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**THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND
YUGOSLAV CRISIS**

**MEMORANDUM
ON THE BACKGROUND AND
POSSIBLE RESOLUTION
OF THE CRISIS**

**SUBMITTED TO
THE HONORABLE JAMES A. BAKER III
SECRETARY OF STATE**

**SERBIAN UNITY CONGRESS
JULY 15, 1991**

MEMORANDUM

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND YUGOSLAV CRISIS

I. GEOPOLITICAL AND HISTORICAL SETTING

A powerful case can be made that the global issue behind the current Yugoslav crisis is whether Germany will once again be allowed to attempt to dominate Europe.

1. Apparently, our foreign policy planners are reluctant to consider the Yugoslav events in historical and geopolitical terms. Most probably because such consideration would cast doubt upon our currently preferred view that the "new" united Germany will refrain from challenging the Anglo-American-French domination of EC and NATO. Of course, understandably enough, no one wants to reopen the issues fought over in the two World Wars. But the truth is that, with the USSR down and out and Russia a pauper, Germany doesn't need EC or NATO. Even if Germany remains a democracy, her geopolitical dynamics may revive a coalition of neo-fascists, petty jingoists, and religious and other reactionaries throughout post-Communist Europe.

2. In fact, the European Community's current handling of the Yugoslav crisis already reveals its inability to take a unified position: France, England and Spain want to preserve the integrity of Yugoslavia, while Germany and Austria (though the latter is not an official member of the Community) seem to be eager to wreck Yugoslavia by supporting and recognizing the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. If these developments are not resolutely discouraged, they will revive the old rivalries between major European powers and split the European Community into two blocks: one led by France and England, and the other by Germany and Austria.

We must not disregard the real possibility that sometime in the future Germany may connect with a revived Russia and again threaten our interests and foster instability in that part of the world. It is in such a scenario that the Balkans will continue to be one of the key elements of European geopolitics.

Seen in this setting, the events now unfolding in Yugoslavia may be a foretoken of the real "New Order" arising autochthonously from the ashes of Fascism and Communism. We pray and hope that for once in modern times our foreign policy planners will anticipate this reality, instead of reacting to it.

II. THE UNITED STATES GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS IN YUGOSLAVIA

Our overall policy toward Yugoslavia should be guided by our long-range strategic and geopolitic interests in that part of the world. These interests must not be obscured and distorted by self-serving, squabbling Yugoslavs, aspiring Germans or cautious French. The scenario we sketched in Part I of this Memorandum is quite sensible. Historical evidence suggests that our true friends in the Balkans have consistently been the Serbs and the Greeks. Hence, our long-range policy should be to nurture these two nations and through them keep our foothold in the strategically important South East Europe.

The Yugoslav issue with all its implications is too important to be left to the European Common Market. We must be actively involved in the resolution of the current Yugoslav crisis, and safeguard our well-defined long-range interests in the Balkans.

III. YUGOSLAVIA: THE REAL ISSUES

Having failed to strategically define the Yugoslav crisis, we made a number of tactical errors, most of them still part of the Yugoslav drama being played out.

1. While Slovenian and Croatian leaders initiated the current crisis, we placed most of the blame upon Serbia. We have thus alienated this power center in Yugoslavia and the Balkans and have imperiled friendship with our proven friend in both World Wars.
2. We seem to have succumbed to the very skillful and well-heeled public relations blitz by the Slovenes, the Croatsians, and their pro-German friends and supporters. These two republics were portrayed as "democratic and pro-Western". But the fact of the matter is that all governments in the republics of Yugoslavia are led and dominated by former communists; all are striving hard, each in its own way, to preserve the authoritarian hold over the political and economic affairs in their respective republics.

None of these governments deserves United States sympathy or preferential treatment. All are ideologically opposed to the fundamental values of the American democracy. This also goes for the ghost-like Federal government of Premier Ante Markovic, an unelected holdover from the old Communist regime, whom we have befriended and nurtured for some mysterious and inexplicable reasons.

3. While our expressed objective has been to preserve Yugoslavia, we have done everything to alienate the very people who created Yugoslavia and without whose support there can be no Yugoslavia--the Serbs. The implementation of Nickles Amendment and our open support of the former Communist, never-elected Premier Markovic, have been some of the major insults to the Serbs. Moreover, on the issue of human rights, we have staunchly supported the Albanians extremists in Kosovo, while paying lip service to the most serious and documented violation against Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo itself.

4. We have failed to openly admit that the key element in the Yugoslav crisis has been the internal borders. They were established in 1943, during Yugoslavia's Civil War, at a guerrilla meeting organized by Josip Broz Tito.

The Serbs have never accepted these borders. There will be no common ground for any dialogue with Serbs, unless and until we recognize this fact.

Serbia cannot be expected to abandon millions of her people to the uncertain future and mercy of newly formed and hostile foreign countries. The Serbs have lived in Lika, Kraina and Slavonia for centuries and their right to the land was confirmed by the London Treaty of 1915.

5. Our policy has failed to take properly into account the fear of millions of Serbs that history may repeat itself. There is a genuine fear on the part of Serbs living in Croatia (about 12 to 15 percent of the total population in the Republic of Croatia). These

people do not wish to leave Yugoslavia and be a part of the new state of Croatia.

Many policies and symbols of the new State of Croatia tragically remind the Serbs of the mass genocide carried out by the Croatian Fascists fifty years ago, when close to one million Serbs, Jews and Gypsies were slaughtered in the then Independent State of Croatia (1941-45).

So long as we continue to consider these issues to be "water under the bridge" as one foreign policy official remarked to us, a peaceful and lasting solution to the Yugoslav crisis will remain out of our reach.

IV. POSSIBLE RESOLUTION

We are beginning with the premise that the post-World War II Yugoslavia is dead. Referendums held in Slovenia and Croatia recently have clearly indicated the will of their people to either radically restructure Yugoslavia or leave it. Furthermore, we believe that the current Yugoslav external borders should be preserved, in order to avoid potential for "Balkanization" of

South-East Europe, or even Europe itself. We hold that any resolution of the Yugoslav crisis must not impair the Helsinki Accords.

Despite recent dramatic events in Slovenia, there should ultimately be no problem in satisfying their demands for either full independence or some type of loose ties with a restructured Yugoslavia. The case of Croatia is altogether different, because of the large number of Serbs who do not wish to leave Yugoslavia and become subjects of the new Croatian State. The fact is that Yugoslavia can be neither made, nor unmade, without the consent of its largest nation--Serbia.

We should encourage a solution which would fulfill the basic aspirations of the majority of the people involved. The solution would be implemented within the existing borders of present-day Yugoslavia, and it postulates four essential prerequisites:

- (a) Borders between The Republic of Croatia and Yugoslavia would have to be redrawn in such a manner as to assure that (1) a majority of Serbs in Croatia remain in Yugoslavia, and (2) that after this split, the new State of Croatia can effectively function as a political, economic and social entity.

- (b) Strong and functioning mechanisms must be created to permanently secure and protect all civil, ethnic and other rights of minorities which would have to remain behind such new borders, due to geographic or socio-economic imperatives. To this end, a set of carefully crafted treaties ought to be implemented which would clearly guarantee these rights. A type of regional structure for these minorities should be designed. Moreover, an international commission, made up of impartial members, as well as representatives of the respective ethnic minorities will have to be constituted.
- (c) Once these objectives are accomplished, a set of treaties regulating future relations between the new States of Slovenia and Croatia on the one hand, and Yugoslavia on the other, can be worked out.
- (d) The United States and the European Community must resist the temptations and pressures to simultaneously bring the issue of Kosovo, the Albanians and their grievances to the table.

This "linkage" would enormously complicate the problem, and possibly prevent effective solutions. The problem of the Albanian minority and the issue of the illegal immigrants from the State of Albania are serious and important, but they need their own, separate agenda and treatment.

This recommended approach appears to be optimal under the present circumstances and complexities, because:

1. it takes into account the already expressed desires and aspirations of the Serbian, Slovenian and Croatian people;
2. it leaves the present-day Yugoslavia intact in terms of geography, transportation, economic and financial markets and, most importantly, within the currently existing external borders;
3. it leaves the Helsinki Accords inviolate;
4. it may become a model for resolution of similar problems in other parts of the world.

We strongly urge your consideration of the proposal.

We are ready to assist and help in whatever way we can.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Michael Djordjevich".

Michael Djordjevich
President
Serbian Unity Congress

SERBIAN UNITY CONGRESS

THE SERBIAN UNITY CONGRESS WAS FOUNDED IN DECEMBER 1990 IN RESPONSE TO THE HISTORIC CHANGES OCCURRING IN YUGOSLAVIA. IT IS A BROAD-BASED INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, WITH ITS HEADQUARTERS AND MAJORITY OF MEMBERSHIP AND SUPPORTERS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS WAS ELECTED DEMOCRATICALLY. ITS MEMBERS HOPE TO HELP SERBS IN YUGOSLAVIA IN THEIR TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND TO HELP SERBS LIVING IN THE DIASPORA RETAIN THEIR LEGACY OF CUSTOMS AND TRADITIONS THAT HAVE BEEN ENRICHED OVER THE CENTURIES.

SERBIAN UNITY CONGRESS PRESIDENT

MICHAEL DJORDJEVICH, THE ORGANIZATION'S FIRST PRESIDENT, IS CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND DIRECTOR OF CAPITAL GUARANTY INSURANCE COMPANY. HE WAS ACTIVE IN CIVIC AFFAIRS AND HELD RESPONSIBLE POSITION IN CALIFORNIA POLITICS. CURRENTLY, HE IS A DIRECTOR OF SPANEK INC. AND AMERICAN EXPRESS VARIABLE ANNUITY INC. DJORDJEVICH WAS AWARDED THE AMERICANISM MEDAL, THE HIGHEST AWARD BESTOWED UPON FOREIGN BORN NATIONALS BY THE DAUGHTERS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, AND SERVED AS A MEMBER OF THE STATUE OF LIBERTY/ELLIS ISLAND CENTENNIAL COMMISSION.