pense que votre réponse à cette question rendrait service à tout le comité.

Ce que vous dites, monsieur Pasik, c'est que quelqu'un va profiter de tout cela pour monter un dossier anti-serbe. D'autres font valoir que pour régler cette question, il est temps d'envoyer en Bosnie-Herzégovine des militaires qui

[Text]

adequate resources into Bosnia-Herzegovina to make the situation stable and hopefully to put back into the control of the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with whatever resources are necessary, the capacity to make and maintain the peace. How could it possibly be anti-Serb to do that?

Mr. Pasik: In a civil war of this type, which is something like Lebanon, bringing in military force to help a government that has lost control of the situation, that is, so desperate—well, first of all we will go back to basics. The recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, without the preliminary solving of the national problem, was the biggest mistake Europe made since the war, because that brought practically the whole thing to a boiling point. This was done, as we all know, by the pressure of Germany and the concessions made to Germany.

The ambassador is quite right when he says that there is an attempt by the United Nations and the EC to come to a formula, but the formula they are discussing has to be done round-table, and they have to work out their political situation in that country.

The Serbian side, as far as you know and as far as I know, has many times been prepared to negotiate. The question is why, every time we go to negotiate, something happens. They are putting the blame on the Serbs, the Serbs are putting the blame on the Muslims, and this can go on and on. Foreign intervention will only make it worse. Even General MacKenzie said he was handicapped when he was trying to get them to negotiate, when suddenly news came of an intervention from abroad, which gave the Bosnian Muslim side hope to continue the war.

• 1215

I think it's the reverse. I think Mr. Izetbegovic and the Muslim side are making difficulties. It's not the Serbian side. If you look at the whole problem, the problem again turns up to this map. The Croat side has—I don't use the term ethnic cleansing because it's not really that. Armies come in, they've been fighting each other, there have been some murders and killings, which is awful, and populations are afraid and escape.

This is a change of boundaries. What they're doing is trying in the most primitive and most undemocratic and most tragic way, by using hostages and civilian populations—and this applies to everyone—to change the boundaries for a federal state which was never meant to be created in this area. The Croats now even have their own money; they have everything in the Herzegovina Krajina.

They're immediately next to the Croat Republic so it's easy for them to join that into the republic. The Serbs are doing the same in their area, and because the accident of history was that the Muslims and Turks and Islamized Bosnians lived in the towns, they haven't an ethnic clear area. The tragedy is that nationalism at this extreme creates this hypnosis that you can create ethnic clear states.

[Translation]

disposent de suffisamment de ressources pour stabiliser les choses et pour rendre le contrôle de la situation au gouvernement de la Bosnie et de l'Herzégovine, avec les ressources nécessaires et la capacité de faire et de maintenir la paix. Comment cela pourrait-il être interprété comme étant anti-serbe?

M. Pasik: Dans une guerre civile de ce genre, qui est semblable à ce qui se passe au Liban, faire intervenir des forces militaires pour aider un gouvernement qui a perdu le contrôle de la situation est une initiative si désespérée... revenons, tout d'abord, aux éléments de base. La reconnaissance de la Bosnie et de l'Herzégovine, sans la résolution préalable du problème national, a été la plus grave erreur commise par l'Europe depuis la guerre, car cela a amené les choses au point critique. Comme nous le savons tous, cela a été amené par les pressions exercées par l'Allemagne et les concessions faites à celle-ci.

L'ambassadeur a tout à fait raison de dire que les Nations Unies et la Communauté européenne essaient d'en arriver à une formule, mais la formule dont elles discutent doit faire l'objet d'une table ronde, et elles doivent façonner une solution politique dans le pays.

Le côté serbe, comme vous le savez, comme je le sais moi-même, a maintes fois été prêt à négocier. La question est de savoir pourquoi, chaque fois que nous sommes prêts à négocier, il arrive quelque chose. Ils rejettent la responsabilité sur les Serbes, qui rejettent alors toute la responsabilité sur les musulmans, etc., etc. Une intervention étrangère ne fera qu'aggraver les choses. Même le général MacKenzie a dit avoir été handicapé lorsqu'il essayait d'obtenir d'eux qu'ils négocient lorsque tout d'un coup arriva la nouvelle d'une intervention étrangère, ce qui avait ravivé les espoirs du camp musulman bosniaque, les poussant à poursuivre la guerre.

Je pense que c'est l'inverse. Je pense que ce sont M. Isabegovic et le clan musulman qui créent des problèmes. Ce ne sont pas les Serbes. Et si vous examinez le problème dans son ensemble, vous le voyez bien, sur cette carte. Le clan croate a... Je ne voudrais pas parler d'épuration ethnique, car ce n'est pas vraiment cela. Des armées arrivent, elles se sont battues entre elles, il y a eu des meurtres et des tueries, ce qui est horrible, et les gens ont peur et s'enfuient.

Il y a un changement de frontières. Ce qu'ils font, c'est essayer, de la façon la plus primitive, la plus anti-démocratique, la plus tragique, en utilisant des otages et des civils—et cela s'applique à tout le monde—de modifier les frontières d'un État fédéral dont la création n'avait jamais été prévue dans cette région. À l'heure actuelle, les Croates ont leur propre monnaie; ils ont tout à Krajina en Herzégovine.

Ils se trouvent juste à côté de la République croate, alors il est facile pour eux de se joindre à cette république. Les Serbes font la même chose dans leur région, et parce que l'histoire a fait que des musulmans, des turcs et des bosniens-islamiques vivaient dans ces villes, il n'y a jamais eu de zones ethniquement pures. La tragédie est que le nationalisme poussé à l'extrême que l'on sait crée cette hypnose qui vous convainc qu'il est possible de créer des États ethniquement «purifiés».

[Texte]

That's what the Croats did in the horrible genocide of the Second World War. They don't like to talk about that history. It's a tragic history, and let the historians talk about it. We're thinking about the young people here and the ambassador talks about the concessions and the Serbs physically owning about 50% of the land. In fact, the families and family-owned properties go even more than that, now occupying 70%. Do you understand?

It's a question of negotiation and not a question of bringing in new arms. Canada can play an enormous role in negotiating.

Mr. Flis (Parkdale—High Park): Mr. Chairman, yesterday we had a debate in the House of Commons about trying to solve the Somalian crisis, in which you have three warlords promoting tribal warfare and preventing food and other humanitarian aid to get to the starving. I know there's no comparison between the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia but we are looking at the role of the United Nations for the 1990s and beyond.

I have to disagree with the statement given to us this morning by the Canadian Croatian Information Congress, which says:

Canada, along with the rest of the international community has done nothing to stop or suppress the genocide of the non-Serb civilians in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Serbian-occupied Croatian territory.

I think Canada has tried everything under the sun through various international organizations. The United Nations has tried, the EC has tried, the Western European Union has tried, NATO has tried.

Trying to put our personal differences aside now, I'd like to hear from the ambassador and Mr. Pasik. We're developing a role for the UN, a peacemaking role, a peacekeeping role, without arms. We heard yesterday that for Somalia the model will be that the U.S. will go in with force and the peacekeepers will come up behind.

We've heard from our witnesses yesterday and this morning that we should give Serbia 72 hours' notice, and if it does not pull out its heavy artillery, we should use air strikes and move it out. Is this really going to be the new role for the UN if one side doesn't agree to a UN resolution? We have the same thing in Cyprus, where Greek Cypriots are agreeing to a UN resolution but Turkish Cypriots are not. Will this be the future role of the UN, to bring in might, to bring in force? Do you honestly see that as the solution for the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

• 1220

Mr. Sacirbey: I think one needs to make a distinction between a relatively stable situation and a very volatile situation. The situation in Somalia is very volatile. People are dying by the hundreds, maybe thousands, every day from a

[Traduction]

C'est ce qu'ont fait les Croates dans l'horrible génocide de la seconde Guerre mondiale. Ils n'aiment pas en parler, de cette histoire. C'est une histoire tragique, et que les historiens en parlent. On pense aux jeunes gens là-bas, et l'ambassadeur parle des concessions et des Serbes qui sont propriétaires de 50 p. 100 des terres. En fait, les familles et les propriétés familiales accaparent aujourd'hui plus de 70 p. 100 du territoire. Comprenez-vous?

C'est une question de négociations. Elle ne se résume pas à faire venir de nouvelles armes. Le Canada peut jouer un rôle énorme dans la négociation.

M. Flis (Parkdale—High Park): Monsieur le président, hier nous avons eu un débat à la Chambre au sujet d'initiatives visant à résoudre la crise en Somalie, où il y a trois rois de la guerre qui font la promotion de guerres tribales et qui empêchent la distribution d'aliments et l'offre d'aide humanitaire à ceux qui meurent de faim. Je sais qu'il n'y a aucune comparaison entre la situation en Bosnie-Herzégovine et celle en Somalie, mais on parle du rôle des Nations Unies pour les années quatre-vingt-dix et au-delà.

Je dois me prononcer contre la déclaration faite ce matin par le *Canadien Croatian Information Congress*, où il est dit:

Le Canada, et le reste de la communauté internationale, n'a rien fait pour arrêter ou contenir le génocide des civils non-serbes en Bosnie-Herzégovine ou sur le territoire serbe occupé par les troupes canadiennes.

Je pense que le Canada a fait tout son possible, par l'intermédiaire de diverses organisations internationales. Les Nations Unies ont essayé, la Communauté européenne a essayé, l'Union de l'Europe occidentale a essayé, l'OTAN a essayé.

Laissons maintenant de côté nos différences personnelles, J'aimerais entendre l'ambassadeur et M. Pasik. Nous sommes en train de définir pour les Nations Unies un rôle de pacificateur, sans armes. Nous avons entendu hier que pour la Somalie, le modèle choisi prévoit que les Américains y aillent en usant de force et que des pacificateurs les suivent.

Les témoins que nous avons entendus hier et ce matin nous ont dit que nous devrions donner à la Serbie un préavis de 72 heures, et que si celle-ci ne retire pas toute son artillerie lourde, nous devrions mener des raids aériens et déblayer le terrain. Est-ce que ce sera là le nouveau rôle pour les Nations Unies si un camp n'accepte pas une résolution des Nations Unies? Nous avons la même chose à Chypre, où les Chypriotes grecs acceptent une résolution des Nations Unies, mais où les Chypriotes turcs la refusent. Le nouveau rôle des Nations Unies sera-t-il de faire intervenir sa force, de frapper? Pensez-vous franchement que ce soit là une solution au conflit qui déchire la Bosnie-Herzégovine?

M. Sacirbey: Je pense qu'il importe de faire une distinction entre une situation relativement stable et une situation très explosive. La situation en Somalie est très explosive. Chaque jour, les gens meurent par centaines, peut-

[Text]

lack of food, and that's not because the food is not available, it's because it cannot be delivered due to bandit forces. That is a situation where discussions and negotiations went on for months, and during those negotiations and discussions thousands died.

I think the situation in Bosnia is the same, if not worse. It is a volatile situation. It's a situation where any delay causes death and, in this instance, where delay is viewed as appeasement and is therefore an invitation for further aggression.

It's not appropriate, I think, to compare those two particular situations to what's going on in Cyprus, in the Middle East or in Cambodia. In order for a peacekeeping effort to be successful, I think we need to have some peace to keep, and in order to have a peace to keep, you need to have a peacemaking effort. Peacemaking can be achieved only through two means or through a combination of the two—one is negotiations, the other one is implementation of some sort of solution.

We have both attempts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but unfortunately the implementation is lacking. We have committed troops, but then we said that these troops will serve only a very limited purpose. Worst of all, we have said that these troops are a deterrent to more resolute action to bring about peace, so I would propose that in most instances—and I go through these discussions everyday at the UN—solutions will be found peacefully.

There are many crises that we don't even hear about in the papers, and they're negotiated away. However, there are some crises where the conflict is not one where two parties have a different view of a situation, a legitimate difference of opinion. This is a case where one party has a philosophy of expansionism, of fascism, and the other party wants coexistence. One party has all the arms and has the will and the might to use them, the other party has none.

That type of imbalance can only be dealt with through the force of international law. It is no different than the imbalance of a peaceful citizen sitting in his home and having his house broken into by masked gunmen with guns, knives and other weapons drawn.

Mr. Pasik: I have not been able to follow the diplomatic back-room negotiations in Washington and Europe, but I know that Mr. Hannay, the experienced British representative who has done a lot of work on Yugoslavia—in fact, he's done most of it—realizes that Yugoslavia is a new experiment for the United Nations. It is the first time the UN has faced this since the Cold War ended. He said this in a lecture the United Nations, which I was visiting with a group from Oxford. He said this experiment is in the form of a two-track approach—this is what the ambassador is saying too—the peacekeeping forces and the negotiations.

[Translation]

être même par milliers, faute de nourriture, et ce n'est pas parce que la nourriture n'est pas disponible. C'est parce qu'elle ne peut pas être livrée, à cause de bandits. C'est une situation où les discussions et les négociations ont duré pendant des mois, et pendant ces négociations et ces discussions, des milliers de personnes sont mortes.

Je pense que la situation en Bosnie est la même, sinon pire. C'est une situation explosive. C'est une situation où tout retard amène des morts et, dans ce cas-ci, où tout retard est perçu comme un affaiblissement et par conséquent une invitation pour de nouvelles agressions.

Je ne pense pas que l'on puisse comparer ces deux situations à ce qui se passe à Chypre, au Moyen-Orient ou au Cambodge. Pour qu'une initiative de paix réussisse, je pense qu'il faut qu'il y ait déjà une paix à maintenir, et pour qu'il y ait une paix à maintenir, il faut qu'il y ait une initiative de pacification. La pacification ne peut être réalisée que de deux façons, ou par une combinaison des deux: il y a la négociation et il y a la mise en oeuvre d'une solution.

Les deux choses ont été tentées en Bosnie-Herzégovine, mais malheureusement, la mise en oeuvre fait défaut. Nous avons engagé des troupes, puis nous avons dit que ces troupes ne joueront qu'un rôle très limité. Ce qui est pire, c'est que nous avons dit que ces troupes ont un effet dissuasif quant à la prise de mesures plus énergiques pour ramener la paix. Je dirais donc que dans la plupart des cas—et je participe à des discussions de ce genre tous les jours aux Nations Unies—les solutions viendront pacifiquement.

Il survient de nombreuses crises dont on n'entend jamais parler dans les journaux, qui sont réglées par voie de négociation. Il est cependant des crises où le conflit n'est pas tel que deux parties ont une vision différente d'une situation, où il y a divergence d'opinions légitime. C'est un cas où un camp a une philosophie axée sur l'expansionnisme ou le fascisme, et l'autre désire la coexistence. Un camp a toutes les armes, ainsi que la volonté et le pouvoir de s'en servir, et l'autre n'a pas d'armes du tout.

Ce genre de déséquilibre ne peut être résolu que par la force du droit international. La situation n'est pas différente de celle, tout à fait déséquilibrée, d'un citoyen tout à fait pacifique, qui est installé chez lui, et qui se fait cambrioler par des personnes masquées et armées de fusils, de couteaux ou d'autres armes.

M. Pasik: Je n'ai pas pu suivre les négociations diplomatiques qui ont été menées en coulisses à Washington et en Europe, mais je sais que M. Hannay, le représentant britannique chevronné qui a fait beaucoup de travail en ce qui concerne la Yougoslavie—en fait, c'est lui qui a fait le plus gros du travail—estime que la Yougoslavie est une nouvelle expérience pour les Nations Unies. C'est la première fois que les Nations Unies se trouvent confrontées à une telle situation depuis la fin de la guerre froide. C'est ce qu'il a dit lors d'un discours qu'il a prononcé aux Nations Unies, où j'étais en visite avec un groupe d'Oxford. Il a dit que cette expérience a pris la forme d'une approche sur deux fronts—c'est ce que dit l'ambassadeur également—avec les forces de maintien de la paix d'un côté et les négociations de l'autre.

[Texte]

[Traduction]

• 1225

Because of Germany's bumbling terrible pressure of recognizing Bosnia before they even... Not only did they not even work out their own ethnic things, but you know how they proclaimed their independence with a majority of Croatian and Muslim votes overcoming the Serbian votes. In fact, Serbia said they always, by a 99% referendum, wanted to stay in Yugoslavia. Now, of course, that means stay within the state, but if you take that protection away from them, then what they are doing now, all of them—except the Muslims are in a terrible position because they can't really do that—is creating a federal state by force.

The Badinter Commission clearly said in Brussels that you can't change internal borders by force—and this is what they are trying to say—you have to stay within the borders of Tito's administrative internal borders, which have absolutely no legality whatsoever. They were created even without any parliament, without legislation. It was an internal Communist Party decision.

Mr. Flis: Where did the UN go wrong, if it did? Surely to goodness the size and the strength and the power of the international community should be able to resolve this conflict. Where did they go wrong?

Mr. Pasik: They have made the mistake... and I will explain it to you, because Mr. Hannay said at that time, which was October, that there were mistakes made by both sides. He admitted, of course, this recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina was presumably done much too early and didn't give them a chance to solve their internal problems. But he thought that in the end things would work out unless, of course, nobody could control these three parties any more, which I think is the worst situation.

When I asked him what about Yugoslavia, the remainder, the rump of Yugoslavia, he said it was just a legal problem, that it was quite easy for them to work out amongst the lawyers, that they could get them as members of the United Nations. The way he was thinking at that time was that the Bosnians would somehow work out a deal amongst the Serb-Croatian-Muslims that the independent states of Bosnia and Croatia and Slovenia and Yugoslavia would be recognized in the United Nations and that they would stay for the time being, or even for a long time, within their frontiers and work out their differences.

Where they went wrong was that now you have foreign troops from the Muslim countries coming in. I have horrible pictures of Muhajeens cutting off Serbian heads and kicking them, kids, around in the yards. We have terrible stories on each side. You have a lot of military might coming into Herzegovina by the Croats. It is not true that we are talking about Uzis and tanks. What the Muslims feel is that if the Serbs try and consolidate their territory, then their idea of a civic state in which there would be no ethnic divisions or states will collapse.

À cause des pressions terribles de l'Allemagne pour reconnaître la Bosnie avant même que... Non seulement ils n'ont pas réglé leurs problèmes ethniques, mais vous savez qu'ils ont proclamé leur indépendance avec une majorité de voix croates et musulmanes, écrasant les voix serbes. En fait, la Serbie a dit qu'elle a toujours voulu rester en Yougoslavie, invoquant un référendum où 99 p. 100 des voix se seraient prononcées en faveur de cela. Maintenant, bien sûr, cela veut dire rester au sein de l'État, mais si vous leur enlevez cette protection, alors ce qu'ils font maintenant, tous—à l'exception des musulmans qui sont dans une position terrible parce qu'ils ne peuvent pas vraiment faire cela—c'est créer par la force un État fédéral.

La Commission Badinter a clairement dit à Bruxelles que l'on ne peut pas modifier des frontières internes par la force—et c'est ce qu'ils essayent de dire—il faut rester à l'intérieur des limites administratives de Tito, qui ne sont pas du tout légales. Elles ont été créées sans Parlement, sans loi. C'était une décision interne du Parti communiste.

M. Flis: Où les Nations Unies se sont-elles fourvoyées, si c'est cela qui s'est passé? Il me semble que l'importance, la force et la puissance de la communauté internationale devraient suffire pour résoudre ce conflit. Où les Nations Unies se sont-elles trompées?

M. Pasik: Elles ont commis l'erreur... et je vais vous l'expliquer, car M. Hannay a dit à l'époque, c'est-à-dire en octobre, que des erreurs avaient été commises des deux côtés. Il a bien sûr admis que cette reconnaissance de la Bosnie et de l'Herzégovine était sans doute venue trop tôt et que cela ne leur avait pas donné l'occasion de résoudre leurs problèmes internes. Mais ils pensaient que les choses finiraient par s'arranger, à moins, bien sûr, que personne ne parvienne plus à contrôler ces trois parties, ce qui est je pense la pire situation.

Lorsque je l'ai interrogé sur la Yougoslavie, sur le reste, sur la croupe de la Yougoslavie, il a dit que c'était un problème purement juridique, qui pourrait être réglé entre juristes; qu'ils pourraient devenir membres des Nations Unies. Ce qu'il pensait à l'époque, c'est que les Bosniens parviendraient à une entente entre les Serbes, les Croates et les musulmans, de sorte que les États indépendants de la Bosnie et de la Croatie ainsi que la Slovénie et la Yougoslavie puissent être reconnus aux Nations Unies et rester pour lors, ou même pendant très longtemps, à l'intérieur de leurs frontières, et régler leurs conflits.

Le problème, est qu'il y a maintenant des troupes étrangères des pays musulmans qui arrivent. J'ai des images horribles de Moudjahiddines coupant des têtes de Serbes et tabassant des enfants. Nous avons des histoires épouvantables à raconter de part et d'autre. Les Croates amènent en Herzégovine une énorme puissance militaire. Ce n'est pas vrai qu'on parle d'Uzis et de chars. Ce que pensent les musulmans, c'est que si les Serbes essayent de consolider leur territoire, alors leur projet d'un État civil sans divisions ethniques et sans États s'effondrera.

les Serbes de Bosnie

9

[Text]

Karadzic said, we have occupied more than what our ethnic territory covers, and the negotiation behind the scenes was to make a deal that they can carve out Bosnia into perhaps three cantons. The Muslims realize that even if the Serbs give them 20% back—I mentioned that they occupy about 55% territorially—they still won't have a viable state because they are cut off from the Adriatic. They are put in a very awkward position.

The argument I am making and pleading is that these political solutions can be negotiated, and the parties there are prepared to negotiate them, and it's not true that you create monsters of communism and facism and Stalinism of the Serbs. They have to be given a chance to negotiate, and Canada is the first country that is able to help. In fact, Canada played a big role in the peacekeeping there, but didn't play a big role diplomatically.

Mr. Bissette sent lots of reports here to Canada, yet Canada—

The Chairman: Mr. Pasik, I am going to interrupt. I apologize. This answer is now taking too long.

Mr. Pasik: So that's the answer. Basically we have to find a political solution, not go through a military one.

• 1230

Mme Bertrand (Brome—Missisquoi): Merci, monsieur le président. Madame Gast, inutile de vous dire la sympathie que le peuple canadien éprouve pour ce qui se passe dans votre pays. Nous voyons tous les jours, et tous les soirs, des images qui nous chagrinent. Ensemble, nous essayons de trouver des solutions, sinon politiques, du moins humanitaires.

J'aimerais parler avec vous de solutions ou d'aide à court terme, parce qu'il y en a d'autres qui sont à moyen terme et à plus long terme. Quand vous parlez de négociations politiques, etc., c'est à moyen et à long terme, c'est pour des solutions plus lointaines. Mais à court terme, pour vos enfants, pour votre population vous avez dit quelque chose, si je ne me trompe, à savoir que vous ne souhaitez pas d'interventions militaires, mais que vous souhaiteriez une résolution par laquelle les Serbes n'auraient plus la possibilité de se servir de leurs tanks afin d'équilibrer les forces. M. Weyman, je pense, a parlé de réfugiés, ou quelqu'un a dit « nous ne voulons pas que notre population quitte le pays, on veut que les gens demeurent chez eux ».

Est-ce qu'il n'y a pas là une espèce de paradoxe? D'accord, il y a beaucoup de pays qui ont fermé leurs frontières aux réfugiés, mais est-ce que chez vous, encore, il est possible de sauver des vies avec ces solutions à court terme?

N'importe qui peut répondre, monsieur le président.

Mr. Weyman: Please forgive me for not being able to respond in French. I was saying, regarding the refugee situation, that it is in the best interests of Serbia to support the world community in pulling off and taking care of refugees and in moving them to other countries. To create permanent refugees around the world saves them from having to commit ethnic cleansing and enables us, by proxy, to do their job. The policy of ethnic cleansing was stated by the Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic as a national policy towards the Bosnia-Herzegovinas.

[Translation]

Karadzic a dit: nous avons occupé plus que ce que recouvre notre territoire ethnique, et les négociations dans les coulisses avaient pour objet de déboucher sur une entente visant la séparation de la Bosnie en trois cantons. Les musulmans se sont rendu compte que même si les Serbes leur rendent 20 p. 100—j'ai mentionné qu'ils occupent environ 55 p. 100 du territoire—ils n'auraient toujours pas d'État viable, car ils seraient coupés de l'Adriatique. Ils se trouvent dans une situation très inconfortable.

Ce que je dis, c'est que ces solutions politiques peuvent être négociées, et les parties en présence là-bas sont prêtes à les négocier. Il n'est pas vrai que les Serbes sont des monstres du communisme, du fascisme et du stalinisme. Il faut leur donner l'occasion de négocier, et le Canada est le premier pays à pouvoir aider. En fait, le Canada a joué là-bas un important rôle dans le maintien de la paix, mais il n'y a pas joué un grand rôle sur le plan diplomatique.

M. Bissette a envoyé beaucoup de rapports au Canada, mais le Canada...

Le président: Monsieur Pasik, je vais vous interrompre. Je m'en excuse, mais la réponse commence à être longue.

M. Pasik: Alors c'est là la réponse. Il nous faut trouver une solution politique, et non pas militaire. C'est là l'essentiel.

Mrs. Bertrand (Brome—Missisquoi): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mrs. Gast, it goes without saying that Canadians are deeply affected by your country's plight. Every day and every night, we see images which sadden us. Together, we are striving to find solutions—if not political—then at least humanitarian.

I would like to talk about short-term solutions or short-term aid, as opposed to medium or long-term solutions. When you mention political negotiations, you were referring to medium or long-term solutions. But in the short term, unless I'm mistaken, you said that in the interest of the children, of the population, you did not want military intervention, but rather that Serbian forces not be allowed to use their tanks anymore. This would level the playing field. I believe Mr. Wenman spoke of refugees, or someone else said that "we don't want the population to leave the country, we want people to stay home."

Isn't this contradictory? We know that many countries have closed their borders to refugees, but is it still possible to save people in your country with short-term solutions?

Any witness may answer, Mr. Chairman.

M. Weyman: Je m'excuse de ne pouvoir vous répondre en français. Je disais, en parlant des réfugiés, qu'il était dans l'intérêt de la Serbie d'appuyer la communauté internationale en s'occupant des réfugiés et en les renvoyant à l'étranger. Créer des réfugiés permanents dans le monde leur évite de procéder à l'épuration ethnique et nous permet, par procuration, de faire leur travail. Le leader serbe, Slobodan Milosevic, a déclaré que la politique d'épuration ethnique faisait partie de la politique nationale de la Bosnie-Herzégovine.

[exte]

Nations would be prepared to act in that way. If it's not prepared to use air strikes to cut supply lines from Serbia, or to knock out artillery batteries and aircraft that are slaughtering civilians, then at the very least, they could establish safe havens within Bosnia.

Those are the questions, Mr. Chairman, I would put to the witnesses.

Mr. Sacirbey: On the arms embargo, I think there are two very significant implications. Number one, we're facing an army, as has been pointed out, one of the largest armies in the world, with tremendous weapons. On the other hand, we have a government and a people who were never prepared for this war; in fact, they thought that this could all happen somehow peacefully. Now we find ourselves at a terrible disadvantage, and obviously the other side has no interest in negotiating, because there is nothing to confront them.

Number two, maybe a more dangerous long-term perspective here is fragmentation. If in fact a central government cannot fulfil its primary objective of defending its people against aggression, then the loyalty of the citizens of that government will go to those people who can, and this means local bands, local warlords. We will have a much tougher time bringing that country to peace, because local interests, parochial interests, will rule rather than the interest of reason and a more centralized perspective.

If I may add something regarding the safe havens, we believe that there is a very dangerous aspect to the safe havens; that is, you are potentially providing ghettos for non-Serb populations, particularly the Muslim population. You are providing the basis for future ethnic divisions. However, things are pretty tough. Winter is going to kill hundreds of thousands. If this is the way to save people, then we are fully for it. We are now working on plans that would have both the short-term and the long-term desired impact.

Mr. Pasik: There is a route going from Belgrade to Sarajevo that is quite, as far as I know, possible. There were hold-ups, as you know. There was even a tragedy of Serbian women who had had their husbands slaughtered and killed in Muslim areas. They felt that they shouldn't give food to the Muslims at Srebrenica. These are all local fights. The basic thing is political. If the conditions of political agreements are such that they can bring in these things free, we don't need military enforcements. I feel that the crux of the issue has always been this: how are they going to create their federal boundaries within this thing? The way they're doing it is primitive, it's awful, but they're all doing it. This is my point. Unless they realize that's the wrong way to do it—and they will have to come to negotiations—there won't be a solution. But don't make it worse.

The Chairman: Mrs. Gast, and then Mr. Sacirbey. I intended it to be the last comments from each of you.

[Traduction]

communautés? Si les Nations Unies ne veulent pas faire des attaques aériennes pour couper les lignes d'approvisionnement qui ont leur origine en Serbie, ou si les Nations Unies ne veulent pas détruire des batteries d'artillerie et des avions qui servent à décimer la population civile, peuvent-elles au moins établir des lieux sûrs en Bosnie?

Voilà les questions que je pose aux témoins, monsieur le président.

M. Sacirbey: Je crois que l'embargo sur les armes a deux effets importants. Premièrement, comme nous l'avons mentionné, nous luttons contre une des plus grandes armées du monde et qui est d'ailleurs bien équipée. Ensuite, nous avons un gouvernement et un peuple qui n'ont pas anticipé cette guerre; en fait, ils ont cru que le pays allait se diviser dans la paix. Nous sommes maintenant dans une position très désavantageuse, et il est évident que l'autre côté n'a aucun intérêt à négocier, car rien ne lui résiste.

Deuxièmement, un danger plus grave qui nous guette est probablement la fragmentation. Si un gouvernement central ne peut pas s'acquitter de sa première responsabilité qui est de défendre sa population contre une agression, la population se tournera vers ceux qui pourront la protéger, soit des bandes locales ou des chefs de guerre locaux. Il sera d'autant plus difficile d'établir la paix car les bandes locales veilleront à leurs propres intérêts plutôt qu'à l'intérêt général.

J'aimerais ajouter un mot sur les lieux sûrs. Ceux-ci présentent un aspect très dangereux, soit qu'on court le risque de créer des ghettos pour les populations non serbes, en particulier la population musulmane. Cela revient à créer une situation propice à de futures luttes ethniques. Néanmoins, la situation est difficile. L'hiver va emporter des centaines de milliers de personnes. Si c'est la façon de sauver des gens, nous sommes pour. Nous sommes en train de travailler sur un plan qui apporterait des solutions à court et à long terme.

M. Pasik: D'après ce que je sais, il existe une route ouverte entre Belgrade et Sarajevo. Comme vous le savez, personne n'a été arrêté de force sur cette route. Puis il s'est produit un événement tragique pour les femmes serbes lorsque leurs maris ont été massacrés dans des régions musulmanes. Par la suite, elles n'ont pas voulu donner de la nourriture aux musulmans qui se trouvaient à Srebrenica. Il s'agit de combats locaux. La base est politique. Si les ententes politiques prévoient l'acheminement gratuit de vivres, il ne sera pas nécessaire d'avoir des renforcements militaires. D'après moi, le noeud du problème a toujours été le suivant: comment vont-ils dessiner les frontières fédérales avec ce conflit en arrière-plan? Leurs actions sont primitives et terribles, mais tous y souscrivent. Voilà ce à quoi je veux en venir. À moins qu'ils ne se rendent compte que leur approche est mauvaise—tôt ou tard ils vont devoir s'en remettre à la négociation—il n'y aura aucune solution. Mais il ne faut pas empirer la situation.

Le président: M^{me} Gast, suivie de M. Sacirbey. Nous terminerons sur vos propos.

(DRAFT)

**A PROPOSAL TO SETTLE CONTESTED CLAIMS
AMONG CROATIA, BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND SERBIA &
MONTENEGRO**

October 9, 1992

News item:

RTw 09/24

GENEVA, Sept. 24, Reuter - Serb and Croat religious leaders on Thursday urged an immediate end to fighting in former Yugoslavia and condemned the forced expulsion of ethnic minorities as inhuman.

"We do not only appeal for but demand....immediately and without condition a stop to the inhuman practice of ethnic cleansing, by whoever it is being incited or carried out," the leaders said.

In a statement issued after a one-day meeting near Geneva, Patriarch Pavle of the Serbian Orthodox Church and Catholic Cardinal Franjo Kuharic of Zagreb also demanded a halt to destruction of churches and mosques by different sides in the conflict.

"Equally and with one mind and voice we condemn all crimes and distance ourselves from all criminals, irrespective of which people or army they belong to or which church or religious affiliation they claim." the statement said. They called for the immediate freeing of all war prisoners and civilian hostages in "this evil war" and for all refugees and people forced from their homes to be allowed to return.

In their statement, the two church leaders did not accuse any one group of "ethnic cleansing," whereby groups of people are forced out of disputed territory. United Nations investigators have largely blamed the Serbs while saying Croats and Moslem bore some responsibility.

Reis-ul-ulema Jakub Selimoski, a leader of the Slav Moslems of Bosnia, was due to have attended the meeting but was unable to leave the republic's capital of Sarajevo which has been under siege by rebel Serbs for nearly six months. In a message to him, the Patriarch and the Cardinal said they were convinced he would agree with the views expressed in their joint statement.

Objective: Attempt to satisfy - as realistically feasible - claims to territories and sovereignty, and the desire of people to live with one's own kind in one's own state.

Due to the stated claims and counter-claims, there can be no perfect solution to the present crises, which would simultaneously satisfy maximal demands of the contestants. The solution suggested herewith would enable all contestants to claim a victory of sorts and to save faces; to lay foundation for an economic recovery and for political and economic cooperation; and to start building bridges so sorely needed for a durable good-neighbors policy of the future.

Starting Point: The United Nations plan presented in Annex III to the Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the UN Security Council, S/2380, dated 11 December 1991.

A Role for the United Nations

To achieve peace and acceptable fair settlement, it is recommended that renown men/women--presently outside and/or opposing the warring ruling bodies--be brought into negotiations, directly or indirectly. The ruling bodies proved themselves, so far, unwilling and/or unable of settling the contested claims through peaceful negotiations. Therefore, they should no longer be trusted. A gradual, but finite, switch-over should be effected. There are many capable, qualified, and honest men and women outside the ruling apparatus of the Yugoslav republics who prefer negotiation to war and who could contribute to a fair and satisfactory settlement.

It is extremely painful to the author of this proposal to admit the existence of mutual hatred and mistrust among the warring sides, which was initiated by the primordial sin of genocide against the Serbs--and Jews and Gypsies--in the Independent State of Croatia (1941-1945), and which is pushed by the present civil war to a blinding level. The only solace to his heart is the common human experience that time finds a way to heal wounds and to renew hope.

Obsessions of the ruling warring bodies with their plans and designs, their unwillingness and/or incompetence to settle the contested claims peacefully among themselves--without foreign intervention--is most regrettable and irresponsible. So are also those moves by members of the international community which were motivated primarily by their own interest, instead of by a sincere desire to unselfishly contribute to a fair and lasting solution of the problems in Yugoslavia.

The present situation being what it is, perhaps an active role of the United Nations, especially in Bosnia, might have a salutary effect during the initial stage of the healing process--provided such role is motivated by an even-handed approach and a sincere effort to help people equally on all warring sides.

The following suggestions are offered in search for a negotiated settlement.

A. THE UNITED NATIONS PROTECTED AREAS IN CROATIA

1. Transform the "UNPA Eastern Slavonia" into Common Territory of Croatia and Serbia.
2. Transform the "UNPA Western Slavonia" into Common Territory of Croatia and Bosnia.
3. Divide the "UNPA Krajina" into two parts:
 - a. Make the counties of Gracac, Obrovac, Benkovac and Knin Common Territory of Croatia and Bosnia.
 - b. Annex to Bosnia the counties of Donji Lapac, Titova Korenica, Slunj, Vojnic, Vrginmost, Glina, Petrinja, Kostajnica and Dvor.
4. Provide dual citizenship / Croatian-Serbian and Croatian-Bosnian, respectively / to all residents of the Common Territories.

Purpose: In addition to the expression of sovereignty--so dearly loved at this time--the dual citizenship would also present legal protection so badly needed to allay fears of mistreatment. This feature would be a potent inducement to the displaced population to return to their domiciles, and a powerful assurance absolutely essential for their future there.

Return of the displaced persons to their homes is a major goal of the UN protection plan.

5. Provide guaranty and opportunity to the residents of the annexed territory, who do not want to live in Bosnia, to resettle elsewhere.
6. Demilitarize the Common Territories.
7. Administration of the Common Territories:
 - a. Structure the local administration, including police, to reflect national/ethnic composition of the local population.
 - b. Structure the territorial administration likewise and administer it according to agreement which will be worked out among the respective states and United Nations.
8. Free movement of people, goods, and services within and through the Common Territories should be guaranteed by the Constitutions of Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia, respectively, and should be additionally backed up by the United Nations.
9. Individual, human and national rights of the Serbian population remaining in Croatia should be explicitly protected by the Constitution of Croatia, and safeguarded by the United Nations. Such protection is needed to assure the Serbs against dreadful experiences of the past which, by itself, would immensely contribute to the stability and peaceful development of Croatia.
10. Keep the presence of the UN in the Common Territories during the recovery and reconstruction period, i.e. during the transition to the self-sustaining administration.

B. BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

1. Annex to Croatia the counties of Livno, Tomislavgrad (Duvno), Prozor, Prosusje, Grude, Listica, Citluk, Ljubuski, Caplijina, Odzak, Orasje and Bosanski Samac.
2. Annex to Serbia the counties of Bijeljina, Ugljevik, Lopare and Rudo.
3. Annex to Montenegro the counties of Kalinovik, Gacko, Nevesinje, Bileca, Ljubinje and Trebinje.
4. Provide guaranty and opportunity to the residents of the annexed territories, who do not want to live in Croatia, Serbia or Montenegro, respectively, to resettle elsewhere.
5. Keep the remaining counties, with those annexed from Croatia, in the state of Bosnia. Provide constitutional guaranties for an autonomous or special status for those enclaves in Bosnia that may wish to have it. Safeguard such constitutional provisions with additional guaranties by the United Nations.
6. This state of Bosnia should enter into a confederal relation with the present Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

This arrangement would satisfy--as much as realistically feasible at this time--the desire of the Serbs and Muslims to live with their own kind in one state.

7. Internal organization of Bosnia would be left to the will and agreement of the Bosnian Muslims and Serbs.
8. Cultural, political, and economic bonds between Bosnia and other member states of the Confederation should be reflected in the Constitutions of the Confederation and of each constituent member state.
9. As a significant portion of the Croats of the present Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Table B.1.) would be annexed to Croatia, the remaining Croatian population should be protected by the provision of Item B.5., above.

C. NEW CONFEDERATION

1. The Republic of Macedonia should join Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia in forming a new Confederation.
2. The Constitution of the new Confederation should not preclude Croatia and Slovenia to join the Confederation or to enter with it into some other formal administrative-organizational relationship(s).
3. Internal borders of the members of Confederation--accepted at the peace conference--may be adjusted by mutual consent of the members upon completion of the recovery and reconstruction phase.
4. This new Confederation should hold free democratic elections for the Constitutional Assembly. The elected representatives would then establish the Constitution of the Confederation which would define its internal organization, prerogatives of the Confederation and its member states, and all other aspects of the functioning of the common state. (Among others: the name of the Confederation, the site and status of its capital city, conduct of external affairs, monetary and fiscal policies, organization of the military, etc.)
5. Each member state should be free to organize itself according to its own will but within the framework of the Confederal Constitution.

6. Special attention should be given to the mutual economic cooperation and assistance in order to facilitate economic recovery, particularly in the areas ravaged by the war.
7. Protection of minorities, their individual, human and national rights, ought to be guaranteed by the Confederal Constitution and, likewise, by the Constitutions of each member state.

D. POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION

1. The post-war reconstruction and economic recovery should be financed by:
 - a. the Confederation itself, to the extent possible;
 - b. grants and aid by the European Community; and
 - c. grants and aid by the United States of America, as well as by other members of the United Nations who, until now, took part in the decisions affecting territories of former Yugoslavia.
2. The funds needed for the reconstruction and recovery would be those which would, otherwise, be spent of the displaced people, care for them, maintenance of their centers or camps, etc.

Supporting the displaced over a prolonged period of time might become even more costly than providing them means to rebuild their homes, farms, shops, schools, hospitals, etc. Their return to their home would free the host countries of potentially undesirable, embittered and possibly disruptive political, social and psychological consequences in the host countries themselves. A lesson ought to be learned from the fate of the Palestinians and the social and political upheaval in Germany due to the presence of foreigners.

3. A joint Commission--composed from the representatives of the Confederation, member states, and all fund-contributing nations--should be formed to:
 - work out an overall plan of recovery and reconstruction,
 - set priorities,
 - insure proper use of funds in strict adherence with the plan.
4. Prompt and generous support by the international community would trigger overall economic recovery, particularly in Bosnia. That, in turn, would tend to sway people's attention from the war enmities to more positive aspects of future life and coexistence.
5. After so much bloodshed, destruction and evil-doings, coexistence of the Serbs, Muslim Slavs and Croats in one state seems impossible to many people. Yet, if this is accepted as a valid premise, then the logic leads us through the "need" for "ethnic cleansing", to a future life in "ethnically pure" state. Why, then, the domestic (Yugoslav) and international outcry against the "ethnic cleansing"? Just because of unacceptable methods it has been carried out?

On the other hand, if the "ethnic cleansing" is to be abhorred, condemned and rejected--as it should be, and as it was done by the religious leaders--then the coexistence is a logical consequence and conclusion.

The Croats and the Muslim Slavs can not have it both ways: condemn the "ethnic cleansing" before the international community, and at the same time, create,

at home, an atmosphere of persuasion that the coexistence with the Serbs is impossible. Ditto for the Serbs.

Return of the displaced to their homes is the centerpiece of the UN plan. The displaced were not only the Muslims and Croats but the Serbs also. Making possible their return means accepting the premise of their coexistence. Hardships will be unavoidable, of course, but the alternatives might be much worse. Ethnic, religious and/or civil war is not a human tragedy experienced uniquely by the South Slavs. Many European nations, for example, have passed through and survived such bitterness and successfully left it behind. Why could the South Slavs not do the same?

The sooner the first step is taken, the better.

6. In order to help healing wounds, all paramilitary forces should be disarmed and disbanded; all crimes condemned and criminals brought to justice; and only a nominal military force be maintained under control of the Muslim-Serbian government of Bosnia.

E. RATIONALE

1. No government of Croatia could consent to the partition of its area into two or more territorially separated parts, unless it is militarily defeated and forced to accept such a condition. Under the existing circumstances, such military defeat of Croatia is unlikely.

This is the main reason for the suggestion in Item A.3.a. (please see text) to make the southern Krajina counties the Common Territory of Croatia and Bosnia, rather than to annex them to Bosnia together with the Krajina's northern counties. Such partition of Croatia would become a permanent casus belli, a veritable time-bomb awaiting an opportunity to explode, plunging the area into another bloody war.

The author of this proposal wishes to state emphatically that the above suggestion is made without malice and prejudice, in the belief that such arrangement would be preferential to another round of fighting, killings and destruction. After all, what is the sense in "establishing our borders, once and for all", even at the price of "fighting to the last man"? If the "last man" survived, he could only sorrowfully watch other people(s) cross those borders and ask himself: Why did all the others die? The suggestion of Item A.3.a. ought to be viewed within the context and spirit of the entire proposal, and not as an isolated feature.

2. The suggestion in text Item A.3.a. would secure the road and rail links between Dalmatia, Lika and the northern parts of Croatia. Obvious economic advantages due to this link (commerce, travel, tourism, ...) would benefit the local Serb population as well as the Croatian.
3. Northern Krajina counties (text Item A.3.b.), the location of which represents no threat of territorial partitioning of Croatia, are suggested for the annexation to Bosnia for two major reasons:
 - a. to satisfy the desire of a sizable section of the Serbian population from Croatia to live with their own kind, which is prevalent in Western Bosnia;

- b. to spare Croatia from potential instability in the future.
- 4. Same reasoning applies for the annexation of Western Herzegovina counties to Croatia (Item B.1.) and those of the Serbian-majority counties of Eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina to Serbia and Montenegro (Item B.2. and B.3., respectively).
- 5. Although Neum's county population (only 4,030 in the 1981 census) is largely Croatian, it is suggested that the county be retained in Bosnia in order to provide Bosnia with an exit to the Adriatic Sea. Neum's more populous neighboring counties (Stolac, Ljubinje and Trebinje) are predominately inhabited by the Serbs and Muslims.
- 6. Kiseljak and Kresevo counties (total area of 314 km², total population / 1981 census / of 27,805) have an absolute Croatian majority. However, the counties are separated from the other "Croatian" counties and, therefore, not suggested for the annexation to Croatia.

To "compensate" Croatia for the "loss", it is suggested that the county of Bosanski Samac--situated between the "Croatian counties" Odzak and Orasje in Northern Bosnia--be annexed to Croatia. (Area: 219 km²: population / 1981 census / 32,320--Croats 44.3%, Muslim Slavs 5.3%, Serbs 41.2%).

- 7. Why the annexation of the Northern Krajina's counties to Bosnia and the "sharing" of the Common Territories between Croatia and Bosnia, and not Croatia and Serbia? Because of the territorial adjacency with Bosnia. However, as Bosnia is envisaged to be in a confederal union with Serbia and Montenegro, the said annexed and Common Territories would be indirectly bound with Serbia and Montenegro as well.

For this bond to be beneficial and durable, Bosnia's, Serbia's and Montenegro's entry into the Confederation should be bona fide, without any mental reservations; a permanent arrangement without hidden intentions of separation or majorization at a future date. Anything that would rekindle old suspicious and animosities which, in turn, would work against the stability of any member state, should be avoided. Safeguards against separation and/or majorization should be provided for in the Constitutions.

- 8. Impacts due to the suggested territorial changes--
 - a. From its present area of 57,090 km², Croatia would cede to Bosnia (see Table A.3.a.) 5,045 km², would acquire from Bosnia 4,725 km² (Table B.1.)--for a net loss of 320 km²-- or approximately 0.56% of the present area.
The new area would be 56,770 km².
 - b. Bosnia-Herzegovina's present area of 51,183 km² would change as follows:

cede to Croatia	4,725 km ²
cede to Serbia	1,706 km ²
cede to Montenegro	4,555 km ²
acquire from Croatia	5,045 km ²
for a total loss of	5,941 km ² , or almost 11.6%.

 Bosnia's new area would be 45,242 km².
 - c. To the Serbia's area of 78,452 km² would be added 1,706 km²-- or about 2.18%--for a new area of 80,150 km².
 - d. Montenegro's area of 13,666 km² would be augmented the most, by 4,555 km² or approximately 33.3%. Although the gain would be substantial relative to the

present area, the new area of 18,221 km² would still make Montenegro the smallest state in the new Confederation.

- e. Two major results due to the suggested territorial changes would be:
- (1) partitioning of Herzegovina, and
 - (2) reducing the number of principal ethnic groups in Bosnia from three to two (Muslim Slavs and Serbs).

The population of Western Herzegovina feels very much "Croatian", while that of the Eastern considers itself very strongly Serbian, akin to the population of Montenegro.

After ceding the Herzegovina counties to Croatia and Montenegro, the present-day Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be, if effect, transformed into the state of Bosnia. If the population of the ceded counties should care to continue identification with Herzegovina, they could make such arrangements with Croatia and Montenegro, respectively.

The reduction from three to two political factors would make administration of Bosnia less complicated, as there would be eliminated a potential of collusion of two against the third factor.

9. Impacts due to the suggested population changes--

- a. Detailed data from the March 31, 1991 census are not available to the author of this proposal. Therefore, the data from the March 31, 1981 census are used herein to illustrate the points discussed and not as definitive data to be used in settlement of the contested claims.

Even if the 1991 census data were available, the war, displacement of the population, uncertainty of return of the displaced, the number of war victims, etc. would make such data unreliable as a major criterion of solution of the crises.

- b. On the area of 51,183 km², the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina lived (in 1981) in 100 counties--counting metropolitan Sarajevo as one. The number of counties and area, for each ethnic group, were as follows:

Without absolute majority	23 counties,	12,117 km ² ,	or 23.67387%
With the Muslim absolute majority	32	14,112	27.57165%
With the Serbian absolute majority	31	19,904	38.88791%
With the Croatian absolute majority	14	5,050	9.86655%
Total	100 countries	51,183 km²	100.00%

- c. Sarajevo had an area of 2,049 km² and 448,500 inhabitants.

- d. Distribution of major ethnic groups is shown below--

	1981 Census		1991 Census	
	Number of Inhabitants	As % of Total	Number of Inhabitants	As % of Total
Total population (B-H)	4,124,008	100.0	4,359,911	100.0
Croats	758,136	18.38347	754,265 ⁽¹⁾	17.3 ⁽¹⁾
Muslims	1,629,924	39.52281	1,905,281 ⁽¹⁾	43.7 ⁽¹⁾
Serbs	1,320,644	32.02331	1,369,012 ⁽¹⁾	31.4 ⁽¹⁾
Yugoslavs	326,280	7.91172	239,000 ⁽²⁾	5.48 ⁽²⁾

- (1) Computation based on the percentages given by Storer R. Rowley, *Chicago Tribune*, May 21, 1992.
 (2) Estimated, based on newspapers' reports.

e. Population and ethnic distribution (in terms of 1981 census) of the counties suggested for transfer among the states involved are presented in Attachment I as follows:

- Table A.3.b. Nine (9) counties in Croatia to be annexed to Bosnia
 Table B.1. Twelve (12) counties in Bosnia-Herzegovina to be annexed to Croatia
 Table B.2. Four (4) counties in Bosnia-Herzegovina to be annexed to Serbia
 Table B.3. Six (6) counties in Bosnia-Herzegovina to be annexed to Montenegro

Summary:

	Table	Population	Croats	Muslims	Serbs	Yugoslavs
(1) Loss to Bosnia	B.1.	306,267	230,779	31,054	31,240	10,293
	B.2.	164,718	2,136	50,049	98,340	9,488
	B.3.	81,289	2,727	16,572	53,659	6,052
Total Loss		552,274	235,642	97,675	183,239	25,833
(2) Gain to Bosnia	A.3.b.	160,693	49,054		92,598	14,789
Net Loss		391,581	186,588	97,675	90,641	11,044

f. Had such an exchange taken place shortly after the 1981 census date, the demographic picture of the Bosnia's major ethnic groups would have been as follows:

	1981 Census	Hypothetical Loss	Adjusted Figure	As % of Total
Total Population	4,124,008	391,581	3,732,427	100.0
Croats	758,136	186,588	571,548	15.31303
Muslims	1,629,924	97,675	1,532,249	41.05223
Serbs	1,320,644	90,641	1,230,003	32.9545
Yugoslavs	326,280	11,044	315,236	8.44458

As seen from this summary and the preceding data, such as exchange would have tended to decrease the participation of the Croats in Bosnia's population,

while increasing it in Croatia. Participation of the Muslims and Serbs would have been somewhat increased.

- g. Brutal realities of the wars, however, drastically altered the assumed hypothetical scenario. The actual impact on the ethnic distribution can not be anticipated because it can not be estimated, at this time, how many of the displaced people would actually return to their homes and how many would resettle elsewhere

While the displacement will impact the Yugoslav population and regions the most, it may also be very grave on the international community, and particularly on the European Community. But, instead of preventing the fragmentation of Yugoslavia--admittedly not an easy task, but recommended nevertheless, at the time, by far-seeing statesmen--the European Community helped the fragmentation along. The USA, and some other countries, subsequently followed suit. The consequences are apparent: now one has to cure what should and could have been prevented.

10. Before the recognition of its individual republics, former Yugoslavia had only one seat in the international forums, as its six republics were not internationally recognized independent entities. Boundaries of the republics served the purposes of internal administration and were not international borders for the purposes of the Helsinki Final Act, for example. Recognition of the internal boundaries as external borders of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, etc., for the purposes of defining the states' territories, was, therefore, an arbitrary political act. The right to self-determination which, supposedly, was the guiding principle in defining the new states' territories, was not consistently applied. Referendum on the federal--Yugoslav--level was not held, nor the referenda on the county level. Why? The referenda on the county level would have most closely expressed the will of the population as to which state it would prefer to live in. Had that been done, then internal Yugoslav negotiations--*bona fide* supported by the international community--could have resulted in peaceful settlement more acceptable to all concerned.

In this proposal, therefore, an attempt is made to express--as realistically feasible--the will of the population on the county level. Although a precise delineation among the Serbs, Muslims and Croats is impossible--due to centuries-old intermixing and intermarrying--this proposal matches states' borders with the ethnic distribution more closely than the presently recognized states' borders do. In addition, it provides better safeguards for the ethnic enclaves within the states. Therefore, adjustments to the presently recognized borders ought to be made.

11. If the UN plan of returning the displaced should succeed to a reasonable degree, Bosnia would again become a "composite state", a "smaller Yugoslavia". Is it not paradoxical and illogical to actively support a smaller "Yugoslavia", while actively resisting a larger one?

Should the aforementioned UN plan fail, "ethnically pure"--or almost "pure"--Balkan states loom as a probability. Admittedly unwillingly, in such a case the

West would have to share in the blame and responsibility for such a state of affairs. Blaming only Slobodan Milosevic will not do; blaming Serbia and/or Serbs, as a whole, will do even less.

Military intervention against "the main aggressor"--on the side of "lesser" culprits--would certainly add to the bloodshed and devastation and could even facilitate creation of "ethnically pure" state of the "smaller" malefactors.

12. The suggested provision of dual citizenship for the residents of the Common Territories should not scandalize anyone. Dual citizenship exists elsewhere. The Republic of Croatia itself recognized validity and legitimacy of dual citizenship by allowing--and, actually, inviting--participation, for instance, of the American citizens of Croatian parentage, in the August 2, 1992, Croatian election. *Chicago Tribune* reported (August 4, 1992) that tens of thousands living overseas were allowed to vote in 111 special polling places abroad.
13. The idea of Common Territory should not be rejected just because such arrangement does not presently exist. Nowhere in Europe exists a situation like the one in (former) Yugoslavia. Why not apply a unique solution to a unique situation?

Croats, Slavic Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbs speak the same language (now under two names), hail from the same region or were merged on their journey through time and space into one broad "ethnic" community, settled into the Balkans during the same period in history. According to these criteria, they are one ethnic community, one people. Usage of two names, Croats and Serbs, does not negate their commonness, just as the names of Bavarians and Prussians do not negate their German commonness.

Slavic Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina are descendants of the Serbs and Croats. Only recently--three censuses ago--the term "Muslim" was used also as a "national" identification implying a separate "nationality"--which is now used as a basis for "national selfdetermination". This apparent ethnic triad differs basically not in ethnicity but in religious affiliation. Process of national unification, basically accomplished in the Western Europe during the nineteenth century, was impeded for the South Slavs by the presence of two non-Slavic empires, the Austria-Hungarian and Ottoman. This unfinished process, coupled with religious affiliation, resulted in the present coidentification: Croat-Catholic, Serb-Eastern Orthodox, Muslim-Islamic. And this spotlights the religious component to the civil war in Yugoslavia.

The question for the peace negotiators is how to end this civil war without planting--unwillingly--seeds for another one?

All three components of this South Slav triad have lived in Bosnia for centuries; likewise, the Serbo-Croat components in the areas now under the UN protection. This gives them rights to consider these areas as "their own" territories. This bond to the land was fortified by intermarriages, natural cultural and economic integration, knowledge of their commonness and of the foreign influences which effectively retarded or impeded unification processes similar to those which occurred in Western Europe. To them, these areas are "home", "homeland", their common homeland.

The stated goal of the UNPA plan is to return all displaced persons--not the Croats only, the Serbs only, or the Muslims only--to their homes. This means: to return them to their common territories. Why not, then, give these territories administrative-regulatory status and forms which will reflect this commonness?

Should the integrating processes of the European Community continue--even on a bumpy road with significant obstacles--new administrative-regulatory status and forms will come into being for "common European home". Why not implement a similar concept for the UN Protected Areas in Croatia?

Indeed, a similar concept may be useful and applicable to other, potentially dangerous, areas of the world, beset with ethnic problems and strife. The classical "national sovereignty" is gradually but effectively losing its original meaning and purpose through the global economic reach, interdependence and integration. New realities will impose new administrative-regulatory forms.

The concept of Common Territories among Croatia-Bosnia-Serbia would not actually eliminate the sovereignty, but would cause sharing it. As Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia have expressed willingness to join the European Community, they` already have implied their willingness to share their sovereignty with the other members of the EC, as will be required. Why not, then, share it with each other?

14. Hoping to be substantially assisted primarily by the Islamic countries' military intervention, the Bosnian Muslims may not, at this time, be receptive to this proposal.

However, should such military intervention take place, probability is very high that it would lead to wide confrontations in the Balkans, transforming the present Yugoslav civil war into an international one and destabilizing the South-Eastern Europe.

Such intervention--featuring the Islamic countries in a leading role--could be interpreted by the non-Islamic, primarily Slavic, peoples of the former Soviet Union--for example--as an indication of a trend that might affect their areas. In their preventive reaction, they might actively side with the Serbs.

A military intervention by the Islamic countries--with or without active support by the West--may be interpreted by the Serbs, and by the Croats as well, as primarily politically motivated: to take advantage of a civil war in order to advance the Islamic political, cultural, economic and religious influence in Europe. Such interpretation may not be limited to the Serbs and Croats only; it might be shared by other peoples of the Balkans and Europe. The UN/EC peace negotiations should keep in mind that the Eastern Europe nations still remember the presence of the Ottoman Empire in their lands.

Prolonging and/or widening the war in Bosnia may exact huge numbers of victims, especially among the male population. Given the existing demographic numerical ratios, proportionate losses may be crippling to the Serbs and Croats, but unrecoverable to the Bosnian Muslims.

And once such "victory" is achieved, what then? Create own "ethnically pure" state(s)? Deny individual, human and national rights to the vanquished? Take away his land(s) as war reparations or punishment?

15. This proposal is in the interest of the West as well. Its acceptance would preclude a possibility of the West being sucked into a military quagmire for an unforeseeable length of time. Otherwise, active military participation would call for a military

victory, achievable only through decimation of the Serbs and a huge destruction of Serbia and Montenegro. Is this what the West really wants?

One should hope it is not. If not, then the alternative is to stop the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina by negotiating a political settlement which will take into account legitimate claims of all warring sides and which will safeguard rights and freedom of the minorities. It would be more humane and just, less costly and painful, and therefore better, to endure hardships of negotiation until a satisfactory solution is reached for all three sides, than to continue fighting in the name--and under the guise--of selective moral standards and/or "national interest".

ATTACHMENT I.

	County	Area (km ²)	Population	Croats	Serbs	Yugoslavs
Table A.1. "UNPA Eastern Slavonia"- Common Territory of Croatia and Serbia	Beli	1,147	53,409	19,120	12,872	8,385
	Manastir					
	Vukovar	606	81,203	30,126	25,173	17,215
	East of Osijek city					

Eastern parts of Vinkovci

Table A.2. "UNPA Western Slavonia"- Common Territory of Croatia and Bosnia	Grubisno	435	15,756	5,672	4,553	2,143
	Polje					
	Daruvar	610	31,424	8,924	9,521	5,593
	Pakrac	567	27,903	8,483	10,715	5,860
Western parts of Nova Gradiska						
Eastern parts of Novska						

Table A.3.a. "UNPA Krajina" Southern Counties-- Common Territory of Croatia and Bosnia	Gracac	1,016	11,863	2,147	8,577	985
	Obrovac	509	12,362	4,178	7,430	544
	Benkovac	640	33,549	13,453	17,781	1,711
	Knin	1,079	43,731	4,154	34,504	4,461
		3,244	101,505	23,932	68,292	7,701

Table A.3.b. "UNPA Krajina" Northern Counties-- Annex to Bosnia	Kostajnica	365	15,548	4,307	8,629	2,286
	Petrinja	390	33,570	14,637	12,622	5,069
	Dvor	505	16,307	1,533	13,192	1,337
	Glina	543	25,079	8,953	14,220	1,530
	Vrginmost	447	18,841	4,126	13,452	791
	Vojnic	237	8,908	125	7,892	463
	Slunj	802	21,732	13,017	6,411	1,413
	Titova	1,150	12,261	2,305	8,485	1,275
	Korenica					
	Donji	606	8,447	51	7,695	625
	Lapac					
		5,045	160,693	49,054	92,598	14,789

Table B.1.
Annex to Croatia

County	Area (km ²)	Population	Croats	Muslims	Serbs	Yugoslavs
Livno	994	40,438	28,913	4,408	3,882	2,669
Tomislav-grad	967	30,666	26,710	2,883	675	245
Prozor	477	19,108	12,095	6,707	57	191
Posusje	372	16,455	16,290	16	33	66
Grude	218	17,767	17,607		36	36
Listica	388	26,076	25,633		183	156
Citluk	181	14,101	13,805	127	14	99
Ljubuski	289	27,603	25,340	1,491	83	524
Capljina	249	26,032	13,927	6,768	3,462	1,562
Odzak	205	27,895	15,426	5,384	5,356	1,199
Orasje	166	27,806	20,715	1,557	4,143	1,057
Bosanski Samac	219	32,320	14,318	1,713	13,316	2,489
	4,725	306,267	230,779	31,054	31,240	10,293

Table B.2.
Annex to Serbia

Bijeljina	734	92,808	464	24,316	56,056	8,167
Ugljevik	199	24,540	24	9,399	14,061	515
Lopare	429	33,769	1,621	11,954	19,518	507
Rudo	344	13,601	27	4,380	8,705	299
	1,706	164,718	2,136	50,049	98,340	9,488

Table B.3.
Annex to Montenegro

Kalinovik	732	6,597	26	2,678	3,688	145
Gacko	736	10,279	21	3,423	6,219	349
Nevesinje	923	16,326	278	3,853	11,591	522
Bileca	633	13,199	40	1,808	10,190	726
Ljubinje	326	4,516	54	406	3,839	149
Trebinje	1,205	30,372	2,308	4,404	18,132	4,161
	4,555	81,289	2,727	16,572	53,659	6,052





Sources: *Statisticki kalendar Jugoslavije 1983*, Savezni savod za statistiku, Beograd
Jure Petricevic, *Nacionalnost stanovnistva Jugoslavije*, Verlag Adria, Brugg, 1983

Note: Computations based on percentages of ethnic distribution given by Petricevic.



CROATIA AND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
 Ethnic distribution by counties
 (Census of 1981)

LEGEND
 Applicable only to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

-  Counties without absolute majority
-  Counties with Croatian absolute majority
-  Counties with Muslim absolute majority
-  Counties with Serbian absolute majority

HRVATSKA I BOSNA - HERCEGOVINA
Nacionalno opredjeljenje po općinama
(Popis 1981.)

Slovenia

Serbi

Montenegro



- Općina
1. bez apsolutne većine
 2. s apsolutnom hrvatskom većinom
 3. s apsolutnom muslimanskom većinom
 4. s apsolutnom srpskom većinom

5. Ilustracija etničke pomješanosti :
 GOSPIĆ - Hrvati 59,3 %
 Srbi 30,0 %
 Jugoslaveni 9,1 %

Političko-teritorijalna podjela
 Stanje na dan 1. 1. 1983.

Administrative territorial boundaries
 as of January 1, 1983

County legends on majority population :

1. without absolute majority
2. with Croatian absolute majority
3. with Moslem absolute majority
4. with Serbian absolute majority

5. Illustration of ethnic mix : GOSPIĆ - Croats 59.3 %
 Serbs 30.0 %
 "Yugoslavs" 9.1 %

Objective: Attempt to satisfy - as realistically feasible - claims to territories and sovereignty, and the desire of people to live with one's own kind in one's own state.

Due to the stated claims and counter-claims, there can be no perfect solution to the present crises, which would simultaneously satisfy maximal demands of the contestants. The solution suggested herewith would enable all contestants to claim a victory of sorts and to save faces; to lay foundation for an economic recovery and for political and economic cooperation; and to start building bridges so sorely needed for a durable good-neighbors policy of the future.

Starting Point: The United Nations plan presented in Annex III to the Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the UN Security Council, S/23280, dated 11 December 1991.

A Role for the United Nations

To achieve peace and acceptable fair settlement, it is recommended that renown men/women--presently outside and/or opposing the warring ruling bodies--be brought into negotiations, directly or indirectly. The ruling bodies proved themselves, so far, unwilling and/or unable of settling the contested claims through peaceful negotiations. Therefore, they should no longer be trusted. A gradual, but finite, switch-over should be effected. There are many capable, qualified, and honest men and women outside the ruling apparatus of the Yugoslav republics who prefer negotiation to war and who could contribute to a fair and satisfactory settlement.

It is extremely painful to the author of this proposal to admit the existence of mutual hatred and mistrust among the warring sides, which was initiated by the primordial sin of genocide against the Serbs--and Jews and Gypsies--in the Independent State of Croatia (1941-1945), and which is pushed by the present civil war to a blinding level. The only solace to his heart is the common human experience that time finds a way to heal wounds and to renew hope.

IT COMES as no surprise that the Vance-Owen plan has been "accepted eagerly by Bosnia's Croats and reluctantly by the Muslims" (leader, April 6). Under the plan, the Bosnian Croats get far more territory than they could have possibly expected. To the Bosnian Muslims, the plan represents the best prospect for foreign military intervention. The cost to the Muslims, however, has been the abandonment of their goal of a unitary state.

The Bosnian Serbs object to the Vance-Owen plan on two points: first, the map leaves large numbers of Serbs in areas dominated by Muslims and Croats and second, it denies the

Serbs a land corridor between the large Serb-inhabited region in north-western Bosnia and Serbia itself.

Given the present animosity between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats and Muslims, an isolated Serb region in Bosnia would become the Nagorno-Karabakh of Europe. It is inconceivable that the Serbs would voluntarily accept this arrangement.

Nevertheless, the West is attempting to force the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Vance-Owen plan. For the second time in a year, the US and EC are attempting to impose a flawed settlement on Bosnia's 1.5 million Serbs. A year ago, the "independence" of Bosnia was recognised by the West despite the objections of the Bosnian Serbs.

The Serbs, who constitute a third of Bosnia's population and inhabit 60 per cent of its territory, opposed independence prior to an agreement on constitutional principles. Predictably, they took up arms to resist being forcibly incorporated in an inherently hostile state. The consequences of their rebellion have been dreadful.

Although the Vance-Owen plan goes a long way toward recognising the right of all three Bosnian groups, including the Bosnian Serbs, it stops short of an equitable and lasting solution. Adjustment must be made to the Vance-Owen plan to ensure that it is fair to all Bosnians. Otherwise, the country will be condemned to decades of misery.

George Tintor.
London EC2.

The Guardian April 8, 1993

Muslims accused of breaking truce

Jonathan Steele in Moscow

THE Russian foreign ministry expressed concern yesterday at reports that Bosnian Muslims and Croats were violating the ceasefire, and criticised the foreign media for claiming Bosnia's Serbs had rejected the Vance-Owen peace plan. The statement was in line with Moscow's persistent efforts to preserve contact with Belgrade.

Sergei Yastrzhembsky, the ministry's chief spokesman, said the Bosnian Serb parliament had merely "not yet accepted the plan fully". He also said that Vitaly Churkin, President Boris Yeltsin's special envoy, might soon return to Belgrade. Mr Yastrzhembsky added that Moscow believed pressure for a resumption of broad military operations was coming from Muslim units in particular.

The ministry had information that the Serbs had "fulfilled all their obligations" regarding the evacuation from Srebrenica but that "Muslim commanders have interfered".

Mr Yastrzhembsky did not comment on the American suggestion that the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims be lifted, but there is little doubt Russia strongly opposes it. Moscow has had a series of disputes with Washington over former Yugoslavia, starting with the Vance-Owen plan, which Moscow has always accepted.

Last week Russia persuaded the Security Council to soften its resolution authorising the use of air power to enforce the Bosnian no-fly zone. It insisted there be no mention of ground targets, thus ruling out attacks on airfields.

Moscow's line is partly influenced by conservative MPs who want to maintain a close alliance with the Serbs. While not going this far, the foreign ministry has presented itself as the main outside power which can talk to the Serbs.

Russia has come under Western pressure to contribute troops to a UN peace-keeping force in Bosnia, but General Pavel Grachev, the defence minister, rejected this last week. He already has forces engaged in Georgia and Tajikistan.

*The Guardian
Apr 7/93*

Moscow uneasy at Serbia's international isolation

FROM MICHAEL BINYON IN MOSCOW

PRESIDENT Yeltsin's government is uneasy about the international isolation of Serbia, with which Russia has strong historic and religious links.

A foreign ministry spokesman said yesterday that Russia might take new steps to try to end the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and might soon send Vitali Churkin, its special envoy on Yugoslavia, back to Belgrade. He held talks with Mr Karadzic and with President Cosic, the Yugoslav federal leader, last week.

Mr Yeltsin discussed the Bosnian fighting with President Clinton at the Vancouver summit, but Russia still appears uncertain how far it should continue supporting the Western line. The foreign ministry suggested in February that Russia could send

peacekeeping troops to the war zone, but Pavel Grachev, the defence minister, last week ruled out the dispatch of any more Russian forces.

About 1,000 Russian troops are taking part in UN peacekeeping operations in Croatia. Russian opposition deputies, right-wing journalists and shadowy military figures frequently visit Belgrade. Many of them are suspected of trying to help the government of Slobodan Milosevic get round sanctions.

According to a recent investigation by *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, managers of state factories in Russia, many of which have old ties to Yugoslav enterprises, are actively engaged in semi-legal business outside government control. It said Russian and Serb go-betweens had co-operated

in sanctions-busting through Cyprus, and Belgrade is helping finance Russian opposition to Mr Yeltsin.

Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader, was due in Moscow yesterday for secret talks with Russian opposition leaders who strongly back the Serbian cause and have called for an end to international sanctions against Serbia. But Dr Karadzic cancelled his visit at the last moment.

□ **Muslims condemned:** Russia said yesterday that it might take new steps to help end the fighting in Bosnia and condemned Muslim leaders for preventing the evacuation of people from Srebrenica.

Sergei Yastrzhembsky, the chief foreign ministry spokesman, said that Mr Churkin, might return to Belgrade quite soon. (Reuter)

The Times April 7/93

Britain opposes intervention

The Guardian Apr. 7/93

Ian Black
Diplomatic Correspondent

DESPITE mounting public disquiet over the Bosnian tragedy, Britain remains opposed to military intervention in Bosnia, calling instead yesterday for more pressure on the Serbs in the form of punitive sanctions to accept the Vance-Owen peace plan.

The Tory chairman of the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee issued a rare call for Western military action, but the Foreign Office could only repeat that it was "essential" that the Serbs sign up for the United Nations and European Community-sponsored plan to divide Bosnia into 10 ethnically based semi-autonomous provinces. Failure to do so would produce the "most severe consequences", a spokesman said.

Britain is trying hard to ensure that strengthened sanctions against the rump Yugoslavia will be effective, even though the UN Security Council debate on the issue, originally scheduled for Monday, has been delayed until next week as a result of a secret understanding reached between the US and Russian presidents at their weekend summit in Vancouver.

British efforts are concentrating on persuading the Russians, sensitive to domestic nationalist sentiment, to accept tough new anti-Serbian measures which would be presented as a "ratcheting up" of present sanctions rather than unpalatably draconian new ones.

In one indication of a slowly changing political climate,

David Howell, chairman of the all-party foreign affairs committee, said he had "very, very reluctantly" concluded that the time had come for the West to move in in force.

"The mood of the world is beginning to say that the democracies must intervene, even if it's not in their direct narrow interest," he said in an interview with BBC Radio 4.

Mr Howell said for the first time that he agreed that the UN arms embargo against the combatants in the former Yugoslavia might now be amended to exclude the Bosnian Muslims, an idea that has been raised by the US.

He said that the Serbian siege and UN evacuation of Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia would "live in people's minds down history as a point of supreme horror and terror".

Mr Howell's impassioned appeal is likely to cut little ice with Ministry of Defence and Foreign Office mandarins united in their belief that there is no viable and risk-free option for Western military intervention.

Also speaking on Radio 4, a gloomy sounding Lord Owen, co-author of the ill-fated peace plan, said it would be "a tragedy of very major proportions" if the world accepted the legitimacy of Serbian gains won by "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia.

He said Britain, the US and France were not prepared to put forces into Bosnia. "It is an understandable response but it does not produce quick and dramatic results and it means you have to rely on the slow process of diplomacy without having the sanction of the ultimate threat of military force."

The
Guardian
April 6, 1993

Britain and France, who supply most of the UN troops escorting relief convoys in Bosnia, are fiercely opposed to exempting the Bosnian government from the arms embargo on former Yugoslavia and have threatened to pull out their forces if the US view prevails. The Russians are also opposed.

Since the weekend when the Serbs nailed their colours to the mast of the partition of Bosnia, the Croats, too, have followed suit, demanding Muslim capitulation in the areas they get from the Vance-Owen map.

The Bosnian Croat military command issued an ultimatum to the Muslims, stating that if the Muslims did not submit to Croatian rule by April 15 in a large swath of south-west Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croats would take matters into their own hands.

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Evening Standard
7 April 1993

Bosnia: 'No John Wayne solution'

by John Williams

DEFENCE SECRETARY Malcolm Rifkind today ruled out military intervention in Bosnia, saying there could be no "John Wayne solution" to the strife in the former Yugoslavia.

He warned 100,000 troops could be bogged down for up to 20 years if Britain and her allies sent in troops to impose a military solution.

That, he said, was not just a political view, but the military advice the Government was getting.

Mr Rifkind said: "To believe that somehow there is a simply military solution, a sort of John Wayne solution whereby you go in with guns blazing, sort it out and leave a few weeks or months later — history tells us that

does not work." He was responding to rising demands for military intervention, powerfully voiced yesterday by the chairman of the Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, David Howell.

Mr Rifkind told the BBC: "Unless one is prepared to contemplate a massive UN force going in on the ground and being bogged down for many years, becoming essentially a combatant in that war, many of these other options are unlikely to achieve their military objective. That is indeed the military advice, not just a political view." Other

options, like air strikes, would not work unless they were a softening-up exercise as a prelude to troops going in on the ground.

"The biggest ever air strikes were those against Saddam Hussein. They did not by themselves remove a single Iraqi soldier from Kuwait. It was only when a huge international army went in that the Iraqis were removed."

Mr Rifkind has been opposed all along to British troops being drawn in too deeply, beyond their humanitarian role, and his strong language lines him up with those Tories who believe the calls for military intervention must be resisted.

He went on: "I am not aware of any of the critics of the UN arguing that the UN should initiate a

policy whereby perhaps 100,000 UN troops could be bogged down there for 10, 15, 20 years.

"That is not an option I have heard argued. I have heard people suggesting that somehow it would be all over in weeks if the UN had the will. That is, frankly, an unconvincing policy."

The United Nations today postponed plans to get more food into the beleaguered Bosnian town of Srebrenica.

Nine UN lorries which brought food and medical supplies into the town were to have taken out hundreds of Moslem women and children.

But Moslem leaders sent them away empty because they feared the UN humanitarian mission would help the Serbian policy of ethnic cleansing and said evacuation of the weakest made Srebrenica more vulnerable.

Today, in a sign of a breakthrough, UN peacekeeping officials said local Moslems had indicated they would be ready to let some refugees be evacuated in buses rather than trucks.

The Daily Telegraph April 8, 1993

Moscow pins hope on Karadzic

FOR THEIR different reasons, the Russian government and its bitter enemies are making far from subtle overtures to Dr Radovan Karadzic, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs and a man shunned by most of the international community.

Russian diplomats still harbour hopes of talking Dr Karadzic round and persuading him to accept a solution to the Bosnian conflict based on the Vance-Owen plan.

Hardline nationalists see in Serbians' irredentism a cause close to their own. For the collapse of federal Yugoslavia read the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

The Serbian enclaves in Bosnia are seen to be victims like the Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic states.

Dr Karadzic can expect an enthusiastic welcome from like-minded Russian nationalists if his scheduled trip to Moscow comes off.

"I expect to see Dr Karadzic and listen with interest to what he has to say about the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina," said Mr Ilya Konstan-

By Marcus Warren
in Moscow

tinov, a Russian people's deputy and leader of the hardline National Salvation Front. He added that he felt "sympathy and solidarity" with the Bosnian Serbs.

Asked what he thought of American accusations that Dr Karadzic was guilty of war crimes, Mr Konstantinov snapped: "I expect Washington will declare us war criminals next."

Although spokesmen for hardline factions within the Russian parliament all confirmed that they were expecting Dr Karadzic, no one would admit to having invited him to Moscow or knowing who had issued the invitation — except for a wag at the ultra-nationalist newspaper, *Day*, who claimed the foreign ministry was responsible.

Policy towards the former Yugoslavia is a useful stick with which hardliners can beat the foreign ministry, which they suspect of collaborating with the Americans to weaken Russia and impose a "new world order"

against Moscow's interests. The ministry is eager to exploit Russia's traditional links with Serbia. Its relationship with Belgrade confirms its status as a diplomatic superpower invaluable within bodies such as the UN Security Council.

When Mr Vitaly Churkin, President Yeltsin's special envoy to the former Yugoslavia, flies on to the US from Belgrade, he will be speaking to his opposite numbers from a position of authority that most Russian diplomats would envy.

As the Yeltsin administration comes under fire from its nationalist enemies, it cannot afford to be perceived as victimising Serbia in the interests of the West.

Russia has suffered much more than western countries by obeying UN sanctions against the former Yugoslavia, the hardline Rossiya parliamentary group claims.

● Adrian Brown in Belgrade writes: Mr Churkin arrived in Belgrade for more talks with Serbian leaders, hoping to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to sign the peace plan.

Renewed fighting feared between Moslems and Croats in the west

By Laura Spier in Mostar

COMMANDERS of the Moslem-led Bosnian army fear the eruption of renewed clashes with Croat forces in spite of pledges by both sides to support an international peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Bosnian commander Humo Esad said this week that the fractured alliance would break down completely after the declaration last weekend of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO), the military wing of Bosnia's Croatian Democratic Union, the sister of the ruling party of Croatia.

The HVO set an April 15 deadline for Moslem forces to withdraw from provinces designated to Croat control under the peace plan of Mr Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, United Nations mediators.

"We are ready to fight if we must. But it will be a dangerous political game for Croats to play now," said Cmdr Esad, who believes the HVO statement makes renewed clashes inevitable in central Bosnia.

The HVO declaration means they want Cmdr Esad and his men to withdraw from Mostar,

even though it is their home town.

"They may try to assert control in the smaller towns rather than risk fighting in Mostar," he said of Bosnia's second-biggest city which over the last year of war has shrunk to some 30,000 people, many Moslem refugees from Serb and Croat-held territory.

Some 50,000 fled the once picturesque southern city on the banks of the River Neretva,

'Serbs are kicking down the front door and Croats are sneaking in the back,' said a Moslem soldier

where Moslems comprised 41 per cent, Croats 39 per cent and Serbs under 20 per cent.

Western diplomats believe renewed fighting between Moslem and Croat forces could deal a death blow to the Vance-Owen plan. "We will find out in the next few days," said a diplomat this week.

Under the international peace plan, endorsed by Mr Alija Izetbegovic, Bosnia's Moslem President, and Mr Mate Boban, the Croat nationalist

leader, Mostar is one of three provinces which would be designated to Croat control. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic at the weekend rejected the plan to divide Bosnia into 10 ethnic provinces despite threats of stepped-up sanctions.

Mr Boban, like Mr Karadzic, his Serbian counterpart, last year declared his own national mini-state of Herceg-Bosna.

"The HVO wants to unite

influence over the Bosnian forces because they control five of the power stations on the River Neretva.

Cmdr Esad, the second in command in Mostar, says the Croats have constantly blocked the delivery of weapons to the mostly Moslem Bosnian forces and emergency relief to Moslem refugees.

"The regular Croatian Army takes 58 per cent. The HVO then takes another 50 per cent - leaving us with next to nothing," he said bitterly. The stormy alliance collapsed but in January was patched up under a ceasefire brokered by Mr Vance and Lord Owen.

Despite the truce, the out-gunned Moslems are gloomy about the prospects for peace with the Croats and the Serbs. "Serbs are kicking down the front door and the Croats sneaking in the back," said a Bosnian soldier.

Some western diplomats fear that the failure of the international community to stop the bloodshed in Bosnia has emboldened Serb and Croat nationalists to make their land grab in Bosnia. "The Croat and Serb share a common contempt for Moslems and plan to

with Croatia. They have the same uniforms, badges and symbols. Every day there is more proof of what they are doing here," says Cmdr Esad.

The red-and-white checker-board Croatian symbol is emblazoned on flags and number plates throughout Mostar except in the ruined centre, where the blue and yellow *fleur-de-lis* marks Bosnian government control. The Croatian dinar is the most-used local currency. The HVO has added

carve up Bosnia-Herzegovina," says one.

Mr Jadranko Prlic, acting prime minister of the self-styled Croat state, claims "Moslems expected too much of Croats", smallest of Bosnia's three main ethnic groups. "Who can expect Croats, who make up just 17 per cent of the population, can deliver a free Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Moslems?" he asks.

Serb forces from the surrounding hills last year bombarded the now blackened town in which most buildings in the old Turkish centre have

been razed. Bosnian forces, backed by Croat troops, drove Serb fighters out in June.

"In a few days there will be a war between the HVO and the Bosnian army," said an electrician, a Croat who, fearing reprisal, spoke on condition of anonymity. Like many, he described the war in Bosnia as a rural-urban conflict.

"I am going to fight with the Bosnian army. This is my city and I have nowhere else to go. The Croats want to rule Mostar, but they have the villages in the hills," he said.

Financial Times
April 8, 1993

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