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SUMMARY:

Supported by expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, Norway's mainland economic activity has gained sufficient momentum to sustain economic growth during 1991 and 1992. With business prospects improving, mainland investment will become stronger, while growth in private consumption may ease moderately if the household savings rate picks up as currently expected. Growth in the mainstay offshore oil and gas sector will likely remain strong because of continuing field developments and increased exploration activity.

Norway continues to adapt its economic policies to the emerging EC single market. Norway and the other EFTA countries are in the process of negotiating an economic cooperation agreement with the EC under the framework of the European Economic Area (EEA), and there is increasing speculation in business and political circles that Norway will join the flock and submit an application for EC membership.

The fall and the subsequent stabilization of the U.S. dollar, vis-a-vis the Norwegian krone (NOK), since 1985 has improved the price competitiveness of U.S. products and should continue to help the United States retain its position as Norway's fourth largest trading partner. The Norwegian market will likely continue to offer interesting opportunities for U.S. suppliers of high-tech machinery and equipment (e.g., oil and gas technology, and aircraft), industrial raw materials, and various consumer goods. Apart from opportunities in trade, Norwegian offshore oil and gas development should continue to attract U.S. investors, and expected liberalization of remaining foreign exchange restrictions will likely improve the general investment climate. Major competitors in the Norwegian market will remain the EC member states, Sweden, and low-cost producers in Asia and elsewhere (e.g., the Newly Industrializing Countries). Norwegian state monopolies and non-tariff barriers will likely continue to complicate U.S. exports in areas ranging from communications equipment to vegetables and fruits.

ECONOMIC POLICY:

General Policy Framework:

Domestic Economic Policy: Norway remains a mixed economy, with resource allocation determined by a combination of direct and indirect state intervention and free market forces. The Norwegian public sector remains more significant than in the United States, with public spending amounting to 53 percent of GNP (36 percent in the United States). To a certain degree, a central planning mechanism is in place, and large-scale state enterprises have been formed (e.g., Statoil, and Norsk Hydro) in order to control activity in key areas, including Norway's mainstay petroleum sector. For regional and other

considerations, subsidies are extensively used to support agriculture and other industry. A welfare state system, which redistributes incomes via the tax system, is firmly in place, and the Government of Norway puts a premium on keeping unemployment low. These programs have required constant financial underpinning, and the tax burden on the economy (54 percent of GNP) remains one of the highest in the OECD. Meanwhile, the Norwegian private sector, which accounts for the bulk of GNP, remains dominant in strategic industries such as shipping, services (e.g., banking and domestic trade), and small to medium-scale manufacturing.

External Economic Policy: Norway welcomes foreign investment as a matter of policy, but foreign ownership continues to be restricted or prohibited in areas of financial services, mining and acquisition of property. Norway continues to adapt its economic policy to international developments, notably the emerging EC single market. Norway and the other EFTA members are in the process of negotiating an economic cooperation agreement with the EC under the framework of the European Economic Area (EEA). This agreement, which promotes free trade, is being designed to limit the distortive impact of the EC single market on commodity trade and the movements of labor and capital. Meanwhile, there is increasing speculation in political and business circles that Norway will follow the suit of Sweden and seek EC membership to prevent the Norwegian mainland from developing into a stagnant backwater.

Recent Developments and Progress: Norway has implemented several important supply-side reforms since 1987, including liberalization of the domestic financial services industry, significant relaxation of foreign exchange controls, and gradual tax changes--the latter involving the lowering of marginal tax rates, combined with broadening of the tax base. In the spring of 1991, the GON presented proposals for further tax reform to become effective as of January 1, 1992. The proposals include an overhaul of capital taxation intended to remove present distortions arising from different tax treatment of investments by type, location, and mode of financing. Although marginal tax rates will be lowered further, the overall tax burden will be maintained to keep the welfare state running. Despite progress made in recent years, there appears to remain much room for further improvement of the supply side of the economy. The Norwegian agricultural sector remains hidden behind protectionist walls (e.g., high subsidies and import restrictions). Moreover, large parts of industry, including the transportation and telecommunications markets, remain subject to regulations, including statutory barriers to entry.

ECONOMIC RESOURCES AND STRUCTURE:

Economic Resources: The Norwegian resource base is dominated by

energy and energy-based production--notably offshore crude oil, natural gas, metals, and crude materials production. This domination continues to render the domestic economy vulnerable to downturns in a handful of global commodity prices, particularly that of oil. Norwegian crude oil reserves stood at 11.5 billion barrels as of January 1, 1990, which was 61 percent of Western Europe's reserves and equivalent to about 18 years at the 1990 production level of 1.7 million barrels a day. Natural gas reserves amounted to 82.2 trillion cubic feet, 43 percent of Western Europe's reserves, and equivalent to nearly 75 years at present production levels. Norway has limited land deposits of non-renewable energy resources (i.e., coal at Svalbard), but the country is blessed by abundant hydro-power for industry and domestic use. Other resources include limited minerals and metals reserves (e.g., iron), fish, land, and forests. But various material resources (e.g., industrial inputs) are in short supply or absent, and the relatively harsh Norwegian climate dictates that Norway import various foodstuffs and other agricultural goods. The Norwegian human resource-base is small (population only 4.24 million), and high wages and short working hours continue to limit the scope for improvement in industrial competitiveness. Norway remains one of the world's principal maritime nations, and Norwegian shipowners command over 10 percent of the world's commercial fleet.

Economic Structure: Offshore petroleum production will remain Norway's principal economic activity for the next several decades, although the petroleum sector's significance will decline gradually along with the depletion of Norway's crude oil resources. In the past decade, the economic significance of the offshore petroleum sector continued to fluctuate along with world oil prices. In 1990, petroleum production accounted for 14.3 percent of Norwegian GDP, compared with a peak of 18.5 percent in 1984. The Norwegian primary sector (i.e., agriculture and fishing) remains heavily protected by subsidies and non-tariff barriers, but its share in GDP declined gradually to some 3 percent of GDP from over 5 percent, with depletion of the traditional fishery resources being a contributing factor. The share of manufacturing production hovered in the 16-18 percent range, with activity dominated by large-scale export-oriented industry producing metals (e.g., aluminum), chemicals and various industrial inputs (e.g., pulp and paper). While Norway has developed competitive industries over the years (e.g., offshore supporting industry and fish farming), high Norwegian wages and increasing overseas competition have contributed to rising structural problems in several sectors (e.g., textiles and shipbuilding). As in most industrialized countries, the Norwegian services sector (e.g., domestic trade and banking) accounts for the bulk of GNP (nearly 55 percent).

Looking ahead, it is difficult to envision major shifts in Norway's economic structure in the coming decade, although the establishment of the EC single market (65 percent of Norwegian

exports, of which the bulk is oil and gas) will pose increasing challenges for the Norwegian non-oil industry. Meanwhile, the Norwegian non-oil export-oriented industry is presently scrambling to get footholds inside the EC in order to maintain market share. Major large export-oriented Norwegian corporations (e.g., Norsk Hydro A.S.) have already adjusted their operations to the EC throughout the past decade by establishing subsidiaries and marketing offices within the EC. However, small to medium-sized corporations, chiefly producing for the domestic market (e.g., food processing), remain unprepared, and will likely experience a period of structural adjustment brought about by increased competition, a process that will be painful whether or not Norway becomes an EC member.

ECONOMIC GROWTH:

Current Developments: In 1990, mainland economic growth recovered moderately, led by private consumer demand which expanded 3 percent in volume terms. There was continuing growth in exports and public sector spending, the latter buoyed by expansionary fiscal policy since 1988. However, private sector fixed capital investment slumped 26.5 percent because of continuing overcapacity in areas including the mainland building and construction sector. Offshore economic activity remained buoyant, with crude oil production rising gradually due to new capacity coming on stream and the lifting of Norway's self-imposed production restraint in support of the OPEC pricing policy. On external accounts, the value of imports rose significantly due to the impact of rising consumer demand and stock replenishment. Value of exports rose strongly, due largely to the impact of higher world crude oil prices following the Gulf crisis and a continuing increase in the volume of oil production. Thus, despite the upturn in imports, Norway posted a hefty 1990 \$4.1 billion current account surplus, compared with a slight NOK 250 million surplus in 1989. As a result of improved external accounts, Norwegian net foreign debt declined to \$14 billion at the end of 1990, from \$19 billion a year earlier.

Fiscal and monetary policies were eased throughout 1990 in order to limit growth in unemployment. As a result, the budget balance has moved into a significant deficit, while domestic interest rates have eased moderately. On foreign exchange rate policy, the trade weighted currency basket was substituted by the European Currency Unit (ECU) in October 1990, with a 7.9940 central rate against the Norwegian krone and a plus/minus 2.25 percent variation band. The krone is now more stable vis-a-vis the major European currencies, notably the Deutch mark, than in the past, but the variability against the U.S. dollar has increased slightly.

Economic Outlook: Supported by expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, mainland economic activity should have gained sufficient momentum to sustain economic growth during 1991 and 1992, unless the economic downturns in the United States, the United Kingdom, and neighboring Sweden are deeper than currently anticipated. The composition of demand is likely to change with the improvement of the business climate. Mainland investment may recover, while private consumption demand may slow if the household savings rate picks up as expected. Offshore oil and gas activity will likely remain strong because of continuing field developments and increased exploration activity. With imports remaining buoyant, the high value of oil exports will likely make for significant current account surpluses and gradual reduction of Norway's net external debt.

INFLATION, WAGES, AND EMPLOYMENT:

Inflation and Cost of Living: Following belt tightening in 1987, annual Norwegian consumer price inflation (CPI) fell gradually to 4.1 percent in 1990, one of the lowest rates in the OECD. No near-term resurgence in Norwegian inflation is expected since persistent labor market slack will likely help moderate inflation, with Norwegian prices growing in line with the OECD average. This improvement notwithstanding, Norway has a poor record on inflation control, with annual CPI averaging 8 percent in the past decade, compared with only 4.6 percent in the United States. Periods of high inflation have been followed by Norwegian currency devaluation. There is a risk, therefore, that history may repeat itself if economic policies fail. One of the principal reasons for Norway's lack of industrial competitiveness, as well as the country's high cost of living, is the high inflation of past years. Despite slowing inflation since 1987, Norway's cost of living ranks near the top of the world list. The cost of living in Oslo is about 30 percent higher than in New York and greater than Stockholm or Copenhagen.

Wages and Working Hours: The GON set a wage freeze in the spring of 1988 (governed by the Incomes Regulation Act) which was subsequently extended to cover the year starting April 1, 1989, to curb run-away wages. As a result, average annual wage growth eased gradually to 5.8 percent in 1990, from 16.1 percent in 1987. With wage pressure easing, the wage freeze was abolished in the spring of 1990, and wages are presently determined by collective bargaining between management and labor. For 1991, the GON expects moderate wage growth (averaging 4-5 percent annually) and an absence of major labor unrest. However, some Norwegian industry analysts are less optimistic, considering past trends. As with inflation, Norway has a poor record of wage control, and in the past, industrial unrest has been disruptive. In the past decade, annual Norwegian wage growth averaged 9.1 percent, versus only 3.4 percent in the United States. Thus, despite recent moderate

wages, Norwegian wage costs remain among the highest in the world. Illustratively, hourly wages in Norwegian manufacturing averaged an estimated \$14.77 in 1990, compared with \$10.84 in the United States. Meanwhile, the average working week is short in Norway, having been reduced to 37.5 hours from 40 hours in 1987.

Unemployment and Labor Force: Unemployment reached a post-war record of 5.2 percent in 1990, reflecting the impact of increasing structural problems in industry (e.g., the fishing industry, shipyards, and mechanical engineering), as well as mounting overcapacity in some sectors (e.g., building construction and retail sales). Looking ahead to 1991 and 1992, modest growth in the mainland economy is unlikely to make significant inroads into the current level of unemployment because problems in industry will remain largely unresolved. Norwegian industry analysts expect that overcapacity in Norwegian building construction will last into the mid-1990s because of inadequate demand for dwellings and office space. While the present level of unemployment (some 5 percent plus of the labor force) is high by Norwegian standards, Norway's labor market remains tight from a European perspective, with the OECD (Europe) posting over 8 percent unemployment. In order to limit growth in unemployment, the GON has established public job-creation programs and enforces strict regulations on non-Scandinavian immigrant labor. In 1990, the Norwegian labor force numbered 2.14 million (56 percent of which was male) by mid-year out of a population of 4.24 million. The bulk of Norwegians employed (69 percent) were engaged in the services sector, followed by manufacturing (15.5 percent) and building construction (7.2 percent). Being capital intensive, the offshore petroleum sector and mining absorbed only 1-2 percent of total Norwegian employment.

NORWEGIAN EXTERNAL ACCOUNTS:

Significance of Foreign Trade: The Norwegian economy remains highly dependent on foreign trade. Illustratively, the country's combined merchandise exports and imports account for nearly 60 percent of GDP, compared with 16 percent in the United States. Petroleum dominates (over 40 percent), representing the bulk of exports. Thus, the value of Norway's exports tends to fluctuate along with world oil prices, while imports depend on domestic economic activity and variations in foreign exchange rates.

Directions of Foreign Trade: In terms of combined merchandise exports and imports, the United States is Norway's fourth single largest trading partner after the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Germany. The U.S. dollar depreciated 37 percent vis-a-vis the Norwegian krone between 1985 and 1990, and the weaker greenback has helped boost the U.S. share of Norwegian imports, which rose

to 8.1 percent in 1990, from a low of 6.4 percent in 1987. In the past decade, Norway has posted surpluses in its trade with the United States largely because of rising oil exports. In 1990 Norway's trade surplus with the United States was \$567 million.

Taken as a group, the EC remains Norway's principal trading partner. In 1990 the EC accounted for 65 percent of Norwegian exports and 46 percent of imports. The other Nordic countries remain important trading partners (20 percent of exports and 25 percent of imports), and trade with low-cost less developed countries continues to increase rapidly. Norway's trade with Eastern Europe remained miniscule, with the COMECON accounting for less than 2 percent of total Norwegian trade.

Looking ahead, it is difficult to envisage major near-term changes in Norwegian foreign trade directions, considering present policies and global economic trends. Nonetheless, Norwegian analysts speculate that Norway's trade ties with the EC will be moderately strengthened by an EEA agreement. Moreover, analysts remain hopeful that there will be a subtle increase in Norwegian trade with Eastern Europe. The United States will most likely retain its position in major niche areas, including aircraft and specialized oil equipment. Major factors that will determine the competitive position of the United States in other areas include the strength of the U.S. dollar, the U.S. marketing effort, and changes in Norway's trade with the European continent and the rest of the world.

Norwegian Exports by Category: Primary and semiprocessed goods continue to account for the bulk (nearly 80 percent) of Norwegian merchandise exports. The remainder consist of exports of machinery, equipment, and various manufactured articles. In 1990, Norwegian merchandise exports totaled \$34.2 billion: with petroleum accounting for 41 percent; metals 13 percent; chemicals and other raw materials 20 percent; and foodstuff (including fish), 7 percent. In addition to goods, Norway exported \$12.5 billion worth of services, 59 percent of which were shipping services. Meanwhile, Norwegian 1990 exports to the United States, totaling \$1,848 million, were dominated by crude oil, metals, chemicals, fish, and various semiprocessed and manufactured goods. Looking ahead, major changes in the composition of Norwegian exports appear likely in the near term, but petroleum exports may increase in prominence in the remainder of the 1990s if world oil prices hold and Norwegian natural gas deliveries to Europe increase.

Norwegian Imports by Category: In 1990, the bulk of Norwegian imports (59 percent) consisted of machinery, equipment, and other manufacturing goods; followed by industrial inputs (37 percent) and food and drinks (5.4 percent). Total 1990 imports stood at nearly \$27 billion. In addition to goods, Norway imported \$11.8 billion worth of services, of which 39 percent

were shipping services (e.g., repairs). Meanwhile, Norway's 1990 imports from the United States stood at \$1,281 million, with imports dominated by aircraft and parts (29.8 percent); data processing and office equipment (11.5 percent); other machinery and equipment (24.8 percent); other manufactures (12 percent); various chemicals and industrial inputs (16.2 percent); and food and drinks, including vegetables and fruit (5.7 percent).

Looking ahead, major near-term changes in Norwegian import patterns are unlikely, considering present policies. However, the EEA agreement and deregulation prompted by GATT pressure may gradually lead to deregulation of the Norwegian agricultural market, according to foreign trade analysts.

Norwegian Trade and Balance of Payments Trends and Outlook:

Helped by rising world oil prices following the Gulf crisis, the 1990 Norwegian foreign trade surplus rose strongly to \$7.2 billion, and the rising trade surplus caused the 1990 current account surplus to rise to \$4.1 billion. Looking ahead to 1991 and 1992, merchandise exports should become stronger if OECD growth recovers as currently anticipated. Merchandise imports should firm, with the GON's stimulatory policies contributing to the upturn. Official projections indicate that the Norwegian trade and current accounts will remain in surplus in both 1991 and 1992. A major down-side risk remains in the form of significantly lower world oil prices coinciding with weakening OECD growth.

Direct Foreign Investment in Norway: The total stock of direct foreign investment in Norway stood at over \$17.5 billion at end-1990 compared with only some \$5 billion at the time of the world oil shock in 1974, according to Norwegian statistics. Principal foreign investors were the United States (\$2.9 billion), the United Kingdom (\$3.7 billion), and Sweden (\$3.2 billion), although growth in the latter slowed because of recessionary tendencies in Sweden. The stock of U.S. direct investment in Norway remains concentrated in the petroleum and mining sector (over 40 percent), followed by the financial and business services sector (30 percent); manufacturing, notably chemicals and machinery (12 percent); and equipment production and the domestic trade sector (6 percent). Looking ahead, the outlook for direct foreign investment in Norway remains relatively encouraging, notably because of prospects for continuing expansion in the offshore petroleum sector. On the mainland, export-oriented industries (e.g., chemicals, metals, and shipping) will also look for foreign capital in order to expand and diversify in Norway and overseas. Foreign investment will also be encouraged in other Norwegian industries presently adapting their operations to increased deregulation and competition in the remainder of Scandinavia and the EC (e.g., the Norwegian financial services industry). But direct foreign investment will likely remain insignificant in Norwegian sectors

presently suffering from overcapacity (e.g., building construction) or other problems. As noted earlier, the GON has a relatively open attitude toward foreign investment and says it plans to ease remaining restrictions. Foreign direct investments remain restricted in several areas, however, (e.g., the Norwegian oil sector and the financial services industry), and prohibited in areas such as broadcasting and railways.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

The fall and the subsequent stabilization of the U.S. dollar since 1985 has improved the price competitiveness of U.S. products, and this situation should continue to help the United States to retain its position as Norway's fourth largest trading partner, unless the greenback strengthens more than currently anticipated. As in the past, Norway will need to import goods which are in short supply or not produced domestically. The Norwegian market will, therefore, continue to offer interesting opportunities for U.S. suppliers of specialized high-tech machinery and equipment (e.g., oil and gas technology and aircraft), various industrial raw material supplies, and food and other consumer goods. Apart from opportunities in trade, Norwegian offshore petroleum developments will continue to provide opportunities to U.S. investors, and liberalization of remaining foreign investment restrictions may attract U.S. investors to other areas. Major competitors in the Norwegian market remain the EC countries, Sweden, and low-cost producers in Asia and elsewhere. The existence of state monopolies and non-tariff trade barriers will likely continue to complicate U.S. exports in some areas ranging from communications equipment to fruit and vegetables, pharmaceuticals, and the provision of communications equipment.

The American Embassy in Oslo remains well-equipped to assist American business visitors. Working closely with the U.S. Department of Commerce, the Department of State and other Washington agencies, the Embassy provides services and information for the U.S. business community. There is a commercial library open to the public, and trade specialists are available to assist U.S. business visitors, as well as Norwegian agents, importers and end-users. U. S. exporters traveling to Norway on business who need help with entree into Norway's business community, are encouraged to call the Embassy Commercial Section for an appointment. In the United States, information about the Norwegian market is available from the Norway Desk, U.S. Department of Commerce, (202) 377-4414.

FACT SHEET U.S. EXPORTS TO NORWAY
(US\$ million)

<u>Category</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>Percentage Change</u>
Food, Drinks and Tobacco	76.4	106.2	39.0
Fruit and Vegetables	37.3	38.4	2.8
Fish	7.3	45.8	527.8
Grain and Products	25.3	15.0	-40.6
Drinks	3.5	4.1	19.4
Tobacco	15.2	13.9	-8.4
Raw Materials-Non-edible)	70.1	72.4	3.3
Oilseeds	46.2	41.6	-10.0
Ores	9.2	15.2	66.1
Energy (e.g., Coal and Mineral Oils)	53.2	65.4	22.9
Chemicals and Chemical & Products	107.1	105.3	-1.7
Inorganic & Organic Chemicals	53.3	25.8	-51.7
Pharmaceuticals	11.1	13.1	18.3
Plastics	10.3	15.6	51.4
Metals and Products	57.7	65.6	13.7
Machinery and Equipment	1,099.1	1,440.4	31.1
Industry Machinery	271.5	280.8	3.4
EDP and Office Machinery	240.4	250.4	4.2
Telecommunication Equipment	42.1	44.2	5.1
Electrical Machinery and Equipment	107.8	129.2	19.9
Road Vehicles	58.6	85.9	46.5
Aircraft and Other Transportation Equip.	378.6	649.9	71.6
Miscellaneous Manufactured Goods	236.4	261.1	10.5
Clothing and Footwear	11.8	15.2	28.5
Scientific and Technical Instruments	95.5	87.8	-8.0
Photographic and Optical Equipment	34.9	31.7	-9.2
Total U.S. Exports to Norway	1,756.6	2,182.9	24.3

Compiled from Norwegian foreign trade statistics. Differ somewhat from data provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce for statistical reasons.

Gro Harlem BRUNDTLAND
(Phonetic: BROONTlahnd)

NORWAY

Prime Minister (since 3 November 1990)

Addressed as: Madam Prime Minister

Gro Harlem Brundtland heads a minority government in the Storting (Parliament). She served as Prime Minister for eight months in 1981 and again during 1986-89. Labor Party chairman since 1981, Brundtland was reelected party leader at the national convention in March 1989. She was the opposition leader in the Storting until assuming her current position.

Under Brundtland's chairmanship (1984-87), the UN World Commission on Environment and Development published its findings on sustainable development in the book *Our Common Future*, more commonly known as the Brundtland Report. The commission held public hearings on five continents to gather information on projections for pollution, natural resources, environment, development, and human settlement through the year 2000. In 1988 Brundtland was nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize for her environmental work.

Brundtland was born on 20 April 1939. The daughter of a Labor Party official, she joined the children's organization of the party at 7. As a college student she helped found the party's University Student Organization. She received a medical degree from the University of Oslo in 1963 and a master's degree in public health from Harvard in 1965. Before entering politics in the early 1970s, she held various positions in medicine and public health. She was Minister of Environmental Affairs from 1974 until 1979. She took her seat in the Storting in 1979 and headed its Foreign Affairs Committee from 1980 until 1981.

Brundtland enjoys sailing and cross-country skiing. She speaks excellent English. Married to Arne Olav Brundtland, a research scholar at the Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute, she has three sons and a daughter.



7 November 1990

Meeting with Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland
November 11, 4:00 PM

Mrs. Brundtland will just have returned from the NATO summit. Norway supported US objectives in NATO discussions leading up to the Summit. Mrs. Brundtland stated after the summit that Norway was concerned not to be isolated and would support a stronger European pillar only on the condition that it not leave out non-EC NATO members.

Talking Points:

--Express appreciation for staunch Norwegian support of the Euro-Atlantic community concept and for the maintenance of a strong NATO

--Ask for Mrs. Brundtland's assessment of the summit

--Ask how Norway will fit into a European Security Identity

Norway is a strong supporter of CSCE and of the US proposal to expand the Office of Free Elections. There is support within some political parties for expanding CSCE into the security area by creating CSCE peacekeeping forces, but the government has expressed scepticism that the CSCE can be effective in the security area.

Talking Point:

--Ask Mrs. Brundtland to explain her vision of how the institutions of the new Europe should fit together, and in particular, what the CSCE's role should be

President Bush's nuclear initiative was extremely welcome to Norwegians who were particularly gratified by the decision taken on sea-based tactical nuclear weapons.

Talking Point:

--Ask for Mrs. Brundtland's views on the future of arms control

Norwegian leaders are greatly concerned about instability in the Soviet Union and frequently make the point that they will be the only NATO nation bordering the Russian Republic. They are particularly concerned about spill over from the Kola peninsula of pollution and possible flows of asylum seekers in the wake of economic crisis or political upheavals.

Talking Point:

--Discuss Norwegian and US views of events in the Soviet Union

**Prime Minister
Gro Harlem Brundtland**

**Opening address - CSCE Seminar on Democratic Institutions,
Oslo, 4 November 1991.**

**Mr. Chairman,
Distinguished participants,
Ladies and gentlemen,**

It gives me great pleasure to welcome you all to the opening of this important CSCE event. I take particular pleasure in welcoming the representatives of the Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania who have now regained their rightful place among the free and independent states.

Europe has undergone profound changes since the Final Act of the CSCE Conference was signed in Helsinki sixteen years ago. In times of confrontation and set-backs in East-West relations, the CSCE remained a forum of dialogue even if that dialogue at times was unproductive and stale, and Europe was divided by seemingly insurmountable ideological and political barriers.

But the belief endured that Europe could not in the long run remain divided by the Cold War and barbed wire. The firm conviction that suppression would one day have to yield to openness and pluralism remained alive. The widespread support of the CSCE process became a part of the struggle for enhanced human rights and democratic freedoms. Non-governmental organizations on both sides of the former East West divide used the CSCE and its principles as a platform and a legitimate outlet for their aspirations for the future.

Today, in a rapidly changing world, the CSCE remains the one institution that brings together all the countries of Europe and North America in a search for joint solutions to problems faced by all. It remains a key forum for arms control and crisis management. It remains a catalyst for peaceful change and a stronghold of stability.

The historic transformations that have taken place over the last few years have greatly enhanced the potential of the CSCE process. In Paris last year we all solemnly pledged a common commitment to human rights, democracy and the rule of law as the basis for our future cooperation. These rights and

principles remain the foundation of a Euro-Atlantic Community reaching from Vancouver to Vladivostok and from the Barents Sea to the Mediterranean.

The security situation in Europe has improved radically. The threat of a large-scale military confrontation has been significantly reduced as a result of the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe and a series of breakthroughs in arms control. The CFE Treaty will effectively eliminate the capability for major offensive operations and surprise attacks. The START Treaty and the recent initiatives of Presidents Bush and Gorbachev open up entirely new vistas in nuclear disarmament. The nuclear threshold will be significantly heightened and strategic stability strengthened.

However, in spite of all these heartening developments there is no cause for complacency as we ponder on the outlook for Europe in the nineties. Whereas the potential for joint action and joint solutions has been enhanced, the CSCE community is facing new challenges. There are less threats, but there are also new risks.

The protracted crisis in Yugoslavia is a tragic illustration of the kind of emergency and instability that can threaten European security in the future. It is totally unacceptable that the armed conflict continues in defiance of the untiring efforts of the European Community, supported by the CSCE. Those Yugoslav leaders who envisage a future for themselves in European politics must bear in mind that there is such a thing as a standard that must be met if they want to participate in European cooperation. No political objectives can justify what is now going on.

We, the 38, must be able to respond to present and future crisis situations, and we must do so at several interrelated levels.

Firstly, we must provide the CSCE with the means to become quickly involved in emerging conflicts as well as acute crises. Fundamental decisions must be taken at next year's CSCE summit in Helsinki. A broad range of CSCE crisis management procedures and mechanisms must be elaborated as a matter of urgency. Peace-keeping under CSCE auspices is in our view an option deserving careful consideration in this context.

Secondly, we must build a stable and sturdy, but above all cooperative, new security order. In the new Europe of the nineties, security can only be shared and common security. We must build on existing CSCE principles and documents and use other existing institutions to pursue a wide range of objectives. These objectives include market economies with a strong social dimension and a human face, free flow of thoughts and ideas as well as environmental excellence and sustainable development. NATO must remain a source of stability and cooperation. Its role must be adapted to changing realities. We must build interdependence, not least with regard to economic integration. The European Community and the new European Economic Area will increasingly be a centre of gravity which gradually must include more countries in steadily widening and deepening European cooperation.

A web of cooperation must be woven through this network of institutions that is strong enough to withstand the severest of tests and capable of both preventing and resolving conflicts. If we are to succeed in preventing a new poverty gap from dividing Europe, we must act quickly and with determination. Otherwise we may increasingly be facing unrest, aggression and violence. A comprehensive effort on the part of the affluent countries is required in order to support our partners in the new democracies. Social stability must be maintained while painful reforms are being implemented.

And thirdly, we must cooperate both within and outside the institutions we have created to consolidate democracy and expand its reach. Important as it is, crisis management alone cannot ensure stability and security. Democratic systems of government, the rule of law and respect for human rights are fundamental prerequisites if Europe shall truly be termed whole and free.

This is why Norway proposed holding this meeting. This is why we have been reinforced in our belief that joint efforts to shore up democratic institutions in the Euro-Atlantic area should be one of the key fields of CSCE cooperation in the nineties. Recent events, such as the aborted coup in the Soviet Union, have further underlined its importance.

Through a system of checks and balances, a stable democratic order ensures that no segment of society becomes all-powerful. It is a safeguard against oppression committed in

the name of authoritarian and all-encompassing ideologies. It protects the rights of the individual. At the same time, a firmly embedded democratic culture based on division of power and viable democratic institutions is a barrier against adventurist, aggressive foreign and security policies.

The new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe have come a long way in an amazingly short time. Basic political and economic reforms have been implemented. More are under way. The new democracies deserve and have a right to expect from their CSCE partners generous and consistent support for their efforts to build democracy.

No doubt, established democracies have gained experience that could be useful for those who have recently embarked upon this road. Yet it would be wrong to conceive of CSCE cooperation on democracy-building as a one-way street.

People who have been deprived of democracy probably know a lot more about its importance and significance than those who sometimes seem to have become all too used to having it. The "old" democracies have an important lesson to be learned from the democratic revolutions in Eastern and Central Europe: Freedom, democracy and human rights are values that cannot be taken for granted. They must be fought for. And, they are worth fighting for.

The unveiled ecological crisis in former totalitarian states show too clearly what can happen when governments exempt themselves from public criticism. People must have a right to information about activities which affect their environment or their health. People must have a right to participate in democratic decision-making and to speak up when their interests are trespassed upon. Partnership, participation and pressure from the people are the requisites of change and for sustainable development

Therefore, it is so vital that people use their democratic freedoms. We should not sit idle and let others make decisions for us. An active and informed population is the best line of defence against environmental degradation. So I say; take care of our common interests. Don't be sure that others will do it for you.

Democracy is not achieved once and for all. Democracy is a never-ending process. In this process, we must learn again

and again how to strike the right balance between the search for the common good and the rights and the freedom of the individual; between the principle of majority rule and the respect for the rights of the minorities; between the need for efficient decision-making and the need for broad and effective participation in the decision-making process.

Freedom, the rule of law and human rights cannot be taken for granted. As democracies mature and develop, some problems may be done away with, but new ones arise. There is no such thing as a perfect democracy. We must all be willing to subject our democratic systems to the critical scrutiny of ourselves and our partners.

Mr. Chairman, this seminar can make a lasting contribution to future of democracy in Europe. In addition to the actual findings and conclusions of the seminar, the bringing together of so many people from different walks of life will help creating the network that we need.

The problem is not a lack of clear standards and commitments. The Paris Charter and the Copenhagen and Moscow Documents, have provided us with a firm foundation of shared democratic values. Rather, what is needed are practical ideas, projects, measures and contacts between people who can make a difference in their own countries.

Finally, this seminar must also deal with the question of how the CSCE community is to organize and structure its future cooperation in the field of democracy-building and democratic institutions. The proposal to transfer the Warsaw Office of Free Elections into an Office for Democratic Institutions, which in fact could function as a Center for Democracy and Human Rights - is a key one in this regard.

Democratic institution-building is not exclusively a governmental responsibility. I would like to emphasize the importance that we as host country attach to the parallel NGO activities. Non-governmental organizations have always played an important role in the CSCE process. The new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe sprang mostly from independent civic movements such as Charta 77 and Solidarity. We would do well to seek advice and support from non-governmental organizations and involve them actively in our future cooperation in this area.

6

The tasks we are facing, in the CSCE and at this seminar, are daunting. We must secure the basic democratic values of the Euro-Atlantic Community.

Many of you have lived with fear for decades. Now is the time for freedom and opportunity. Democracy originated in Europe. For 2000 years Europe has been a laboratory of ideas that have gained ground on a global scale.

European nations have become linked together in a common destiny. With democracy also gaining ground where its roots are anchored on the thinnest soil, we can have a vision of Europe regaining its rightful role in the world. Democracy is no mere recent phase of human history. It is human history. And human history is being made now. Thank you.

SLUTT

CURRICULUM VITAE

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Born 28 April 1931

Graduated in law at Oslo University, 1957

Joined the Foreign Service 1958, various posts in the
Ministry, Bangkok, Paris (NATO) and London, 1958-71

Head of Division, Department of Legal Affairs, Ministry
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Deputy Director General, Department of Legal Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1973-76

Director General, Ambassador, of the Secretariat of the
Minister for the Law of the Sea, 1976-78

Ambassador, Adviser to the Foreign Minister on Northern
Area questions, in charge of negotiations with the
Soviet Union on maritime delimitation, 1978-80

Ambassadeur en Mission Spéciale, Special Adviser on
energy questions, Norwegian Representative to the
International Energy Agency, 1980-82

Ambassador to Chile, 1982-87

Special Adviser for Administrative Affairs, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 1988

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Mr. Vindenes is married to Barbara Vindenes



NORWAY INFORMATION

Some questions on Norwegian foreign policy

By Helge Loland, Editor, Norinform

What is the Norwegian attitude towards the following issues:

Global cooperation under UN direction?

In view of the ever-increasing number of common tasks facing the world community, the Norwegian government believes that a strengthening of global cooperation within the UN system is of vital importance. Sectors of particular significance are :

- a reinforcement of the UN apparatus for dealing with conflicts. This can be achieved through making more use of the Security Council, and through strengthening the role of the Secretary General, and through continued participation in the peace-keeping forces.
- support to the UN work of negotiating binding agreements on the most important sectors of global cooperation. An example of this is North/South cooperation, where Norway should continue to play an active role in working for generally agreed solutions to problems affecting the entire world community.
- tactive participation in the follow-up to the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development. The Norwegian government stresses in particular the need to institute a more binding cooperation on environmental issues, by measures such as the establishment of an ecological security council.

NATO cooperation?

During the post-war years Norway's geographical location has played a central role when foreign and security policies were formulated. As a result of Soviet policy, and of developments - particularly in eastern Europe - after WWII, Norway decided in 1949 to join NATO. The build-up of one of the world's biggest military bases on the Kola peninsula has underlined the fundamental importance of NATO membership for Norwegian foreign policy. Developments in weapons technology, in the naval sector for example, have further spotlighted the position of the northern areas in the strategic relationships between the superpowers. These factors have also made it important that Norway strive to maintain a correct, satisfactory relationship with its neighbour to the east, the Soviet Union.

The prime goal of Norwegian security policy is to safeguard the country's peace and freedom. Protecting Norwegian sovereignty and freedom of action,



Norwegian information

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this goal can best be reached through a binding defence and security cooperation with NATO allies.

Norway believes it is important to maintain NATO as a central Western forum for discussing defence and detente. The reason for this is twofold. First, Norway wishes to solve its defence problems in a cooperation with its NATO partners, and, second, it is interested in gaining insight into and influence over the foreign policy issues most directly affecting it.

Nordic cooperation and the Nordic Council?

The Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland) cooperate closely in most sectors of societal life. This broad, organized Nordic cooperation was initiated after the second world war. The Nordic Council - which was established in 1952 - is a joint forum of the collaborative efforts of Nordic parliaments and governments. In order to strengthen the cooperation between the five countries, the Nordic Council of Ministers was established in 1971.

Despite the members countries' differing security policies, the international aspects have in recent years brought more and more to the forefront when common Nordic cooperation issues are under discussion. The Nordic foreign ministers meet twice yearly, and their ministries cooperate in a variety of sectors. This collaboration is particularly close in the UN and the global cooperative organizations.

The Norwegian government is strongly in favour of upholding and developing all forms of Nordic cooperation.

Atlantic cooperation?

Norway is keenly interested in Atlantic cooperation. Its relationship to the USA can be termed a cornerstone of Norwegian foreign policy. It has also long enjoyed a close and satisfactory relationship with Canada. The US security guarantee covering the defence of Norway within the NATO framework, is particularly significant. The USA, by virtue of the weight it carries in the military, political and economic sphere, plays a leading role in international cooperation. Norway's relationship to the USA therefore influences many sectors of its foreign policy.

The East/West relationship and the CSCE process?

The improved relationships between the superpowers have already had favourable effect, and the East bloc lands' progress towards greater democracy has helped create an improved climate for international negotiations.

Norway aims to contribute to a further dismantling of the East/West divide in Europe. It believes that this can best be achieved through participation in talks on conventional armaments control, through expansion of the confidence and security creating measures enshrined in the documents from the Stockholm Convention of 1986, and through following up its stipulations on human rights, the right to human contacts, freedom of information and increased economic cooperation in sectors such as environmental protection.

The framework conditions for East/West contact that were negotiated during the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process, have also created a basis for increased bilateral connections with the countries of East Europe. In recent years Norway has enhanced this contact through the exchange of visits, round-table conferences and other measures.

Foreign policy cooperation between the EC countries?

Norway considers it important to keep up a continuous exchange of information and presentation of its views and interests through the established system of contact with the chairmanship of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), and also through active, bilateral diplomacy towards the individual EC countries.

The Council of Europe?

It is Norway's view that the Council of Europe will continue to play an active role in European politics, on account of its involvement in human rights issues, its specialist cooperation and its potential for contributing towards better East/West contacts in Europe. Norway supports the view that the countries of eastern Europe be allowed to participate in the work of the Council of Europe, in step with the progress these countries make in democracy and reform.

Disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation?

Norway will continue to support efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, to work for a complete, global halt in nuclear testing, and a ban on chemical weapons, and to support a build-up of international verification systems to ensure that disarmament agreements are respected.

At both regional and global levels, the prime task is to implement balanced disarmament measures, so that the resources now employed in armaments can be channelled into economic development.

During the last 15 years the northern areas have assumed increasing significance for Norwegian foreign policy. This is related to the establishment of economic zones in the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea, the issue of fisheries rights and the preservation of resources, matters relating to the Norway/Soviet demarcation line in the Barents Sea, and the growing military/strategic importance of the northern areas.

Norway's sovereignty over Svalbard, and Norwegian jurisdiction and administration on the archipelago – based on the Svalbard treaty of 1920 – contribute towards a strengthening of the polar dimension in Norwegian foreign policy.

Norway encourages the promotion of international scientific research cooperation in the Arctic. This is to be open to all lands with a genuine interest in Arctic research. It is proposed that the secretariat be located in Norway.

On the basis of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, and the conventions whose aim is to regulate the eventual utilization of resources, Norway intends to continue its involvement in the Antarctic.

International economic cooperation?

By means of international economic cooperation Norway wishes to promote the following:

- better coordination of the economic policies of the industrialized countries, in order to lay the basis for a stable economic growth and low inflation, and to combat unemployment and reduce the problems connected with international balances of payment.
- the establishment of a larger area of European cooperation between EFTA and the EC lands, partly with a view to exploiting common potentials and partly to counteract new economic dividing lines in Europe.
- the expansion of economic connections between East and West Europe.
- active Norwegian participation in international scientific and technological cooperation.
- a strengthening of cooperation on energy issues, with increased emphasis on a coordinated global energy policy.
- a furthering of the liberalization of world trade and an improvement of the international monetary system in order to secure more stable conditions for global trade and flow of payments. An example of this is the wish to create better trading connections for the poorer countries.
- an improved integration of environmental measures in international economic policies to promote a sustainable global development.
- a coordinated, long-term strategy aimed at reducing the debt problems of the Third World and at securing increased transfers of resources.

The Common Market?

Around 70% of Norway's exports go to the 12 member countries of the EC. Developments within the Market are therefore of vital importance to Norway.

Norway's goals in relation to European economic cooperation are closely related to the following:

- adjustment to the EC Single Market
- participation in scientific and technological cooperation.
- the establishment of a European Economic Space which embraces both the EC and EFTA lands.

The adoption of the European Single Administration Act in 1985 has served to strengthen, expand and deepen the integration process taking place in the EC. The Act will among other things, fulfil the goals of the Treaty of Rome on the fusion of national markets into a common market for goods, services, labour and capital.

The reaction of Norway and the other EC lands to the challenge of the Treaty of Rome was, initially, to safeguard the development of free trade. But this integration model is no longer adequate to meet the challenge of the EC. If Norway and the other EFTA members do not adapt to the new EC rules, Norway's competitive ability in the Common Market can be impaired.

Norway's interests are safeguarded within the framework of a negotiating apparatus where the EFTA/EC cooperation forms a main platform.

The European Free Trade Association (EFTA)?

The prime objective of EFTA at its inception in 1959 was to establish a free trade area for industrial goods. In recent years the cooperation has been marked by the dynamic development taking place within the EC. The final breakthrough for a new and intensified cooperation concept between EFTA and the EC was made during a joint ministerial meeting in Luxembourg in 1984. A main goal was to set up a large area of European cooperation, the European Economic Space, between EFTA and the Common Market.

EFTA is today a main instrument in negotiations with the EC on issues such as adjustment to the inner market.

Norway believes that the EES should be regarded as a dynamic concept, which will alter in content in step with developments in the EFTA/EC cooperation.

Environmental protection, the social dimension, and education are new sectors which Norway has accorded high priority within the EFTA/EC framework. Emphasis will also be placed on expanding cooperation in other sectors which are important for Norway, such as agricultural policies.

Following up the EFTA/EC process will be a major task for Norwegian foreign policy in the coming years.

The OECD is a central organ for the discussion and appraisal of the economic policies of the member countries. Furthermore, it is the most important international forum for debate on shipping policy. Therefore, in Norway's opinion it is a significant instrument of foreign policy. For Norway, which stands outside the EC, membership also provides an opportunity to exert some degree of influence on international framework conditions, to which the EC too must adapt, particularly in relationships with the USA and Japan.

Structural policy in the widest sense of the word has been on the OECD agenda since the early 1980s. Norway finds it natural to strongly stress the human, social and regional policy aspects of structural adjustment in particular.

Norway will also place increasing emphasis on cooperation in sectors such as environmental protection, the management of resources and development.

The General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs (GATT)?

GATT is the central, multilateral framework of regulations governing international trade. It also functions as the main forum of negotiations on the removal of trade barriers.

An important goal for Norway, in connection with participation in the so-called Uruguay round, which started in 1986, is to bring to an end the increasing protectionism and bi-lateralization of trade, by means of a revised and strengthened set of international rules.

Norway's viewpoint is that trade in agricultural goods is perhaps the most important single item under debate.

A meeting in Geneva in April of 1989 brought accord on a framework for the long-term negotiations on the liberalization of trade in agricultural goods and the reduction of subsidies and import restrictions.

The Norwegian authorities face major challenges when the concrete terms of these agreements are to be laid down. Self-sufficiency in food supplies, the environment, regional policy and social considerations are core factors in the formulation of Norwegian agricultural policies.

From a Norwegian viewpoint it is important to try to strengthen GATT. On account of its open foreign economy, Norway is best served by an international trade cooperation which is subject to a binding and agreement-regulated set of rules based on free trade.

UNCTAD and the North/South dialogue?

Norway considers the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to be a central element in the North/South dialogue. The major part of UNCTAD's work in recent years has centred around economic analyses and discussions of economic issues in the North/South relationship. In coming years the main emphasis will be placed on an integrated treatment and analysis of structural problems in the economic relations between industry and the developing countries.

Norway has had a long-standing involvement aimed at promoting the interests of the least developed lands. This work will continue, both in UNCTAD and other organs.

Another goal for Norway is to work for increased emphasis on the concept of sustainable development, and that the concept be incorporated in those situations where it can contribute towards practical results.

International cooperation on energy?

As Norway has no nuclear power plants, its international interests in the energy sector largely revolve around petroleum. One exception is Norway's keen interest in the safety of nuclear power plants in other countries.

Due to the lack of more organized international cooperation on petroleum issues, a major part of contact activities and the development of the oil market is effected bilaterally. In years to come this will make strong demands on a vigorous Norwegian oil policy. Countries in the EC area, which currently purchase Norway's entire gas production, and buy 75% of oil exports, will probably be important working partners and purchasers of Norwegian petroleum in the future too. But on the longer term Norway hopes to do business with other European lands and with the USA.

In the coming years Norway will press for active measures to make environmental considerations an integral part of international discussion on energy policies.

Norway's relationship to OPEC and the IEA?

As there is no global organization for cooperation in the petroleum sector, Norway has pursued its oil policy objectives mainly through the International Energy Agency (IEA), an organization of oil-importing countries in the OPEC region. Bilateral contact has also been established with the oil-producing countries and the OPEC secretariat.

Norwegian participation in the IEA will be given high priority in coming years, out of consideration to both foreign and petroleum policy objectives. One important task will be to direct more attention to the member countries' long-term security of delivery and supply situation.

As a Western industrialized country Norway neither will nor wishes to apply for OPEC membership. Nevertheless, out of consideration to Norway's national interests as a petroleum exporter, it is necessary to further develop good, and regular contact with central market participants, both OECD countries and others.

Developments in the security policy situation, in the EFTA/EC process and in tasks requiring global involvement create tasks which in Norway's view must also be dealt with in bilateral relationships with other countries. A determined effort to implement the main goals of Norwegian foreign policy calls for the use of both multilateral and bilateral measures.

In both foreign policy and economy, Norway has considerable interests tied up in the western industrialized countries. Through the process of internationalization an increasing share of contacts with these countries is arranged directly with the relevant authorities, and through economic connections in the private sector. However, this does not prevent the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from playing a central role in the preparatory and establishment stages of a new cooperation, and in the further processing of issues relating to overseas economy and shipping policies.

Contacts with the countries of eastern Europe are more often effected through the central authorities and through diplomatic channels. However, as these countries gradually adopt pluralistic and more open political and economic structures, this situation may change.

Norway also has interests in countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The task of promoting Norwegian foreign policy and economic interests, Norwegian initiatives for assisting towards peaceful solutions to regional conflicts, and work on international development and environmental problems necessitate good bilateral contacts with countries on these continents.

The rapid, major changes on the international arena make ever increasing demands on flexibility in utilizing the resources that Norway puts at international disposal. This applies especially to the political situation in the developing countries. Therefore, the Norwegian government wishes to propose the establishment of a fund for democracy, development and national independence. This will increase the potential for rendering rapid financial aid to a country which after having gained its freedom, toppled a dictatorship or fought a war, is left in a state of crisis, entirely dependent upon external financial aid.

South Africa?

The government's guiding principle is that Norway maintain contacts with every country in the world. The problem, however, is how to react towards states which do not respect international norms and obligations in sectors such as human rights, thereby triggering sanctions or calls for isolation. As a general rule Norway will assess sanctions only as part of a common, multilateral action. Full international isolation can often contribute towards polarization or a fast-freezing of standpoints rather than stimulating dialogue and development. Nevertheless, long-term developments in some countries clearly demonstrate that all attempts at dialogue and contact are doomed to failure. The apartheid regime of South Africa is a case in point.

South Africa is the only country in the world where racial origin determines political rights. In Norway's view the apartheid system violates the most fundamental rights of freedom and equality. This is why Norway takes part in the international trade boycott of South Africa. Furthermore, Norway has repeatedly condemned the South African government's aggressive policy towards its neighbour states.

Namibia, which for a number of years has been a mandate under South Africa, must be accorded its rightful place among the nations of the world. Free elections have taken place under UN control, and Namibian refugees in Angola and Zambia are now returning to their homeland.

During the transition phase, and immediately after independence, extensive practical support from the international community is a necessity. Norway has supplied men for a UN police unit.

Norway maintains close contact with other countries - mainly the Nordic ones, and through the UN - so as to give Namibia the best possible political, economic and development aid assistance. A special departmental working group is following developments and assessing the role that Norway can play in the Namibia process.

Human rights and other humanitarian issues?

The work of improving international protection of the rights of the individual and of vulnerable groups has a central position in Norwegian foreign policy. Specially important are:

- strengthening of international norms and protection by way of human rights agreements, and systems for international surveillance to ensure compliance with treaty obligations. Norway believes that global surveillance should be UN directed and regional surveillance be effected through CSCE-established mechanisms and through the European Convention on Human Rights.
- the strengthening of international protection of the status of indigenous peoples and minority groups.
- safeguarding the human rights of the handicapped.
- a continuation of Norway's international efforts to secure sexual equality and an improvement of the status of women.
- an active contribution towards solving the world's refugee problem.

The work of improving the legal protection of the indigenous peoples throughout the world has been a central element in Norway's human rights involvement.

It is important to ensure that development and establishment measures pay due consideration to the special situation of the indigenous peoples, and that they do not have unfortunate consequences for their economic, social and cultural rights.

Norway believes in continuous financial support to the task of documenting the situation of the indigenous peoples, as well as assisting their organizations in their endeavour to set up a worldwide network.

Norway wishes to aid international human rights organizations who focus on the situation of the indigenous peoples. In cooperation with Norwegian Sami organizations it has contributed to the formulation of international rules of law for these peoples.

Refugees and asylum seekers?

A special concern for refugees has long been a core characteristic of official Norwegian policy. In addition, voluntary organizations have built up an extensive support apparatus which can be quickly pressed into service in refugee areas, and which plays a valuable part in the country's participation in international refugee work.

In an international context Norway is one of the major contributors to refugee aid.

In response to the needs in this sector, Norway has set up the following goals for refugee work.:

- active participation in the UN and other international organs with a view to preventing conflicts and a subsequent mass exodus of refugees.
- humanitarian aid to catastrophe areas from which people are forced to flee.
- support to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in his task of procuring temporary housing, and arranging for voluntary repatriation and permanent settlement in new homelands.
- strengthening the legal protection of refugees

Norway is a permanent member of the High Commissioner's Executive Committee, and UNHCR is a main channel for Norwegian aid to refugees. An annual quota of 1,000 refugees makes Norway an important ally in the High Commissioner's resettlement programme. Of European countries only Sweden accepts more quota refugees than Norway. In addition to the quota come a considerable number of family reunions.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees is a Norwegian, former minister of foreign affairs in the Labour government, Thorvald Stoltenberg.

Up to 1985 very few asylum seekers and spontaneous refugees came to Norway. The growing number of people seeking asylum in Western Europe, combined with more restrictive immigration laws in other European countries has changed this picture. Norway expects a large influx of refugees in the next few years.

Equal status and the situation of women?

Equal status between men and women is a prime goal of Norwegian policy. The following plans are included in the guidelines for Norway's international work in this sector:

- a comprehensive documentation of the international obligations that Norway has taken on in order to promote equal status and the rights of women (issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1988).
- the preparation of a plan to promote equal status between the sexes in multilateral organizations.
- giving preference to women from the developing countries when filling positions in international organizations
- emphasizing the needs and rights of both sexes when granting funds to emergency relief and to refugee work.

The role of women in the development process of the Third World countries is also an important sector of Norway's international efforts to promote sexual equality.

Future international tasks include an assessment of equal status issues in connection with adjustment to the EC, which is also working on these matters.

Development Aid?

Since development aid was first granted in 1953, Norway's aim has been to play a part in improving the daily life of the most impoverished sectors of the community in the poorest developing countries. A bearing principle is that this aid is a gift.

Norway's national assembly, the Storting, has resolved that the Norwegian development aid budget is to be divided approximately equally between bilateral and multilateral aid, which is channelled through the UN and the World Bank.


For many years Norway has strongly emphasized the human rights situation in the countries with which it cooperates. But in the practical implementation of development work the accent is on Norway's role as a strong and constructive support in general democratic development.

All the projects and programmes within Norwegian development aid are now reviewed on the basis of whether they will strengthen the position of women, and, indirectly, of children. The same procedure is applied as regards environment versus development. Since the early 1980s Norway has topped the OECD list of member countries' contributions measured as a percentage of the GNP. (see diagram next page).

% of GNP 1.2

Development aid and national income

The diagram depicts net aid given by the members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), measured as a percentage of the GNP. The goal of the member countries is a net aid of 0.7%.



Environmental protection?

Not without reason, the UN World Commission on Environment and Development – which was chaired by former Norwegian Prime Minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland – stated in 1987 that the current pattern of economic growth imposes a strain on the environment of an extent that threatens the very foundations of existence for coming generations. A sustainable development requires continued economic growth, but the pattern of growth must be drastically altered. The challenges are overwhelming, but thanks to rapid technological development, ways of tackling the problem are available. However, this requires full-scale international cooperation.

One of Norway's main aims is to contribute towards a common solution of the world's ecological and resource problems. Global cooperation within the UN system is particularly important for the achievement of this goal. In line with the World Commission's recommendation to think globally and act locally, national environmental assignments are intimately linked to international obligations with regard to limitations on discharge into water, air and soil. This applies particularly to the serious regional and global pollution problems which can affect the climate, deplete the ozone layer, or cause acid rain and ocean pollution. On some points Norway wishes to go much further than the global and regional obligations stipulate, for example with regard to reductions in the discharge of sulphur dioxide and nutrients.

In recent years Norway has also signed a number of bilateral agreements with other countries regarding cooperation on environmental protection. An agreement with the Soviet Union on the solution of pollution problems along the two countries' common northern frontier is especially interesting. Other important bilateral agreements cover sectors such as warning of accidents at nuclear power plants, ocean pollution and acid rain.

The situation of children?

On 20 November 1989 the UN passed an important milestone when the General Assembly unanimously adopted an international convention on the rights of children; the "Children's Constitution" as it has popularly dubbed. For more than ten years tireless enthusiasts in many countries, including Norway, had worked on this issue, before the world organization could come to accord on a document entirely devoted to the rights and welfare of children.

The convention put down on paper the principle that every child should grow up in a safe and protected environment; a factor which should be the automatic birthright of all the world's children. But, naturally, the unanimous resolution of the assembly did not imply that with one single stroke all would be well. Children all over the world will continue to be abused and neglected, to starve and suffer, and to be sent as child soldiers to die in wars that are not of their choosing.

The next step in the campaign to better the status of children will be to persuade each individual country to bring its legislation into line with the articles of the convention. Norway wishes to give maximum support to this work.

A just solution to the Middle East conflict must in Norway's view be based on the UN pact, the Security Council's resolutions 242 and 338 of 1967 and 1973 respectively, and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people-including the right to self-determination - with all that this implies.

- the seizure of territories by force can thus not be accepted.
- Israel must withdraw from the occupied areas.
- all states in the area have the right to live in peace within secure and acknowledged boundaries.
- an international peace conference under UN auspices should be convened soon. All affected parties should take part. The conference should be a forum for binding discussions whose aim is to arrive at a comprehensive and just solution.
- none of the participants must adopt measures which can make efforts to find peaceful solutions even more difficult. The Israeli settlement policy and other aspects of Israeli conduct in the occupied areas are illegal by international law, and must cease.
- the establishment of a Palestinian state must be possible as part of a comprehensive solution to the conflict.

International terrorism?

The problem of international terrorism was on the agenda of the UN for several years, though the General Assembly was unable to reach accord on a clear condemnation. However, a breakthrough was made during the 40th General Assembly. The decisive factor was the hijacking of the Italian passenger ship "Achille Lauro" in 1985. The president of the Security Council denounced all forms of terrorism, regardless of where they took place and by whom they were perpetrated. Norway regarded this as an important statement, and at the 40th General Assembly, following lengthy consultations, a proposal for a resolution containing a similar denouncement was brought forward and passed unanimously.

During the debate on the issue certain countries wished to concentrate on the underlying causes of terrorism. Norway pointed out that such a discussion could contribute towards a justification of terrorism. In Norway's opinion international law, as cited in article 2 of the UN pact, already enshrined a clear ban on the use of force or threat against the territorial integrity or political independence of other states.

The Security Council has subsequently adopted a denunciation of all those who take hostages. The UN now seems to have developed the necessary resolution and unity that are needed to make an effective contribution in the struggle against terrorism. Norway sees this as positive, in that a cooperation in this sector should have as international a character as possible, and take place independent of traditional East/West and North/South constellations.

NORWAY - COMMERCIAL HIGHLIGHTS

From 1826 to 1910 Norway gave to America a larger portion of her people than any other country, except Ireland, during the great immigration. In total more than 850,000 Norwegians left their homes and country to make a new life for themselves and their families. This is very important as strong U.S. links help the U.S. in our effort to trade with Norway.

Norway is a good friend and an excellent trading partner of the U.S. With only small trade irritants, U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service has been able to dedicate its efforts toward trade promotion. Commercially Norway is more important than its size and population would indicate.

Norway, from its earliest history, continues to be a nation highly dependent on world trade. Exports include petroleum, light metals, forest and fish products, plus a variety of manufactured finished goods. Shipping is another important industry; fifth in the world with nearly 1000 ships. This is particularly important to the U.S., as Kloster, Royal Caribbean Cruise Line and Seaborne Cruise Line operate out of Florida port, with 10 ships, one the Norway, the world's largest cruise liner.

North Sea offshore oil production is Norway's major export. This is a giant industry, today with 17 operating fields. Production rose sharply in 1989 from 1.16 million barrels/day increasing to 1.56 million barrels/day. 1/3 of Norway's estimated USD 23 billion exports is petroleum.

Investment in this Offshore North Sea oil sector also is in the billions. Four U.S. major oil companies have operations; their investments alone are valued at approximately USD 8 billion. The U.S. is the major foreign supplier to this oil industry. This area is particularly important for exports from the states of OK, LA, TX, CA.

The U.S. is Norway's largest foreign investor. Nearly 200 U.S. companies have subsidiaries. Most are in the oil sector. One company, NL Industries, is also one of Norway's major exporters, shipping around \$350 million/yr of titanium dioxide. At least 10 U.S. companies have set up Norwegian operations in the last two years. Food franchisers, such as McDonalds and Burger King, and other, such as Pearl Optical also recently have started up operations.

In 1988, selected Norwegian corporations with support from the GON, invested in the EPCOT Norway Pavilion. This has been a wonderful showcase for products from Norway and an excellent vehicle to promote tourism to the U.S. In 1988 for the first time, over 100,000 Norwegians visited the U.S.

Norwegian investments are all over the U.S. For the example Dyno Corp. purchased the Hercules Powder Division from Dupont. Norcem has cement operations on the East Coast; Norsk Hydro has leased aluminum reduction plants in OR & WA. MN, WI & WA. with the large number of Scandinavian descendants continues to be favorite areas for Norwegian investments. Norway's major trading partners in order are; Sweden, West Germany, UK, U.S., Denmark and Japan. U.S. exports to Norway for the first time in 1989 climbed to over U.S. \$1 billion. Export growth has been in excess of U.S. 100 million in each of the last two years. U.S. major exports are: aircraft and parts; EDP equipment and software; North American built automobiles, vans, light pick-up & trucks; office equipment - plus small orders of just about anything and everything.

U.S. Embassy's US/FCS is very active in staging single company promotions, new products catalog shows and in sponsoring a U.S. pavilion at the Offshore Northern Seas Exhibition (ONS). ONS will be held this year in Stavanger, Norway, the last week of August. It is the world's largest oil and gas show hosting over 30,000 professionals and more than 700 exhibits.

Norway is a good market for U.S. exports. Import restriction are minimal and Norwegian businessmen are English speaking and receptive to U.S. products and services. Best prospects for U.S. companies are: oil and gas field equipment, EDP and computer software, telecommunications, process controls, electronic components and healthcare products. Also there is market for fast food franchising, high fashion, and new products.

1990



FACT SHEET

MOD NORWAY

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NORWEGIAN PARTICIPATION IN UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Introduction

Norway's involvement in UN peacekeeping operations stretches back almost as far as the United Nations itself. Norwegian authorities have defined support to such operations as one of the Armed Forces' main tasks. About 30 000 Norwegians have served under UN command, divided between the UN forces and observer corps. The largest peacekeeping operation to date in terms of Norwegian participation has been our country's contribution to the UN peacekeeping force in South Lebanon (UNIFIL). Norway is among the countries with the largest number of military personnel at the disposal of the United Nations. The present Norwegian contingent numbers 889 officers and men, and is the biggest in UNIFIL. Almost 22 000 Norwegian men and women from all branches of the Armed Forces and the Home Guard have served in Norwegian military units in UNIFIL. The peacekeeping forces are under the command of the Secretary General of the United Nations. National authority is restricted to personnel management, disciplinary issues and some logistics.

THE UN APPARATUS FOR SOLVING CONFLICTS AND HANDLING CRISES

Norway member
of the UN in
1945

It was natural for Norway to become a member of the United Nations in 1945 after five hard years of war. The main purpose of establishing the United Nations was to maintain international peace and security. Ever since 1945 it has been an important element of Norwegian foreign policy to work to strengthen the UN apparatus for solving conflicts

and handling crises.

The weakness of the collective system of security which the UN Charter is intended to guarantee is its inadequate ability to avert war. On the other hand, the Security Council has become a more valuable body for solving conflicts.

In line with Norwegian tradition

Norway's participation in UN operations conforms with our best humanistic traditions. It is inspired by the principle that it is totally unacceptable to occupy the territory of another country. The UN peacekeeping forces are an instrument for solving conflicts that have already occurred.

UN peace-keeping operations

UN peacekeeping operations have been an important instrument for the Security Council in its efforts to limit international conflicts. It is here that Norway and the other Nordic countries have been able to contribute most towards the work of the United Nations. UN forces have been proven valuable, and the large majority of nations are agreed that these peacekeeping forces are the UN's most important institution for maintaining international peace and security. The United Nation's efforts to preserve peace and security are valued highly the world over. The UN peacekeeping forces received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988.

Different from other forces

THE PEACEKEEPING FORCES AND THE OBSERVER CORPS

UN peacekeeping forces differ from ordinary military forces in several ways. Their ability to avert war is not a result of their combat capability, but of their status and authority as representatives of the international organization, the United Nations. The UN forces are an expression of the collective will of the majority of the nations of the world. The UN forces shall not take sides in a conflict. They shall be impartial, and shall not force the contenders to bow to an external will. They shall help to promote trust between the conflicting parties, so that the negotiations have a chance of succeeding.

Experience best from operations based on a previous agreement

Experience has shown the UN forces to be of greatest value when deployed on the basis of a binding agreement between the conflicting parties. The UN forces have had a far more difficult task when there has been no previous agreement, or when the parties have been incapable of keeping such an agreement.

**Nordic
cooperation**

Ever since the 1950s there has been close Nordic cooperation on UN peacekeeping operations. Iceland has no armed forces, and does not contribute to the peacekeeping efforts. In 1959, the then Secretary General asked Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland to consider earmarking contingents for service under the United Nations.

The Ministers of Defence of these countries meet twice a year to discuss matters affecting the contingency forces. A special Nordic coordinating group makes preparations for the meeting of Ministers, plans courses for Nordic UN personnel and exchanges experiences from service with the UN forces. Norway is responsible for a joint Nordic course (UNLOC) on logistics (supplies) and communications (transport).

**The arrange-
ment formally
approved in
1964**

The present contingency force was formally established on 8 June 1964 when the Storting (the Norwegian National Assembly) adopted Proposition no. 61 (1963-64). After various updating, the decision now refers to 1 330 persons, including an observer corps of 44 officers. It is an assumption that the Norwegian contingency force is composed of volunteers who can be called up at short notice for service anywhere in the world.

The system is that, following a request from the UN, the Government can make Norwegian contingents available to the UN if the general situation so permits. In practice, it would be difficult to refuse a request from the UN to provide contingents for peacekeeping operations without having very good grounds for doing so. The UN has no stand-by forces of its own. It is the member countries of the United Nations who place such forces at the disposal of the organization.

UN observers

In addition to the peacekeeping forces, the system of UN observers has also been found to be a valuable instrument in connection with international conflicts. The main task of the UN observers is to monitor the actual situation in the area to which they are deployed and report on developments to the Secretary General.

**Deployment
areas**

Norwegian officers and men have served/are serving under UN command in the following observer missions and forces:

- 1947-52: United Nations Special Commission on Balkan (UNSCOB)
- 1948- : United Nations Military Observer (UNMOGIP) Group in India and Pakistan (Kashmir)
- 1948- : United Nations Truce Supervision (UNTSO) Organization (Palestine/Middle East)
- 1951-54: Norwegian Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (Korea) (NORMASH)
- 1956-57: United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) (Gaza)
- 1958 : United Nations Observer Group (UNOGIL) in Lebanon
- 1960-64: Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC)
- 1963-64: United Nations Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM)
- 1978- : United Nations Interim Force (UNIFIL) in Lebanon
- 1988- : United Nations Iran/Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)
- 1989- : United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM)

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF UN PERSONNEL

Impartial and independent

All persons wishing to serve in UN peacekeeping forces must sign a contract. This contract requires each person to avoid any actions which may be conceived as unfortunate in the light of the obligation of the peacekeeping forces to remain impartial and independent and to respect the norms and laws of the host country and neighbouring states. Norwegian military personnel serving with the UN forces receive various supplements to their normal pay.

THE CONFLICT IN LEBANON AND THE DEVELOPMENTS LEADING UP TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF UNIFIL

Lebanon is the focal point of the complicated conflict in the Middle East, and the Middle East is where most of the UN peacekeeping forces have been deployed.

Civil war

In Lebanon, political and religious dissension became particularly acute in the early 1970s. Total civil war broke out in 1975. When the civil war ended in 1976 the country was unable to produce an effective government. Since 1976 the country has become increasingly split into independent Christian and Muslim sectors.

Israeli
invasion

The situation in South Lebanon tended to undermine international security and raised the level of tension in the area. About 15 000 Palestinian guerilla soldiers were camped between the River Litani and the Christian enclave north of the border with Israel. The distance to Israel was short, and Palestinian guerilla units took advantage of this situation to attack Israel and the Christian communities living along the border with Israel. On 14 March 1978 Israeli forces crossed the border and invaded Lebanon.

UNIFIL was
established

The Israeli invasion created a situation which could threaten world peace. At the request of the Lebanese Government the matter was brought before the UN Security Council. On 25 March 1978 the UN requested Norway to participate in a UN peacekeeping force. Since March/April 1978 Norway has been represented in UNIFIL by one battalion and several supporting elements.

UNIFIL's
mandate

UNIFIL's mandate is to assure the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, to establish peace within the its area of operation, and to help the Lebanese Government to again establish effective control in the area. Unlike operations by other UN forces in the Middle East, the UNIFIL operations were initiated without the conflicting parties having entered into any binding agreement in advance.

Israeli
reservations

Israeli did not directly oppose the establishment of UNIFIL, but had certain reservations against the formulation of the UN resolution which provided the basis for the establishment of this force. It is also fairly evident that Israel has not accepted the interpretation of UNIFIL's mandate adopted by Lebanon and the Security Council. This applies in particular to the assumption that Israel should withdraw from the area that was occupied during the intervention, right down to the Israeli-Lebanon border, and hand over this area to UNIFIL.

DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF UNIFIL

Israel withdrew her forces from Lebanon on 13 June 1978, but the Israelis handed over their military positions to the so-called "de facto"-forces of the falangists (later changed to SLA - South Lebanese Army).

The situation
in 1982

When Israeli forces again invaded Lebanon in the summer of 1982, they advanced through UNIFIL's area of operation. This placed the UN forces behind the Israeli lines.

The situation in 1985

The circumstances changed again when, in 1985, Israel completed its partial withdrawal from Lebanon. Israel established a "security zone" controlled by the South Lebanese Army (SLA), which is dependent on support from Israel. This zone passes right through UNIFIL's area of operation, which means, inter alia, that the whole Norwegian battalion (NORBATT) is located within the "security zone". Thus UNIFIL's area of operation is unable function as a buffer zone as originally intended. UNIFIL was meant to establish a buffer zone by deploying forces right down to the international border between Israel and Lebanon, and in a continuous belt along this border.

UNIFIL surrounded

UNIFIL is thus wedged between Israeli or Israeli-supported forces on the one side and Lebanese groups on the other. This means that UNIFIL is sometimes in the line of fire and is confronted with one of more of the conflicting parties.

UNIFIL 12 years after

The UN force is still in Lebanon - 12 years afterwards. UNIFIL has not managed to fulfil its mandate. Nor does it seem likely that it will do so in the near future. However, the forces have been a considerable help in maintaining stability and a fairly peaceful situation in the area.

Ensures stability

A sign of this stability is a strong increase in population in the areas controlled by UNIFIL. In the NORBATT area alone the population has increased by 100% since 1978. The number of inhabitants, including the many who spend some parts of the year in the area around the Persian Gulf as foreign workers, has risen from 13 000 in 1978 to about 25 000 today.

Other countries' contribution to UNIFIL

Countries other than Norway with their own battalions in UNIFIL are Finland, Ghana, Fiji, Ireland and Nepal. Sweden, France, Italy and Ireland have units in Naqoura, the site of UNIFIL headquarters. Naqoura lies outside UNIFIL's grouping area, close to the border with Israel (see map on last page).

THE NORWEGIAN UNIFIL CONTINGENT

The Norwegian contingent at present includes:

- A staff unit at UNIFIL headquarters
- A UN battalion, with staff, headquarter company and 2 rifle companies (NORBATT)
- A maintenance company (NORMAINTCOY)
- A military police unit
- A movement control unit
- Participation in Force Mobile Reserve/FMR - a mobile stand-by force whose task is to turn out to help battalions under pressure. Norway contributes about 30 men to this "emergency corps", which was established in 1987.

Enforcement of the mandate

NORBATT enforces the UNIFIL mandate by:

- preventing the parties from establishing themselves in the Norwegian area of operation
- keeping the conflicting parties apart
- ensuring peace, order and security for the area's inhabitants
- doing humanitarian work.

NORBATT isolated

NORBATT carries out these functions through so-called check-points (CP), observation posts (OP), patrols and turn-out forces. The whole of NORBATT is located within the Israeli-controlled area, and is completely isolated from the rest of the UNIFIL units. The area between NORBATT and the rest of UNIFIL is controlled by Israel.

Replacement every six months

Normally the Norwegian contingent is replaced every six months, assuming that UNIFIL's mandate is extended, and that the Government decides to continue to supply a contingent to the UN. The forces are replaced in groups at the turn of the months May/June and November/December.

UNIFIL'S BUDGET

The United Nations prepares a special budget for UNIFIL. All participating countries are refunded the same daily wage for military personnel. This means that countries with a high level of pay have to cover part of their own expenditures on wages. Countries with a low level of wages may be refunded more than they pay out to their forces. Norway's expenditures far exceed the sum budgeted by the UN. Furthermore, because some countries have not paid their contribution to the UN, neither has the organization been able to pay the compensation in full. At the end of 1989, the United Nations owed Norway NOK 260. million. NOK 40 million refers to Norway's participation in UNEF/GAZA, and the

rest to her involvement in UNIFIL.

Expenditures amounting to NOK 2.6 bill.

Up to 31 December 1989 Norwegian participation in UNIFIL has cost Norway a total of NOK 2.65 billion. By the same date the UN had refunded NOK 688 million.

Distribution of expenditures in the National Budget

Up to and including 1989, NOK 1 035 million has been paid from the Defence Budget. Before 1988 the Norwegian expenditures were divided equally between the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Development Cooperation and the Ministry of Finance. Since 1988 inclusive, all net costs have been covered through the Defence Budget. In 1989, NOK 297.3 million was budgeted for UNIFIL; it is assumed that, of this amount, NOK 60 million will be refunded by the UN. For 1990, NOK 297,2 millions is budgeted for UNIFIL and Norway expects the UN to refund NOK 82 million.

EXPERIENCE GAINED FROM UNIFIL

Valuable to the Armed Forces


The UNIFIL forces operate in a much more realistic environment than can be simulated during initial service or refresher training. This realism means that the personnel have to confront many more relevant military challenges and tests than they have to face in Norway in peacetime. This does not apply only to the technical disciplines, but also to commanders at team, troop, company and battalion level. Through Norway's involvement in UNIFIL, the personnel gain valuable experience, to the benefit of the Defence Establishment and, not the least, the mobilization forces.

Not only military experience

Participation in UNIFIL does not provide only military experience. United Nations service promotes a positive attitude towards the Defence Establishment, and helps us to place our own defence in a broader international and peacekeeping perspective.

Norway will continue her efforts

Norway intends to continue to contribute to the UN peacekeeping operations, and will work actively to make the United Nations as capable as possible of carrying out its task of maintaining peace and security in the world.



YUGOSLAV BILATERAL

TURKISH BILATERAL

DELEGATION OF TURKEY

MR. DARYAL BATIBAY, HEAD OF DELEGATION
MR. ERGUN OZBUDUN
MR. FERIDUN HADI BINIRLIOGLU
MR. BAKIR ALPAY GAGLAR
MR. TEKIN AKILLIOGLU
MS. AYSE OMUR SAGMAN, Secretary of the Delegation

also to be at luncheon hosted by the Commission

Mr. Omur Orhun, Turkey's Ambassador to Norway
Mr. Omur Solendil, Counsellor
Mr. Seyfir Islekcerci

BACKGROUND FOR TURKISH BILATERAL

POLITICAL UPDATE

In 1980, after a decade marked by political instability and extremist violence which killed thousands, Turkey's military wrested power from a civilian regime for the third time in as many decades. In 1983, the generals restored civilian power and elections were held, although limitations were placed on political figures associated with previous civilian rule. In 1987, as in 1983, Turks voted into power the Motherland Party, led by Turgut Ozal. On October 20, 1991, elections were again held, yet no party received a majority of seats in Parliament. Suleyman Demirel, Prime Minister on six previous occasions and twice ousted by the military, will head the new government. President Ozal's continued role in policymaking is now questionable.

Five parties will be represented in the new 450-member Turkish Parliament. As none received a majority, some type of coalition government will be formed, although this presents problems. The largest party in parliament (DYP), led by former Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, will have 180 seats. The former ruling party of President Ozal (ANAP) will have 113 seats. A left-leaning party (SHP), which garnered Kurdish support, won 88 seats, 22 of which went to Kurdish candidates. A Moslem fundamentalist group gained 62 seats, and another left-oriented group will have seven seats. Demirel is not expected to be a "friend of human rights". He is also known for his hardline positions vis-a-vis Kurds rights issues. Many are concerned that coalition politics will spur civil unrest and violence not unlike the anarchic periods preceding past military takeovers.

HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION

Turkey's rapid transformation into an industrialized and secular society has placed strains on its political, social, economic and military structures, resulting in unrest and three military takeovers in the past 30 years. Modern democratic institutions and respect for basic human rights have taken a firm hold in the Turkish political landscape, yet numerous statutes still reflect intolerance of various forms of non-violent expression and an unwillingness or inability to take decisive steps to deter mistreatment of detainees.

Allegations of torture remain widespread throughout Turkey. Since the military takeover in September 1980, Amnesty International estimates that over 250,000 people have been arrested on political grounds in Turkey, and most have been tortured. Human rights groups in and out of Turkey have received scores of reports of torture since Turkey signed the U.N. and Council of Europe Conventions on Torture in August 1988. The government has prosecuted few for torture related offenses, and punishments have been light. Most allegations of torture focus on the period of pre-trial detention when detainees are interrogated at police stations. Individuals have been held up to 30 days without access to lawyers and without being charged with specific crimes.

In April 1991 the Turkish Parliament enacted the "Anti-Terrorist Act", addressing a wide range of human rights and internal security issues. The legislation, accompanied by a high-profile public relations campaign, abrogated certain Penal Code Articles (141, 142, 163)

which restricted non-violent expressions, yet replaced them with equally restrictive laws. In addition, the law makes it more difficult to bring legal proceedings against officials accused of torture and detainees charged under the new law may only meet with lawyers in the presence of prison or police officials. Other articles used in the past to arrest journalists, leftists, religious fundamentalists, Kurds or others for exercising free speech remain in effect, including those which criminalize verbal assaults on the President, parliament or the integrity of the Turkish state. Legislation is being considered in Parliament to shorten the maximum period of pre-trial detention from 15 to 4 days, however, it is unlikely to become law before next year, if ever. In the past three years, groups have been established in parliament and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to examine human rights issues, although human rights groups charge that they have been ineffective.

Attacks on members of the Turkish Human Rights Association (HRA)-- the largest and most respected indigenous human rights watchdog -- have occurred recently, including four on Kurdish human rights activists and the offices of the HRA in Diyarbakir since August. Vedat Aydin, a HRA member and President of the Peoples Labor Party, was found murdered three days after being taken from his apartment by armed men. Official handling of the murder investigation has been criticized by human rights groups. Some claim that security forces have adopted "death squad" tactics.

KURDISH ISSUE

Kurds comprise about 12 million of Turkey's 54 million inhabitants and have lived in remote sections of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria and the Soviet Union for almost 1,000 years. The Kurds are Muslims but maintain a distinct language, alphabet and cultural forms. Since the establishment of modern Turkey in 1923, Kurds have faced pressures to assimilate and have been erroneously referred to as "mountain Turks".

In the past seven years, over 3,000 people have died in confrontations involving Kurdish separatist guerrillas and security. Operating from Syria, Iraq, Iran and hideouts in remote mountainous regions of southeast Turkey, insurgents incite the local population to rebel against Turkish rule, with mixed results. Eight southeastern provinces of Turkey remain under a State of Emergency under which the regional Governor has expanded powers to curb political and media activity. Local inhabitants are forced to choose between helping the guerrillas and risking violent reprisal by Turkish security forces, or not helping and facing the equally harsh retribution of the rebels. Villagers have been rounded up by security officials and subjected to beatings, mass arrests and intimidation. Locals thought by guerrillas to be sympathetic to Turkish authorities have been executed in cold blood.

Unprecedented meetings between Iraqi Kurdish leaders and Turkish officials, recent laws legalizing use of the Kurdish language, and continued development of the Greater Anatolia Project (economic development) are positive steps vis-a-vis Turkey's Kurds. Yet while the speaking of Kurdish, as well as Kurdish music and songs is now permitted, publishing and broadcasting in Kurdish remain prohibited. The Kurdish terrorist movement, supported now by Saddam Hussein, has led to increased instability in the Southeast and heightened security measures. The Turkish army recently entered Iraq and Iran to combat the PKK.

TALKING POINTS for TURKISH BILATERAL MEETING

OPENING

No nation is immune from civil and human rights problems, including the United States. As friends and supporters of Turkey, we feel that it is useful to discuss problems affecting our relationship. In 1989, during the Paris Human Dimension Conference, the U.S. Head of Delegation and I had the opportunity to discuss human rights issues with the Chairman of the Turkish delegation, Ambassador Iscen. [EES-chen]

PAST COMMISSION ACTION

The Commission has published two reports on Turkey, most recently in 1988. In August 1989, we visited refugee encampments near the Bulgarian border and in Diyarbakir, and toured the Ankara Closed Prison. Co-Chairman DeConcini, who led the delegation, was most grateful for the efforts of the government to allow access to the prison.

CONCERNS

KURDS

The Commission welcomes efforts to broaden ties with regional Kurdish leaders and parliament's decision to rescind the ban on spoken Kurdish. We are also encouraged by efforts to complete the Greater Anatolia Project, a series of dams which will greatly enhance the economic viability of the region's population.

We are concerned by escalating violence in Southeast Turkey and deplore terrorism employed by Kurdish separatists, however, it is imperative that the Turkish government balance internal security concerns with respect for the rights of its citizens in the Southeast.

Tactics of Turkish security forces have resulted in abuses of innocent civilians.

- There are reports of Kurds along the Iraqi border being forced to choose between guarding the village against terrorists or leaving their homes.
- Kurdish villagers have faced harsh and degrading collective punishment on suspicions that some aided the PKK.

Radio and television broadcasts in Kurdish remain illegal, as do Kurdish publications.

TORTURE

Widespread allegations of torture persist, especially during initial periods of detention.

It is my understanding that under "Anti-terror" legislation passed last April, the Interior Minister must give permission for charges to be brought against officials charged with torturing people accused of political violence. In addition, trials of such officials take place in State Security Courts, whose prosecutors supervise the interrogations where most allegations arise. Officials are not detained during their trials, and the law contains no provision requiring suspension from duty during the trials. In addition, police officers who interrogated suspects and witnesses covered by the law testify only in closed hearings. This law appears to make it even more difficult to prosecute torturers and is not indicative of a government determined to deal seriously with this issue.

ACCESS TO LAWYERS AND PRETRIAL DETENTION

The Commission receives numerous reports of individuals who have been denied access to lawyers. (See specific cases 1, 2, 3) Why doesn't the government enforce Article 136 of the Criminal Procedure Code which mandate access to lawyers?

Individuals are routinely held without charge for more than limits proscribed by Article 128/2 of the Criminal Procedure Code. (See specific cases 1 and 4) We hope parliament will pass legislation shortening pretrial detention to a maximum of four days.

POLITICAL PRISONERS

The Commission and independent human rights groups in Turkey and abroad believe that numerous political prisoners are incarcerated in Turkey for non-violent political expressions. (See specific cases 4 and 5) While "Anti-terror" legislation passed last April removed a number of Penal Code articles which criminalized certain non-violent expression, the new law contains similar provisions. The definition of terrorism in Law 3713 is sufficiently broad that, for example, any two people pressing for changes in the economic and social system of Turkey could be prosecuted. There is no requirement under the law that violent acts be committed.

SPECIFIC CASES

1. **Erol Ozpolat (OSE-poe-lot)** surrendered to police in Ankara last February, to prove his innocence, after learning he was wanted in connection with the January 30 assassination of a Turkish general. He was detained beyond the 15 day limit proscribed by Article 128/2 of the Criminal Procedure Code and was not allowed to meet with lawyers. The Bench in the Ankara State Security Court concurred with protest petitions that the Chief Prosecutor's decision to extend detention was improper, but stated that it was not competent to overturn it since protests against prosecutors can only be heard by the Ministry of Justice, which has failed to take action on this or numerous similar cases. He has been charged with three murders and is awaiting trial in Ankara Central Prison awaiting trial. Ozpolat has one functioning kidney. Prosecutors have asked for the death penalty. He claims to have been tortured repeatedly, and treated medically to diminish signs of mistreatment.

2. **Ibrahim Bingol (BEEN-goal)** and **Alp Aslan (AHS-lahn)** were detained last February and were not allowed to meet with attorneys. They are awaiting trial in Ankara Central Prison, charged with collaborating in an assassination. A prosecutor has asked that they be sentenced to death. Bingol is reportedly in poor health, and had only been released from prison in May 1990 while on trial for nine years before an Istanbul military court.

3. **Murtaza Kacmaz (KOCK-mahz)**, **Nilay Ergen Sen (SEHN)**, **Sengul Mete (MEH-teh)**, **Ali Kacmaz (KOCK-mahz)** and **Ali Kocgun (KOKE-goön)** were detained in May for activities associated with a violent left-wing radical group. They were not allowed to meet with lawyers and await trial at the Malatya E-type prison.

4. **Deniz Tetzell (TET-ZELL)** is a journalist for Gunes (GOO-nesh) newspaper who was detained on June 14, 1991 in Istanbul. Since 1980, she has followed, in her professional capacity, all trials in the Istanbul military courts since 1980. Documents and photos were seized from her files by arresting officials. She was transferred to the Ankara Central Prison and has had no formal charges filed against her. The U.S. Embassy has requested to meet with her.

5. **Senar Turgut (TOUR-goot)** is a film producer who was arrested while making a movie in Kurdish based on an ancient Kurdish love story. (The book was banned) He has been charged with membership in an illegal organization. His lawyers have been unable to meet him without police supervision. He awaits trial in the Van Closed Prison.

SOVIET INFORMATION

USSR

- Mr. S.S. Alekseev, Chairman of the USSR's Committee for the Constitutional Supervision, Head of Delegation
- Mr. V.A. Morozov, Deputy Head of Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Head of Delegation
- Mr. A.B. Azimov, Representative Azerbaïdsjan
- Mr. S.P. Simonjan, Representative Armenia
- Mr. S.S. Ogurtsov, Representative Bjelorus
- Mr. B.N. Negro, Representative Moldova
- Mr. V.I. Bahmin, Representative RSFSR
- Mr. V.N. Tchernega, Representative RSFSR
- Mr. A.H. Saidov, Representative Usbekistan
- Mr. E.M. Prokhorov, Deputy Head of Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Mr. V.V. Trofimov, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Mr. V.A. Anisimov, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Mr. E.N. Efimov, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Mr. V.M. Gorbunov, Member of the Committee for Constitutional Supervision
- Mr. Iouri Petzovich Chiche Kotchine
- Mr. Arkadi Jossiforitch Vaksberg

TALKING POINTS AND QUESTIONS

-- THE DEVOLUTION OF POWERS FROM THE CENTER TO THE REPUBLICS RAISES ALL KINDS OF QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES.

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE TODAY FOR PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PEOPLE LIVING ON THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER USSR? DO THE ALL-UNION KGB AND OVIR HAVE ANY REAL INFLUENCE ANYMORE ON THE FATE OF REFUSENIKS? OR SHOULD WE IN THE WEST BE DEALING EXCLUSIVELY WITH REPUBLIC INSTITUTIONS?

WILL REPUBLICS HAVE THEIR OWN LAWS ON EXIT AND ENTRY? WE HAVE HEARD REPORTS OF CENTRAL ASIAN OFFICIALS TELLING PEOPLE THAT THEY WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE UNTIL THEY PAY FOR THEIR EDUCATION.

-- THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO THIS MEETING INCLUDES REPRESENTATIVES OF 6 REPUBLICS, AS WELL AS THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY AND OTHER CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS.

CONSIDERING THE ONGOING DISINTEGRATION OF THE FORMER USSR AND THE SHAKY POSITION OF THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, COULD THIS BE THE LAST CSCE MEETING WHERE THERE WILL BE A SOVIET DELEGATION? MIGHT THERE BE SEPARATE DELEGATIONS FROM VARIOUS REPUBLICS AT HELSINKI?

-- LAST SEPTEMBER IN MOSCOW, VLADIMIR LUKIN, CHAIRMAN OF RUSSIA'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE TOLD ME THAT ALL THE REPUBLICS ARE ALREADY MEMBERS OF CSCE, AS THE USSR SIGNED ON THEIR BEHALF. DO YOU CONSIDER THIS INTERPRETATION PROPER AND ACCURATE?

-- WHAT STRUCTURES OR MECHANISMS WILL ENSURE THAT THE SOVIET REPUBLICS PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS AND IMPLEMENT HELSINKI COMMITMENTS, BEFORE THEY FORMALLY BECOME MEMBERS OF CSCE?

-- DO THE REPUBLICS OF THE FORMER USSR CONSIDER THAT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AGREED TO IN THE CSCE WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ARE BINDING ON THEM?

The Former USSR

Political Situation

The powerful centrifugal forces unleashed by the failed August coup continue to hold sway in the former Soviet Union. Turkmenistan voted overwhelmingly for independence in an October 26 referendum, leaving Russia and Kazakhstan as the only republics not to have declared independence. Within Russia, Boris Yeltsin has gained new powers to implement a radical economic reform, but his advisors are divided: some urge that Russia go it alone, while others stress the need to preserve the union. Yeltsin himself seems torn between these preferences.

Meanwhile, Mikhail Gorbachev is still fighting an uphill battle to keep the remaining 12 republics of the former USSR -- minus the Baltic States -- in some sort of economic and political union. Eight republics signed an economic treaty on October 18, but they have still not reached agreement on many key issues, including repayment of the USSR's foreign debt, which naturally concerns potential Western grantors of aid and economic assistance. [Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Azerbaijan didn't sign]

Boris Yeltsin's New Powers and Plans

After spending several weeks vacationing while his lieutenants bickered and governing essentially came to a halt, Yeltsin returned to Moscow and last week won overwhelming approval from Russia's Congress of People's Deputies for a radical economic reform package. Its basic features include: by January 1992, ending subsidies and freeing of prices (although prices of some commodities, like basic foods and oil, will be regulated); privatization of 50% of small and medium-sized enterprises; conducting trade with the independent former republics in world prices; ending foreign aid. Initially, he said he would back an inter-republic currency and bank for all republics if they would forego their own currencies, but he then voiced preference for a Russian bank and, eventually, a Russian currency (apparently, a response to continuing efforts to go it alone by the republics).

To implement this plan, Yeltsin has received parliament's mandate to become Russia's prime minister, as well as its president [Lech Walesa's expression of interest in doing the same in Poland has encountered serious opposition]. Deputies did not, however, approve his call for legalizing buying and selling of land. Yeltsin has also called for the abolition of 70 USSR ministries and departments by mid-November and also plans to cut Russia's government in half.

The Reaction to Yeltsin's Program

The leaders of some other republics have expressed concern about this rush to the market and having to pay world prices. Gorbachev, for his part, has approved the basic

outlines of the program but criticized Yeltsin for failing to take into account the interests of the less well-off part of the population, not sufficiently coordinating with policies of other republics, and not acting to de-monopolize production.

Gorbachev has few means of keeping Yeltsin from trying to implement his plan, especially since the West (and the IMF) support it. Gorbachev did, however, win one victory this week: Ukraine, which had previously failed to sign the economic treaty on October 18, has agreed to do so. [Moldova is reportedly rethinking its decision not to sign] But even the republics that signed the treaty continue to formulate their own economic policies, so a signature on such a document these days is not overly significant.

The Future of the Soviet Foreign Ministry

With the republics going their own way, Yeltsin has urged stripping the Soviet Foreign Ministry of most of its functions, and cutting its funding by 90%. He wants to restrict its activities to coordinating the foreign policies of the Soviet republics. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev supports these proposals, which has put Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pankin and the entire Soviet ministry in a bind.

The changes in the "USSR" are reflected in the composition of the Soviet delegation to Oslo, which includes representatives from Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belorussia, Moldova and Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, the Soviets have not continued the practice introduced at the Moscow Meeting of having a representative of the Russian Republic as a Co-Chair of the delegation. [The head of delegation, Sergei Alexeev, is Russian by origin but he chairs the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee and does not represent institutionally the Russian Republic] Another odd aspect of the delegation's staffing is the selection of Vladimir Morozov as the Deputy Head of Delegation. Morozov, an old CSCE hand, is around 60 years old and during Basket III negotiations in Vienna, took a hard Soviet line throughout the meeting. Despite his experience, a younger, more progressive individual could have been found.

CSCE Military Security -- Update

The CSCE security forums are in a period of reappraisal, faced with an uninspiring set of proposals and an uncertain security situation in Europe. Last year's treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, as-yet unratified by most signatories, appears less relevant to the new concerns of European states as countries cut their forces unilaterally, the United States and the Soviet Union pursue massive unverified nuclear reductions, and new military powers -- not parties to the treaty -- emerge.

CFE: After a slow start caused by a dispute over Soviet interpretation of the treaty and the breakdown of the traditional bloc-to-bloc negotiating pattern, the CFE-1A talks have begun data exchanges designed to lead to agreed personnel limits by the time of the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting. Personnel limitations are very difficult to negotiate, as was proven by the fruitless ten-year Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks (MBFR), which focused on limiting personnel. Key issues include the definition of a soldier -- should support troops, civilian support, or internal security forces be counted -- and the difficulty of verifying personnel levels. The personnel limitations would take the form of a set of non-binding declarations -- one from each state -- which would be presented and discussed in the CFE forum before being formalized.

CSBM: Traditional confidence- and security-building measures negotiations -- prior notification and observation of military activities, limitations on exercise size -- were intended to reassure against large-scale conventional assaults and are also less relevant to today's security concerns. Negotiations are continuing on measures expanding the CSBM information exchange to reserve units, more types of equipment, and the introduction of new equipment, but the proposals are slight, reflecting uncertainty on what the future of confidence-building is.

Post-Helsinki Arms Control: Informal discussions on the mandate for the post-Helsinki forum combining CSBMs and CFE are ongoing in Vienna. The forum looks likely to emerge as an umbrella, under which smaller negotiations could be convened and dialogue on general security issues could be held. Issues being considered for this forum include further arms limitations (although U.S. officials have been reluctant to consider further cuts while the future shape of the U.S. presence in Europe is uncertain), measures for specific regions, constraints on activities and more information on weapons, budgets, and arms transfers.

Conflict Prevention Center: States are taking a second look at the CPC and considering expanding it to give it a more active role in conflict prevention and resolution. It is likely to be mandated to create fact-finding missions when necessary; more ambitious proposals involve tasking it with peacekeeping or conflict resolution responsibilities. Currently, the CPC reviews CSBM implementation, houses the unused mechanism for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, and hosts meetings which any participating State may call out of concern with another state's military activities.

CSCE Military Security -- Norway's Role

As elsewhere in the CSCE, Norway takes the CSBM and CFE talks seriously and plays an important and constructive role. As Norway has not yet decided whether to apply for EC membership and may never do so, it feels marginalized by EC efforts to influence security talks in CSCE and reduce NATO coordination to a secondary role. Norway is a staunch defender of NATO and always a responsible ally.

Currently, Norway is playing a leading role at the CSBM talks by chairing an informal group to work out language including non-active forces (i.e. reserve units) in CSBM information and verification regimes when they are activated. This prickly question (most of the neutrals have extremely high percentages of their forces in non-active units, about which they are secretive) will be highly important to the transparency of future European military organizations, as many countries are increasing the percentage of their military personnel in reserve units.

Norway's main security concerns grow out of its location: far from what was the center of East-West tension in Germany, Norway nonetheless is the only NATO member other than Turkey to have a border with the Soviet Union. Memories of the experience of Finland and past Soviet practices of holding exercises by charging the Norwegian border have led Norway to insist:

- o That CSBM and CFE include no bilateral measures. Fears have been strong of pressures that the Soviet Union could place on Norway in a purely bilateral context. Recent events have led Norwegians to reconsider this policy but not to change it as yet.
- o That CFE include limitations on concentrations of arms on the so-called "flanks" (Norway in the north and Turkey in the south) as well as in central Europe. In this, they do not always have the sympathy of Central Europeans, who see their concerns as secondary. Flank issues were among the last to be solved in the CFE negotiations.
- o That naval arms control be considered. In the past, Norwegian parliamentarians in particular have been strongly in favor of naval arms control, an area that the United States considers outside of CSCE's mandate and suitable for consideration only on a global basis. Norway's extensive coastline and resulting vulnerability are behind this interest, which has however been muted, if not reduced, since the signing of the CFE treaty.

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ROME DECLARATION

ON

PEACE AND COOPERATION

Issued by the Heads of State and Government
participating in the meeting
of the North Atlantic Council in Rome
on 7th-8th November 1991

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Rome to open a new chapter in the history of our Alliance. The far-reaching decisions we have taken here mark an important stage in the transformation of NATO that we launched in London last year.

2. The world has changed dramatically. The Alliance has made an essential contribution. The peoples of North America and the whole of Europe can now join in a community of shared values based on freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. As an agent of change, a source of stability and the indispensable guarantor of its members' security, our Alliance will continue to play a key role in building a new, lasting order of peace in Europe: a Europe of cooperation and prosperity.

A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

3. The challenges we will face in this new Europe cannot be comprehensively addressed by one institution alone, but only in a framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America. Consequently, we are working toward a new European security architecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, the WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other. Regional frameworks of cooperation will also be important. This interaction will be of the greatest significance in preventing instability and divisions that could result from various causes, such as economic disparities and violent nationalism.

THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE ALLIANCE: OUR NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

4. Yesterday, we published our new Strategic Concept. Our security has substantially improved; we no longer face the old threat of a massive attack. However, prudence requires us to maintain an overall strategic balance and to remain ready to meet any potential risks to our security which may arise from instability or tension. In an environment of uncertainty and unpredictable challenges, our Alliance, which provides the essential transatlantic link as demonstrated by the significant presence of North American forces in Europe, retains its enduring value. Our new strategic concept reaffirms NATO's core functions and allows us, within the radically changed situation in Europe, to realise in full our broad approach to stability and security encompassing political, economic, social and environmental aspects, along with the indispensable defence dimension. Never has the opportunity to achieve our Alliance's objectives by political means, in keeping with Articles 2 and 4 of the Washington Treaty, been greater. Consequently, our security policy can now be based on three mutually reinforcing elements: dialogue; cooperation; and the maintenance of a collective defence capability. The use, as appropriate, of these elements will be particularly important to prevent or manage crises affecting our security.

5. The military dimension of our Alliance remains an essential factor; but what is new is that, more than ever, it will serve a broad concept of security. The Alliance will maintain its purely defensive purpose, its collective arrangements based on an integrated military structure as well as cooperation and coordination agreements, and for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear forces. Our military forces will adjust to their new tasks, becoming smaller and more flexible. Thus, our conventional forces will be substantially reduced as will, in many cases, their readiness. They will also be given increased mobility to enable them to react to a wide range of contingencies, and will be organised for flexible build-up, when necessary, for crisis management as well as defence. Multinational formations will play a greater role within the integrated military structure. Nuclear forces committed to NATO will be greatly reduced: the current NATO stockpile of sub-strategic weapons in Europe will be cut by roughly 80% in accordance with the decisions taken by the Nuclear Planning Group in Taormina. The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies remains political: to preserve peace, and prevent war or any kind of coercion.

EUROPEAN SECURITY IDENTITY AND DEFENCE ROLE

6. We reaffirm the consensus expressed by our Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen. The development of a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the further strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance. The enhancement of the role and responsibility of the

European members is an important basis for the transformation of the Alliance. These two positive processes are mutually reinforcing. We are agreed, in parallel with the emergence and development of a European security identity and defence role, to enhance the essential transatlantic link that the Alliance guarantees and fully to maintain the strategic unity and indivisibility of security of all our members. The Alliance is the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty. Recognising that it is for the European Allies concerned to decide what arrangements are needed for the expression of a common European foreign and security policy and defence role, we further agree that, as the two processes advance, we will develop practical arrangements to ensure the necessary transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence identity as it emerges in the Twelve and the WEU, and the Alliance.

7. We welcome the spirit in which those Allies who are also members of the Twelve and the WEU have kept the other members of the Alliance informed about the progress of their ongoing discussions on the development of the European identity and about other issues, such as their peace efforts in Yugoslavia. Appropriate links and consultation procedures between the Twelve and the WEU, and the Alliance will be developed in order to ensure that the Allies that are not currently participating in the development of a European identity in foreign and security policy and defence should be adequately involved in decisions that may affect their security. The Alliance's new Strategic Concept, being an agreed conceptual basis for the forces of all Allies, should facilitate the necessary complementarity between the Alliance and the emerging defence component of the European integration process. As the transformation of the Alliance proceeds, we intend to preserve the operational coherence we now have and on which our defence depends. We welcome the perspective of a reinforcement of the role of the WEU, both as the defence component of the process of European unification and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance, bearing in mind the different nature of its relations with the Alliance and with the European Political Union.

8. We note the gradual convergence of views in the discussions concerning the developing European security identity and defence role compatible with the common defence policy we already have in our Alliance. We feel confident that in line with the consensus in Copenhagen, the result will contribute to a strong new transatlantic partnership by strengthening the European component in a transformed Alliance. We will help move this development forward.

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RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: A QUALITATIVE STEP FORWARD

9. We have consistently encouraged the development of democracy in the Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We therefore applaud the commitment of these countries to political and economic reform following the rejection of totalitarian communist rule by their peoples. We salute the newly recovered independence of the Baltic States. We will support all steps in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe towards reform and will give practical assistance to help them succeed in this difficult transition. This is based on our conviction that our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe.

10. The Alliance can aid in fostering a sense of security and confidence in these countries, thereby strengthening their ability to fulfil their CSCE commitments and make democratic change irrevocable. Wishing to enhance its contribution to the emergence of a Europe whole and free, our Alliance at its London Summit extended to the Central and Eastern European countries the hand of friendship and established regular diplomatic liaison. Together we signed the Paris Joint Declaration. In Copenhagen last June, the Alliance took further initiatives to develop partnership with these countries. Our extensive programme of high level visits, exchanges of views on security and other related issues, intensified military contacts, and exchanges of expertise in various fields has demonstrated its value and contributed greatly to building a new relationship between NATO and these countries. This is a dynamic process: the growth of democratic institutions throughout Central and Eastern Europe and encouraging cooperative experiences, as well as the desire of these countries for closer ties, now call for our relations to be broadened, intensified and raised to a qualitatively new level.

11. Therefore, as the next step, we intend to develop a more institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues. We invite, at this stage of the process, the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Romania, and the Soviet Union to join our Foreign Ministers in December 1991 in Brussels to issue a joint political declaration to launch this new era of partnership and to define further the modalities and content of this process. In particular, we propose the following activities:

- annual meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ministerial level in what might be called a North Atlantic Cooperation Council;
- periodic meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ambassadorial level;

- additional meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ministerial or Ambassadorial level as circumstances warrant;
- regular meetings, at intervals to be mutually agreed, with:
 - NATO subordinate committees, including the Political and Economic Committees;
 - the Military Committee and under its direction other NATO Military Authorities.

This process will contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the CSCE without prejudice to its competence and mechanisms. It will be carried out in accordance with the core functions of the Alliance.

12. Our consultations and cooperation will focus on security and related issues where Allies can offer their experience and expertise, such as defence planning, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations, civil/military coordination of air traffic management, and the conversion of defence production to civilian purposes. Our new initiative will enhance participation of our partners in the "Third Dimension" of scientific and environmental programmes of our Alliance. It will also allow the widest possible dissemination of information about NATO in the Central and Eastern European countries, inter alia through diplomatic liaison channels and our embassies. We will provide the appropriate resources to support our liaison activities.

THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

13. We remain deeply committed to strengthening the CSCE process, which has a vital role to play in promoting stability and democracy in Europe in a period of historic change. We will intensify our efforts to enhance the CSCE's role, in the first instance by working with the other participating CSCE states to ensure that the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting in 1992 will be another major step towards building a new Europe. The CSCE has the outstanding advantage of being the only forum that brings together all countries of Europe and Canada and the United States under a common code of human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, rule of law, security, and economic liberty. The new CSCE institutions and structures, which we proposed at our London Summit and which were created at the Paris Summit, must be consolidated and further developed so as to provide CSCE with the means to help ensure full implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and other relevant CSCE documents and thus permit the CSCE to meet the new challenges which Europe will have to face. Our consultations within the Alliance continue to be a source of initiatives for strengthening the CSCE.

14. Consequently, we will actively support the development of the CSCE to enhance its capacity as the organ for consultation and cooperation among all participating States, capable of effective action in line with its new and increased responsibilities, in particular on the questions of human rights and security including arms control and disarmament, and for effective crisis management and peaceful settlement of disputes, consistent with international law and CSCE principles. To this end, we suggest:

- that the CSCE Council, the central forum for political consultations, continue to take decisions on questions relating to the CSCE and the functions and structures of the CSCE institutions;
- that the Committee of Senior Officials serve as the coordination and management body between Council sessions and that it acquire a greater operational capacity and meet more frequently, with a view to ensuring the implementation of decisions;
- that the CSCE's conflict prevention and crisis management capabilities be improved: as one contribution, in addition to the functions entrusted to it by the Paris Charter, the means available to the Conflict Prevention Centre should be strengthened and made more flexible to enable it to fulfil the specific tasks assigned to it by the CSCE Council and the Committee of Senior Officials;
- that specific tasks based on a precise mandate by the CSCE Council or the Committee of Senior Officials might be entrusted to ad hoc groups;
- that the decisions taken at the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting ensure complementarity among CSCE activities in the security field including, inter alia, conflict prevention, arms control and consultations on security;
- that consideration should be given within the CSCE to develop further the CSCE's capability to safeguard, through peaceful means, human rights, democracy and the rule of law in cases of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of relevant CSCE commitments, if necessary in the absence of the consent of the state concerned;
- that the Office for Free Elections be transformed into a broadly focused Office of Democratic Institutions to promote cooperation in the fields of human rights, democracy and the rule of law;
- that the monitoring and promotion of progress on human dimension issues be continued in the form of periodic meetings of short duration on clearly defined issues;

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- that further political impetus be given to economic, scientific and environmental cooperation so as to promote the basis of prosperity for stable, democratic development.

ARMS CONTROL

15. We strongly support President Bush's initiative of 27th September 1991 which has opened new prospects for nuclear arms reduction. We also welcome President Gorbachev's response. We particularly applaud the decision of both sides to eliminate their nuclear warheads for ground-launched short-range weapons systems. The Allies concerned, through their consultations, have played a central role in President Bush's decision which fulfilled the SNF arms control objectives of the London Declaration. They will continue close consultations on the process of the elimination of ground-based SNF warheads until its completion. We will continue to work for security at minimum levels of nuclear arms sufficient to preserve peace and stability. We look forward to the early ratification of the recently signed START agreement.

16. We note with satisfaction the recent achievements in the fields of conventional arms control and disarmament. We reiterate the paramount importance we attach to the CFE Treaty and call upon all CFE signatories to move forward promptly with its ratification and implementation. We urge our negotiating partners to work with us to reach substantial agreements in the CFE IA and CSBM negotiations, and remain dedicated to achieving concrete results by the time of the CSCE Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting. We welcome the resumption of the Open Skies negotiations; we look forward to agreement on an Open Skies regime by the time of the Helsinki Meeting as an important new element in greater openness and confidence-building in the military field.

17. The Helsinki Meeting will mark a turning point in the arms control and disarmament process in Europe, now with the participation of all CSCE states. This will offer a unique opportunity to move this process energetically forward. Our goal will be to shape a new cooperative order, in which no country needs to harbour fears for its security, by:

- strengthening security and stability at lower levels of armed forces to the extent possible and commensurate with individual legitimate security needs both inside and outside of Europe;
- conducting an intensified security dialogue within a permanent framework and fostering a new quality of transparency and cooperation about armed forces and defence policies; and
- promoting effective mechanisms and instruments for conflict prevention.

18. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their means of delivery undermines international security. Transfers of conventional armaments beyond legitimate defensive needs to regions of tension make the peaceful settlement of disputes less likely. We support the establishment by the United Nations of a universal non-discriminatory register of conventional arms transfers. We support steps undertaken to address other aspects of proliferation and other initiatives designed to build confidence and underpin international security. We also deem it essential to complete a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons next year. We welcome the positive results of the Third Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, in particular the decision to explore the feasibility of verification.

BROADER CHALLENGES

19. Our Strategic Concept underlines that Alliance security must take account of the global context. It points out risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage, which can affect Alliance security interests. We reaffirm the importance of arrangements existing in the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, coordination of our efforts including our responses to such risks. We will continue to address broader challenges in our consultations and in the appropriate multilateral forums in the widest possible cooperation with other states.

20. The North Atlantic Alliance was founded with two purposes: the defence of the territory of its members, and the safeguarding and promotion of the values they share. In a still uncertain world, the need for defence remains. But in a world where the values which we uphold are shared ever more widely, we gladly seize the opportunity to adapt our defences accordingly; to cooperate and consult with our new partners; to help consolidate a new undivided continent of Europe; and to make our Alliance's contribution to a new age of confidence, stability and peace.

21. We express our deep appreciation for the gracious hospitality extended to us by the Government of the Italian Republic.



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THE SITUATION IN YUGOSLAVIA

Statement issued by the Heads of State and Government
participating in the meeting
of the North Atlantic Council in Rome
on 7th-8th November 1991

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, are deeply concerned by the current crisis in Yugoslavia and the grave danger it poses to stability in the region. We deplore the tragic loss of life, the intimidation of civilian populations and the extensive destruction of property.

2. It is only for the peoples of Yugoslavia themselves to decide on their country's future. We call on all parties to comply fully with the principles of the CSCE. All attempts to change existing borders through the use of force or a policy of fait accompli are unacceptable; we will not recognise any unilateral change of borders, external or internal, brought about by such means.

3. We condemn the use of force to achieve political goals. Continuing attacks by the Yugoslav National Army on Dubrovnik and other Croatian cities are out of all proportion to any provocation, ceasefire violation or requirement to protect Serbian communities or Army garrisons. We call on all parties to respect ceasefire agreements. Commitments for deblocking of barracks and withdrawal of JNA forces, to which parties subscribed on 18th October in the Hague and were reaffirmed on 5th November, have not been complied with. We remind all those responsible for acts of violence in Yugoslavia and for violations of ceasefire agreements that under international law they are personally accountable for their actions in contravention of relevant norms of international humanitarian law.

4. We express our support and appreciation for the efforts of the European Community, the CSCE and the Security Council of the United Nations to resolve this crisis. We urge all parties to cooperate fully with the European Community in its

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implementation of ceasefire and monitoring agreements and in the negotiating process within the Conference on Yugoslavia.

5. We welcome Lord Carrington's efforts to provide a framework in which the peoples of Yugoslavia can solve their differences. We urge all parties concerned to agree on a peaceful resolution in the framework of the Hague Conference on Yugoslavia. The prospect of recognition of the independence of those republics wishing it, can only be envisaged in the framework of an overall settlement, that includes adequate guarantees for the protection of human rights and rights of national or ethnic groups. The right to self-determination of all the peoples in Yugoslavia cannot be exercised in isolation from the interests and rights of national or ethnic groups within the individual republics. Authorities at all levels should respect international norms and international obligations, especially those embodied in the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and other CSCE documents.

6. We welcome the measures agreed by the European Community and its member states at the meeting of Foreign Ministers on 8th November.

7. We encourage all efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to the victims of the conflict, both inside and outside Yugoslavia, involving the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Red Cross. We urge all sides to allow humanitarian supplies to reach the communities in need and the many persons displaced by the fighting.

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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION

Statement issued by the Heads of State and Government
participating in the meeting
of the North Atlantic Council in Rome
on 7th-8th November 1991

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, warmly welcome the historic events that are fundamentally transforming the Soviet Union as we have known it and the relationships among the republics. By their resolute and courageous stand against the illegal coup of 19th August, the men and women of the Soviet Union have affirmed their determination to build a new future based upon democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and economic liberty. The nations of the Atlantic Alliance pledge themselves to assist in this great endeavour. We are prepared to build our relationships with the Soviet Union and the republics on the basis of the following fundamental principles that have guided our own policies and practices for decades.

2. It is for the peoples of the Soviet Union to decide their future relationship through peaceful and democratic means. At the same time, we encourage them to progress towards a common ground of cooperation, both among themselves and with us. In this process, there is no place for threats, intimidation, coercion or violence. Authorities at all levels should respect international norms and international obligations, especially those embodied in the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and other CSCE documents. Consistent with these commitments, government must be based on democracy through free and fair elections, and on the rule of law. Inalienable human rights must be guaranteed, including full respect for the individual and protection of the rights of persons belonging to minorities.

3. In a period of dramatic political change, it is important also to the development of our relations that leaders of the Soviet Union and the republics implement policies that contribute to international peace and security. In this respect, it is critical that the Soviet Union and the republics take all

necessary actions to ensure that international agreements signed by the USSR, especially the START Treaty, the CFE Treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Biological Weapons Convention are respected, ratified, and implemented. We call upon all authorities to refrain from any steps that could lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons or other means of mass destruction. We therefore welcome the intention of the Soviet leadership to ensure the safe, responsible and reliable control of these weapons under a single authority. This matter affects the security interests of the entire Atlantic Alliance, as well as those of the international community as a whole. The Soviet and republic governments should adopt firm measures to prevent the export of nuclear or other potentially destabilising military technologies. We urge restraint in the development of conventional military forces that by their size and character could exacerbate political tensions, retard market economic reform, and contradict efforts toward lower and more stable levels of forces as embodied in the CFE Treaty. Because it reduces the dangers of instability and enhances openness, the CFE Treaty is in everyone's interest, including those of the Soviet Union and the republics.

4. The Allies are firmly convinced that political change should be accompanied by economic liberty and the building of market economies. We support the development of economic policies that promote trade and economic cooperation among republics in the interest of growth and stability. In this context, it is essential that all the republics assume their appropriate responsibilities vis-à-vis Soviet international obligations, which would facilitate integration of the Union and the republics into the world economy. Newly established links with the international financial institutions should facilitate rapid reform towards the development of a market economy as the basis for economic recovery and prosperity for the Union and the republics. The Allies stand ready to assist in this historic undertaking, including through technical assistance in key sectors. In addition, we are providing humanitarian support to the Soviet peoples as they cope with the political and economic crises that confront them. We consider such assistance a vital contribution to the future security of Europe and of the world as a whole.

5. We hope that leaders and authorities at all levels throughout the Union and the republics will reaffirm their commitment to the values and principles we have reaffirmed in this statement.

6. The North Atlantic Council will continue to consult actively on developments in the Soviet Union, with a view to harmonising our approach towards unfolding events.

Highlights of the Moscow Concluding Document

General

-- The Moscow Final Document deepens and supplements CSCE commitments in the Copenhagen and Geneva Documents, as well as the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. It categorically and irrevocably declares that CSCE human dimension commitments are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and not solely the internal affair of the State concerned. This puts to rest the argument, made in the past, that criticisms of a State's human rights situation are an "interference in internal affairs".

Expansion of Human Dimension Mechanism

-- The cornerstone of the Moscow Concluding Document is the significant expansion of the Human Dimension Mechanism.

-- The expansion contains a logical progression of steps. The first step permits a State voluntarily to request that a mission of experts, selected from a CSCE list, visit its territory to assist in the resolution of a human dimension issue. Ideally, such assistance would be requested at an early enough stage that an unfortunate situation could be prevented, or at least improved.

-- The experts would have flexibility in carrying out their mission and could, if appropriate, use their good offices and mediation services to promote dialogue and cooperation among interested parties. They could also perform additional tasks assigned to them by the State.

-- Although it is the decision of a particular State whether to request the assistance of a mission of experts, the expanded mechanism also contains an element of "friendly persuasion." Thus, if other CSCE States consider that a State should be inviting a mission of experts to address a particular issue, they may formally inquire of that State whether it would be willing to do so.

-- Importantly, the expanded mechanism does not end with voluntary assistance. It is hoped that a State with an issue amenable to CSCE assistance would request such assistance voluntarily. However, if it does not (even after "friendly persuasion"), or if such assistance is not successful, the mechanism also provides for a mandatory next step, under which a mission can be sent to a State without that State's consent. Such a mission would be directed at fact-finding and the preparation of a report, which could then be addressed by the Committee of Senior Officials. To discourage frivolous use of the mandatory step, six CSCE States must support such a mission in any given case.

-- Such a mandatory element is desirable for two reasons: the existence of a mandatory element should act as an incentive for a State to request assistance voluntarily, which is the preferred outcome; and a mandatory element will provide CSCE with a tool for addressing an issue of interest to the CSCE community, even if the State itself is unwilling to address it.

-- Finally, the expanded mechanism provides for a short-cut mandatory step in extraordinary cases. Thus, if there is a particularly serious threat to the fulfilment of CSCE human dimension commitments, a State may, with the support of nine other CSCE States, proceed directly to invoking the mandatory step with respect to another State. This possibility is important because, while the expanded mechanism is generally structured in order to encourage a State to request assistance voluntarily, there may be situations so unusual and so critical that there is simply not enough time to go through the other steps. At the same time, a high number of supporting States is required to ensure that this option will not be used frivolously simply to jump over the other steps.

Substantive Commitments

-- In addition to the expanded mechanism, the Moscow Concluding Document contains advances over previous CSCE commitments in several important areas.

-- In the area of the rule of law, the new commitments address such issues as:

- o condemnation of illegal seizures of power;
- o the importance of open and accountable legislative processes, and review of administrative regulations and decisions;
- o guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary;
- o regulating the conduct of law enforcement personnel, including by subjecting law enforcement acts to judicial control;
- o expanding and protecting the rights of individuals detained and arrested;
- o ensuring against improper or arbitrary State intrusions upon the person or private property;
- o the need for civilian control of military and paramilitary forces, internal security and intelligence services, and the police;
- o safeguarding the independent media, including first-time recognition within CSCE that independent media are essential to free and open societies and accountable systems of government;
- o the value of bilateral and multilateral legal and administrative cooperation to develop, particularly in States where they do not yet exist, legal systems based on respect for human rights, the rule of law, and democracy;
- o limitations on the imposition of states of emergency and protection of human rights during any state of emergency; and
- o expanding the functions of the Office for Free Elections to cover democratic institution-building.

-- In other areas of the human dimension, commitments address:

- o easing internal travel restrictions for nationals and foreigners and easing internal residence restrictions for those entitled to permanent residence;
- o respect for the rights of migrant workers and their families, condemnation of acts of discrimination against migrant workers, adoption of appropriate measures to enable migrant workers to participate in the life of society of the CSCE States; and possible future discussions within CSCE on all issues regarding migrant workers;
- o facilitating humanitarian relief operations;
- o non-discriminatory treatment of women, including recognition that full and true equality between men and women is a fundamental aspect of a just and democratic society based on the rule of law;
- o protection of the rights of persons with disabilities;
- o the importance of human rights education; and
- o detailed elaboration of provisions on non-governmental organizations, including recognition of NGOs that declare themselves as such, commitment to allow NGOs to convey their views to their own governments and other CSCE States, and recommendation of "access and openness" guidelines for the effective participation of NGOs in the future human dimension work of the CSCE.