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CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE: AN OVERVIEW

Prepared by the staff of
the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

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Part I: From Helsinki to Vienna

A. Background

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe -- also known as the CSCE or Helsinki process -- is an on-going, multilateral forum involving 36 European countries,* the United States and Canada (see section V.A.). Although its roots go back to Soviet proposals for an all-European security conference in the early 1950's, the CSCE actually began in earnest in the early 1970's, during the period of "detente" between East and West. The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, West German treaties with the Soviet Union, Poland and East Germany, and agreement to begin Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks set the stage for the Conference, which began in 1973. It culminated two years later with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, also known as the Helsinki Accords, by the leaders of the 35 participating States on August 1, 1975. This document is not a legally binding treaty but is considered politically binding on each of the signatory States, which, on the basis of the rule of consensus, agreed to its provisions. These provisions are divided into what are called "Baskets" covering the following areas:

Basket I: A Declaration of 10 Principles Guiding Relations Between States, including Respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Equal rights and Self-Determination of Peoples, Territorial Integrity of States, Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, and Inviolability of Frontiers; and a section on Military Security, including a series of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), such as notification of troop maneuvers, designed to lessen the risk of surprise military attack in Europe;

Basket II: Provisions Concerning Economic, Scientific and Environmental Cooperation, as well as cooperation in the related fields of Transport, Tourism, Migrant Workers in Europe, and Personnel Training; and

Basket III: Provisions Concerning Human Contacts (Family Reunification and Visits) and other Humanitarian Matters, the Free Flow of Information, Cultural Cooperation, and Educational Exchanges.

B. 1975 - 1986: A Decade of Division

Although the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies from the start sought to manipulate the CSCE into a highly politicized security forum, the Final Act reflects a more comprehensive and balanced approach to East-West relations. It served as an impetus for human rights activity in the East, for example, sparking the formation or contributing to the work of the Helsinki Monitoring Groups in the Soviet Union and the Baltic States, Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia and the Committee for the Defense of Workers (KOR) in Poland. Private Helsinki human rights organizations formed in the West as well. In 1976, the U.S. Congress created the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission) to monitor and encourage compliance with the Helsinki Final Act. With this activity, the CSCE process developed into a useful diplomatic and public tool for advancing human rights among the participating States, especially in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The signing of the Final Act did not represent the end of the Conference itself. Instead, it initiated a process consisting of a series of follow-up meetings to review implementation of Helsinki provisions and elaborate upon these provisions as necessary. The first such follow-up was held in Belgrade in 1977-78. Eastern violations of human rights provisions made this a highly confrontational meeting in which the participants could only agree to meet again. They did so in Madrid, from 1980-83, where the CSCE States were able to adopt a substantive concluding document containing new commitments, although a deterioration in East-West relations -- beginning with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and exacerbated by the declaration of martial law in Poland, the imprisonment of a large number of human rights activists, and declining emigration rates -- drew out the negotiation considerably.

* The German Democratic Republic was an original member but ended its participation with the unification of Germany on October 3, 1990, leaving the Federal Republic of Germany to participate in the name of Germany. Albania, the only country originally to refuse participation, became a full member on June 19, 1991, and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became full members on September 10, 1991.

In addition to setting the date and place for the third follow-up meeting, the Madrid document mandated the holding of several inter-sessional or subsidiary meetings to focus on selected topics. This built upon a practice which began between the Belgrade and Madrid meetings, when three such meetings were held: a meeting on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in Montreux in 1978, a meeting on Mediterranean cooperation in Valletta in 1979 and a scientific forum in Hamburg in 1980. Following Madrid, a second meeting on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes was held in Athens in 1984, and a seminar on Mediterranean cooperation was held in Venice that same year. Madrid also called for commemorating the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Final Act in Helsinki.

In addition, a Stockholm conference, convened in 1984 to develop the Final Act's CBMs into new Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs), concluded in 1986 with a document that significantly advanced the confidence-building process.

Seeking to balance this enhanced effort on military security aspects of the CSCE were three six-week meetings focusing on the human rights and humanitarian concerns: the Ottawa Human Rights Meeting in 1985, the Budapest Cultural Forum in 1985, and the Bern Human Contacts Meeting in 1986. Eastern intransigence at these meetings, all of which ended without concluding documents, and continuing violations of CSCE provisions on human rights and human contacts led to calls in the West, particularly in the United States, for abandoning the CSCE as it ended its first decade.

C. 1986 - 1989: Vienna and Times of Change

Beginning at the Bern Human Contacts Meeting, where the Soviets announced that a number of outstanding human contacts cases were going to be resolved, there were signs that the worsening human rights situation which had called the credibility of the CSCE process into question might be reversed. The period from November 1986 to January 1989, covering the third main follow-up meeting, in Vienna, witnessed much of this reversal. In the Soviet Union, where Mikhail Gorbachev was gaining strength vis-a-vis the remaining hard-liners of the Brezhnev era, a series of reforms were initiated leading to greatly improved implementation of CSCE commitments. Hundreds of political prisoners were released, and many long-divided families were finally reunited. Improvements also took place in some East European countries, although Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR strongly resisted reformist trends and Romania took steps backwards.

As a result of improved implementation, as well as increased Western resolve to get a strong human rights result, the Vienna meeting ended in January 1989 with a document that placed Helsinki human rights commitments at a significantly higher level of ambition. It also mandated a number of subsidiary activities leading up to the fourth main follow-up meeting, to be held in Helsinki in 1992. In the military security field, the Vienna document called for additional work on CSBMs, building upon the results of the Stockholm conference. It also contained the mandate for negotiations to be held within the framework of the CSCE between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE). Both negotiations began in Vienna in March 1989.

Balancing the security talks, the Vienna document also established a Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (CHD), combining discussion of human rights, human contacts and other humanitarian issues into three four-week meetings. The first of these meetings took place in Paris in May and June 1989. The second was held in Copenhagen in June 1990, and the third is scheduled to take place in Moscow in October 1991. The meeting in Moscow has been the subject of considerable controversy, potentially being both a great propaganda boon for the Soviets and a lever to press for further reforms in the USSR. Other meetings were mandated to focus on economic cooperation, the environment, cultural heritage, the free flow of information, Mediterranean ecosystems and the peaceful settlement of disputes (see section V.C. for a list of all meetings).

Part II: Post-Vienna Meetings

A. London Information Forum

The London Information Forum, April 18 - May 12, 1989, was the first non-military security meeting following the Vienna meeting. It was held with near-maximum openness and access for the public. Journalists and other individuals from the 35 CSCE States active in various information fields discussed practical matters relating to their work and cooperation between them. Soviet and East European censorship practices, including the continued Bulgarian jamming of radio broadcasts, as well as the treatment of foreign journalists, were raised by the United States and some other Western delegations. The United States itself was subjected to considerable criticism from both East and West for the restrictions the McCarran-Walter Act places on entry to the United States. As the forum came so soon after Vienna, there was little effort to seek consensus on a document.

B. Paris Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension

From May 30 - June 23, 1989, the first of the three meetings of the Conference on the Human Dimension (CHD) was held in Paris to examine the entire range of human dimension issues, including a thorough review of implementation of newly undertaken Vienna commitments. Progress in implementation was acknowledged, but the meeting focused on continued Soviet and East European violations of religious and minority rights, the right to freedom of assembly, association and expression, and the right to leave a country. As at the London Forum, the United States was criticized for its entry restrictions as well as for its failure to ratify the international covenants on human rights. An in-depth discussion also took place regarding the human dimension mechanism described in the Vienna Concluding Document. This mechanism provides for continuing dialogue on human rights between CHD meetings by committing States to respond to bilateral representations and requests for meetings on either individual cases or broader human rights issues. Public and press interest in the meeting was considerable, although access was at times overly restricted by the French hosts.

Paris, like London, did not adopt a document. Most countries, including the United States, saw little need for one since the meeting took place so soon after the adoption of the Vienna Concluding Document and significant violations of that document continued. Nevertheless, many new proposals were introduced, setting the stage for future work in the human dimension. The United States, for example, introduced a proposal calling for free elections and political pluralism, and supported other proposals on abolishing exit visas, permitting foreign observance of trials, and creating independent and impartial judicial systems. These proposals were forwarded to the CHD meeting in Copenhagen (see section II.E.).

C. Sofia Environment Meeting

A Meeting on the Protection of the Environment was held in Sofia from October 16 to November 3, 1989. It focused on three main issues: (1) industrial accidents with transboundary effects; (2) hazardous chemicals; and (3) transboundary water pollution. Largely due to U.S. efforts, the meeting also focused considerably on public awareness of environmental problems and the work of independent groups and private individuals dedicated to the protection of the environment.

No report was adopted at Sofia, due to the denial of consensus by one country -- Romania -- to a draft prepared by four neutral countries. The Romanian delegation objected to language in the report on the rights of environmentalists to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association. In early 1990, however, the new Romanian leadership announced that it would support the entire Sofia draft, and it was formally adopted by the participating States in Vienna in November 1990. The U.N. Economic Commission for Europe has acted on Sofia recommendations for multilateral action. The Sofia meeting also provided a valuable and timely forum for raising human rights issues and encouraged an unprecedented amount of independent activity in Bulgaria. Experts were able to exchange views on environmental problems and to share information on how to respond to these problems.

D. Bonn Economic Conference

The Bonn Conference on Economic Cooperation in Europe took place from March 19 to April 11, 1990. Attended by representatives of the business communities of the CSCE States, the conference focused primarily on creating better conditions for Western business representatives working in Eastern countries, including better facilities and more economic and commercial information. There was also considerable discussion of economic reform efforts underway in the Soviet Union and the countries of East-Central Europe, including descriptions of the legal parameters for foreign investment and efforts to make currencies in nonmarket-economy countries convertible. The conference served as a useful forum for these private individuals to establish contacts and raise practical problems regarding the conduct of business relations.

The Bonn conference ended with the adoption by consensus of a concluding document, the first such document at a subsidiary CSCE meeting other than on military security issues since 1984. Among the notable provisions of this landmark document are a list of principles on economic cooperation, based on a United States proposal, which include establishing democratic political systems, respecting workers' rights, allowing market forces to determine prices, protecting private property rights, and considering environmental questions in economic development. The document also contained a number of practical steps to facilitate the conduct of business relations.

E. Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension

From June 5-29, 1990, the second meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension took place in Copenhagen, picking up where the Paris meeting left off (see section II.B.). Although there was the traditional review of implementation of past CSCE commitments and continued discussion of the functioning of the human dimension mechanism, the major political changes which swept through East-Central Europe during the preceding year shifted the focus of the meeting to negotiating a document with strong new human rights commitments that reflected the improved political landscape of Europe. Built upon the agreed premise that "pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are essential for ensuring respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms," such a document was adopted, containing commitments originally proposed in Paris regarding free elections and political pluralism as well as essential elements for the rule of law and accountable judicial systems. A number of human rights measures, especially those dealing specifically with persons belonging to national or ethnic minorities, are also detailed in the Copenhagen document, and set new international human rights standards.

At the Copenhagen Meeting, Albania participated in the CSCE for the first time, receiving observer status. In contrast, similar requests by the three Baltic States -- Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia -- were not acted upon favorably by the Danish hosts. Like other post-Vienna meetings, Copenhagen was attended by a large number of foreign ministers. There was also a substantial presence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including, for the first time, a significant number from the countries of East-Central Europe and the USSR. Copenhagen set excellent precedents for the third Human Dimension meeting, scheduled for Moscow in September 1991 (see section II.K.).

F. Palma Meeting on the Mediterranean

The participating States convened in Palma de Mallorca from September 24 to October 19, 1990, for a Meeting on the Mediterranean. This was the third CSCE meeting to focus exclusively on Mediterranean issues, the previous two being Valletta in 1979 and Venice in 1984. Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia attended the meeting as non-participating Mediterranean States. This status permits them to participate in the sessions but not in drafting or decision-making. The representative of the German Democratic Republic attended the meeting through October 2, after which the number of CSCE States went from 35 to 34 in light of the unification of Germany.

The Palma meeting focused on problems facing the Mediterranean ecosystem and an exploration of possible remedies to those problems, as well as on social and economic concerns in the region. Some security issues not on the agenda were also raised, and a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) was suggested. The meeting adopted a final document outlining ways to better protect the environment, improve social conditions and strengthen the economies of Mediterranean countries. The non-governmental organization Greenpeace sponsored an alternative conference in Palma during the course of the meeting.

G. Paris Summit

In 1988, Soviet President Gorbachev first suggested the convening of a summit of the leaders of the CSCE participating States, similar to that which convened in 1975 to sign the Helsinki Final Act. He made a strong call for such a summit while in Italy in December 1989, stating as its purpose the ushering in of a new era in Europe. He argued that the next main CSCE follow-up meeting, slated for Helsinki in 1992, was too far in the future for the CSCE to address the new issues facing Europe, and indicated his desire to give the summit a heavy focus on military security issues. While his prior calls were considered premature given the continued division of Europe, in 1989 the other participating States responded positively to Gorbachev's call in light of the remarkable events which shook East-Central Europe that year. A "Preparatory Committee" was subsequently set up in Vienna to work out the necessary arrangements.

Foreign ministers of the CSCE States met in New York on October 1-2, 1990, to review and give an impetus to the preparatory work. A communique was adopted which set the summit for November 19-21, 1990, in Paris, with the expectation that a CFE treaty on conventional forces would be ready at that time for the signature of the 22 leaders of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries participating in those negotiations. Taking place on the eve of German unification, the meeting also welcomed this historic event, and a separate statement adopted by the ministers expressed a common opposition to Iraqi aggression in the Persian Gulf.

At the Paris summit, the leaders of the CSCE States adopted the "Charter of Paris for a New Europe." The document addresses a wide spectrum of concerns, including human rights, free and fair elections, the rule of law, economic liberty, principles of market economies, security, culture, and environmental protection. A statement of friendly relations among the participating States was also included, in which they pledged to refrain from the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. There was also an endorsement of German unification. The leaders agreed to two additional inter-sessional experts meetings before the next follow-up meeting, one in Oslo on democratic institutions and the other in Geneva on national minorities. Acknowledging the role of non-governmental organizations and religious groups in the process, the Charter states that such organizations and groups need to be given a clear role in a revamped CSCE.

The Paris summit took the first steps to regularize and institutionalize the CSCE process. The leaders agreed to meet every two years, on the occasion of follow-up meetings and beginning with the Helsinki meeting in 1992. Foreign Ministers are to meet at least once annually, with a Committee of Senior Officials to meet periodically to prepare for the ministerials and review current issues. Agreement was reached on the time and place for the first meeting of the Committee, as well as the place for the first post-summit ministerial. Moreover, an administrative secretariat was set up in Prague, along with a Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) in Vienna and an Office of Free Elections (OFE) in Warsaw. The Paris Charter calls for a CSCE Parliamentary Assembly but leaves the setting up of such an Assembly to parliamentarians themselves. A supplementary document to the Charter describes in detail organizational matters and general guidelines for these new institutions.

In effect, the Paris summit was seen to bring the Cold War to an end. Nevertheless, the unwillingness of any of the CSCE States to propose, at the summit, that observer status be granted to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, along with a reversal of a decision to give special entry status to the visiting foreign ministers of these Baltic States by the French hosts, reportedly in response to a high-level Soviet complaint just before the summit officially opened, demonstrated that some significant issues remained unresolved.

H. Valletta Meeting on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

From January 15 to February 8, 1991, the participating States met in Valletta for a third experts meeting on the peaceful settlement of disputes, one of the 10 CSCE Principles Guiding Relations Between States. Two previous meetings -- Montreux in 1978 and Athens in 1984 -- were unable to achieve any tangible progress in elaborating a specific and effective mechanism for settling disputes, largely due to the polarization of East-West relations. In contrast, the Valletta meeting adopted a concluding document which elaborates on general principles adopted at Montreux and outlines a new "CSCE Dispute Settlement Mechanism." Unfortunately, the document includes provisions which restrict this mechanism to a limited range of disputes. Moreover, the results of Valletta were overshadowed by the Soviet crackdown in Latvia and Lithuania, which began during the course of the meeting. The Berlin meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers agreed to give the Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna oversight of the Valletta mechanism (see section III.B.).

I. Krakow Symposium on Cultural Heritage

The Krakow Symposium on Cultural Heritage was held from May 28 to June 7, 1991. Originally, the meeting was intended to provide a forum for experts to meet and exchange views on such aspects of cultural heritage as ways of life and language, and on more tangible aspects such as preservation of sites, structures and objects. Much of the focus of the delegates, however, devolved to drafting groups tasked with negotiating a report on the meeting. The document ultimately adopted discusses culture and freedoms; culture and heritage; and principal areas for preservation and cooperation.

J. Geneva Meeting on National Minorities

From July 1 to 19, 1991, the participating States met in Geneva to discuss questions regarding national minorities, including the rights of persons belonging to such minorities. The meeting was mandated not by the Vienna Concluding Document but the Paris Charter in light of growing inter-ethnic tensions in East-Central Europe and the Soviet Union. The threat posed by these tensions was, in fact, made evident by the crisis in Yugoslavia, and specifically the Yugoslav military's attempted crackdown in Slovenia, just prior to the meeting.

Other than expressions of concern regarding the situation in Yugoslavia, there was little attempt to engage in a frank exchange of views on specific problems such as non-compliance with existing CSCE provisions, reflecting the extreme sensitivity with which national minority issues are viewed in Europe. Only the United States and a few other delegations were willing to engage in such a review, raising problems in Yugoslavia and Romania in particular but in the Soviet Union and Bulgaria as well. The remaining delegations focused primarily on their own approaches to minority questions, and on drafting a concluding report of the meeting. Negotiations on such a document reached an impasse because of widely divergent views, but a new draft proposed by Western countries at the initiative of the United States was able to gain consensus, allowing the meeting to end with a modest but still substantive report. In terms of access to the conference center and having facilities at their disposal, Geneva set many positive precedents for the treatment of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) at CSCE meetings.

K. Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension

From September 10 to October 4, 1991, the third and final meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension was held in Moscow. Holding a conference on humanitarian cooperation in Moscow was first suggested by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze at the opening of the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting in 1986. The United States set certain conditions before it would agree to Moscow as the site of the third Human Dimension meeting -- including public access and openness and specific measures which combined would constitute significant improvement in Soviet human rights performance -- but gave its consent to Moscow at the end of the Vienna meeting despite the fact that not all of the conditions were fully met by the Soviets. However, the Bush Administration indicated that

U.S. attendance at the meeting would be conditioned on further Soviet progress in these areas. Progress did continue, but persistent problems and the Soviet crackdown in the Baltics kept the question alive, and during the course of the attempted hard-line coup in Moscow in August 1991, the European Community countries indicated that their attendance would not be possible under such conditions, a position which the United States took as well. The failure of the coup removed the possibility of a boycott, and, instead, permitted the granting of full CSCE membership to the three Baltic States by a decision of foreign ministers just as the Moscow meeting opened.

The agenda and modalities for the Moscow meeting were the same as those for the Paris and Copenhagen meetings which preceded it. The implementation review featured considerable Soviet self-criticism, along with Western criticisms of Soviet shortcomings, including problems at the republic level, and expressions of concern regarding implementation in certain East European countries, especially Yugoslavia. A lengthy document was adopted covering a range of human rights issues -- including some new areas such as the rights of women and persons with disabilities -- and developing commitments made in Copenhagen. Most importantly, the document expands the human dimension mechanism to permit voluntary good offices missions as well as rapporteur missions which the recipient State would be obliged to accept if six other States supported the effort (ten for immediate action in response to extraordinary situations). The achievements of the Moscow document likely represent a turning point in the development of human dimension of the CSCE, with future meetings focusing more on fostering compliance than on advancing new commitments.

As far as public access and openness, the Soviet hosts essentially met the standards set in the Vienna and Copenhagen documents, although some problems persisted throughout the meeting. In addition to a number of U.S. and other Western non-governmental organizations, numerous Soviet and republic-based groups and individuals visited the meeting to press their human rights and self-determination causes.

L. Oslo Seminar on Democratic Institutions

In accordance with the Paris Charter, a two-week meeting on democratic institutions is being held in Oslo from November 4-15, 1991. The meeting is to consider ways and means to consolidate and strengthen viable democratic institutions, including comparative studies of legislation on human rights and fundamental freedoms.

M. Military Security: Confidence- and Security-Building

The Helsinki Final Act contains a series of confidence-building measures (CBMs) designed to reduce the secrecy surrounding military activities in Europe through such measures as prior notification of military maneuvers and observation of maneuvers. In Madrid, the CSCE States agreed to convene a Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE), beginning in Stockholm in 1984 with a mandate to develop more concrete measures -- called confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) -- that would apply to a zone stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains and would be "of military significance and politically binding ... with adequate forms of verification." After nearly 3 years of negotiations, a document based largely on Western proposals was adopted. The agreement, which took effect January 1, 1987, requires notification, observation and annual forecasts of military activities above 13,000 troops, as well as on-site inspection with no right of refusal. The accord broke new ground in arms control as the first international agreement in which the Soviet Union accepted verification on its own territory.

During the Vienna meeting, agreement was reached to convene a new round of negotiations under the Madrid mandate to build upon and expand the results achieved in Stockholm. The negotiations opened in Vienna on March 9, 1989 and reached a first agreement in November 1990, in time for the 1990 Paris summit (see section II.G.). It builds upon the Stockholm provisions and develops CSBMs in new ways: (1) annual exchange of information on military manpower, equipment, deployment and budgets; (2) establishment of a communications network among the participating states for CSBM and CFE purposes; (3) an annual meeting to review CSBM implementation; (4) improved inter-military contacts, including mandatory visits to airbases; and (5) mechanisms giving states the right to an explanation of unusual or hazardous military activities and, in the case of unusual activities, to call a bilateral or full CSCE meeting if the explanation is not satisfactory.

CSBMs are also closely tied to the Conflict Prevention Center which the 1990 Paris Summit decided to establish in Vienna (see section IV.E.). It plays a key role in the implementation of CSBMs already adopted, and its consultative committee is staffed by the heads of delegations to CSBMs. The negotiations themselves will continue until the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting in 1992, at which time the CSBM and CFE negotiations will be folded into one European security forum including all participating States. CSBMs are now focused on improvements to already adopted measures, some new proposals, and some left-over items -- notably expansion of the information exchange and inclusion of reserve units when they are activated, as reserve units form an increasingly large share of post-Cold War European armies.

In the context of the CSBMs negotiations, a seminar on military doctrine was held in Vienna from January 16 to February 5, 1990. For the first time, Chiefs of Staff from all CSCE States assembled to discuss issues of military strategy, training and budgeting, against the backdrop of a rapidly evolving military situation in Europe. A second seminar was held from October 8-18, 1991, under the auspices of the Conflict Prevention Center. Shorter seminars on specific security topics are being planned for the Center.

N. Military Security:

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

In April 1986, the Warsaw Pact countries endorsed an appeal of General Secretary Gorbachev -- known as the Budapest Appeal -- calling for conventional arms reduction negotiations within the CSCE process. In light of a high-level task force report, the NATO countries in December 1986 issued a declaration calling for bloc-to-bloc negotiations separate from the CSCE between NATO and Warsaw Pact members on conventional arms in an area from the Atlantic to the Urals. Proposals along these lines were introduced at the Vienna meeting, and subsequent agreement on the mandate was incorporated into the Vienna Concluding Document.

The Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) is conducted autonomously within the framework of the CSCE process, involving only the 22 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Its mandate provides for periodic meetings with the 12 neutral and non-aligned CSCE States to exchange views and information. The mandate covers conventional forces of these countries in a zone from the Atlantic to the Urals. Like the CSBM negotiations, CFE opened in Vienna on March 9, 1989. President Bush's May 1989 call, supported by NATO, for a 1990 agreement and accomplishment of reductions by 1992 or 1993 led to intensive work and the signing of a treaty on November 19, 1990, in connection with the Paris CSCE Summit. The treaty sets limits of 20,000 tanks, 30,000 armored combat vehicles, 20,000 artillery pieces, 6,800 combat aircraft and 2,000 helicopters for each alliance. Each country's individual holdings must be negotiated within its alliance, or former alliance in the case of the Warsaw Pact. Limits are also set on the percentage of any type of equipment which may be held by one state. The treaty also mandates an extensive annual exchange of information and, based on the picture of military forces obtained from the information exchange, verification inspections to forces, storage and destruction sites.

Immediately after the treaty was signed, a controversy arose over the manner in which the Soviet Union interpreted certain provisions. The Soviets exempted over 10,000 pieces of equipment from reduction liabilities by claiming that the forces to which they were attached (strategic rocket forces, naval infantry, coastal divisions) were not covered by the treaty. All 21 other participants agreed that it was the type of equipment, not the branch of the armed forces holding it, that determined eligibility for reduction. This, as well as substantial pre-treaty removal by the Soviets of limited equipment from the zone of application, led to a six-month stalemate. A June 1991 compromise was brokered by U.S. Secretary of State Baker with Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh; the U.S. Senate and 20 other legislatures must ratify the treaty for it to enter into force. Following the controversy, CFE follow-on negotiations began work to agree to limits on military personnel within Europe before the 1992 Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting, as currently Germany is limited to 370,000 troops by a politically binding declaration made in association with the CFE treaty and German unification.

The Paris Summit agreed that CFE and CSBMs would be folded together in one security forum to come into being after the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting. Informal discussions on the mandate for this new forum are ongoing in Vienna. With the dramatic changes that have taken place since the CFE and CSBM negotiations began, and continuing uncertainty regarding the future of the Soviet armed forces, the new forum is likely to focus less on traditional arms control and reduction and more on information and security dialogues.

Part III: Regularization and Institutionalization

A. Regular Consultations

The Paris Charter creates a network of regular consultations at the levels of heads of state or government at least once every two years, ministers of foreign affairs at least every year, and senior CSCE officials as needed in between. Foreign Ministers form a Council of Ministers, which provides a forum for regular and high-level political consultations within the CSCE, with the Committee of Senior Officials meeting more regularly to prepare Council meetings and implement Council decisions. If 12 CSCE States so request, emergency meetings of the Senior Officials can also be quickly assembled. Meanwhile, inter-sessional, or subsidiary, meetings take place as scheduled.

B. Council of Ministers

The Supplemental Document adopted in Paris, which gives effect to various provisions in the Charter of Paris, established "The Council," which consists of the foreign ministers of the CSCE States, as the central forum for regular political consultations within the CSCE process. It meets at least once a year.

The Berlin meeting, held on June 19-20, 1991, has been the only meeting of the Council to date, although the CSCE ministerial held in New York in October 1990 could be considered a precursor to the Council. The Berlin meeting made several decisions of importance to the future of the CSCE. First, consensus was reached to admit Albania into the process as a full and permanent member. Second, the meeting endorsed the report of the Valletta meeting and agreed to designate the Vienna-based Conflict Prevention Center as the nominating institution for the dispute settlement mechanism adopted in Valletta. Third, a statement was issued which expressed concern about the growing Yugoslav crisis. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Ministers agreed to a procedure for convening meetings of the Senior Officials Committee within 2-3 days when requested by at least 12 CSCE States in the event of a "serious emergency situation." The ministers agreed in Berlin to hold their next meeting in Prague on January 30-31, 1992, when preparations for the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting will be in full swing.

C. Committee of Senior Officials

Below the Council is the Committee of Senior Officials, which prepares Council meetings and, as necessary, carries out its decisions. It also has a mandate to review current issues and consider future CSCE work.

Soon after the Paris summit concluded, consultations began on bringing into effect those parts of the Charter dealing with institutionalization and regularization. Ad hoc negotiations paved the way for agreement on several such matters at the first Senior Officials Committee meeting, held in Vienna in January 1991. The directors of the CSCE institutions were selected, and an administrative report on the operation of the institutions was adopted. There was discussion of but no agreement on the method for using the emergency mechanism to convene the Committee as described in the Paris Charter. Soviet efforts at the time to reestablish control over Lithuania and Latvia through the deployment of special troops was condemned by many CSCE States. In fact, just prior to the Senior Officials meeting, Austria had sought to convene an emergency CSCE meeting to deal with the Baltic crisis, but the consensus needed to do so was denied by the Soviet Union. Finally, tensions in Yugoslavia almost erupted into outright conflict just prior to the meeting, causing several participating States to express concern and call for a peaceful and democratic resolution of differences within that country. Two subsequent Committee meetings were held -- the first in May in Prague and the second in June in Berlin -- to prepare for the Berlin Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The first regularly scheduled meeting of the Committee following Berlin, held in Prague on October 22-24, discussed the expansion of CSCE institutions but reached no agreement other than to meet again on January 6-7, 1992, prior to the Council meeting. In the meantime, a working group will meet in December to prepare for the Committee meeting.

The Berlin Council meeting agreed to a procedure for holding emergency sessions of the Committee of Senior Officials as envisaged in the Paris Charter. First, a participating State may request a clarification regarding an emergency situation that has developed and is of concern, and the recipient State is obligated to respond. If the situation remains unresolved, however, a request can be made to the Chairman of the Senior Officials Committee at the time, requesting a two-day emergency session of the committee. As soon as 12 or more CSCE States have seconded this request, the Chairman will notify the participating States of the meeting, which must be held no earlier than 48 hours or later than 3 days from that time.

This procedure was put to its first test almost immediately thereafter, when the nine countries of the West European Union (WEU), along with the United States, Austria and Hungary, called for the holding of an emergency session in regard to the Yugoslav military's actions in Slovenia. The Committee first met in Prague on July 3-4 and issued an urgent appeal for a ceasefire, offered a "Good Offices" mission to Yugoslavia to facilitate political dialogue and supported an initiative of the European Community to send a team to Slovenia to observe the implementation of a ceasefire. Fighting subsided in Slovenia based upon a subsequent EC-brokered ceasefire agreement, only to erupt in fierce fighting in neighboring Croatia. The German Chair of the Senior Officials Committee therefore reconvened the Prague meeting on August 8-9, during which agreement was reached to expand the scope of EC observer mission to Croatia, to expand its size and to include personnel from other CSCE States. A "Good Offices" Mission was again offered. The Committee agreed to meet again when called by the Chair. It did so on September 3-4, during which the CSCE States welcomed the formation of a peace conference on Yugoslavia in The Hague and agreed to impose an arms embargo on Yugoslavia for the duration of the conflict, which was subsequently overtaken by a UN embargo. A fourth emergency meeting took place in Prague on October 10, which condemned the continued violence, stated that those responsible for this violence should be held personally accountable under international law for their actions, and banned the use of heavy weapons. The regularly scheduled meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials, from October 22-23, also issued a strong statement on Yugoslavia, and agreed to form a Rapporteur Mission to Yugoslavia to inform the CSCE on the situation in Yugoslavia with respect to human rights, including the rights of national minorities.

D. CSCE Secretariat

To provide overall coordination of CSCE, the Paris Charter established a CSCE Secretariat in Prague. Currently, the Director is Nils Eliason of Sweden, who oversees three officers provided by selected participating States and administrative and technical personnel. The Secretariat is charged with providing administrative support for meetings of the Council of Ministers and the Committee of Senior Officials; maintaining an archive of CSCE documentation and circulating documents as requested by the participating States; providing information to individuals, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, non-participating States, and the press; and providing appropriate support to the Executive Secretaries of CSCE summits, follow-up meetings and inter-sessional meetings.

E. Conflict Prevention Center

To assist the Council of Ministers in preventing conflict, the Paris Charter established a Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) in Vienna. Currently, the Director of the CPC is Bent Rosenthal of Denmark, who oversees a secretariat of two officers provided by selected CSCE States and other personnel. It also works with a consultative committee consisting of representatives of the participating States. Initially, the role of the Conflict Prevention Center was limited to working with Confidence- and Security-Building Measures to which agreement had been reached at the CSBM negotiations, such as keeping a record of information exchanged and publishing it in yearbook form; planning a hosting seminars on military topics; and holding meetings to discuss implementation of CSBMs as well as meetings for clarification of unusual military activities, if necessary. One such meeting was held in early July 1991 at the request of Austria in light of Yugoslav military activities in Slovenia, which led to some Yugoslav intrusions into or over Austrian territory. In September, Hungary also invoked the measure but in this case only to hold a bilateral meeting with the Yugoslavs regarding similar intrusions when the fighting moved to northeastern Croatia.

The June 1991 Berlin ministerial decided to house in the CPC the mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes adopted in Valletta and to consider possible responsibilities for the center, such as sending fact-finding missions to troubled regions.

The Consultative Committee of the Center, made up of representatives of each participating State, is currently preparing recommendations on CPC enhancement for the January Council meeting, in order to move the CPC more to the forefront of CSCE efforts in crisis management, although different ideas persist on how this should be done.

F. Office of Free Elections

An Office of Free Elections (OFE), originally a U.S. initiative, was also established by the Paris Charter. The Director of the Office, which is located in Warsaw, is Luchino Cortese of Italy, who oversees one officer provided by a selected CSCE State and necessary personnel. The basic task of the Office is to facilitate contacts and the exchange of information on elections, including making available information and data relating to specific elections in addition to broader efforts, such as seminars and other meetings regarding election procedures and democratic institutions.

Additional thought has been given to ways to broaden the mandate of the Office of Free Elections beyond its current task of essentially facilitating the circulation of information on elections and election procedures. Proposals by the United States, Italy and Poland to expand the OFE into an "Office for Democratic Institutions" or similar institution, with a broader mandate to support developing democratic institutions, have gained broad support and continue to be discussed at experts' meetings such as Moscow and Oslo as well as meetings of the Committee of Senior Officials.

G. Parliamentary Assembly

In May 1991, parliamentarians from the participating States gathered in Madrid to establish a CSCE Parliamentary Assembly. The idea for a parliamentary wing of CSCE was advanced by Secretary Baker in Berlin in 1989. The concept was endorsed by the NATO leaders at their London summit meeting and was reflected in the Charter of Paris. It was decided in Madrid that the Assembly will convene on an annual basis, normally in early July. The purpose of these meetings will be to assess implementation and discuss CSCE-related issues as well as consider declarations, recommendations and proposals. Decisions of the Assembly will be transmitted to the Council of Ministers. A Committee of Heads of Delegation will oversee administrative and procedural matters. A small permanent secretariat is envisioned. The first annual meeting will be held in Budapest in 1992, with subsequent meetings to be held on a rotating basis.

Part IV: Conclusion

A. The Role of the CSCE Process

When the leaders of 35 countries, both East and West, met in Helsinki in 1975 to sign the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, they provided a framework for addressing the dilemmas of a divided, post-War Europe. Originally proposed by the Soviets to confirm their hold on Eastern Europe and to spread disarmament propaganda, the Helsinki process was quickly labelled by its detractors as a Western diplomatic sellout, an official acceptance of the legacy of Yalta. Emigration denials and persecution of activists in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe -- flagrant violations of Final Act provisions -- contributed to this skeptical view. Then came the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the declaration of martial law in Poland. By the early 1980's, the Helsinki process faced a credibility crisis that threatened its very existence.

Far from maintaining the status quo, however, Helsinki provided for peaceful change by chipping away at Soviet and East European stonewalling on human rights. By focusing the efforts of Western governments and private citizens in both East and West, it has helped set the stage for much of what is happening today.

First, its provisions became a yardstick for measuring human rights performance. When raising human rights violations, countries could cite commitments which the responsible governments freely undertook.

Second, human rights became a subject for discussion between States, no matter how hard Eastern officials, claiming it was an internal concern, tried to prevent it. Diplomatic niceties were often dropped in CSCE meetings as specific violations were repeatedly raised along with the names of victims of official repression. The Soviets and East Europeans fought back when the United States first raised these violations, but a growing number of other countries joined the ever louder chorus. Eastern diplomats, apt at playing the games of traditional diplomacy, were having a tougher time dealing with the sharp and steady barrage of criticism from the very Europeans whom they had hoped to win over through the same Helsinki process.

Third, private individuals made use of the CSCE to make the same comparison of words and deeds. Hundreds of citizens in the USSR, the Baltic States and Eastern Europe, hoping that Helsinki would make a difference, formed groups to monitor implementation of the Final Act. Private groups also formed in the West, and in 1976 the U.S. Congress created the Helsinki Commission to encourage CSCE implementation. The continued pressure of public opinion in both East and West, often downplayed or dismissed in the past, in fact contributed greatly to change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Fourth, the rule of consensus is the basis for CSCE decision-making. Nothing is adopted without the opportunity for any one of the participating States to withhold consent if it wishes. Some have done this in the past, including the United States, but none can claim that it was outvoted or otherwise forced to undertake commitments against its will. This fact strengthens arguments that commitments must be implemented.

Finally, unlike other human rights fora, Helsinki integrated human rights into East-West relations, along with military security and trade. As a result of this most explicit expression of linkage, Eastern countries continued to participate, despite the heavy human rights content, in the hope of shaping the process to serve their interests as well.

Combined with leadership changes, economic problems and other factors, this East-West diplomacy had a considerable impact on human rights performance. This was most evident during the two years of the third main CSCE meeting, held in Vienna from 1986-1989, where Western and neutral countries reviewed Eastern human rights performance thoroughly and held firm in extended negotiations until a document was adopted that advanced international human rights commitments to a new level. The Soviets and some East European governments responded by freeing hundreds of political prisoners, increasing emigration, ending the jamming of Western radio broadcasts, and tolerating more independent activities, including the practice of faith. Further changes were seen at subsequent meetings, and the firm stand on human rights at the Sofia meeting in late 1989 directly contributed to positive changes in Bulgaria. The hopes of Helsinki, at long last, were becoming reality.

B. The Future of the CSCE Process

As countries move beyond respect for basic human rights to the broader issues of democracy, Helsinki can help consolidate efforts to make these countries true democracies, such as with new commitments regarding political pluralism and respect the rule of law. Commitments originally made in Helsinki on the treatment of national minorities, the self-determination of peoples and the territorial integrity of states serve as a basis for future efforts on these increasingly significant and related issues. Events across Europe show the strong desire of all peoples to decide their own economic and political futures, and the possible break-up of some CSCE States into new, independent European states will create special challenges which can be best handled in the CSCE. Similarly, ethnic strife in several countries, especially those in the Balkans, and more numerous expressions of anti-Semitic and anti-Roma (Gypsy) views, show the need for a better understanding and dialogue among neighboring national and ethnic groups. The CSCE will also provide the forum for discussion of security issues in a new environment, moving beyond traditional military definitions of security. Multilateral discussion of these issues may well prove vital to maintaining stability in Europe during major political upheavals such as those now occurring, and the CSCE is the only forum with the membership, broad mandate and flexibility to address these issues adequately.

The CSCE is adapting to the changing face of Europe so that it can remain an effective force for positive change. Regularizing the Helsinki process, through more frequent meetings on an increasing number of topics, and establishing new and permanent CSCE institutions are the first steps in this direction. There is a need to ensure, however, that the advantages of the CSCE in its original form -- a process and not an institution -- are somehow preserved. Indeed, institutionalization may bring an added, short-term sense of stability, but it may also decrease the flexibility of the CSCE which it needs in order to adapt to further changes. It may also make it less, and not more, open to public involvement, as well as less a vehicle to promote further positive change than to maintain the status quo. CSCE institutions also run the risk of duplicating the efforts of other international bodies, and could break the unique inter-linkages between the many issues covered by Helsinki process.

The crisis in Yugoslavia demonstrated the first real challenge for the enhanced CSCE process in the new Europe. The process was effective in noting the problem and in recognizing that it had a vital role to play at the international level in seeking a resolution of the crisis. However, the extreme sensitivity which surrounds inter-ethnic disputes and questions of self-determination has minimized the ability of the CSCE to assert itself effectively. Moreover, the rule of consensus for CSCE decision-making has arisen as a potential obstacle to the adoption of effective measures in response to urgent situations. Thus, the question for CSCE remains one of procedure as well as of the political will of the participating States to engage actively in specific and complicated yet urgent situations. Without further strengthening, the CSCE mechanisms already in place or being adopted may become ineffective, and CSCE will be viewed as a process to define the long-term direction of Europe and not to respond to the short-term problems which arise along the way.

During difficult years in East-West relations, the CSCE survived while other channels for dialogue failed. In fact, with its comprehensive focus, adaptability and directness, CSCE helped to reverse much of the legacy of Yalta which it originally was thought to have confirmed. New challenges are emerging, however, and the CSCE is being called upon to address them. Hopefully, it will do so with the same success that has marked its past.

Part V: Appendices**A. List of Participating States**

The CSCE States, in seating order (i.e. French alphabetical order), are:

Albania ¹	Denmark ³	Ireland ²	Monaco	Sweden
Germany ³	Spain ³	Iceland ⁴	Norway ⁴	Switzerland
United States ⁴	Estonia ⁵	Italy ³	Netherlands ³	Czechoslovakia
Austria	Finland	Latvia ⁵	Poland	Turkey ⁴
Belgium ³	France ³	Liechtenstein	Portugal ³	Soviet Union
Bulgaria	United Kingdom ³	Lithuania ⁵	Romania	Yugoslavia
Canada ⁴	Greece ³	Luxembourg ³	San Marino	
Cyprus	Hungary	Malta	Holy See	

The October 1990 unification of Germany ended the participation of the German Democratic Republic in the CSCE process, leaving the Federal Republic of Germany participating in the name of Germany and 34 of the original 35 States in the CSCE. Albania, which at the opening stages of the CSCE refused to participate, requested and was given observer status at each CSCE meeting from the Copenhagen meeting in June 1990 until the Berlin ministerial in June 1991, when consensus was achieved to grant Albania full and permanent membership, bringing the number of participating States back to thirty-five. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania also first petitioned to join the CSCE as observers in Copenhagen, but no action has been taken regarding their requests there or at subsequent meetings, in light of clear Soviet opposition. Following the failure of the August 1991 coup attempt, however, Moscow authorities withdrew their opposition, and the three Baltic States became full members on September 10, 1991. Slovenia, Croatia, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia and other emerging political entities in Europe have expressed interest in the CSCE, some actually making formal requests to participate, either as observers or as full participants.

While the CSCE does not formally recognize blocs or groups among the participating States, in reality several major groups and sub-groups have existed for the purposes of coordination and negotiation. Traditionally the principal groups were: 1) the sixteen countries of NATO, also referred to as "the Sixteen" or, along with Ireland, "the West;" 2) the seven countries of the Warsaw Pact, also known as "the East;" and 3) the remaining CSCE countries, except the Holy See and Monaco, which formed the Neutral and Non-Aligned, also called "the NNa" or the "N+N." CSCE negotiation practices in the past usually saw the NNa countries serving as "coordinators" between Eastern and Western positions in an attempt to reach the necessary compromises to achieve consensus. Over time, the European Community, known as "the EC" or "the Twelve," has become a major player in the CSCE, although, with 11 of its 12 members also belonging to NATO, it has generally coordinated its positions with the NATO group.

As the removal of political barriers has made Europe less divided, these traditional groups have become even more informal and, in the case of the Warsaw Pact, no longer play a role in the CSCE. These groups may soon be supplemented or replaced by new informal groups, at least for coordinating on certain issues, such as a new group of Central European countries originally called the "the Pentagone" and now "the Hexagone" -- Austria, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. There is also a Nordic Caucus of Scandinavian countries which has taken strong positions on the environment and the Baltic States. The sole exception to the reshaping informal groups is the group of CSCE States belonging to the European Community, which, in the past year, has sought and at least partially received official recognition in CSCE in addition to that given each of its 12 member-States.

¹ Invited but refused to participate in 1973. Observer since June 1990. Full member since June 1991.

² Member of the European Community.

³ Member of both NATO and the European Community.

⁴ Member of NATO.

⁵ Full Member since September 1991.

B. Summary of CSCE Organizational Structure

With the adoption of the Paris Charter, the CSCE process has become both institutionalized and regularized. While linkages and relationships have yet to be fully clarified, generally speaking the regularly scheduled meetings are the broadest decision-making bodies, being able undertake commitments in a wide range of CSCE fields and to schedule other meetings as so desired. Other meetings must be mandated by a regularly scheduled meeting. They can also take decisions but will generally be less likely to do so and, even then, focus only on specific CSCE fields. The institutions are designed to assist the regular and other meetings as appropriate in addition to carrying out assigned activities on a day-to-day basis. The CSCE Parliamentary Assembly will meet annually and may establish an institution of its own to serve as a secretariat. The Council of Ministers and the Committee of Senior Officials will likely define responsibilities and relationships which would be formally adopted along with other decisions at the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting in 1992.

<u>Regular Meetings</u>	<u>Other Meetings</u>	<u>Institutions</u>	<u>Other</u>
CSCE SUMMITS OF HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT, on the occasion of FOLLOW-UP MEETINGS (every two years, beginning with Helsinki in 1992)	INTER-SESSIONAL/SUBSIDIARY MEETINGS such as Experts Meetings Seminars, Symposia, etc. (between follow-up meetings)	CSCE SECRETARIAT Prague	PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY (every year in July)
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (at least once annually, beginning with Berlin on June 18, 1991, as agreed by the Committee of Senior Officials)	NEGOTIATIONS ON CSBMS * Vienna (until Helsinki in 1992)	CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTER Vienna which includes a CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE *** (annual implementation assessment, other activities)	
COMMITTEE OF SENIOR OFFICIALS (as agreed, beginning with Vienna on January 28, 1991, or by emergency mechanism)	MEETINGS OF OTHER MINISTERS (as agreed)	OFFICE OF FREE ELECTIONS Warsaw	

* Technically an inter-sessional/subsidiary meeting but with distinct characteristics.

** A meeting of 22 of the original 35 CSCE States held within the framework of the CSCE process.

*** To be organized by the Director of the Crisis Prevention Center and, as a rule and until the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting in 1992, with the CSCE States represented by the Heads of Delegation to the Negotiations on CSBMs which are also taking place in Vienna.

C. List of Post-Vienna Meetings *1989

Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures	Vienna	9 March -
Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) **	Vienna	9 March -
Information Forum	London	18 April - 12 May
First Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension (CHD)	Paris	30 May - 23 June
Meeting on the Protection of the Environment	Sofia	16 October - 3 November

1990

Seminar on Military Doctrine	Vienna	16 January - 5 February
Economic Conference	Bonn	19 March - 11 April
Second Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension (CHD)	Copenhagen	5 June - 29 June
Meeting on the Mediterranean	Palma de Mallorca	24 September - 19 October
Preparatory Committee for a CSCE Summit Meeting ***	Vienna	10 July - 17 November
Meeting of Foreign Ministers ****	New York	1 October - 2 October
Summit of CSCE States *****	Paris	19 November - 21 November

* Except where otherwise indicated, mandate contained in the Vienna Concluding Document.

** A meeting of 22 of the 35 CSCE States held within the framework of the CSCE process. The German Democratic Republic was an original, 23rd participant, until the October 1990 unification of Germany.

*** Not mandated by the Vienna Concluding Document. Organized by agreement of the participating States at the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE.

**** Not mandated by the Vienna Concluding Document. Agenda and modalities for this meeting were arranged by the Vienna Preparatory Committee.

***** Not mandated by the Vienna Concluding Document. Arrangements made at the Vienna Preparatory Committee, and the New York Meeting of Foreign Ministers set the dates and location.

C. List of Post-Vienna Meetings (continued)

1991

Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes	Valletta	15 January - 8 February
Committee of Senior Officials *	Vienna	28 January - 29 January
Committee of Senior Officials *	Prague	23 May - 24 May
Symposium on Cultural Heritage	Krakow	28 May - 7 June
Committee of Senior Officials *	Berlin	16 June - 17 June
Council Foreign Ministers **	Berlin	19 June - 20 June
Meeting of Experts on National Minorities ****	Geneva	1 July - 19 July
Committee of Senior Officials ***	Prague	3 July - 4 July
Committee of Senior Officials ***	Prague	8 August - 9 August
Committee of Senior Officials ***	Prague	3 September - 4 September
Committee of Senior Officials ***	Prague	10 October
Third Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension (CHD)	Moscow	10 September - 4 October
Seminar on Military Doctrine	Vienna	8 October - 18 October
Committee of Senior Officials *	Prague	23 October - 24 October
Seminar of Experts on Democratic Institutions ****	Oslo	4 November - 15 November

1992

Committee of Senior Officials *	Prague	6 January - 7 January
Council of Foreign Ministers **	Prague	30 January - 31 January
Preparatory Meeting for the Fourth CSCE Follow-Up Meeting	Helsinki	10 March (two-week duration)
Fourth CSCE Follow-Up Meeting	Helsinki	24 March -

* Provided for by the Paris Charter. Preparations currently being made through informal channels.

** Provided for by the Paris Charter. The Committee of Senior Officials makes necessary preparations.

*** Convened through the Emergency Mechanism.

**** Mandated by the Paris Charter.

YUGOSLAV BILATERAL
STATEMENT

**BRIEFING BOOK FOR CODEL HOYER
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**CODEL HOYER TO
THE OSLO SEMINAR OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
OSLO, NORWAY**

November 8 - 12, 1991

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman

Representative Steny H. Hoyer

Members

Representative Glenn Anderson
Representative Martin Olav and Ms. Sylvia Lee Sabo
Representative Helen Delich Bentley
Representative Ben Jones
Representative Collin C. Peterson
Mr. William Fritts, Commissioner, U.S. Department of Commerce

Commission Staff

Ambassador Samuel G. Wise, Staff Director
Mary Sue Hafner, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel
R. Spencer Oliver, Consultant
Jesse Jacobs, Staff Member

James D. Ford, Chaplain, House of Representatives

Air Force Escorts

Lt. Col. Robert W. Topel
Maj. Dennis M. Kaan
M.Sgt. Curtis L Banks
S.Sgt. Eugene Barlow, Jr.

ITINERARY -- CODEL HOYER -- OSLO, NORWAY

Friday, 8 November

7:00 pm departure from Andrews Air Force Base
+ 5 hours (dinner aboard aircraft)

Saturday, 9 November

5:55 am Arrive Shannon -- refuel

7:25 am Depart Shannon
+ 1 hour (breakfast aboard aircraft)

10:35 am Arrival Oslo Fornebu Airport
Met by Ambassador Rupper and Mr. Ruppe
Control Officer Elizabeth Spiro

10:45 am Check-in at the SAS Scandinavian Hotel
Holbergsgt 30, Oslo
telephone from U.S.: 011-47-2-11-30-00
fax from U.S.: 011-47-2-11-30-17 (clearly mark intended recipient)
Room Keys will be given out in Control Room (Rm. 1815/16)

Lunch reservations have been made at nearby Savoy Restaurant
(optional)

2:55 Depart Hotel for U.S. Embassy

3:00 Arrive Embassy -- proceed to 4th Floor Conference Room
Briefing on Oslo Seminar by Assistant Secretary Schifter

3:45 Country team briefing -- U.S. Embassy

4:45 Depart Embassy for SAS Hotel

5:00 Bilateral with Yugoslav Delegation -- SAS Scandinavian Hotel
Suite ~~2209~~ 2008

6:55 Depart SAS Hotel

- 7:00 Open house hosted by the Norwegian Institute for Human Rights, Coordinator of Non-Governmental activities for the Oslo meeting
Grensen 18 (street address)
- 8:00 Depart Open House for "Grand Cafe"
- 8:15 Arrive "Grand Cafe" Restaurant for delegation dinner
No-Host -- optional (Bus will transport members of delegation who choose to return to hotel)

Sunday, 10 November

- 10:20 Depart SAS Hotel for Akershus
- 10:30 Tour of Norwegian Resistance Museum. Special tour will be conducted by Mr. and Mrs. Gunnar Sonsteby. Mr. Sonsteby is one of Norway's most famous WWII resistance fighters. Mrs. Sonsteby is the director of the museum.
-
- 11:15 Depart for Viking Ship Museum
- 11:30 Arrive Viking Ship Museum
- 11:55 Leave Viking Ship Museum for Folk Museum
- 12:00 Arrive Folk Museum -- museum is outdoors. In case of rain, delegation will have option to tour one of other nearby museums
- 12:30 Leave Folk Museum for Vigeland Graveyard
- 12:45 Arrive Vigeland Graveyard. Lay Wreath on U.S. Monument to WWII dead.
- 1:15 Depart Vigeland for Holmenkollen
- 1:45 Arrive Frognerseteren Restaurant on Holmenkollen for no-host luncheon. (approximately 25 USD)
- 4:30 Arrive SAS Hotel
- 5:40 Depart SAS Hotel for Ambassador's residence
- 6:00 - 8:00 Commission-hosted reception for Delegations to the Oslo meeting and non-governmental representatives at Ambassador's residence


Monday, 11 November

- 10:30 am Chairman Hoyer to address plenary session of Oslo Seminar
- 10:20 Ministry of Trade Naalsund Meeting with Rep. Helen Bentley
- 9:50 Minister of Social Affairs Meeting with Rep. Collin Peterson
- 1:10 pm CODEL departs SAS Hotel for Bristol Hotel
- 1:15 Luncheon hosted by CODEL Hoyer with Turkish Delegation
Bristol Hotel restaurant
- 2:50 Depart Bristol Hotel for Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- 3:00 Meeting with Mr. Helge Windenes, Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry
(will be serving as Acting Foreign Minister)
- 3:50 Depart Foreign Ministry
- 4:00 Meeting with Gro Harlem Brundtland, Prime Minister
- 5:00 Meeting in the Storting with Foreign Affairs Committee Members
- 6:00 Return to SAS Hotel
- 7:55 Depart SAS Hotel for Bristol Hotel
- 8:00 Dinner for members hosted by the Storting Foreign
Affairs Committee

Tuesday, 12 November

- 8:00 am Baggage Call
- 9:00 Depart SAS Hotel
- 9:30 Departure from Oslo
(breakfast snack on board)
- 11:25 Arrive Keflavik, Iceland -- refuel
- 12:55 pm Depart Keflavik
(lunch on board)
- 2:00 pm Arrival at Andrews Air Force Base

1. Armed Forces Museum
Resistance Museum
2. Bislett Stadium
3. Central Postal Office
4. Central Station
5. Cathedral
6. Maritime Museum
7. Geologisk Museum
8. History Museum
9. Mus. of Applied Art
- 10 Majorstua Station
- 11 Munch Museum
- 12 Nasjonalgalleriet
- 13 National Theatre
- 14 Norsk Folkemuseum
- 15 City Hall
- 16 Skating Museum
- 17 Royal Palace
- 18 Transport Museum
- 19 PARLIAMENT
- 20 University
- 21 Vigelandmuseet
- 22 Vikingshipuset
- 23 West Station



*** SAS Scandinavia HOTEL

Oslo, Norway
August 5, 1991

KEY OFFICERS LIST

Ambassador	Loret M. Ruppe
Deputy Chief of Mission	Donald J. Planty
Economic Counselor	F. Brenne Bachmann
Public Affairs Counselor	William Zavis
Political Officer	Elizabeth P. Spiro
Agricultural Officer	Robert Tetro (resident in Copenhagen)
ODA	Captain Douglas D. Blaha, USN
ODC	Colonel William L. Brown, USAF
Commercial Attache	Scott Bozek
Consular Officer	Elizabeth Berube
USIO Tromso	George M. White
Regional Security Officer	Joseph Davidson
Administrative Officer	Herbert R. Brown
Labor Attache	Elaine S. Papazian
Information Officer	John A. Matel

LOCAL HOLIDAYS 1991

28 March	Holy Thursday
29 March	Good Friday
1 April	Easter Monday
1 May	Norwegian Labor Day
9 May	Ascension Day
17 May	Constitution Day
20 May	Whitmonday
25 December	Christmas Day
26 December	Second Christmas Day

HOTELS FREQUENTLY USED FOR OFFICIAL VISITORS/TDY/NEW ARRIVALS

Gabelshus Hotel	Gabelsgate 16, tel. 55 22 60
SAS Hotel	Holbergsgate 30, tel. 11 30 00
Grand Hotel	Karl Johansgate 31, tel 42 93 90
Norum Hotel	Karl Johansgate 33, te. 42 74 80
Europa Hotel	St. Olavsgate 31, tel 20 99 90



Ambassador Loret Miller Ruppe

Ambassador Ruppe was born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in 1936. She attended Marymount College in Tarrytown, New York, and Marquette University in Milwaukee. She is the wife of former 6-term Congressman Philip E. Ruppe of Michigan. The Ruppe's have five daughters, one of whom served as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Nepal.

Ambassador Ruppe enjoyed a long career as a volunteer organizer and civic leader in her hometown of Houghton, Michigan, before joining the federal government. After successfully aiding in her husband's campaigns for Congress in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan, she became George Bush's campaign manager in the 1980 Michigan presidential primary, which he won by a large margin. She served later as the co-chairperson of Michigan's Reagan/Bush State Committee in the 1980 elections, again delivering a Republican victory. She also served as chairman of the 1981, Vice Presidential Inaugural Reception.

Ambassador Ruppe was appointed Director of the Peace Corps by President Reagan in 1981. She served for eight years in that position, making her the longest tenured Director in the agency's 28-year history. She was credited by many with overseeing a revitalization of the agency and a strengthening of its contributions to world peace through development. She was responsible for developing the agency's "Leadership for Peace Program," which established innovative outreach programs (focusing on environmental and women's issues) to colleges and universities, union and trade officials, environmental groups, and the private sector throughout the United States.

Ambassador Loret Miller Ruppe presented her credentials to King Olav V as American Ambassador to Norway on August 29, 1989.

OSLO CSCE SEMINAR

OVERVIEW OF THE OSLO SEMINAR OF EXPERTS
ON DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

By the time the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension was held in June 1990, most of Eastern Europe's hard-liners had fallen, the two Germanies were moving toward unification, and the CSCE had agreed to hold a historic summit in Paris that November. In this context, agreement was reached in the Copenhagen Document on language recognizing the need for cooperation in the establishment and promotion of democratic institutions which would, in turn, encourage democratic values and practices.

Subsequently, the Paris Summit of CSCE Heads of State or Government in November, 1990 agreed to convene a supplemental two-week inter-sessional meeting (in addition to those meetings already mandated by the Vienna Concluding Document) devoted exclusively to the subject of "consolidating and strengthening viable democratic institutions."

In light of the agreement reached on a substantive concluding document just a few weeks ago at the Moscow human dimension meeting, it is unlikely that further progress negotiating additional commitments could be made at this time. Consequently, the United States believes that the Oslo Meeting will best be used as a forum for 1) discussion of the specific needs of countries seeking assistance in building democratic institutions, and 2) improving coordination among those countries that might provide such assistance. To this end, the Oslo Seminar should facilitate dialogue among the experts on the various subjects of discussion (e.g. constitutional reforms, electoral processes, independent, non-governmental organizations) rather than attempt to draft additional commitments. Nevertheless, we would not be surprised if the meetings produced some.

Furthermore, the United States sees the Oslo Seminar as an opportunity to hold further consultations regarding the idea advanced by Secretary Baker -- and now generally endorsed in the 1991 Moscow Document -- for transforming the Warsaw-based CSCE Office for Free Elections (OFE) into an Office for Democratic Institutions (ODI). Although it is unlikely that the Oslo Meeting would take specific steps to that end, consultations in Oslo could help pave the way for the adoption of concrete measures by the CSCE Council of Ministers (scheduled to meet in January, 1992) or at the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting (scheduled to convene in March, 1992). The United States seeks to build consensus to establish the Office of Democratic Institutions as the human rights counterpart to the military security-oriented Conflict Prevention Center. It would constitute an integral element in the overall CSCE approach to crisis management.

**UNITED STATES DELEGATION
OBLO SEMINAR OF EXPERTS ON DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS**

UPDATED

Amb. Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary of State
Head of Delegation
Mr. J. Sherwood McGinnis,
Principal Deputy Head of Delegation
Ms. Nancy Ely-Raphel, Deputy Head of Delegation
Mr. David M. Evans, Deputy Head of Delegation
Amb. J. Kenneth Blackwell, U.S. Representative to
the United Nations Human Rights Committee
Mr. Damian Leader, Executive Secretary of Delegation
Ms. Elizabeth Barnett
Ms. Joan K. Benziger
Mr. Todd Buchwald
Ms. Jeanne A. McNaughton
Ms. Erika Schlager

Prof. Thomas Buergenthal
Mr. John M. Elliott
Prof. Elspeth Rostow
Prof. Allen Weinstein

Amb. Loret Miller Ruppe, Vice Chairman of Delegation
Mr. Joseph D. Davison
Mr. John M. Matel
Mr. Edwin R. Nolan
Ms. Leslie Reagan
Ms. Reidun Dybwad

Hon. Steny Hoyer, Chairman of U.S. Helsinki Commission and
Vice Chairman of Delegation
Representative Glenn Anderson
Representative Martin Olav Sabo
Representative Helen Delich Bentley
Representative Ben Jones
Representative Collin C. Peterson
Mr. William Fritts

Ms. Sylvia Lee Sabo
Amb. Samuel G. Wise
Ms. Mary Sue Hafner
Mr. Jesse Jacobs
Mr. R. Spencer Oliver



BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF RICHARD SCHIFTER

Since November 1, 1985, Richard Schifter has been the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. He is also a member of the Board of Directors of the United States Institute of Peace and serves as a State Department representative on the Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

During 1984-85 Mr. Schifter served as Deputy United States Representative in the Security Council of the United Nations, with the rank of Ambassador. From 1983 to 1986 he also held the position of United States member of the United Nations Human Rights Commission.

A lawyer by profession, Mr. Schifter practiced law in Washington, D.C. from 1951 until his entry into full-time government service.

Mr. Schifter participated for many years in the educational affairs of his home state of Maryland as a citizen member of various boards and commissions. His service encompassed twenty years of membership on the Maryland State Board of Education, including eight years as the Board's Vice President and four years as President. He also served on the Executive Committee of the Board of Visitors of the Maryland School for the Deaf, as Chairman of the Governor's Commission for the Funding of the Education of Handicapped Children and as Chairman of the Maryland Values Education Commission.

Mr. Schifter was born in Vienna, Austria in 1923, and came to the United States in 1938. He graduated summa cum laude from the College of the City of New York in 1943 and received his L.L.B. from Yale Law School in 1951. Mr. Schifter served in the United States Army from 1943 to 1946.

Mr. Schifter's wife, Lilo Schifter, also an attorney, is a member of the Maryland Public Service Commission. The Schifters have five children and eight grandchildren.

BIOGRAPHY OF J. KENNETH BLACKWELL
U.S. Representative to the
United Nations Human Rights Commission

On February 19, 1991, J. Kenneth Blackwell was appointed by the President to be U.S. Representative to the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC). Mr. Blackwell is an independent business and education consultant and writer who has spent many years involved in national and international civic and human rights matters. Currently on leave from Xavier University for government service, he is also a Senior Fellow at the Heritage Foundation and a Visiting Senior Fellow at the Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights, University of Cincinnati. Mr. Blackwell was a member of the U.S. Delegation to the 46th Session of the UNHRC in 1990.

From 1989 to 1990, Mr. Blackwell was Deputy Undersecretary in the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development; from 1977-89 he served as an elected representative to the Cincinnati City Council, including periods as Mayor and Vice-Mayor; and from 1971-89, he held a series of positions at Xavier University including Associate Vice-President, Community Relations (1980-89), Director of Community Relations (1975-79), Urban Affairs Coordinator (1971-74); Associate Professor of Education (1977-83), and Assistant Professor of Education (1974-77). From 1978 to 1982, he was a partner in Bitaminex Company, a coal mining and brokerage firm.

Mr. Blackwell was a candidate for Ohio's First Congressional District in 1990. His previous activities in politics included serving as member of the Steering Committee for Bush for President (Ohio, 1988); co-chair of Blacks for Bush (Ohio, 1988); chairman of Citizens for Responsible Government spending (Hamilton County); and advisory committee member of the National Conference of Republican Mayors and Municipal Elected Officials.

His civic activities have included service as co-founder of the Cincinnati Youth Collaborative, member of the Board of Governors of the St. Rita School for the Deaf, chairman of the Catholic Inner City School Education Fund, and member of Ohio Victims of Crime Advisory Council.

Mr. Blackwell was a sponsor for Central American Peace and Democracy Watch, a member of Jerusalem Committee, and a board member of Prodemca National Committee. He has attended several international conferences on managing large cities: the International Conference of Mayors, Jerusalem, 1980; the International Colloquium on the management of large cities, Paris, 1985; and the British-American Conference for the Successor Generation, St. Louis, 1988.

Mr. Blackwell was born on February 28, 1948. He obtained a Bachelor of Science degree in 1970 and a Master of Education degree in 1971 from Xavier University. He was a fellow at Harvard University (1982, Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy School of Government), at the Salzburg Seminar (1988, American Politics and the Foreign Policy Process), and at the Aspen Institute (1986, Humanistic Studies). He also has been awarded honorary degrees from Wilberforce University and Cincinnati Technical College. He is married and has three children.

As Delivered

**Opening Statement
Assistant Secretary Richard Schifter
U.S. Delegation to
the Oslo Seminar of Democratic Institutions**

We, too, want to express our appreciation to the government of Norway for its organizational work on this conference and for its hospitality. As others have noted, it is particularly fitting for Norway, with its long democratic tradition, to host this meeting on the democratic future of our region. And we are indeed grateful to Prime Minister Brundtland for the important and highly constructive statement which she delivered to us.

Permit me to start with a few reminiscences. I attended, in the spring of 1985, the first CSCE meeting devoted purely to the issue of human rights, the Ottawa meeting. It was a meeting at which discussions of human rights did not differ from previous discussions of that issue in the CSCE framework. By that I mean that we divided sharply along ideological lines: John Locke's idea of the role of the state versus that of Vladimir Lenin.

But I also recall what the head of the Hungarian delegation told us in Ottawa. There is a new spirit hovering over us all, he claimed. It is the spirit of the new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, who will change everything. Our delegation watched and listened and did not notice any change. We, therefore, did not give a great deal of credence to the observations of our Hungarian colleague.

Let me add at this point that I was happy to see in this hall a short while ago my Soviet colleague at the Ottawa meeting, Ambassador Vsevolod Sofinsky. I believe it can be revealed today that Ambassador Sofinsky favored perestroika before it became Soviet policy, but his instructions at Ottawa, as he then pointed out to me, then came from Andrei Gromyko and he had to abide by them.

Now we know, of course, that our Hungarian colleague was right. Profound change did not occur immediately, but it came in due time. As we meet today, at a gathering dedicated specifically to the issue of democracy, all of us define that term in the same manner. We all share a common understanding of the concept that a government in order to be legitimate must obtain its mandate from the people in a free and fair election, that it must respect the fundamental rights of all persons under its jurisdiction.

Regrettably this is, however, not a time for expressions of self-satisfaction. Just as years passed before western Europe recovered from the devastation of world war II, so years are likely to pass before Eastern Europe will recover from the distortions of the economy created by the command system, the

social devastation wrought by totalitarianism. And just as there was concern about the survival of democracy in some parts of Western Europe 45 years ago, so are there concerns about the survival of democracy in parts of Eastern Europe today.

Quite understandably people whose hopes for an immediate rise in their standard of living have been dashed, who, in fact see a decline in that standard, who feel insecure, are the prey of demagogues who might promise quick cures of economic ills at the price of a surrender of democratic freedoms. That danger is particularly acute in a region which has for centuries been beset by inter-ethnic disputes and where passions can be aroused by appeals to extreme nationalism. Beyond that, we need to recognize the dangers to democracy in societies in which the people have had little experience with that form of government and where institutions designed to protect the rights of the individual and the right of the people to choose their government are still in their infancy.

None of these problems are unique or unprecedented. In my own country we often recite the words of one of our early presidents who, when told of the decision of the Supreme Court that a person who was serving a prison term was to be freed, said: "the Chief Justice has made his decision. Now let him enforce it." It is clear that it takes time before the rule of law matures in any society.

Having stated the problem, we need also to look for a solution. Let us keep in mind that it was the CSCE process which for the last sixteen years has served to define human rights standards for the participating states and has drawn attention to transgressions against these standards. The question before all of us is whether the CSCE process can now do more, help those who want to strengthen their democratic institutions to do just that.

Accidents of history and geography have bestowed on some of us the good fortune of living in societies which are long-established democracies. Others are democracies of more recent vintage and some have made their commitment to democracy only during the last two and a half years. Those who fall into the last of these categories are today led by and large by people who have the political will to identify themselves with democracy but who need the support of institutions which can assure the realization of the democratic goal. So as to be able to build these institutions without undue delay they need technical know-how.

To provide such know-how and to channel it effectively, I submit, is a challenge now before us in the CSCE process. The task, to develop a multitude of cooperative programs within the CSCE system, is vast. The resources will, necessarily, be limited. It is vitally important that they be deployed as effectively and efficiently as possible. Unnecessary duplication should be avoided. That is why a coordinated effort is required.

It is to coordinate our efforts of democratic institution building that the United States concurs in the recommendation recently discussed by the Committee of Senior Officials to transform the present Office for Free Elections into an Office of Democratic Institutions. In offering this suggestion we do not recommend the creation of a new, substantially enlarged bureaucracy. What we recommend is that we create a clearing house, an office to which governments needing specific forms of technical help can turn and which would then identify the individuals or organizations that can provide the help, sponsored, as they may be, by governments, intergovernmental organizations, or nongovernmental organizations. This office can then coordinate our cooperative work in advancing the cause of democracy and human rights in the CSCE area.

As important as this organizational innovation may be, it should not be the only objective of this gathering. We must constantly examine conditions in our region and, where there are serious shortcomings. We must ask ourselves how we can help solve the problems which deny to some people in the CSCE area the benefits of the Helsinki Final Act. We can not let this meeting pass without paying particular attention to the tragedy that is Yugoslavia, the oppression in Kosovo, the death and destruction wrought by a struggle between Serbs and Croats over issues that should have been resolved at the conference table. What is wrong, we must ask ourselves. How can the CSCE bring its resources to bear to bring these killings to an end? We are encouraged by the agreement reached at the last Committee of Senior Officials meeting to send a rapporteur mission to Yugoslavia. We ask that parties involved take full advantage of this opportunity to end the bloodshed and work toward a peaceful solution to their differences.

We should also take note of the difficulties which the twelve republics which constituted the USSR will encounter on the road to democracy. The world was truly amazed by the fortitude demonstrated by the people of Russia when confronted by a coup led by the heads of the country's security forces. But as we all know, overcoming the coup was only a first step. The adverse effect of the legacy of more than seven decades of totalitarianism will be felt for years to come, more so in some republics, in some regions, than in others. And just as in Yugoslavia, there is concern about inter-ethnic violence, again more so in some republics than in others.

We must view it as a responsibility of all of us to help those who must confront these problems directly. We must help them find solutions to these problems in a democratic order, respectful of human rights. What the signatures of our leaders on the Helsinki Final Act should remind us of is that we are indeed our brothers' keepers.

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FOREIGN PRESS CENTER BRIEFING

Briefer: Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs Richard Schifter

Topic: ``The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Seminar in Oslo on Democratic Institutions''

Location: National Press Building, 14th and F Sts. NW, room 898
October 28, 1991
Time: 3 p.m.

NOTE: This transcript is for use only by foreign news organizations.

RICHARD SCHIFTER (Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Operations): The decision to have a meeting in Oslo in November 1991 was taken at the Paris meeting of the CSCE principals in November 1990. The idea was to have a meeting on democracy, and the question that this poses to all of us was could the government have made a decision as to what it is that ought to be talked about topically. The question that is then up to us who have operating responsibilities is to figure out precisely what does that mean in terms of what you really want to take up.

Where we now are in the CSCE process? We believe that the kind of debate that went on in the years immediately following the conclusion of the Helsinki Final Act, namely, a debate on fundamental principles of democracy. That's part of the past. The question has been resolved by and large. We now have an agreed definition of the terms that contained within the Helsinki Final Act. We may not have full compliance with all the provisions, and problems of that kind may still exist. But, as I say, the debate, which was ultimately a debate as I have seen it, between the teachings, let's say, of John Locke, on the one hand, and the teachings of Vladimir Lenin, on the other-- that's over. And we can say that in principle therefore there is agreement.

What we now have to talk about, and that is really to me the key to discussion, is how we can work together to build democratic institutions, speaking very practically. We have to be concerned about the fact that in any country in which there has been either no tradition or only very limited tradition of democracy that there are forces at work now, particularly in light of the very difficult circumstances, which might tend to undermine a movement toward democracy or may at least create doubt about it in people's minds, and therefore ultimately in what it is that happens in the streets.

What we have to try to do, then, those of us who have been fortunate enough to live in more established democracies where the institutions are on firmer ground, to see whether the extent to which other countries are interested in getting technical help and advice and counsel in the creation of institutions that underpin democracy, whether we can provide

such service and whether we can provide it as efficiently and effectively as we possibly can.

We have had the opportunity to talk about the fact that one of the problems that we sometimes run into is that you go to a particular country in Eastern Europe and there is a group of delegations from the more established democracies that sort of trip over each other, each trying to do something in the country in question to advance democratic cause. All of this could be channelled appropriately if the government of the country in question identifies what it believes to be its needs and then works back from that with the countries that might be able to provide advice and counsel.

And the question, then, would be how can that most effectively be done? We have some notion on that, and that is to create an Office of Democratic Institutions under the CSCE umbrella so that a country that is interested in receiving certain service would be able to be in touch with that office; the office would have a data bank as to who is able to provide the service; and that office would then act as a catalyst in providing the service.

That's basically it, and this is what we would like to discuss with our colleagues in Oslo next month to see whether we can then move toward the creation of such an office. There may be other things that other people have in mind, but if there's one single goal that we have it is to translate good intentions into practical realities and try to do this as efficiently as we possibly can. We have vast needs, we have limited resources, and it's important therefore not to have, as I say, people trip over each other, but to see whether we can channel our help in line with the needs and interests of the countries that are looking for this kind of thing.

Let me stop right here, and I'll be happy to respond to questions.

Q: My question is about women's rights situation in Turkey, obviously Turkish policy against Kurdish minority in Turkey, and (inaudible).

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: Let me just tell you, I really come here to discuss the CSCE process. As far as the question that you are concerned about goes, this is something that we need to focus on and we'll be discussing with the Turkish government. But this is not a topic for Oslo.

Q: This office that you're talking about, have you decided where it's going to be, and how many countries are participating in the meetings?

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: The countries that participate in the CSCE process--the number is 38. They are all countries of Europe, including those that reach into Asia, such as Turkey and the Soviet Union, and the two countries of North America--those are the 38.

The office in question, there is an office on free

elections which is located in Warsaw, and our recommendation would be to expand that office to take on these broader responsibilities.

Q: Could you be more specific on the tasks of that office? Would that be advising only on constitutional laws, also on economics? How broad would be the data bank?

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: On democratic institutions; it would not be economic; it would be, as I see it, on the appropriate functions of an independent legislature, of an independent court system, of independent media, and of local government. Those are the four principal areas that I could see that could be a significant channeling of technical help.

Q: Are there any new ideas to resolve the conflict between two basic principles of territorial integrity and the right of self-determination which led to the bloody civil war in Yugoslavia, and in fact to resolve the problem when one party of the CSCE is not observing (inaudible) of peaceful negotiations?

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: Well, we just talked about this. It's a very serious problem that we have to try to deal with. I would say that the fact that the CSC process has not been able to deal with the Yugoslav issue is most unfortunate--that is, it has not been able to deal with it successfully, and this is a challenge that demonstrates that we still have a distance to go.

Q: Will this be discussed in Oslo?

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: Somebody may discuss it. It is not directly relevant to the topic that has been chosen for the meeting, but at the CSCE meeting, if anyone decides to speak on a particular subject, nobody is going to be stopped from speaking or ruled out of order. I'm quite sure that in the informal discussions that are going to be going on, the issue of Yugoslavia is going to be very active.

Q: Two questions for you. One you've just answered. There are four main principles or four areas that will be dealt with or that the office can provide services for. You didn't mention elections. Will they be provided for?

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: Oh, elections are already part of the process, yes. I'm suggesting adding these four.

Q: Adding those four.

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: Yes. Elections, that's done.

Q: Okay, and two, will the Soviet state of Armenia be participating as one of the 38?

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: No, no. At this particular point, the 38 include the three Baltic republics and the U.S.S.R.

Q: So none of the other republics will be participating on any level even observer status or anything like that?

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: Somebody would have to raise that question; then there would have to be consensus on doing that.

Q: At the time of the meeting?

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: I have not heard the question being raised yet.

Q: In this office, are you planning to handle some regional, religious freedom or ethnic freedom issues also, for example, in which there arises a conflict between the countries, some countries? For example, the Turkish minorities.

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: As far as this particular office is concerned, the idea will be to concentrate exclusively on technical assistance. We have a country that wants some help in institution building. The question of resolution of disputes, such as the one that you have mentioned, no, that is not the office in which that would be handled. We have the human dimension mechanism to deal with that.

Q: Ambassador, you gave us the broad outlines of the conference. I was wondering as the head of the American delegation, what would be in your view the main important items you would like to stress at Oslo, which (inaudible) the Eastern and Central European countries need the most help in building democratic institutions?

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: My belief is that, as you go from country to country, it differs slightly. But let me put it this way--

Q: Can you give us a brief rundown in each country, please, which are in each country the most important?

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: Ultimately--let me really make this particular point--ultimately it would be for each country in question to decide on its own what it believes to be the greatest need. I was in Budapest, for example, close to a year ago, and had a very interesting discussion with the chief prosecutor who was very much interested in getting an improved understanding of developments in the process of criminal law in the United States, and as a matter of fact what we have done since then, just to give you an example of that--we have arranged for an American prosecutor to spend I believe three or four months in Budapest lecturing on the subject, so that prosecutors in your country would have the opportunity of just

getting their questions answered about how the criminal process works here.

We had in August a seminar in Romania, (inaudible), in which six American judges participated with about 45 Romanian judges in discussing basic issues of jurisprudence and the fundamental issue of the role of a judge, of an independent judge in a court system in a democratic society. The problem in all the countries that were formerly under Leninist domination or Soviet domination is that the model of jurisprudence is one under which the prosecutors are the arm of the state that really has the status and the judges are minor functionaries that chair the meetings at which in many cases predetermined decisions are being pronounced--changing that relationship to give judges an understanding that independence does not only require drawing up laws, regulations and giving lectures on the subject, but it's also we feel important to have contact between judges and these countries, and judges and a society in which a judge is an independent agent.

Well, this is the kind of thing that we try to facilitate. There's a question of reviewing codes, relevant legal codes, improving them. As far as your own profession is concerned, you can judge for yourself, but let me put it this way. For example, as far as television media are concerned, the question that frequently comes up is how does one deal fairly with different political points of view in the presentation of--give equal access to different points of view in the media, particularly when you have a system that is dominated by the government, and there may be responsible to the government and not to the opposition. And there's the question of training for journalists who may want to get some experience as to how the profession is practiced in other parts of the world.

As far as local government is concerned, a good many countries local government institutions operate out of the ministry of interior, they're totally centralized. And once you decentralize, the question is how do you decentralize, what is it, what power do you give to a local government and what is it that you have to retain at the center? How does a local government function, then, in terms of its interrelationship with the general public? What about such things as public hearings, the intercession of an individual citizen on, let's say, a project of road construction in a particular area? What about the entire zoning process? How do you deal with environmental problems? A whole variety of questions involving local government where by and large the tradition in the region that the individual citizen believes this is all beyond their ability to influence one way or the other (audio drop).

Q: Well, if this goes through, (inaudible) large office in Warsaw?

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: That would be the idea that we are going to propose, that by and large--let me put it this way: we now deliver some services of this kind directly to these countries. We find, as we go to these countries, as I say, that

we run across other people who are doing more or less the same thing, and it appears reasonable under the circumstances to work this out much more consistently. I would assume, for example, that as far as Hungary is concerned, a great many people are in Budapest, but what about (inaudible)--somebody has to get out there, too, and very often I suppose they don't. And one of the things that one ought to try to work out is some sort of system which we all take our share, both in capitals and elsewhere.

VOICE: If I may just make, before we continue, a quick comment-question. Apropos of that, it seems that that is one of the most significant results of this conference. It's the first of its kind in the CSCE process, the focus on democratic institution building. Would you say that that is and will be the primary result, the actual creation of the Office of Democratic Institutions?

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: As a matter of fact, it probably will have to await the meeting in Helsinki next year (inaudible). What I hope is that at this meeting in Oslo we will lay a foundation in terms of really having fully discussed what it is that this office ought to be doing, and reaching we hope a consensus both as to form, structure, and content.

Q: In relation to what we could say now about the economic conditions, (inaudible), and so forth, I was wondering whether you have--I'm sure you have--talked through the problem of economic conditions that exist in particular areas of the country with increasing nationalism. The best example would be Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia, and this may undermine the process--and how do you plan to deal with that?

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: Again, let me simply say the Oslo meeting was not convened to deal with that question, but there's no doubt that you have identified, as you did, a very important question, and one that really can endanger the progress toward democracy throughout that part of the world. It is something that will therefore be discussed, I'm quite sure, in the corridors and will be undoubtedly a major issue at the Helsinki meeting next year. This is indeed a very, very serious problem.

I want to tell you, I've had the impression as if the entire region was sort of put into a deep freeze from the end of the 1930s and had whatever problems communism brought about, and now that it's coming out of the deep freeze all the problems of the 1930s are right on the table--it's amazing, two generations later. Disconcerting, but there it is. All these nationality issues that were just sort of suppressed by the communists, they're all coming out again.

Q: If I may follow up, what makes you delay the discussion of the issue, because when you talk about (inaudible), you will definitely run into that problem.

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: Well, let me put it this way, when you run into the--the ideal will be to decentralize, to provide for local government, to make this idea, this service, available. Each country can decide on its own, and in the process of doing it it may very well in some situations relieve some of the pressures that are now posed by the nationalities problem--no doubt about that. But, you see, not in the context of saying this is going to be an autonomous area for minority X; instead, throughout this country there will be more power at the local level. And if it happens in one area ethnic group A is in the majority and in another area it's ethnic group B and that therefore these different ethnic groups will have a greater amount of say about the day-to-day concerns and affairs, so much the better.

Q: But, again, if I can finish, there was a very good observation in The Washington Post today speaking about the problems in Eastern Europe, and they were saying for instance in the case of Yugoslavia that what happened was that the central government gave a lot of the economic power to the states instead of giving economic power to the people, and that was probably a cause of the problems that Yugoslavia faced, especially today, or one of the problems rather--a main problem.

So what you are saying, then, decentralizing, decentralization, going to a region let's say that is more wealthy than another.

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: I'm talking about is to offer to those countries that do want to decentralize but not just to something like the republic level in Yugoslavia, but that want to institute local government, local government in terms of municipal government, the equivalent of what we in the United States would refer to as country government, really at the very local level, where decisions can be made about the day-to-day affairs. Now, you see, in our country, which is of course very different from the European model, schools are run locally. The police system is (inaudible). Now, people don't have to copy us, but if somebody would like to find out--

Q: The best socialist model way.

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: Beg pardon?

Q: The best socialist model is in this country, I think.

(Laughter)

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: Whatever it is, I don't know what label you want to put on it, but--

Q: You may not agree with the term, but in actuality--

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: Well, the fact of the matter

is that we have, that we have really--you see, the one thing about it, of course the United States government, colonial government, government of the colonists, really grew up locally. The king was way over at a great distance, and, by and large, communities in this country had to fend for themselves, they had to hack their community out of the wilderness, and they had to create it, and they just weren't going to listen to anyone telling them what to do, and therefore we have obviously an origin that's quite different from a European model, where all governments (inaudible) descended from divine right monarchies.

I guess the Swiss were the first, were quite different in that regard. But--I suppose Greece at one time, too. But what I am trying to say is that what we are talking about here is if a country would like to take a look, for example, at how we do things, we will have an opportunity to present these ideas, not to try to tell--do it our way--but simply tell, "This is the way we do it, and if you are interested in adapting yourself, or adopting one or the other of our concepts, please do so."

Let me just give you one illustration of this. We had some people in Washington last year from the Soviet ministry of the Interior, when there was still a Soviet ministry of Interior.

And what we did was to--and they were interested in how the police works in the United States. And we took them to FBI headquarters. We then took them also to the--to Richmond and to Annapolis to talk to the Virginia and the Maryland State Police, and we took them to Arlington and to Montgomery County to talk to local police.

In every case they asked, well, do you--asked the local police--do you get your orders from the state and the state get the orders from the FBI.

And they were really shocked to hear that the answer was no. Well, it may very well be that it isn't the most efficient way of doing business, but it surely helps protect democratic institutions, not to have a centralized police force.

As a matter of fact when we got to Germany in 1945 and started to work in a military government there, one point we made was don't have a centralized police. We helped them build local police forces.

Q: You made very clear that a country should come up with their questions, but how will you offer the answers, because for some questions like this centralization, if you talk to a German expert or a French expert or American expert you're going to get very different answers.

So do they choose who answers or do you offer them a sort of range--

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: Well, you see, this is--that's a good question.

Let me simply say that this is what we would hope that this office, the centralized office would be able to do. It would say, well, you know, there are different ways of dealing with some of these questions and here, if we have a database

over there, here are people who are able to give you some ideas (inaudible) different countries, and say if it is (inaudible) gets some advice on that, they can then choose from whom they want to hear, and if they want to hear from three or four different ones, why not?

Q: So you'd present them with a variety?

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: Yeah; yeah. Nobody--the whole idea is to have this totally voluntary, but to have it, as I say, as efficient as it possibly can be, have it channeled appropriately, and have it worked out, also in detail, in such a way that it is meaningful operationally.

Q: As a follow-up to that, who will basically give the advice? Is it the G-7 countries to the Eastern European countries?

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: The idea would be that in this database we're going to have, first of all, we'll have all the members of the participating states that want to--governments that want to furnish advice, but then also non-governmental organizations (inaudible) would like to register, can register, and anyone that would like to be involved will be in that database, and if, as I say, a country would like to pose questions about who can be of help, they'll be given a readout as to who is available.

Q: So basically it's to help, this meeting would focus on the Eastern European countries--

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: Yes, you see, the basic idea, this is a meeting exclusively for the 38 countries participating in the CSC process. What we are talking about here is that in 1975, on August 1st, 1975, 35 countries signed the Helsinki final act for the 35 countries, and have since then participated in what was known as the Helsinki process.

They have met from time to time. This is now the, oh, 15th or so meeting, under the umbrella of the Helsinki final act. (inaudible) happened to the 35 is that one disappeared and that's East Germany, and there were added on--Albania joined only recently, and so did Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. That's how you get to 38.

Q: (inaudible) Asian countries in this process?

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: (inaudible) is that this is-- it's called the Conference For Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Q: Oh, okay.

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: And therefore only the two countries that I mentioned, that happen to straddle Europe and Asia are involved as far as Asia's concerned.

MODERATOR: Interestingly enough, I'll just add a footnote. Some Asian countries have looked at this process, CSCE process, to determine the applicability of having a similar kind of mechanism or entity within Asia. No CSCE, as you mentioned, no Asian participants at all. Other questions?

Q: So there is no similar organization that is trying to promote democratic institutions in Latin America?

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: I would hope that you would view the OAS to be in that category.

Q: Are you familiar with any work that the OAS is doing (inaudible)--

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: Yes, the OAS has, for example, a--has had for many years a Human Rights Commission which is quite active. As a matter of fact there's a delegation just now going to Peru for the OAS.

Q: But in building democratic institutions is my question.

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: Well, let me put it this way: We have been involved in it, the United States has been involved, and all I can tell you is I just had a call this morning from someone in the Canadian government who was interested in talking to us about doing things cooperatively.

But we have been quite heavily involved in democratic institution-building in Latin America, and we have urged the Europeans to get into it, too, but there is no formal framework for doing it. But we have talked to the Europeans about joining us. We certainly don't feel that we want to keep anyone (inaudible) the more the merrier.

Q: As (inaudible) Hamilton would say, rapid development of a process of institutions, rather, that--and changes in a system where institutions are nonexistent, like in the case you were describing, may bring about the opposite result, with disintegration, or to break down a whole system.

From what you are saying, do you have any steps to take, are you going to suggest any steps to take in that process, that would be a lengthy process, or do you envision that? Or do you think you can take, let's say, the American model or the German model and try to apply in a country where no institutions (inaudible)?

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: Yeah, I don't think--let me put it this way. I don't think you can simply take a particular model and simply say, "This is it, this is the way you should do it."

Every country has to make its own decisions in that regard. Let me simply make this observation. I've now been to all the countries in the region and what I would believe is that

in all of them you'll be able to identify a group of persons, a significantly large group of persons who are concerned about governmental structure and who basically believe that the democratic model, broadly speaking, works better than the alternatives.

Perhaps along the lines of what Winston Churchill once said: democracy's the worst possible system of governing except for all the others.

The recognition on their part, that this is really what they want, needs, however, to be combined with an understanding of how to make it work in practice.

And the point I want to make is a good many people have philosophical notions (inaudible). What is necessary is for these philosophical notions to be translated into day to day practices and for institutions to be created that will make it possible to deal with questions of this kind, so that people get used to, for example, in Rumania, to the idea that if you want to change your government, the thing to do is to prepare for the next election rather than to mass in the streets of Bucharest and shouting against the government.

Just as one example. Now I'm not saying that we don't have problems like that elsewhere; you do have problems like that elsewhere as well.

But in a good many places people have gotten used to these fundamental principles. Sometimes it is necessary to think through and help people think through who don't know what the democratic process is like, what the appropriate limits are. That democracy does not mean chaos.

Therefore, for example, coming back to the questions of demonstrations, that in a democratic system we recognize that you can't tie up traffic indefinitely, that therefore there is the way it can be handled, where you can weigh one factor against another, that you can make provisions for people who want to demonstrate to apply for a permit and for a place and a time to be set for the demonstration to take place, so that you have an opportunity freely to express yourself and right to freedom of assembly is guaranteed in that fashion, and yet at the same time you have not created a situation of havoc in that particular community.

The question frequently comes up also about the press, is what are the limits, what's libel. One of the things I have had a very difficult time explaining to the people in the Soviet Union is that at least in the United States a government official has a more difficult time legally to establish libel than a private citizen. They would have thought it should be the other way around. But this is the way it works here, and the point is, it's the kind of thing that one can explain.

We have the British concept of contempt of court, for example, where cases that are handled in the courts may not be discussed in the press. Well, again, this is one of the options that is available, and certainly viewed as being appropriate within a truly democratic country.

My point is that all these very practical problems which people in these parts of the world have never really

confronted, never really thought through and discussed, these can be analyzed and they can then make their own choice as to what they want to do.

But again, to see whether they can have a system that is both democratic and orderly, and perhaps deal with the point that you have made at the beginning, that now that you move to democracy one of the great dangers is that it all comes apart.

Well, the question is how to have democracy and some order at the same time.

Q: Can you envision the CSCE going beyond the government's trying to--I don't know if educate is the proper term--but convey that message also to other parts in this country than simply the government, or is that out of the question?

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: No; no. You're talking about just having arrangements under which the general public--oh, no, no, no.

Again, the basic idea would be, if you go through the CSCE process, what you would want is (inaudible) go in there and simply say we're going to be doing that, whatever the government may say, the government (inaudible). But by all means. As a matter of fact when we talk about, for example, programs involving the media, one point would be just to see whether cooperative arrangements can be made with the press people in these countries, there can be arrangements with university teachers (inaudible) general public (inaudible) of education, something that one may want to think about.

Q: Earlier you said about the Soviet interior ministry delegation who was here last year and attended FBI headquarters, some police headquarters, and so on. This very year I personally met two Soviet delegations who attended FBI headquarters and police headquarters.

Do you think that the possible future as CSCE institutions will be able to (inaudible) itself as an alternative to this method of separate charter nations to get the information (inaudible) United States, United Kingdom, and so on, or it's not the task of the CSCE?

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER: No, let me simply say to the extent--nothing--to the extent to which a particular country wants to make its own arrangements--in my case it was Vadim Bakatin who at that time was the minister of internal affairs, and he and I just talked about it, and he said I would very much like to arrange for that, so the two of us just worked it out and he sent some people here. That was it. Nobody should stop anybody from setting that up.

The only thing that I'm thinking of is that if at the same time some country wants to go about this, not just sporadically, but in a systematic, organized fashion, one would hope that this particular office could be made available so that at least where a comprehensive effort is being undertaken, that

one can, if there's someone, some person, let's say in Moscow, who would want to work something out, can get in touch with that office, and as I say can get a printout of all the people that have registered, so he can pick and choose, perhaps a little bit of background, personalities that would be, would have wanted to participate in this.

And it would just be making it possible for more informed decisions to be made by people who want to go about it systematically.

END SCHIFTER BRIEFING

Charter of Paris for a New Europe 1990

EXCERPT:
THE MANDATE FOR
THE OSLO SEMINAR ON
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

II.

A. Seminar of experts on democratic institutions

The Seminar of Experts on Democratic Institutions will be held in Oslo from Monday, 4 November 1991 to Friday, 15 November 1991. Its purpose is to hold discussions of ways and means of consolidating and strengthening viable democratic institutions in participating States, including comparative studies of legislation on human rights and fundamental freedoms, drawing inter alia upon the experience acquired by the Council of Europe and the activities of the Commission „Democracy through Law“.

The agenda, timetable and other organizational modalities are set out in Annex II.

Annex II

Seminar of experts on democratic institutions

I. *Agenda*

1. Formal opening of the Seminar.
Address by a representative of the host country.
2. Opening statements by representatives of the participating States.
3. Contributions by the Council of Europe and the Commission « Democracy through Law ».
4. Discussion of ways and means of consolidating and strengthening viable democratic institutions in participating States, including comparative studies of legislation on human rights and fundamental freedoms, drawing inter alia upon the experience acquired by the Council of Europe and the activities of the Commission « Democracy through Law ».
5. Closing statements by representatives of the participating States and summing up.
6. Formal closure of the Seminar.

II. *Timetable and other organizational modalities*

1. The Seminar will open on Monday, 4 November 1991, at 3 p.m., in Oslo. It will close on Friday, 15 November 1991.
2. All Plenary meetings will be open. The meetings of the Study Groups will be closed.
3. Agenda items 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 will be dealt with in the Plenary.
4. Agenda item 4 will be dealt with in the Plenary as well as in the following three Study Groups :

*Study Group A :

- Constitutional reforms
- The rule of law and independent courts
- Division of power between legislative, executive and judicial authorities

**Study Group B :

- The organization of elections
- The organization of political parties
- The organization of independent non-governmental organizations (trade unions, employers' organizations)
- The role of the media

***Study Group C :

- Comparative studies of legislation in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

5. Meetings of the Plenary and of the Study Groups will be held according to the attached work programme. The work programme may be modified by consensus.

Opening statements by representatives of the participating States should, as a rule, not exceed 12 minutes per delegation and will be held in the following order : Switzerland, Iceland, Sweden, Poland, Portugal, Holy See, Finland, Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Turkey, Germany, United States of America, San Marino, Monaco, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Luxembourg, Romania, Ireland, Liechtenstein, United Kingdom, Greece, France, Denmark, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Canada, Norway, Malta, Spain, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Netherlands, Italy, Hungary.

6. Prior to the opening of the Seminar, delegations are encouraged to circulate through the Executive Secretariat written contributions on the issues to be dealt with in the Study Groups.
7. The Council of Ministers will take into account the summing up carried out under item 5 of the agenda.
8. At the opening and closing Plenary meetings, the Chair will be taken by a representative of the host country. After the opening Plenary meeting, the Chair will be taken in daily rotation, in French alphabetical order, starting with a representative of the United States of America.
9. The Chair at the opening meetings of the Study Groups will be taken by a representative of the host country. Thereafter, the Chair will be taken in daily rotation, in French alphabetical order starting
- in Study Group A with a representative of Monaco ;
 - in Study Group B with a representative of Romania ;
 - in Study Group C with a representative of Malta.
10. In conformity with paragraph 74 of the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations, the Government of Norway will designate an Executive Secretary. This designation will be subject to approval by the participating States.
11. The other rules of procedure, the working methods and the scale of distribution of the expenses of the CSCE will, mutatis mutandis, be applied to the Seminar.

Work programme

1st WEEK	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
Morning	PL	SG A	SG C	SG B	
Afternoon	PL	PL	SG B	SG A	SG C

2nd WEEK	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
Morning	PL	SG B	SG A	SG C	PL
Afternoon	SG A	SG C	SG B	PL	



Information Circular No. 10

The Executive Secretariat of the CSCE Seminar of Experts on Democratic Institutions to be held in Oslo from 4 to 15 November 1991, presents its compliments to the Participating States and has the honour to suggest that in order to facilitate the work of the Oslo seminar, and in particular the participation of experts, the work of Study Groups A and B should be based on the following schedule:

Study Group A:

Wednesday, November 6:
Constitutional Reform

Thursday, November 7:
Division of Power

Monday, November 11:
Rule of Law and Independent Courts

Wednesday, November 13:
Summing-up of work of Study Group

Study Group B:

Wednesday, November 6:
Organization of Elections

Friday, November 8:
Organization of Political Parties

Tuesday, November 12:
Organization of Independent Non-Governmental
Organizations (Trade unions, employer's organizations)

Wednesday, November 13:
Role of the Media

WORK PROGRAMME

1st WEEK	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
Morning		PL	SG A	SG C	SG B
Afternoon	PL	PL	SG B	SG A	SG C

2nd WEEK	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
Morning	PL	SG B	SG A	SG C	PL
Afternoon	SG A	SG C	SG B	PL	

DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NON-PAPER ON TRANSFORMING THE OFFICE FOR FREE ELECTIONS INTO AN OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

I. Introduction

The following comments are meant as a contribution to the on-going discussion on how best to proceed with the task of strengthening CSCE procedures and institutions. It provides some food for thought on implementing the suggestion that consideration be given to "expanding the functions of the Office for Free Elections to enable it to assist in strengthening democratic institutions within the participating States."

II. Summary

In his June speech in Berlin, Secretary Baker called for expanding the CSCE Office for Free Elections into an Office of Democratic Institutions (ODI), so that "voting day may be matched by 364 other days of liberty in the year." This initiative is designed to maintain the important election work which the Office has already begun. It would expand the scope of the Office for Free Elections so it can help build new democratic institutions while revitalizing already established ones. It is based on the realization that freely elected governments need stable institutions, operating under the rule of law, if they are to survive and flourish.

An Office of Democratic Institutions could serve as a clearinghouse, to bring together institutions, organizations and groups seeking advice and technical assistance with governments and nongovernmental organizations that can provide that assistance. The Office of Democratic Institutions could, like the Office for Free Elections, organize expert seminars. It could also recommend available programs to institutions that would benefit from them. The participation in any programs of the Office of Democratic Institutions would be entirely voluntary.

Expanding the Office for Free Elections into an Office of Democratic Institutions should not require a budget increase, since the Office would take on its new functions incrementally as the need for direct election assistance abates. One extra Deputy Director would be needed, however, to deal with the new areas of activity. This officer would be seconded by a participating State.

III. Structural Changes

- o Change the name from the Office For Free Elections (OFE) to the Office of Democratic Institutions (ODI).
- o The ODI will continue the OFE's present election work, which will naturally decrease in coming years as democracies become established and more familiar with available election resources.
- o The ODI's present staff should be expanded to include a second deputy director. This officer would be seconded from a CSCE state and thus would not entail extra costs for other CSCE members.
- o Expanding the OFE into the ODI should not require other budget increases. The extra responsibilities would be incorporated incrementally, as the focus in emerging democracies moves from elections to solidifying institutions.

IV. The New Mandate

- o The ODI should facilitate access to a broad range of resources necessary for democratic institution-building. Its scope of operations would expand and evolve with the needs and priorities of the countries it serves.
- o It should work closely with existing institutions, governments, NGO's, or individuals who can provide expertise. The ODI should:
 - Develop and maintain a data base of existing organizations, such as the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy, the U.S. Citizens Democracy Corps, private foundations and other resources able to provide technical assistance to member countries (or their regions and municipalities) on a broad range of executive, legislative, municipal and judicial institutional issues (as the OFE now does on election subjects).
 - Act as a coordinating point and facilitator for governmental and NGO programs that help strengthen democratic institutions in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
 - Utilize the extensive resources and experience of the Council of Europe (COE).
 - Organize regular seminars on technical subjects of interest to emerging democracies, such as parliamentary procedure, courtroom procedure, the role of the media in democracies, or free trade union organization. Participation would be voluntary and

costs would be shared by attending states. NGO's would be encouraged to support such seminars as well.

-- Send groups of 6-8 specialists in particular subjects to visit countries by invitation and work for short periods with officials in place, providing technical assistance. The subjects could be as general as "The Role of the Media in Elections" or as specific as "Courtroom Record-keeping."

- o The Office should actively identify areas that could benefit from available programs, and point these out to both the provider and the potential recipient.
- o All assistance would be voluntarily given and accepted.
- o The Office would have no role in judging or setting standards for democratization.

CSCE Seminar of Experts on Democratic Institutions
Oslo, 4 - 15 November 1991

Opening intervention on behalf of the EC and its member states,
as pronounced on 4 November by the Head of the Netherlands
delegation:

Mr. Chairman,

1. Less than one year ago the Heads of State or Government of the States participating in the CSCE declared in Paris that "ours is a time for fulfilling the hopes and expectations our peoples have cherished for decades: steadfast commitment to democracy based on human rights and fundamental freedoms; prosperity through economic liberty and social justice; and equal security for all our countries."
2. Today that hopeful declaration is even more true than could be envisaged one year ago: the strength and the dynamism of democracy and reform have been illustrated several times since the Summit in Paris, and more countries have firmly and irreversibly chosen the challenging path towards democracy, and have pledged to respect human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law.
3. This progress has been reflected in the developments within CSCE itself: four more countries were welcomed as participants in CSCE; participating states have agreed on more new shared values and standards; implementation of those commitments was enhanced; and the CSCE process was enriched by a third role, namely practical co-operation in consolidating what has been agreed upon with the aim, to quote from the Charter of Paris, of making democratic gains irreversible and thus contributing to unity in Europe.

Mr. Chairman, the European Community and its member states, on whose behalf I have the honour to speak today, welcome these developments within CSCE. After making such progress in setting new standards to which a wider group of countries have subscribed, we do feel that more emphasis should be placed on practical cooperation and implementation.

4. This seminar of experts on democratic institutions is an immediate expression of this latest development within the CSCE; the practical co-operation in implementation and consolidation of what CSCE has come to stand for in the field of human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law.

By a happy coincidence, the CSCE Seminar on democratic institutions takes place at a time when the 2500 years of Athenian democracy are being celebrated. It is indeed this year that Greece commemorates this event and honours the founding fathers of that illustrious democracy, Solon, Cleisthenes, Pericles.

5. Mr. Chairman, when your government one year ago offered to host this seminar, this did not only reflect Norway's sincere commitment to the CSCE process and its warm hospitality but

also demonstrated vision & a great

than they maybe did one year ago, the delegations around this table will now agree with me that a seminar devoted to practical co-operation and exchange of information on democratic institutions could not have been convened at a better time.

6. The history of democratic development has taught us several important lessons:
the first lesson learned is that democracy does not come easy; it is a process that takes time, vision, support from the population and a genuine commitment of all levels of government to represent and facilitate the will of the people who elected them into power. How vulnerable this process is to powers which want to reverse it, has been demonstrated again recently by the coup attempt in the Sowjet Union.

The second lesson learned is that there are many roads towards democracy and many different forms of government which can ensure pluralistic democracy and the rule of law. Even though the basic principles of democracy can be fairly clearly described, each country has and will develop the system which is best suited to its own particular historic and cultural background to comply with these principles;

The third lesson learned is that, as stated in the Charter of Paris, commitment to democracy based on human rights and fundamental freedoms is closely linked with prosperity through economic liberty and social justice and equal security for all.

While focussing on democratic institutions, we should keep in mind this wider perspective which will determine whether the creative ideas, which will no doubt emerge during this seminar, will be sustainable in real-life-democracy;

The fourth lesson learned is that throughout the years, notwithstanding setbacks all too well known in European history, democracy has taken deep roots in ever more European countries, and has now gathered enormous momentum not only in Europe, but also in other parts of the world. This momentum should be exploited to establish a just and democratic society in all our participating states now.

Even though we are aware that the development of democracy is in the hands of those peoples themselves, we as partners and friends can offer ideas and experiences to assist those peoples to map out their own routes towards democracy.

A fifth and last important lesson learned is that so called established democracies with a long tradition of pluralistic democracy and the rule of law, including a developing European Community, cannot rest on their laurels either: new developments in their societies pose new challenges to their democratic institutions.

7. Mr. Chairman, in that sense this seminar will be remembered as a starting point of mutual co-operation among CSCE participating states to implement fully and swiftly the commitments and values we all share. We also wish the seminar to set a trend for new modes of cooperation within CSCE.
8. Before turning to the substance of the seminar on democratic institutions I would like to make two more remarks:
As we are all aware, democratic institutions are not only

Created by governments, but also by individual citizens and...

by independent interest groups in which, in a real democracy, the government has no say. I am thinking in the first place of the NGO's active in all aspects of the human dimension, such as the NGO's present here in Oslo. We hope that these NGO'S will make their information and experience available to this seminar, so that this information can be taken into consideration by all delegations if they so wish. But I am also thinking of other private organisations which organise large parts of the private market economy and of the welfare sector.

It is quite likely that a certain bias develops towards democratic institutions generated by governments, such as election-systems, the judiciary and the like. Although these institutions are crucial and interesting enough to fill a fruitful two weeks seminar, it should be kept in mind that the basis of democracy and the legitimacy of the governmental institutions are in the hands of the citizens. I hope due attention and time will be devoted to non-governmental democratic institutions and to the role of the media and the free press in the process of democratisation.

The second remark I would like to make is that discussions about the central themes of the seminar as listed under Study Groups A, B and C should not be limited to a formal description of legislative systems, but should also include the political reality in which they function and come into being. A reality which is often not explicitly reflected in the legislation concerned.

9. For a discussion about subjects on the agenda for this seminar we can draw upon the results of the discussions about these issues during previous CSCE meetings. In the Copenhagen Document a series of basic principles for democracy and rule of law has been laid down on which the Moscow Document has further elaborated.
10. As mentioned before, the European Community and its member states would like to encourage more emphasis on practical cooperation and implementation in CSCE meetings in general and in expert seminars in particular. Therefore we would like to suggest we give as much room as possible to informal discussions between our experts on democratic institutions. The European Community and its member states feel very strongly about this point. They have therefore decided to ask me to make this opening statement on their behalf and will forgo the opportunity for their additional national statements.
11. The European Community and its member states have invited a wide range of experts on democratic institutions to contribute to a practical exchange of information about the formal and the informal roles and functions of those institutions, and also in our written contribution we have tried, each from our own specific background, to focus on the pragmatic exchange of experiences. Several of our member states have prepared documents about election systems, about decentralisation of government, about the division of powers, and about the independency of the judiciary. Our experts are, of course, available to discuss these and other subjects within their competence which may be raised during the Seminar.

In order to contribute to the structuring of our discussions it might be advisable to agree beforehand to specify subjects to be taken up in the study groups still further. I am thinking especially of the work in Study Group A.

In this context we also look very much forward to the contributions of the Council of Europe and the "Commission for Democracy through Law", whose presence we warmly welcome. Their specific achievements and expertise will no doubt contribute to the success of the seminar.

12. We feel that the seminar should be concluded with a short and precise summary of proceedings of the seminar, reflecting the work done in the various groups, commenting on the structures of the seminar and possibly offering materials for future recommendations. This, in order to enable the Council of Ministers, having in mind also the results of the discussions in Prague and Moscow, to draw conclusions from the seminar for its deliberations on the further development of CSCE structures.

We would like to propose to the chairpersons of the day of the Study Groups to make a report of the discussions of that day, which could serve as a basis for a final report by the chairperson of the Closing Plenary Meeting, who will then in consultation with the chairpersons and all delegations, be responsible for the Closing Document of the Seminar on Democratic Institutions.

13. Mr Chairman, my final words will be words of appreciation and gratitude to your Government for hosting this seminar and for extending its warm hospitality to this CSCE community, thus providing optimal conditions for an open minded, frank, informative and effective exchange of experiences and ideas to consolidate and strengthen viable democratic institutions in all our countries.

14. Mr. Chairman, we all look forward to such a fruitful discussion. The European Community and its Member States will contribute to this Meeting in the same constructive spirit in which they have worked in the CSCE since its beginning.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

NORWEGIAN BILATERALS

Background on Political and Economic Issues

Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland leads a minority Labor Party government which came to power November 4, 1990 as a result of the collapse of a Conservative led coalition government. The present government has been under attack for failure to deal with an unemployment rate that is unacceptably high by Norwegian standards. However, after one year in office, Mrs Brundtland remains firmly in power as there is wide acceptance in political circles that there is no alternative to the present government.

By far the most important issue that the Brundtland government faces is the question of whether Norway should apply for EC membership. Norwegians are deeply divided on the issue, including supporters of the governing Labor Party. The EC accepted an application from Norway for membership but Norwegians decided in a 1972 referendum not to join. There is great fear among Norwegians of all political persuasions that the bitter struggle of 1972 will be repeated if the question is again put to a referendum vote. Norway is a member of EFTA which reached agreement with the EC on October 21, 1991 to create an "European Economic Area" of EC-EFTA nations. The hope among Norwegians who do not want to join the EC is that the EEA will create a satisfactory economic association with Europe. They believe that Norway neither needs nor desires the political influence that full membership would bring. Although it is widely assumed that the Labor Party leadership is in favor of EC membership, Mrs Brundtland has not come out in favor of membership. She has said that she will be guided by the decision that the Labor Party will make at a general convention in the fall of 1992. The decision of the Labor Party is the key factor that will determine whether Norway will join the EC.

NATO

The maintenance of a strong North Atlantic Alliance remains a key objective of Norwegian foreign and security policy even in a period of rapid change in Europe. From a security viewpoint, while no longer concerned about a direct Soviet "threat," Norway remains preoccupied with the large concentration of Soviet strategic and conventional forces close to its Northern border on the Kola Peninsula, particularly in a period of profound

Soviet instability. Unable to match Soviet power itself, Norway relies on the collective security provided by NATO and a robust transatlantic partnership with the U.S. In addition, Norway, which is neither an EC nor WEU member, views NATO as its political anchor in Europe and is a longtime supporter of enhancing the political dimension of the Alliance. As NATO is transforming itself, Norway has strongly supported the Alliance's preservation as the principal guarantor of security and stability in Europe. Norway has been skeptical about the creation of a European security identity from which it might be excluded. While it now understands that a European security identity based on the WEU seems inevitable, internal political divisions over the EC membership question have made Norway's participation problematic. Militarily, Norway has supported the move toward more mobile NATO reaction forces which can deal with threats from many directions. Norway is also working to ensure that the new Alliance strategy and military structure maintain the strategic unity of the Alliance so that Norway does not have to deal with the Soviet Union (or Russia) on a one-on-one basis in the North. In this regard, Norway is concerned about recent proposals to change the boundaries of NATO's Northern Command area (AFNORTH) by moving Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark into the Central Command area, thus breaking one of Norway's defense links to the rest of Europe.

CSCE

Norway is an energetic supporter of the the further development of the CSCE process for several reasons. First, Norway strongly shares the principles and values embodied in the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent documents, specifically commitments to the promotion of democracy and human rights. Secondly, Norway views the CSCE process as a important vehicle for bringing the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union back into the European family. Defense Minister Holst has noted that with Eastern Europe in a process of transformation, the CSCE provides a way "to Europeanize the transformation process" and thus contribute to its long term stability. Norway supports examining ways to expand the CSCE's competencies, including transforming the Office for Free Elections into the Office of Democratic Institutions. While it has also suggested consideration of such ideas as CSCE peackeping forces, it does not see CSCE as being able to fill any of NATO's security roles in the foreseeable future. Non-EC member Norway also views an active role in CSCE as a means of enhancing its political voice in Europe. Norway has been concerned about the growing tendency of EC countries to come into CSCE fora with agreed positions that Norway has little opportunity to influence, and supports close NATO consultation on CSCE issues.

The UN

Norway is a strong supporter of the UN and of collective action to address global concerns such as environment, refugees, peacemaking and development. Norway spends more than 1% of its GNP on humanitarian and economic assistance to other nations, much of this is channeled through the UN. It contributes \$58 per capita to UN activities and is usually among the world's top five contributors to the UN's various aid organizations. Norway is a steady participator in UN peacekeeping efforts. It has established permanent UN contingency units and, since 1947, over 27,000 Norwegian military personnel have served in UN peacekeeping operations. Norway is also part of the "Nordic Initiative" in the UN -- proposals aimed at strengthening the peacekeeping and peace-making role of the Secretary General through such means as strengthening the Secretary General's independent role, intensified use of preventive diplomacy, establishment of a permanent UN peacekeeping force and institutionalization of UN supervision of free elections. Prime Minister Brundtland, now a candidate to succeed Perez De Cuellar as UN Secretary General, is the author of the UN report, Our Common Future, which advocates an expanded concept of security which includes economic, social and environmental factors.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

The Norwegian economy is in a definite period of flux. The offshore oil and gas sectors are increasingly responsible for shoring up the traditional mainland economy.

The United States is Norway's fourth largest trading partner; total bilateral trade amounted to some \$3.2 billion in 1990. Despite heavy U.S. involvement in the oil sector, the economic relationship is not without strains. Trade disputes with Norway include U.S. apple and pear exports, Norwegian salmon dumping, government procurement, and, most recently, alleged Norwegian dumping of magnesium. Norway is keenly interested in a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round. EFTA member Norway is still undecided whether to apply for EC Membership.

With the world's third largest merchant fleet, Norway has serious concerns over the Oil Pollution Control Act of 1990, the proposed Gibbons Bill on ship building subsidies, and the long-standing Jones Act. The GON views its shipping resources as being of key importance to the United States and would like to maintain and expand that relationship.


background notes

Norway



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs

July 1989



Official Name:
Kingdom of Norway

PROFILE

Geography

Area (including the island territories of Svalbard and Jan Mayen): 387,000 sq. km. (150,000 sq. mi.); slightly larger than New Mexico. **Cities:** Capital—Oslo (pop. 456,000). *Other cities*—Bergen (210,000), Trondheim (136,000), Stavanger (96,000). **Terrain:** Rugged, with high plateaus, steep fjords, mountains, and fertile valleys. **Climate:** Temperate along the coast, colder inland.

People

Nationality: *Noun and adjective*—Norwegian(s). **Population** (1988 est.): 4.2 million. **Annual growth rate** (1988): 0.5%. **Density:** 11 per sq. km. (28/sq. mi.). **Ethnic groups:** Norwegian (Nordic, Alpine, Baltic), Lapp (or *Sami*, a racial-cultural minority of 20,000);

foreign nationals (1988) 129,452 (from Denmark, U.K., Sweden, U.S., Pakistan, Vietnam, F.R.G., Turkey). **Religion:** Evangelical Lutheran (state church, 94%). **Languages:** Norwegian (official), Lappish. **Education:** *Years compulsory*—9. *Literacy*—100%. **Health:** *Infant mortality rate*—7/1,000. *Life expectancy*—men 72.9 yrs., women 79.7 yrs. **Work force** (1988, 2,183,000): *Government, social, personal services*—33.3%. *Wholesale and retail trade, hotels, restaurants*—17.6%. *Manufacturing*—16.6%. *Transport and communications*—8.4%. *Construction*—7.8%. *Financing, insurance, real estate, business services*—7.2%. *Agriculture, forestry, fish*—6.5%. *Oil extraction*—1.1%. *Gas and water supply*—1.1%.

Government

Type: Hereditary constitutional monarchy. **Independence:** 1905. **Constitution:** May 17, 1814.

Branches: *Executive*—king (chief of state), prime minister (head of government), Council of Ministers (cabinet). *Legislative*—modified unicameral parliament (*Storting*). *Judicial*—Supreme Court, appellate courts, city and county courts.

Political parties: Labor, Conservative, Center, Christian People's, Socialist Left, Progress. **Suffrage:** Universal over 18.

Administrative subdivisions: 18 *fylker* (counties), the city of Oslo, and Svalbard.

National holiday: May 17.

Central government budget (1988): \$40.6 billion.

Defense: 3.2% of GNP.

Flag: White cross with blue inner cross on red field. The white cross and red field are derived from the Danish flag; the blue cross was added to symbolize Norway's independence.

Economy

GNP (1988): \$89 billion. **Annual growth rate** (1988 est.): 1.5%. **Per capita GNP** (1988): \$21,090.

Natural resources: Fish, timber, hydroelectric power, ores, oil, gas.

Agriculture and fishing (3.7% of GNP): *Products*—dairy products, livestock, grain (barley, oats, wheat), potatoes and other vegetables, fruits and berries, furs, wool. *Arable land*—3%.

Oil, gas, shipping (10.6% of GNP).

Industry (manufacturing, 15.7% of GNP): *Types*—food products, pulp and paper, ships, aluminum, ferroalloys, iron and steel, nickel, zinc, nitrogen fertilizers, transport equipment, hydroelectric power, refinery products, petrochemicals, electronics.

Construction: 6.0% of GNP.

Trade (1988): *Exports* (f.o.b.)—\$23.3 billion: crude oil, natural gas, pulp and paper, metals, chemicals, fish and fish products. *Major markets*—U.K., F.R.G., Sweden, U.S. (6.0%). *Imports* (c.i.f.)—\$23.7 billion: machinery and transport equipment, foodstuffs, iron and steel, textiles and clothing. *Major suppliers*—Sweden, F.R.G., U.K., U.S. (7.2%).


Official exchange rate (Dec. 1988): About 6.6 Norwegian kroner = U.S.\$1.

Fiscal year: Calendar year.

Aid sent (1987): \$911 million. *Primary recipients*—Tanzania, Mozambique, Bangladesh, India, Kenya, UN organizations.

Membership in International Organizations

UN and most of its specialized and related agencies, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Nordic Council, associate member of International Energy Agency (IEA), INTELSAT, European Free Trade Association (EFTA).



The United States Government has not recognized the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

GEOGRAPHY

Norway is located in northwestern Europe on the Scandinavian Peninsula and is bounded by a 3,420-kilometer (2,125-mi.) coastline along the North and Norwegian Seas and the Arctic Ocean.

Norway's high plateaus and rugged mountains are broken by verdant valleys, and there are many lakes. About 25% of the land is forested, and only 3% is arable.

The influence of the North Atlantic Current, warmed by the Gulf Stream, results in relatively mild winters, particularly along the coasts; however, winter temperatures in the interior are low. Spring and summer are moderate, with maximum temperatures reaching about 20 °C (70 °F).

Except for Iceland, Norway has the lowest mean population density in Europe. Sixty-five percent of the people live in the south and along the coast.

PEOPLE

Ethnically, Norwegians are predominantly Germanic, although in the far north are communities of Lapps (or Laplanders), who came to the area more than 10,000 years ago, probably from central Asia. In recent years, Norway has become home to increasing numbers of immigrants, foreign workers, and asylum-seekers from various parts of the world, now totaling about 130,000, with

more than 2,000 obtaining Norwegian citizenship every year.

Although the Evangelical Lutheran Church is the state church, Norway has complete religious freedom. Education is free through the university level and is compulsory from ages 7 to 16. At least 12 months of military service and training are required of every eligible man. Norway's health system includes free hospital care, physician's compensation, cash benefits during illness and pregnancy, and other medical and dental plans. A "people's pension plan" guarantees a standard of living during retirement close to that achieved during the individual's working life.

Cultural Achievements

Norway is among the top rank of nations in the number of books printed per capita, even though Norwegian is one of the world's smallest language groups. Norway's most famous writer is the dramatist Henrik Ibsen. Other literary giants are Bjornsterne Bjornson, a contemporary of Ibsen, Knut Hamsun, known for his use of the Norwegian language in his epic *Growth of the Soil*, and Sigrid Undset.

Edvard Munch and Christian Krogh were artistic contemporaries of these writers. Munch drew part of his inspiration from Europe and in turn exercised a strong influence on European expressionists who followed him. Sculptor Gustav Vigeland has a permanent one-man exhibition in the Vigeland Sculpture Park in Oslo. Per Krogh, son of Christian, is among the best known of the modern Norwegian artists.

Musical development since Grieg has followed either native folk themes or, more recently, international trends. Harald Saeverud is a modern composer inspired by Norwegian sources; the late Fartein Valen was typical of the international school; and Arne Nordheim experiments with new equipment in his compositions.

Norway holds a distinguished position as the birthplace of Nordic (cross-country) skiing.

HISTORY

The Viking period (9th to 11th centuries) was one of national unification and expansion for Norway. The Norwegian royal line died out in 1319, and the country entered a period of "union" with Denmark. By 1536, Norway had become part of the Danish Kingdom. In 1814, as a result of the Napoleonic wars, Norway was separated from Denmark and joined with Sweden. A movement for independence, which resulted in the adoption of

the constitution of 1814, was put down by the Swedes. The union persisted until 1905, when Sweden recognized Norwegian independence.

The Norwegian Government offered the throne of Norway to Danish Prince Carl in 1905. After a plebiscite approving the establishment of a monarchy, the parliament unanimously elected him king. He took the name of Haakon VII, harking back to the kings of independent Norway. He reigned until his death in 1957, when he was succeeded by his son, Olav V. Olav's son, Harald, is crown prince and heir apparent. Norway was a nonbelligerent during World War I, but as a result of the German invasion and occupation during World War II, Norwegians generally became skeptical of the concept of neutrality and turned instead to collective security. Norway was one of the signers of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 and was a founding member of the United Nations. The first UN General Secretary, Trygve Lie, was a Norwegian.

GOVERNMENT

The functions of the king are mainly ceremonial, but he has influence as the symbol of national unity. Although the 1814 constitution grants important executive powers to the king, these are almost always exercised by the Council of Ministers in the name of the King (King's Council). The Council of Ministers consists of the prime minister, chosen by the political parties that enjoy the confidence of the *Storting* (parliament), and other ministers.

The 157 members of the *Storting* are elected from 18 *fylker* (counties) for 4-year terms according to a complicated system of proportional representation. After elections, the *Storting* divides into two chambers, the *Odelsting* and the *Lagting*, which meet separately or jointly depending on the legislative issue under consideration.

The judicial structure is similar to that in the United States, and, aside from the special High Court of the Realm, which hears impeachment cases, the regular courts include the Supreme Court (17 permanent judges and a president), courts of appeal, city and county courts, the Labor Court, and conciliation councils. Judges attached to regular courts are appointed by the King in Council after nomination by the Ministry of Justice.

Each *fylke* is headed by a governor appointed by the King in Council, but one governor exercises authority in both Oslo and the adjacent county of Akershus.

Travel Notes

Customs: A passport is required. No visa is required if the total stay in Norway, Sweden, Finland, or Denmark is less than 3 months. A residence permit is required for longer stays.

Health: Standards for public health and medical facilities are high. Tapwater is potable.

Telecommunications: Service is efficient to most of Norway and the world. Norway is six standard time zones ahead of eastern standard time.

Transportation: Daily flights connect Oslo with the U.S. and major European cities. Public transportation is efficient.

Principal Government Officials

King—Olav V

Prime Minister—Gro Harlem Brundtland

Minister of Foreign Affairs—Thorvald Stoltenberg

Minister of Defense—Johan Jorgen Holst

Minister of Commerce—Jan Balstad

Minister of Petroleum and Energy—Arne Oien

Ambassador to the United States—Kjeld Vibe

Ambassador to NATO—Bjorn Kristvik
Ambassador to the United Nations—Tom Vraalsen

Norway maintains an embassy in the United States at 2720 34th Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20008 (tel. 202-333-6000), with consulates in Houston (tel. 713-521-2900), Los Angeles (tel. 213-626-0338), Minneapolis (tel. 612-332-3338), New York (tel. 212-421-7333), and San Francisco (tel. 415-986-0766).

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Until the 1981 election, Norway had been governed by Labor Party governments since 1935 with the exception of three periods (1963, 1965-71, and 1972-73). The Labor Party lost its majority in the *Storting* in the 1961 elections; thereafter, when in power, its rule has depended largely upon support of other parties, according to the issue under consideration.

Labor dropped to 66 seats in the 1981 election, and the Conservative Party, with 53 seats, formed a minority government with the parliamentary backing of two other nonsocialist parties, the Center Party and the Christian People's Party. Kaare Willoch, chairman of the Conservatives, became prime minister. In June 1983, the Conservative government was reorganized into a majority coalition government including ministers from the Christian People's and Center

Parties. The three-party coalition suffered a setback in the 1985 election and was therefore obliged to depend upon support from the Progress Party to maintain a parliamentary majority on key issues. The coalition lost a vote of confidence in April 1986, when the Progress Party joined opposition parties in voting against a proposed gasoline tax increase. Because under the Norwegian constitution the parliament cannot be dissolved, the Labor Party agreed to form a minority government in May 1986. In order to remain in power until the September 1989 election, on every key issue the Labor Party has needed the support of at least a few votes from the parties that comprised the former Conservative-led coalition government.

ECONOMY

Norway is one of the world's richest countries. It has an important stake in promoting a liberal environment for foreign trade. Its large shipping fleet is one of the most modern among maritime nations. Metals, pulp and paper products, chemicals, shipbuilding, and fishing are the most significant traditional industries.

Norway's emergence as a major oil and gas producer in the mid-1970s transformed the economy. Large sums of investment capital poured into the offshore oil sector, leading to greater increases in Norwegian production costs and wages than in the rest of Western Europe up to the time of the global recovery of the mid-1980s. The influx of oil revenue also permitted Norway to expand an already advanced social welfare system.

High oil prices in the 1983-85 period led to significant increases in consumer spending, wages, and inflation. The subsequent decline in oil prices since 1985 has sharply reduced tax revenues and required a tightening of both the government budget and private sector demand. As a result, the nonoil economy showed almost no growth during 1986-88, and the current account went into deficit. Unemployment as of January 1989 stood at a post-1945 high of around 5%. Given the volatility of the oil and gas market, Norway is seeking to restructure its nonoil economy to reduce subsidies and stimulate efficient, nontraditional industry.

Its exports have continued to grow every year largely because of recent high prices for metals and chemicals. Moreover, the flight of Norwegian-owned ships from the country's traditional register ended in 1987 as the government established an international register,

replete with tax breaks and relief from national manning requirements. At the same time, a drop in private consumption has helped to reduce Norway's imports.

In a 1972 national referendum, Norwegians rejected membership in the European Community (EC). Norway is a member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and enjoys a close trading relationship with the EC and EFTA member countries. Its principal trading partners are the EC countries and its Scandinavian neighbors; the United States ranks fourth.

Energy Resources

Offshore hydrocarbons were discovered in the 1960s, and development began in the 1970s. The growth of the petroleum sector has contributed significantly in recent years to Norwegian economic vitality. Current petroleum production capacity is around 1.5 million barrels per day. Although production has increased rapidly during the past several years as new fields are brought onstream, Norway has a policy of holding production to 7.5% below capacity. Total production in 1988 was about 85 million metric tons of oil equivalents, more than half of which was crude oil. Hydropower provides nearly all of Norway's electricity, and all of the gas and most of the oil produced were exported. Production is expected to increase significantly in the 1980s as new fields come onstream. Although not a major energy supplier to the world, Norway provides about 12% of Western Europe's gas requirements, a share that will rise to 25% by the year 2000.

In 1988, Norwegian oil and gas exports accounted for more than 32% of total merchandise exports. In addition, offshore exploration and production have stimulated onshore economic activities. Foreign companies, including many American ones, participate actively in the petroleum sector.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Norway supports international cooperation and the peaceful settlement of international conflicts, while recognizing the need for maintaining a strong national defense through collective security. Accordingly, the cornerstones of Norwegian policy are active membership in NATO and support for the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Norway also pursues a policy of economic, social, and cultural cooperation with other Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden,

Finland, and Iceland) through the Nordic Council.

In addition to strengthening traditional ties with developed countries, Norway seeks to build friendly relations with developing countries and has undertaken humanitarian and development aid efforts with selected African and Asian nations. Norway also is dedicated to encouraging democracy, eliminating colonialism, and protecting human rights throughout the world. Norway has normal relations with communist countries.

DEFENSE

Geographically, Norway occupies a strategically important position close to Soviet bases on the Kola Peninsula and adjacent to the sea lines of communication between Europe and the United States.

Norway's experience of being overrun and occupied during World War II and Soviet moves in Europe in the early postwar period were major influences in the decision to join NATO. One of NATO's staunchest supporters, Norway also has adopted two self-imposed limitations on its defense in order to avoid the appearance of posing any threat to

the Warsaw Pact. These restraints preclude the stocking of nuclear weapons during peacetime and the stationing of foreign forces on Norwegian soil as long as the country has not been attacked or threatened with attack. Norway also has placed certain constraints on deployment of armed forces and on the conduct of military exercises in northern Norway pursuant to a policy of minimizing tension in the vicinity of its border with the Soviet Union.

Norway has a draft system in which all able-bodied males are subject to military service. The Royal Norwegian Navy and Air Force are technically sophisticated organizations manned by a core of professionals. The Norwegian Army is a highly motivated, infantry-heavy mobilization force.

U.S.-NORWEGIAN RELATIONS

The United States and Norway enjoy a long tradition of friendly association. The relationship is strengthened by the millions of Norwegian-Americans in the United States and by about 10,000 U.S. citizens who reside in Norway. The two countries enjoy an active cultural exchange, both officially and privately.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Robert D. Stuart
Deputy Chief of Mission—Keith C. Smith
Chief, Political Section—James E. Thyden
Chief, Economic Section—Weldon Burson
Public Affairs Officer (USIS)—Brian Carlson
Cultural Affairs Officer (USIS)—Eugenie Lucas
Administrative Officer—David Mullenex
Chief, Consular Section—Edna M. Read
Commercial Attache—Robert C. Fraser
Defense Attache—Capt. Douglas D. Blaha
Labor Attache—Jon Benton

The U.S. Embassy is located at Drammensveien 18, Oslo (tel. 44-85-50). ■

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Further Information

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse unofficial publications.

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For information of economic trends, commercial development, production, trade regulations, and tariff rates, contact the International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. 20230.



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Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States

September 1991

NORWAY

Prepared by American Embassy Oslo



**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
International Trade Administration**

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NORWAY: KEY ECONOMIC INDICATORS

<u>NATIONAL ACCOUNTS:</u>	Value in	Percentage		
	US\$ million	volume change (a)		
	1990	1990	1991	1992
Total GDP	106,851	1.8	3.4	3.0
GDP offshore (Oil & Ships)	18,383	5.8	8.1	4.7
GDP Mainland	88,468	1.2	2.7	2.8
Total Domestic Demand	98,979	(0.2)	3.5	3.2
Exports of Goods and Services	46,656	7.2	4.3	5.8
Imports of Goods and Services	38,817	2.2	4.2	6.6
<u>PRICES, MONEY, GOVT. BUDGET:</u>	As Marked(a)	1990	1991	1992
Avg. Consumer Price Inflation	(%)	4.1	3.8	4.5
Avg. Producer Price Inflation	(%)	4.0	3.5	4
Annual Money (M2) growth	(EOP;%)	5.8	6.0	8.0
Money Market Interest Rate(b)	(EOP;%)	11.36	9.5	9.5
Govt. Surplus/(Deficit) (c)	(US\$ mill)	(4,586)	(7,997)	(9,538)
<u>OTHER DOMESTIC INDICATORS:</u>				
Income (GDP) Per Capita	(US\$)	25,192	25,607	27,040
Population	(mill; Mid-Year)	4.24	4.26	4.27
Labor Force	(mill; Mid-Year)	2.14	2.14	2.15
Unemployment Rate (d)	(%)	5.2	5.1	4.9
Hourly Wages(e)	(US\$)	15.12	15.29	16.05
Annual Wage Growth(f)	(%)	4.8	5.8	5.0
<u>BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND RELATED ITEMS:</u>				
Total Merchandise Exports	(US\$ mill)	34,182	34,615	36,154
Oil and Gas Exports	(US\$ mill)	14,087	14,308	14,615
Exports to U.S.(g)	(US\$ mill)	1,948	1,900	2,000
Total Merchandise Imports	(US\$ mill)	26,974	28,969	30,923
Imports from the U.S.(g)	(US\$ mill)	1,281	1,350	1,450
Overall Trade Balance	(US\$ mill)	7,208	5,646	5,231
Trade Balance with U.S.	(US\$ mill)	567	550	550
Current Account Balance	(US\$ mill)	4,169	2,923	2,308
Foreign Exchange Reserves	(EOP; US\$mill)	14,749	14,538	14,615
Foreign Debt(h)	(EOP; US\$mill)	14,058	12,308	11,538
Debt-Servicing Ratio(i)	(%)	22.4	22.0	21.0
Foreign Investment Stock(j)	(EOP; US\$mill)	17,687	17,231	17,538
Of Which U.S. Investment(j)	(EOP; US\$mill)	2,881	3,077	3,385
Avg. Exchange Rate(k)	(NOK: US\$ 1)	6.26	6.50	6.50

Principal U.S. Exports to Norway: aircraft and parts, oil industry equipment, EDP equipment, other machinery, telecommunications equipment, fruit and vegetables, and motor vehicles and parts.

Principal U.S. Imports from Norway: crude oil, fish, metals, paper and products, cheese, and miscellaneous manufactured goods.

(a) Projections by the Norwegian Ministry of Finance, the Norwegian Central Bureau of Statistics, and the embassy; (b) 1-month nibor; (c) central government net borrowing requirement; (d) surveyed unemployment; (e) male wages in manufacturing; (f) nok-based avg. annual change in (e); (g) U.S. Dept. of Commerce definition; (h) net foreign liabilities; (i) debt payments as a percent of exports of goods and services; (j) embassy estimates and projections; (k) embassy projections. EOP = End of Period.