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taxpayers should reasonably expect that all military personnel be able to serve wherever and whenever needed. Any policy short of this, they feel, presents false strength indicators and will result in unfair assignment practices and rapidity for those who meet and maintain established deployability criteria. *Staff contact: Jenny Weeks, x5-8220.*

**Mr. Markey** may offer an amendment requiring the U.S. to suspend its consent agreement allowing the use of special nuclear material at any facility where accounting discrepancies do not allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to determine that this material has not been diverted from the facility. Additional information on this amendment was unavailable at press time. *Staff contact: Mark Bayer, x5-2836.*

**Ms. Brown (FL)** and **Ms. Fowler** may offer an amendment defining CORE logistics capability to be understood as "service-specific," not "DOD-wide." *Staff contacts: Menda Hife (Brown), x5-0123.*

**Mr. Kasich** may offer an amendment expressing the sense of Congress that the president should urge the Republic of Korea to improve its own defensive capabilities, readiness and interoperability with U.S. forces. DOD is to report by the end of this year on readiness and defense acquisition strategy of Korea. *Staff contact: Mike Lofgren, x5-5355.*

### *Part III - Bosnia*

The following two amendments are to be considered under king-of-the-hill procedure. That is, the last amendment to pass prevails and is the only one reported back to the House. Before debating the amendments, there will be 30 minutes of general debate on the arms embargo on Bosnia. The amendments are debatable for 60 minutes each.

**Mr. McCloskey, Mr. Gilman, Mr. Bonior and Mr. Hoyer** may offer an amendment directing the president to lift the arms embargo on the government of Bosnia and Hercegovina upon receipt of a request for assistance. *Staff contact: Patrick Mackley, x5-4636 (McCloskey) and Steve Rademaker (Gilman) x5-6735.*

**Mr. Hamilton** may offer an amendment urging resident to take necessary steps to secure a U.N. Security Council agreement for suspension of the arms embargo on Bosnia Hercegovina. *Staff contact: Chris Kojm, x5-7376.*

### **Other Information** \_\_\_\_\_

For a complete analysis of H.R. 4301, including detailed background information, see *Legislative Digest* Vol. XXIII, #14, May 13, 1994. For coverage of amendments made in order under the first rule, see *Legislative Digest* FloorPrep, May 17, 1994 and *Legislative Digest* Vol. XXIII, #15, May 20, 1994. For information on amendments made in order under the second rule, including arguments for and against the C-17 airlift and delaying defense base closures, see *Legislative Digest* FloorPrep, May 23, 1994 and *Legislative Digest*, Vol. XXIII, #16, June 3, 1994.



*Jim Wilkinson, 226-0378*

## BOSNIA

The practical effect of defeating this amendment is that the McCloskey Amendment passes -- i.e., directs the President to lift the arms embargo.

The Hamilton Amendment calls for a multilateral approach to Bosnia.

The problem with this amendment is that the arms embargo may still be lifted -- however, the Russians are still in a de facto blocking position.

In a perfect world, we should not allow our "allies" to dictate our foreign policy.

However, this is the lesser of two evils.

B. A. Lee  
54251

VOTE NO ON McCLOSKEY-BONIOR, YES ON HAMILTON

e McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment to H.R. 4301:

- ) requires the President to lift the arms embargo unilaterally;
- ) authorizes a military assistance program of up to \$200 million for Bosnia which would make this our fifth largest military aid program.

e McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment should be defeated because:

Lifting the embargo unilaterally would prolong, widen and intensify the war and drag the U.S., alone, into it.

Lifting the embargo unilaterally will put us on the slippery slope of direct U.S. military intervention in Bosnia by involving U.S. forces in delivering the weapons, training the Muslims and rescuing UNPROFOR forces caught in the crossfire.

- Lifting the embargo unilaterally will cause our British and French allies to leave Bosnia destroying the UN relief effort -- which now feeds two out of three Bosnians. The United States will take the blame.
- Lifting the embargo will destroy recent gains in providing relief and improving living conditions in Bosnia and will put Sarajevo and other safe areas under risk of renewed assault -- which only the deployment of U.S. ground troops can prevent.
- Lifting the embargo unilaterally would jeopardize other UN sanctions -- including those against Iraq, Libya, Haiti and Serbia.
- Lifting the embargo unilaterally would damage U.S. foreign policy interests. It will cause a rift between the U.S. and its NATO allies, and with Russia.

The Hamilton substitute allows for lifting of the UN arms embargo by UN Security Council agreement.

The Hamilton amendment should be supported because:

- Its focus is on collective economic, political, military and diplomatic efforts to move all parties toward a negotiated settlement of the Bosnian conflict.
- It protects the President's flexibility. It leaves all of our options -- military and diplomatic including lifting the arms embargo -- open.
- It aims to enhance the defense of Bosnia through coordination with close U.S. allies and with Russia -- while keeping the focus on the peace process.
- It calls on the President, working closely with NATO and the UN, to support continued NATO collective enforcement actions in Bosnia, including use of airstrikes.
- It calls on the President to consult closely with Congress on further actions in Bosnia.



~~SECRET~~  
Jill D. Smith  
of Dept. of State

FN. HFAC  
Marty Skelton

**SUBSTITUTE TO AMENDMENT OFFERED BY  
MR. MCCLOSKEY AND MR. BONIOR  
OFFERED BY MR. HAMILTON OF INDIANA**

Page 308, after line 24, add the following:

1 **TITLE XII -- PEACE IN BOSNIA**

2 **SEC 1201. PURPOSE OF UNITED STATES EFFORTS.**

3 The focus of United States bilateral and multilateral economic,  
4 political, military, and diplomatic efforts should be to move all parties  
5 toward a negotiated peaceful settlement of the conflict in Bosnia-  
6 Herzegovina that provides for a viable Bosnian state.

7 **SEC. 1202. MEASURES TO ENHANCE THE DEFENSE OF BOSNIA.**

8 (a) **RENEWED AND ADDITIONAL UNITED NATIONS AND ALLIED**  
9 **ACTIONS.**--The President, working with the North Atlantic Treaty  
10 Organization (NATO) and the United Nations Security Council and  
11 pursuant to the Security Council's authority to adopt measures for the  
12 maintenance and restoration of international peace and security, should  
13 take such steps as are necessary to enhance the ability of the people of  
14 Bosnia to contribute effectively to their defense, including by--

15 (1) continued collective enforcement actions carried out in

2

1 connection with NATO; and

2 (2) securing additional authorization to enhance Bosnian  
3 self-defense, which may include suspension of, or a limited  
4 exception to, the international arms embargo with respect to  
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

6 (b) CONSULTATIONS.--After consulting with permanent members  
7 of the United Nations Security Council on the status of current NATO  
8 and United Nations efforts to achieve the purposes described in section  
9 1201 and further measures that might be taken to achieve these purposes,  
10 the President should:

11 (1) advise the Congress on the measures taken by the  
12 United Nations Security Council to maintain international peace  
13 and security within the meaning of Article 51 of the United  
14 Nations Charter with respect to Bosnia-Herzegovina; and

15 (2) consult with the Congress on the further actions that  
16 would be useful to address the serious situation prevailing in  
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

244-178  
181-242  
Macloskey  
Hamilton



### STOPPING DRUG SURVEILLANCE FLIGHTS IN SOUTH AMERICA

(Mr. SCHUMER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. Speaker, I rise to strongly protest the shortsighted decision made by anonymous bureaucrats at the Pentagon to shut down our air operations against the drug lords of South America.

Stopping our surveillance in the Andean nations is unwise, untimely, and unusually dangerous. It was taken against the wishes of the State Department, against the advice of the officials on the ground who are on the front line in our fight against the scourge of drugs, and against the needs of our allies in Latin America.

And—worst of all—it directly undercuts the Clinton administration's own drug strategy. That strategy is based on two major prongs. Cutting off the supply right at the source, and cutting down demand by wise drug policies here at home.

I have been in touch with the White House to urge that this decision be reversed immediately. And I intend to offer today a strong sense of the Congress resolution asking that the President overrule the bureaucrats and get his balanced plan back on track.

Drug use is apparently beginning to rise again in America. The South American drug lords are moving into the heroin business.

This is absolutely the wrong time to make this kind of mistake.

### SORE LOSERS?

(Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, this House has passed major pieces of legislation on truly narrow margins—the President's 1993 tax bill passed by just one vote. The ban on assault weapons, by just two votes.

But those were results the majority leadership, acting in concert with the White House, wanted—so the close votes were allowed to stand. Then on May 24, this House voted by a 22-vote, bipartisan margin, to say no to military intervention in Haiti, while saying yes to the Goss safe haven plan. Yet, the powers that be on the other side did not like that result—so, guess what? Today, after a long, tortuous 2 weeks of arm twisting, the Democrat leadership is going to have a revote on the Goss amendment. I urge my colleagues to stand by their principles. Let us not flip-flop on important foreign policy where American lives are at stake. Be consistent and be correct. United States invasion of Haiti is a bad idea.

□ 1030

### RECESS

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. VIS-CLOSKY). Pursuant to clause 12 of rule I, the Chair declares the House in recess for approximately 5 minutes.

Accordingly (at 10 o'clock and 31 minutes a.m.), the House stood in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

□ 1038

### AFTER RECESS

The recess having expired, the House was called to order by the Speaker pro tempore at 10 o'clock and 38 minutes a.m.

### NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 431 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, H.R. 4301.

□ 1039

### IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H.R. 4301) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for military activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal year 1995, and for other purposes, with Mr. BARCA, Chairman pro tempore, in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. When the Committee of the Whole rose on Wednesday, June 8, 1994, amendment No. 67 printed in part 1 of House Report 103-520 offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KASICH] had been disposed of.

Pursuant to House Resolution 431, it is now in order to debate the subject of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] will be recognized for 15 minutes and the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE] will be recognized for 15 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS].

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, we now begin debate on a very important and serious issue, the nature of America's relationship and activities in Bosnia. There will be two amendments before the body, the McCloskey amendment in which, unilaterally, the United States would lift its participation in the arms embargo against Bosnia, would authorize up to \$200 million in aid and trainers to train Bosnian soldiers on using the equipment.

There will also then be a second amendment, the Hamilton amendment, which would urge the President to consult with NATO and the United Nations regarding means of defending Bosnia which might include lifting the arms

embargo, sets United States policy as one of achieving a peaceful negotiated settlement, commits the United States to work collectively to achieve these goals.

In the final moments that I have, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make the following points:

In this gentleman's opinion, the McCloskey amendment approach, to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, threatens to destroy an entire range of international agreements and efforts in which the United States has a vital interest. At a time when we are attempting to bring international resolve and a possible embargo to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation in North Korea, we would send a signal that anyone could opt out of that regime.

At a time when we are trying to sort through the endgame of war in Iraq and bring about positive changes and prevent a renewed escalation of the arms buildup and bloodletting there, we would threaten those efforts.

At a time when we would have succeeded in achieving a cease fire in Bosnia, we will throw all that away as nations collectively to respect the embargo throughout the former Yugoslavia, including Serbia. And finally, there is no doubt in this gentleman's mind, Mr. Chairman, and I hope by the end of this debate that my colleagues will agree, we must not unilaterally lift out embargo and place ourselves as a participant in the battle. It will bring more death and destruction and will result in the defeat of our goals and those of our allies.

I caution all of my colleagues to listen carefully, participate in this discussion and debate. And I hope that at the end of the day they will vote correctly.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 4 minutes.

(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, as with most issues associated with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the question of whether to lift the current arms embargo is complex. No one knows precisely how lifting the embargo against the Moslem forces will affect the attitudes and actions of the warring parties. One thing is certain, however. Policies we are considering today are certain to have an impact on the safety of peacekeepers—particularly United States peacekeepers—that may be deployed to keep the peace in Bosnia in the future. Therefore, we need to carefully consider the long-term consequences of the policies we will be voting on today.

Shortly after taking office, President Clinton committed to deploying as many as 25,000 United States military personnel to Bosnia to serve as peacekeepers in the event of a negotiated political settlement. I opposed this commitment at the time and I oppose it



now. Nonetheless, if deployed, these peacekeeping forces will inevitably be asked to separate and disarm the parties, deter, and respond to military attacks, and ensure compliance with territorial settlements. We ought to factor these elements of the President's longer range commitment to deploy U.S. troops into our deliberations here today on shorter range policy options.

Mr. Chairman, the United States experience in Somalia taught us that peacekeepers seeking to mediate a civil war cannot take sides and not expect to be attacked by one or more parties involved in the conflict. Once the mission of U.S. forces evolved from ensuring the free flow of humanitarian aid to capturing General Aided, the United States became a combatant and the peacekeepers' motto, "Take no sides, make no enemies," no longer applied. The results were tragically fatal and, unfortunately, should have been predictable.

In the case of Bosnia, the United States is already perceived by the Bosnian Serbs not as a neutral power concerned with keeping the peace, but instead, as a backer of the Bosnian Government. The President's May 1993 proposal to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian Moslems and to carry out air attacks on Bosnian Serb targets—the short-lived "lift and strike" policy—as well as the more recent bombing of Bosnian Serb positions in and around Gorazde by United States aircraft this past April, are rightly or wrongly perceived by the Bosnian Serbs and others as evidence of a pro-Moslem bias in United States policy.

Thus, a direct consequence of unilaterally or multilaterally lifting the arms embargo in the near term could be to compound the potential danger faced by any United States military personnel dispatched to Bosnia as part of a peacekeeping force in the future. Any remaining illusion of United States neutrality would disappear if we continue down a course that increasingly aligns the United States with the Bosnian Government.

Therefore, under any circumstance I believe the House has an obligation to recognize that endorsing a policy that overtly embraces the Bosnian Moslem cause ought to simultaneously render null and void the President's commitment to deploy up to 25,000 United States troops as impartial peacekeepers anytime in the future. Perceived as pro-Moslem, future U.S. military personnel are more likely to be vulnerable targets than effective peacekeepers.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished colleague, the gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. SCHROEDER].

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me. I just hope every one here listens intently to this debate.

I rise in support of the Hamilton amendment. I think it is the correct one. But listen to the coalition here. The gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE] and the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] agree on this.

Why do they agree on this? Be very careful. It sounds wonderful to say we are going to lift the embargo, but to do that, we are doing that unilaterally, whereas we put the embargo on with our allies. And they are going to shake their head and say, there they go again, acting like the Lone Ranger.

The Hamilton amendment goes at it the right way. It says that the President should work to get the United Nations to raise the embargo the United Nations put on. The other piece of this scares me a lot, too. There is \$200 million in there this time for trainers. But in the Vietnam war they were often called advisers. Once you get people in doing this, it is very easy to keep pulling and pulling and pulling more folks into that war.

I hope that we start thinking, in this post-cold-war period, about how we are going to interact with our allies. When the NATO parliamentarians got together, many of the generals who have been in Bosnia pleaded with us to work out that structure. Because you had people on the ground under U.N. command and suddenly you had NATO deciding to do its own show with air bombings that put the guys on the ground in trouble as they were taken and kidnapped.

What they were really saying is, we need someone to be there and coordinate the international structures so that we are not putting each other in jeopardy and at risk.

What would be even worse is if not only international structures are going off doing their own thing, that people who belong to those international organizations like ourselves feel they can vote in the international organization one way and then unilaterally change it later.

Please support the Hamilton amendment.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN].

(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, the continuing tragedy of the conflict in Bosnia is one that should shame all who profess to believe in the principles of nonaggression, peaceful settlement of disputes, and collective security. The failure of the international community to defend the new State of Bosnia, whose borders and territorial integrity it recognized when it admitted Bosnia into the United Nations, is one for which we all share culpability.

That Bosnia has been subject to aggression from a neighboring State whose ambition is to annex most of the territory within the internationally recognized borders of Bosnia should be beyond question in this body. Also be-

yond question is the fact that in Bosnia the most basic and fundamental rules of the international system have been trampled on. If we have learned nothing else from the past 60 years we surely understand that aggression unanswered invites further aggression.

There are good reasons why America's Armed Forces should not become directly involved in the conflict on the ground in Bosnia. But none of those reasons excuses us from illegally, under the guise of a Security Council resolution, depriving the Government and people of Bosnia of the means to defend themselves and the borders of their country.

We have seen the results of the weak, vacillating policies that have guided the West's actions concerning the Bosnian conflict. More than 200,000 people killed and millions more driven from their homes, tortured, and maimed. We have seen the perennial peace talks over the 2 years in London, Geneva, and elsewhere which, while allowing known war criminals to legitimize themselves by sitting at the table with some of our finest statesmen, have produced nothing in the way of peace or even pointed to a settlement other than to carve up the Bosnian nation.

And what of the present peace framework now being negotiated? How long would a people forcefully driven from their homes, who have had loved ones killed, maimed, or tortured, abide by a settlement which rewards those who have committed these atrocities? What prospect for peace and stability in the Balkans would this kind of settlement really hold? What precedent would it set in other regions where ethnic groups are dissatisfied with present borders? I can only wonder at the naivety of those who suggest that this kind of peace is the best the Bosnian people, and the international community can hope for.

I also remind my colleagues that the administration has committed the Armed Forces of this country to help enforce a settlement that the parties "agree to" at the negotiating table. I ask my colleagues "What kind of settlement will the Government of Bosnia enter into if it cannot adequately defend itself?" Do we wish to see the Bosnians sign an agreement out of duress, which leaves them not even enough territory for a reasonable hope of a viable state, or do we wish them to enter into an agreement confident that it is the very best they can achieve, having been given the means to fight for their country?

The humanitarian efforts led by the United Nations in Bosnia have involved many courageous men and women and have undoubtedly saved many lives. But when compared to the specific mandates of numerous Security Council resolutions, these efforts are anemic and fall woefully short of the words and intent of the Security Council. Instead of spotlighting the strength of the international community's will,



the work of UNPROFOR has only served to demonstrate our lack of resolve by exposing us to the calculated insults and manipulations of thugs and bullies.

We are also constantly reminded by the opponents of the right of the Bosnians to self-defense that our European allies oppose the measure we are about to debate. I will concede that some of the leadership in those countries with whom the United States stood shoulder-to-shoulder during the dark days of the Second World War have voiced opposition, but the public in Europe believes that present policies in Bosnia have failed. What is clear now is the urgent need for strong U.S. leadership.

It is past the time to adopt a new approach in Bosnia. An approach that will make more equal the military equation which to date has produced only further violence, death, misery, and despair among the Bosnian people. Opponents of allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves contend that more weapons will only produce more violence. To this argument, I say that a Bosnian military capable of adequately responding to aggression will be both a deterrent to further violence and an incentive for earnest efforts at the negotiating table. On the other hand, a weak and poorly armed Bosnian military only invites cynicism at the negotiating table while it sharpens the appetite of Bosnia's neighbor for further conquest.

There is still time to rescue Bosnia from the legacy of failed policy and a shameful lack of resolve on the part of the United States and our friends in Europe. International law and morality is on our side. What we need now is firmness and constancy of purpose. The aggressors in Bosnia must pay a price. It is time to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia.

I urge our colleagues to support the McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment and to defeat the Hamilton amendment.

□ 1050

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON].

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his kindness in allowing me to speak on this.

Mr. Chairman, do we not learn anything from the past? Remember Vietnam? Remember the Gulf of Tonkin? Remember how we got involved with that issue? True, we would be providing equipment and training and trainers. What difference was that between our initial involvement in Vietnam? We called them advisors.

Mr. Chairman, I am chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Forces and Personnel of the Committee on Armed Services. I have been speaking for quite some time about the shortfall of

necessary military personnel to fulfill our role and our mission in defending and being successful in two major regional conflicts, and here we drain off \$200 million in military services and people in uniform who should be devoting their time and energies in defending the interests of the United States of America.

Further, this lifts the embargo. It does something, lifting the embargo against Bosnia, unilaterally. Anyone else can unilaterally lift the embargoes. Do we want it done on Iraq? Do we want it done on Libya? It undermines.

If we want to unilaterally break U.N. resolutions, we will have no standing to demand compliance by anyone else with other United States resolutions. It infuriates our allies. We are their leader. We are the leader in NATO. We are the only superpower in this world. If we violate the embargo, we infuriate our own allies, especially Britain, Canada, France, who have troops on the ground, unlike us, and who fear this action will cause a resumption of the war with their troops stuck in between.

Mr. Chairman, I oppose the McCloskey amendment. I am for the Hamilton amendment.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON].

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Chairman, for 3 years now, we have had dithering in the Balkans. The vacuum of leadership in Western policy there has led only to slaughter.

A disastrous one-sided slaughter, perpetrated by a Communist dictatorship that inherited the preponderance of the Yugoslav Armed Forces.

This is totally unacceptable. For both strategic and moral reasons, we must lift this arms embargo, now.

There are several reasons to do this.

First, we must, especially given what is occurring in Korea right now, restore American credibility, which has suffered several blows recently, and nowhere more so than in Bosnia.

Our vacillating policy must have the Serb aggressors laughing at us.

Worse, we have let our stated favored policy—lifting the embargo—be vetoed in Paris and Moscow, sending a message of weakness to the whole world.

Only by having the courage of our stated convictions will we have credibility.

Further, by assuming a morally equivalent posture in Bosnia, what kind of message do we send to would-be imperialists in countries like Russia, and we ought to see what is going on there. I just returned from there.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, on strategy. Everybody knows that Serbian imperialists dream of a Greater Serbia. We can see it on the maps on the walls of their offices.

Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and Macedonia means a war that could drag in Albania, Bulgaria, and two

NATO allies—Greece and Turkey—on opposing sides. That is a problem for us, a big problem.

This is potentially far more harmful to NATO unity than any tiff that might ensue if we lift the embargo on Bosnia unilaterally.

And of course, morally speaking, this embargo is unconscionable. It should have been declared null and void over 2 years ago under a different administration.

And the only reason it hasn't is because of an absence of leadership. That responsibility, like it or not, devolves to us.

Vote "yes" on McCloskey-Gilman and "no" on Hamilton.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3½ minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCLOSKEY].

(Mr. McCLOSKEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, before getting into a somewhat formal statement, I would like to say that to some degree, the debate so far is being characterized by erroneous information, particularly as to our involvement. We are involved in the sense that the United States and the West generally has been involved in imposing an illegal and immoral arms embargo on an increasingly decimated and victimized Bosnian population.

Secondarily, the provision says that any military equipment from the United States is discretionary with the President. That would have to be provided at the request of the Bosnian Government, and at the discretion of the President. It does not mandate at all any particular military involvement.

The main key to this amendment is to basically lift an illegal and immoral arms embargo on a besieged people who, by Western edict, and what right have we had to do that, have not been allowed to defend themselves.

As we all know, this genocidal course in Bosnia was preceded by the Serbian aggression in Croatia, where tens of thousands lost their lives under the auspices of UNPROFOR. In Croatia the Serbs still control some 30 percent of Croatian territory, and no Croatians have been allowed to return to their homes.

In a short time we will be debating McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer, which I might say has very broad-based and distinguished leadership, including people like the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCURDY], the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR], the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER], and in its essence it states that we tried an illegal and immoral arms embargo for 2 years. It is wrong, it has not worked, and it must change.

Mr. Chairman, I would note that an overwhelming part, nearly all U.N. Member-states, have voted to lift the arms embargo. Only several parties on the U.N. Security Council want to go on with that policy, particularly,



namely Britain, France, and Russia. We know what their actions and values have been in regard to this war.

Mr. Chairman, today we will have every reason in the world why lifting the arms embargo is a bad step, but if the British, the French, and the Russians want to callously and cravenly lead the world down this path, why should we trip along? With the Bosnian-Croatian alliance, which was substantially the result of American leadership, the Government of Bosnia is a little stronger, but they are massively overwhelmed by Serbian heavy weapons, with ratios of like 9 and 10 to 12, and thousands in particular pieces of equipment.

□ 1100

As Prime Minister Silajdzic told me yesterday, their defense against Serb forces is Kalishnikov-rifles and a few pieces of heavy equipment, particularly tanks that they have captured from the Serbs.

If Members want to know about Serb intentions and the importance of this amendment today, the official Serbian news agency for the Bosnian Serbs, and I also believe according to NPR this morning, Tanjug said the 4-week ceasefire is a farce. Their intentions at the end of this are to open up and obliterate the Bosnian people. We know what the Serbs have done. We are talking about a greater Serbia, ongoing Serbian aggression in the Balkans and the fact that the blood of hundreds of thousands of innocent Bosnians is on our hands, we at least have a chance to say, "no more. You shed this immoral policy."

I ask Members to please do this, vote for McCloskey-Gilman.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. SKAGGS].

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman yielding me the time.

I want to urge my colleagues to proceed with extraordinary caution in this debate, and I think the sound and reasoned conclusion to come to in this is to support Chairman HAMILTON's alternative to the McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment.

Mr. Chairman, everybody knows this is an extremely complicated situation and it is a heck of a lot easier to say what we should not do than to come up with a magic prescription for success in this part of the world. But I believe that acting unilaterally in order to satisfy our very understandable and humane desire to do something about Bosnia, lifting the embargo unilaterally could and likely would seriously damage our U.S. foreign policy and security interests.

The rift, more than a rift, that would occur between the United States and our NATO and European Community allies, I think, is predictable and serious. But, additionally, and really uppermost in my mind as a member of

the Committee on Intelligence, there are the implications that unilateral action in this instance would have in other areas of the world that are of paramount importance to the United States and our security interests.

If we move unilaterally in this instance, what credibility does the United States retain in insisting in other areas on maintaining multilateral U.N.-enforced sanctions? How do we surmount that argument with respect to Iraq where there are pressures to again circumvent and undermine the multilateral sanctions regime? How do we move forward to deal with the North Korean situation if we have essentially pulled the plug on a systematic multilateral approach in this instance? The answer is, we won't and we can't. And the further conclusion is that Mr. HAMILTON's amendment charts by far the wiser course.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York [Ms. MOLINARI].

(Ms. MOLINARI asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Ms. MOLINARI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.

Mr. Chairman, let us be clear, the war in Bosnia goes on whether we see it on the television or not. The rapes are continuing, the shelling of innocent lives goes on, and concentration camps throughout the region still have an open-for-business shingle hanging outside.

Let us be clear: The United Nations has failed these people. Now it is time for the United States to give the Bosnians the only thing they have ever asked, the ability to defend themselves and their families.

Let me be clear. By ending the arms embargo, we can in good conscience keep American ground troops out of the region, if in fact we conclude that we still have a national conscience left.

I urge my colleagues not to echo the leadership disasters of Great Britain, not to seek to emulate the leadership and moral imperatives of France, and I certainly urge my colleagues not to seek as our goal to placate the Russians. Our goal is to restore international order, to send messages to other would-be dictators in the world that at least the United States will not stand by and, yes, our goal is to save a few more innocent lives in an area called Bosnia.

My colleagues, this will not go away. We must give them the ability to defend themselves and to survive this bloody war with an ounce of integrity. It is within our grasp today.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.

First I would like to say to my distinguished colleague, the gentlewoman from New York, that in the context of the debate on the amendment, we will be more than happy to address the gentlewoman's arguments in substance. The issues are not nearly so simplistic

as have been articulated in the well of the House.

Mr. Chairman, let me finally in a few seconds set the record straight. I am in agreement with the gentleman from Indiana who indicated that the McCloskey amendment does not mandate military aid, but I believe that my distinguished colleague from New York [Mr. GILMAN] perhaps misspoke himself when he indicated that the bill was permissive on the issue of lifting the embargo. I would suggest that it does indeed mandate the lifting of the embargo. In the relevant part of the amendment entitled "Termination of the Arms Embargo," it states as follows:

"The President shall and I underscore shall for the purposes of emphasis, "terminate U.S. arms embargo on the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina upon the receipt from the Government of a request for assistance in exercising the right of self-determination under article 51 of the U.N. Charter." I just wanted to clarify that.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON], chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services for yielding me the time.

Mr. Chairman, let me observe today that I think the choice before us is really quite a clear one. The amendment sponsored by my friends, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. MCCLOSKEY], the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN], the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR], and the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER], directs the President to lift the embargo unilaterally on the former Yugoslavia, but it is not just that. They also authorize the President to spend up to \$200 million in military aid to Bosnia, thus starting a new foreign aid program.

Mr. Chairman, in my judgment this amendment has a lot of risks for the United States. I think as we just heard a moment ago in the briefings given to us by administration officials, that the McCloskey amendment, if it becomes law, would certainly torpedo the peace talks, it would intensify and prolong the fighting, it would jeopardize the humanitarian relief, it would Americanize the war, and it would certainly encourage others to break U.N. sanctions in other parts of the world. It would create very serious problems between ourselves and our NATO allies and between ourselves and Russia.

Mr. Chairman, I think the amendment if it becomes law would ensure that the war will continue, and it certainly will increase the risk of U.S. involvement in that area.

The amendment that I will offer, the Hamilton amendment, allows for the lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia by the collective action of the U.N. Security Council. It protects the flexibility and supports the President's efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement, and



it really leaves all of our options open, military, diplomatic, including the lifting of the arms embargo. It focuses on a collective economic, political, military and diplomatic effort to move all of the parties toward a negotiated settlement. With all of the problems that the diplomats are now having with respect to that settlement, significant progress has been made and is being made toward that settlement.

Mr. Chairman, the Hamilton amendment will certainly enhance the defense of Bosnia through coordination with close allies and with Russia. It calls on the President working closely with NATO and the United Nations to support continued NATO collective enforcement actions in Bosnia. And, of course, it calls on the President to consult very closely with the Congress.

Mr. Chairman, I think the important thing here for Members to understand is that the choice before us today is very, very clear. The McCloskey amendment, I think, takes us down the road to more war. It takes us down the road to more direct American military involvement in Bosnia. The Hamilton amendment, we stay firmly on the path toward a peace settlement.

Mr. Chairman, I will be spelling out some of these arguments in more detail as the debate progresses.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire as to the balance of time remaining on both sides of the aisle?

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. FIELDS of Louisiana). The gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] has 3 minutes remaining and the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE] has 1½ minutes remaining.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE].

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield my remaining 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCLOSKEY].

□ 1120

Mr. McCLOSKEY. I thank the distinguished gentleman for yielding to me.

Mr. Chairman, we are going to have more time to talk about this, but basically I would note that it is the serious opinion of many, many scholars, including at least some lawyers in the Department of State, that the so-called arms embargo on Bosnia is illegal on its face.

How can the West tell a sovereign country, a sovereign people, a sovereign nation that they cannot defend themselves? If they do do that, they have to provide—and this is in the U.N. documents—adequate defense and protection. No one can say we have provided adequate defense and protection.

A better analogy would be that the United Nations, the world community right now is in the process of enforcing an arms embargo against the Kurdish people being victimized by Iraqi forces and aggression, moving into the Kurdish areas of Iraq and that region.

The Government and people of Bosnia have committed no infraction of the U.N. Charter. If anyone is an in-

nocent victim in all of this, it is the Bosnians, who, I might note, involve all ethnic factions and peoples—Jews, Croats, Moslems, and Serbs. There are hundreds of thousands of Serbs, Mr. Chairman, who want no part of Karadjic and Milosevic.

Maintaining an arms embargo against the Bosnians is unjust, as it punishes the Bosnian people when they have done nothing other than to assert their defense in full accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. We allegedly says they are a sovereign nation. We should act as such and conduct our diplomacy as such.

Again, I thank the gentleman for the time.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, in order to conclude general debate on this side of the aisle, I yield the balance of the time to our distinguished colleague, the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. RICHARDSON].

(Mr. RICHARDSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, along with two members of the Committee on Intelligence, I just got back from Haiti, where we saw how House vote sent terrible signals to the Haitian military rulers; basically, the signal being that the United States had no policy, that we did not have resolve, that we were sending mixed messages. That is why I am opposing the McCloskey amendment today, although it is well-intended and supported by some leaders on this issue for whom I have enormous respect.

If we adopt this amendment, we are going contrary to what the President of the United States wants.

The President has sent a letter opposing this amendment. What lifting the embargo unilaterally would do, is prolong, widen, and intensify the war. But what it will also do is Americanize this war. We will become deeply involved in this conflict.

Remember what the American people are saying about the Bosnians, about the Haitis, about the Somalias; they are saying, "Be careful, be careful about using American troops, be careful about getting in and not being able to get out."

Lifting the embargo unilaterally will cause our British and French allies to leave Bosnia, destroying the U.N. relief effort, which now feeds 2 out of 3 Bosnians. The United States is going to take the blame and the heat.

Lifting the embargo unilaterally would jeopardize other U.N. sanctions against Iraq, Libya, Haiti, and Serbia. Lifting the embargo unilaterally is going to damage our interests, our foreign policy interests, because it is going to cause a rift between us and our NATO allies and with Russia.

The Hamilton amendment, in my judgment, is a lot better. It focuses on collective economic, political, military, and diplomatic efforts. It protects the President's flexibility. It aims to enhance the defense of Bosnia through

coordination with close United States allies and with Russia. It calls on the President, working closely with NATO and the United Nations, to support continued NATO collective enforcement actions in Bosnia, including the use of air strikes. It calls on the President to consult closely with Congress on further actions in Bosnia.

Again, Mr. Chairman, the authors of the McCloskey amendment are leaders on this issue, and this amendment is a product of a lot of frustration. I have felt in the past that perhaps unilateral action should be taken. But at this particular juncture when the President needs all the flexibility he can muster, when our foreign policy has been under siege, and when you have the President having gone to our European allies to state our policy, adopting an amendment like this would send exactly the wrong signal.

On Haiti, we sent an unfortunate signal. By passing this amendment, we would send another bad signal.

The McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment should be defeated because: Lifting the embargo unilaterally would prolong, widen, and intensify the war and drag the United States, alone, into it; lifting the embargo unilaterally will put us on the slippery slope of direct United States military intervention in Bosnia by involving United States forces in delivering the weapons, training the Moslems, and rescuing UNPROFOR forces caught in the crossfire; lifting the embargo unilaterally will cause our British and French allies to leave Bosnia destroying the U.N. relief effort—which now feeds two out of three Bosnians. The United States will take the blame; lifting the embargo unilaterally would jeopardize other U.N. sanctions—including those against Iraq, Libya, Haiti, and Serbia; lifting the embargo unilaterally would damage U.S. foreign policy interests. It will cause a rift between the United States and its NATO allies, and with Russia.

The Hamilton substitute allows for lifting of the U.N. arms embargo by U.N. Security Council agreement.

The Hamilton amendment should be supported because: Its focus is on collective economic, political, military, and diplomatic efforts to move all parties toward a negotiated settlement of the Bosnian conflict; it protects the President's flexibility. It leaves all of our options—military and diplomatic including lifting the arms embargo—open; it aims to enhance the defense of Bosnia through coordination with close United States allies and with Russia—while keeping the focus on the peace process; it calls on the President, working closely with NATO and the United Nations, to support continued NATO collective enforcement actions in Bosnia, including use of air strikes; it calls on the President to consult closely with Congress on further actions in Bosnia.

Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Hamilton amendment on Bosnia. The amendment calls for the President to work through NATO and the United Nations to enhance Bosnia's defense and to end the war.

This amendment makes sense. It calls for a responsible and rational policy based, not only on our national interest, but also on what is best for those who seek peace and an end to



the horrible bloodshed in Bosnia. Today, especially in light of the recently announced ceasefire, we must not act rashly or unilaterally.

Nonetheless, I understand the frustration and desire we all share to act to end the slaughter in Bosnia. But our job to act responsibly, looking at the unintended consequences of our actions as well as the results we hope for.

We must pass the Hamilton amendment and defeat the McCloskey-Gilman amendment. To act unilaterally to lift the arms embargo will have a number of negative results—it will prolong and intensify the war; it will Americanize the war in various ways; The U.S. will become responsible for rescuing and protecting UNPROFOR, the U.N. force now on the ground in Bosnia; we, as a nation, will become responsible for Bosnia's fate, potentially encouraging the Serbs to overrun the eastern enclaves and other isolated Bosnian outposts. At that point, only massive U.S. bombing or the threat of invasion could counter or prevent the Serb attack; American troops would be drawn into the war through the delivery of weapons, the need to keep supply lines open, and to train the Bosnians and, then, to protect our advisors; finally, the United States would then need to fill the gaps, providing relief to the Bosnians after a probable U.N. pullout.

Mr. Chairman, this is the kind of vote that puts our hearts and our heads in competition. We all feel in our hearts the need to act to stop the bloodshed, the warfare, and the starvation. But we need to listen to our heads, to move toward the same goals but to do it in a way that won't cause more harm, more bloodshed, or more starvation. Vote for the Hamilton amendment.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. FIELDS of Louisiana). All time has expired.

Pursuant to House Resolution 431, it is now in order to consider the amendments printed in part 3 of House Report 103-520 relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina, which shall be considered in the following order: (1) By Representative McCLOSKEY, GILMAN, BONIOR, or HOYER; and (2) by Representative HAMILTON.

If more than one of the amendments is adopted, only the last to be adopted shall be considered as finally adopted and reported to the House.

It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in part 3 of House Report 103-520.

#### AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. McCLOSKEY

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. McCLOSKEY: Page 308, after line 24, insert the following new title:

#### TITLE XII—BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA SELF-DEFENSE

##### SEC. 1201. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the "Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1994".

##### SEC. 1202. FINDINGS.

The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) For the reasons stated in section 520 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-

236), the Congress has found that continued application of an international arms embargo to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina contravenes that Government's inherent right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and therefore is inconsistent with international law.

(2) Before deploying United States Armed Forces to defend the territorial integrity and political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or to enforce United Nations mandates in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United States should seek to permit the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to obtain the means necessary to exercise its inherent right of self-defense.

##### SEC. 1203. TERMINATION OF ARMS EMBARGO.

(a) TERMINATION.—The President shall terminate the United States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina upon receipt from that Government of a request for assistance in exercising its right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

(b) DEFINITION.—As used in this section, the term "United States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina" means the application to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina of—

(1) the policy adopted July 10, 1991, and published in the Federal Register of July 19, 1991 (58 F.R. 33322) under the heading "Suspension of Munitions Export Licenses to Yugoslavia"; and

(2) any similar policy being applied by the United States Government as of the date of receipt of the request described in subsection (a) pursuant to which approval is denied for transfers of defense articles and defense services to the former Yugoslavia.

##### SEC. 1204. PROVISION OF UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

(a) POLICY.—The President should provide appropriate military assistance to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina upon receipt from that Government of a request for assistance in exercising its right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

(b) AUTHORIZATION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE.—

(1) DRAWDOWN AUTHORITY.—If the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina requests United States assistance in exercising its right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the President is authorized to direct the drawdown of defense articles from the stocks of the Department of Defense, defense services of the Department of Defense, and military education and training in order to provide assistance to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such assistance shall be provided on such terms and conditions as the President may determine.

(2) LIMITATION ON VALUE OF TRANSFERS.—The aggregate value (as defined in section 664(m) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) of defense articles, defense services, and military education and training provided under this subsection may not exceed \$200,000,000.

(3) EXPIRATION OF AUTHORIZATION.—The authority provides to the President in paragraph (1) expires at the end of fiscal year 1995.

(4) LIMITATION ON ACTIVITIES.—Members of the United States Armed Forces who perform defense services or provide military education and training outside the United States under this subsection may not perform any duties of a combatant nature, including any duties related to training and advising that may engage them in combat activities.

(5) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—Within 60 days after any exercise of the authority of para-

graph (1) and every 60 days thereafter, the President shall report in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate concerning the defense articles, defense services, and military education and training being provided and the use made of such articles, services, and education and training.

(6) REIMBURSEMENT.—(A) Defense articles, defense services, and military education and training provided under this subsection shall be made available without reimbursement to the Department of Defense except to the extent that funds are appropriated pursuant to subparagraph (B).

(B) There are authorized to be appropriated to the President such sums as may be necessary to reimburse the applicable appropriation, fund, or account for the value (as defined in section 664(m) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) of defense articles, defense services, or military education and training provided under this subsection.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the order of the House of Tuesday, May 24, 1994, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCLOSKEY] will be recognized for 30 minutes, and a Member in opposition will be recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by my colleague.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] will be recognized for 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCLOSKEY].

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER], a real battler for justice as to the Bosnians and the Balkans.

Mr. HOYER. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Chairman, nobody has fought harder on this issue than the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCLOSKEY].

Mr. Chairman, we are about to make an important decision in voting on the McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment. It is more than a vote on whether we will or will not lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is a vote on whether we will act according to important international principles, the right to self-defense. It is a vote on whether we will ensure that countries are not rewarded for violating international principles through forceful changing of borders, aggression, and, yes, genocide.

Let us not stand silent, let us not dissemble, let us not say as the gentleman from New Mexico has said, that it is not now time. That is what we said in the thirties; it is not time to confront aggression, it is not time to stand up for principles, it is not time to say enough of killing, enough of taking property by force, enough of ethnic cleansing, enough.

This is a vote on principle. It is not some slick foreign policy "let's deal." We have been trying to deal with the Europeans for 2 years, and they have not acted. It was the policy of the Bush administration to say that we will, in fact, have the Europeans take the lead. That, my friends, was 2½ million refu-



gecs ago. That, my friends, was 200,000 deaths ago.

Have there been more deaths in other parts of the world? There have been. Should we be concerned about those? Of course.

But, ladies and gentlemen of this House, let us not continue to send mixed, ambivalent messages, let us say clearly even if the United States will not become more involved, we will not stand aside while the Bosnians stand defenseless.

Would, if it were other Europeans—not just Moslems—being terrorized, would we stand silent? Would we stand aside and say, "Well, we enforced and imposed an embargo 2 years ago on all of Yugoslavia, on the theory that we would not exacerbate the situation?"

□ 1120

Mr. Chairman, the fact of the matter is that one party got all the arms that the Yugoslav Army had, and they have used those arms against those less able to defend themselves than the aggressors.

Our own State Department, that now does not want to act, has said that the leaders of the Serbs is a war criminal, both in Belgrade and in Bosnia, Milosevic, and Karadzic. This is not something on which our State Department has minced words.

I hope that this House, whether it be the Committee on Foreign Affairs or the Committee on Armed Services, and I hope that the Members of this House, as I hope the American public, will say to those who would perpetrate aggression and genocide, that America will not stand idly by while that occurs. Had we said that in the midthirties, would we have had the tragedy at Omaha Beach? I am not sure; none of us is sure.

But the lesson of history clearly is that aggression and genocide will occur if we stand aside, and stand silent, and stand idle, and say over and over again, "Now is not the time; maybe tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow will be the time to act in the face of aggression, in the face of genocide, in the face of war crimes, but now, now is not the time."

Let us pass this amendment. Let us say that America is going to at least allow Bosnia to defend itself. Let us take that small step, not the deploying of American troops, not the deploying of American force, but at least this small moral step:

"Bosnians, you can defend yourselves, and we will assist you at least in that step."

And let us then reject the Hamilton amendment which says, on the other hand, we will remain with the status quo 2½ million refugees later and 200,000 deaths later.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON].

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, let us make sure we know what the issue is

today. This is an issue whereby we are putting American soldiers in harm's way.

Do not be misled.

It is interesting to hear the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER], our friend and colleague, speak on this resolution and ignore a major part of the language that is in this bill, in this amendment, and that language is to provide United States military personnel to train and advise Bosnians in Bosnia concerning combat. This is a repeat of what went on in Vietnam years ago.

I ask my colleagues, Haven't we learned our lesson from that? How many American lives as advisers will be taken? How many lives as advisers in American uniforms were taken in Vietnam? Do we know the quagmire in which we are involving ourselves?

Mr. Chairman, this is not just an arms embargo lifting. It is putting American soldiers in uniform, who we cannot afford to do away with in our national strategy, into harm's way.

And where does that put us in relation to our allies? The French? The Canadians? The British who have troops on the ground there? We are in essence taking sides, and advising, providing military equipment to put them in harm's way as well.

I say to my colleagues, let's think about what we are doing today. This is a very dangerous thing. Let us not get carried away with emotion. Let us not undermine ourselves in our objectives. This undermines ourselves in Iraq, in Libya, as well as elsewhere.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself as much time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief; just a couple of key points:

For the second time to Mr. SKELTON, really, the analogy is really not quagmire or Vietnam. The analogy really is Europe, fascist aggression and the likes of Chamberlain telling Hitler, "You can have what you want."

As even Mr. Talbot said this morning, the Serbs, as he knows, have committed international aggression. He says they are building a greater Serbia. There are problems pending in Kosovo, Macedonia, problems with Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria; just name it. The message is right now: If we do not do something, if we not shed our hands of this policy, that the Serbs can continue to get away with it.

But particularly again, I say to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON], this bill, this piece of legislation, says nothing about mandating any arms or equipment. It leaves it up to the President, totally at the discretion of the President, which allegedly, since Bill Clinton, President Bill Clinton, told me 2 weeks ago in Air force One that the arms embargo should be lifted, the problem is multilaterality. But, as far as that aspect, that discretion on the part of the President, any kind of commitment to any precipice that we

cannot retreat back from, that is simply not the case.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McCLOSKEY. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. WALKER. Am I not correct that the amendment specifically says that American forces cannot provide training and advising activities that may engage them in combat?

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Nothing can be done without the express authorization of the President as to equipment or anything else.

Mr. WALKER. As I understand it, does the amendment not say, "limitation on activities," and, as I understand it, it says:

Members of the United States Armed Forces who perform defense services or provide military education and training outside the United States, under this subsection may not perform any duties of a combatant nature, including any duties related to training and advising that may engage them in combat activities.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman pointing that out. We should keep the debate going as to what the facts are.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON].

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] for yielding this time to me.

First of all, let me just say that I certainly understand why many of my colleagues in this body are ready to support the McCloskey amendment. The people of Bosnia have suffered very much in a tragic war. We in the West have been unable to stop it up to this point, and, as I have heard so many of my colleagues say, we simply have to do something. And I think many of my colleagues look upon the McCloskey amendment as a relatively cost-free, risk-free way of participating, if my colleagues would, in this war, and I have no doubt at all that they are utterly and completely sincere in their views. But I just want to say that I think the adoption of the McCloskey amendment will drag us much closer to war.

□ 1130

Now, I think these are the consequences that will flow if the McCloskey amendment is adopted. First of all, it is going to intensify the war. If we promise the Moslems arms, promise the Bosnian Government arms, they are going to have very little incentive to negotiate; they will have every incentive to fight. If we arm the Moslems, the Bosnian Government, the Serbs will move quickly to crush the Moslems before they can receive the weapons. No one disagrees with that point. Witness after witness in our committee and in discussions have said to those who want to lift the embargo that it will intensify the war and will increase the killing.



The second point or the second risk is that UNPROFOR will leave, and that will jeopardize humanitarian assistance. There is not any doubt about that. The French Prime Minister, the French Foreign Minister, and the British Foreign Minister have all indicated that they are going to pull out the UNPROFOR if we have a unilateral lifting of the embargo. Why would they not? They have suffered very greatly here, and their troops, not American troops, would be at risk. They have already suffered many casualties, and they do not want to suffer any more casualties. They will move UNPROFOR out.

UNPROFOR today feeds two of every three Bosnians. It has been an extremely successful program under extraordinary difficult circumstances, and they will be gone. They will be gone.

Another consequence is—and our administration officials have reiterated this today—is that the peace process comes to an end. Sure, there are problems with the peace process, enormous problems, but progress is being made day by day, inch by inch. If we vote to lift this embargo unilaterally the peace negotiations fall apart. The President has told us that.

Let me quote the President's letter: "U.S. action to lift the embargo would bring the peace process to an end." That is the President's judgment. It brings the peace process to an end.

Another risk, of course, is Balkan instability. Who can tell what would happen here? But among the successes—and they have been few, I have to acknowledge—among the successes so far has been that we have contained this conflict. There have been horrible events in Bosnia, no question about that, but we have contained the conflict. If we lift this embargo, all kinds of things begin to happen. It could reignite the war in Croatia, and it risks an explosion in Albania and in Kosovo. It could spill out into the former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia. So we risk instability in the Balkans.

Another consequence is that it harms U.S. ties if we lift this embargo unilaterally. Let us look at NATO. Some of us heard what the administration people said this morning, that if we lift this embargo unilaterally, the future of NATO is at risk because this is the first post-cold-war challenge to NATO. We will be walking away from NATO. We will be walking away from Britain and from France, and we will be on our own. We certainly will have a serious rift with Russia, with unpredictable consequences by the nationalist elements in Russia, and those who oppose Boris Yeltsin will be strengthened.

If we lift this embargo, another risk, of course, is that we undermine U.N. sanctions. The United States voted for this embargo. It is a solemn commitment of the United States, and if we unilaterally break our word and lift the embargo, why should we expect any other nation to keep their word on a

national commitment? We break a U.N. sanction, we do no care about Saddam Hussein, so go ahead and give him materials. Many nations want to do that now. We break the U.N. sanctions, we do not care about Libyan terrorism, so go ahead and supply and trade with Libya. We break the U.N. sanctions, we do not care about Haitian democracy. How can we gain support for sanctions on Haiti or Serbian aggression or North Korea?

Now, there have been some legal arguments made here that the McCloskey amendment supporters assert that continuing the embargo on Bosnia violates the right of self-defense. But may I suggest that that interpretation is wrong. Article 51 does not provide the necessary authority to allow the United States to unilaterally lift the embargo. It states that members' rights to "individual or collective self-defense" must not "affect the authority of another responsibility of the Security Council."

That is the next sentence. They only read the first sentence. We undermine the U.N. Security Council's ability to act if we claim a higher right to simply disregard U.N. Security Council action.

The next point is that the McCloskey amendment begins a new foreign aid program, and it is an open-ended foreign aid program. With \$200 million, it would make the Bosnian Government the fifth largest recipient of United States foreign aid on the military side. And moreover, the Defense Department estimates that providing that \$200 million could require between 1,500 and 2,400 additional personnel to train. And if, of course, they are attacked, they have to have force protection.

But in the end, I think the thing that bothers me the most is that the McCloskey amendment would Americanize the war. Let us be clear about this. If we provide \$200 million to one side, we are coming down on their side of the war; we are driving our allies out. They have already told us that.

If the Serbs then target UNPROFOR, American forces will be called upon to rescue them. If our allies pull out troops, the fighting intensifies, and we will be called to help. We will be called upon to send weapons in, and we will be called upon for U.S. troops to help keep the delivery routes open. But in a larger sense, we become responsible for Bosnia's fate.

Bosnia becomes a client. Our prestige and our power will have to be used to assure a Bosnian victory. We cannot go at it halfway.

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by simply saying that I know the frustrations here. They are very, very deep. It is important to see the progress that has been made. Despite the setbacks, we and our allies now have come together. We have contained the conflict, we have reduced the killing, and in recent months there has been an end to the siege of Sarajevo and Tuzla. There has been a peace agreement between

the Moslems and the Croats in Bosnia. There has been a formal cease-fire between Croatian Government and the Serbs in Croatia. There has been a dramatic reduction in the level of fighting, and as of yesterday, with all its fragility, there is a 1-month cease-fire throughout Bosnia. And as the President stated in Europe yesterday, a wider war has been avoided and hundreds of lives have been saved.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to oppose the McCloskey amendment.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to how much time remains on both sides?

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. RICHARDSON). The gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCLOSKEY] has 22½ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] has 18 minutes remaining.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. TORRICELLI] a subcommittee chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and a man of knowledge and force.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. There is not a Member of this House in their own lives that did not look in their parents' eyes and say, tell me about the holocaust. Tell me why it is the world sat silent.

There is not a Member of this House who does not remember during the carnage in Cambodia, how we said to ourselves, we wish that there was something we could have done. But it just was not to be.

This debate is about many things. But, more than anything, it is about this: What are you, my friends, going to say to your children and their children's children, when they say to you, where was America? When the villages were razed, women were raped, a Moslem people were subjected to genocide? Where were you, America? With those in Europe who would argue the legal restrictions, the need to stand together, or with the victims, where America always is when America is right?

The compelling logic of the Moslem people is overwhelming. What is it they want? They want to survive. They are not asking for our blood or our lives. They want to fight to defend their own families.

I know it is a change of policy. What could be more of a compelling argument for this amendment? The policy has failed. And this legislative body at its best, if it is honest with itself, will stand apart and say it was tried. But the idea of an embargo on a poor impoverished people, while allowing a military force under the same rules in Serbia, was an imbalance that was bound to create the situation. Allow ourselves to escape from it.

Now we are told that there are legal precedents. There will be complications. Well, you decide. Do you want to look at history with your own children and say you were respecting prece-



dents, or you were standing for justice? This amendment is justice.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Texas [Mr. COMBEST].

(Mr. COMBEST asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, it might appear this is an easy vote, give the Bosnian Moslems the right to arm themselves and fight. If it were that easy, I would be supporting it. I predict that while it may not seem to be difficult today, in the future many may find this vote haunting them. I hope that if this measure passes and actions are taken accordingly, my position is proven wrong because if I am proven right, it will mean that Americans have lost their lives. Mr. Chairman, there are too many uncertainties.

This amendment makes it clear what we are to do. We are to "go it alone." We unilaterally provide arms. Where are the weapons to come from? How long will it take to supply them and train for their use? And, who trains them? The more independent our role the more American sons and daughters are placed in Bosnia and in harm's way.

What happens if—in recognizing the potential problems of the Moslems being armed—the Serbs launch an all-out preemptive strike in an attempt to end the conflict prior to the Moslems' ability to strike back? What happens to the Americans who we have stationed there in their new role? What do we do then? How much further are we brought into this conflict?

Some military leaders on the scene have observed that an end to the arms embargo months ago would have been a different story. But ending that embargo now would create havoc.

Mr. Chairman, the American people have never lost their resolve for peace and freedom. But they do expect that before our soldiers are placed in danger, every possibility has been predetermined and plans have been made. That is not the case in this instance and until such plans have been outlined and we realize the potential American involvement and ultimately the possible American loss, I cannot support the proposal.

To the proponents, the question must be posed—do you support the introduction of Americans in Bosnia? The answer to that is yes; let us say so and make it very clear that is what we are voting on. Members supporting this amendment had better consider this vote as a call for the intervention of American sons and daughters on the ground in Bosnia.

Several years ago when the House considered the authority to go to war in the gulf, I did not cast my vote blindly as a disinterested bystander. At that time, my son went to work everyday in the Marine uniform and it was almost certain he would go to the gulf. I supported that effort then and today

I am totally convinced that was the right decision.

I do not share the same conviction regarding American involvement in Bosnia today. Until we know the specific result of our actions and until we have planned for the potential reactions to our actions I would not vote to send my son to Bosnia, and I will not vote to send yours.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my dear friend and a real courageous worker on this issue, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. OLVER].

Mr. OLVER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I think one of the most ironic parts of this debate is that at this very time, we have just finished commemorating 50 years since D-day, and that epic struggle against fascism which the Second World War represented. And one of the features of that war, which will remain indelible through history, is that feature which was the most widespread genocide occurring over a whole continent, an effort to obliterate a whole people and a whole culture. Yet we are now in the process of denial of self-defense of a people that is being subjected to genocide.

I do not think there is anybody who denies that this is an effort at genocide on the part of the Serb Chetniks. There are Roman Catholic Churches and Moslem Mosques which have been destroyed. The whole of the religious infrastructure for the two other religions that the Slavic people in Bosnia represent, great and beautiful edifices dynamited, cultural centers destroyed, museums, obliteration of a whole culture is being attempted, along with the concentration camps that we had, the indiscriminate slaughter of all ages of people because of their religion, the millions of refugees that have been created in that process.

The most basic right that people have is the right on the part of individuals and nations, the right of self-defense. Personal law, U.S. law, moral law, Biblical law, international law, all allows for the right of self-defense, except in Bosnia. Except in Bosnia, where there is a defense instead of a denial of that right of self-defense and weaponry to do that on the part of the people involved.

This is the only instance in 50 years of the U.N. history where direct U.N. action, deliberate U.N. action, helped and served the aggressor, made the genocide worse. Bosnia, and Croatia before Bosnia, both of them U.N. members, have been embargoed against even defensive weapons, while Serbia for 3 years supplied arms and men and all kinds of supplies and its own troops to grab as much land in an aggression in Bosnia. As much land as possible has been taken.

It has been a process of kill or drive out all the people that possibly could be killed or driven out, depending particularly on their religion. The embar-

go is illegal and immortal, and ought to be lifted. It is a violation of the U.N. Charter.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MURTHA].

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Chairman, let me talk about the practical side of lifting the embargo and the problems I have with the U.S. unilaterally lifting the embargo.

All of us have seen this tragedy unfold. Not long ago I was in Sarajevo, and I stood on the spot in the central marketplace where the mortar round hit and killed so many people, and they talked about the terrible tragedy that is going on in Bosnia.

General Rose, the U.N. ground commander, took me all through the area in Sarajevo particularly, and talked about the difficulty that the United Nations has on the ground.

For instance, in close air support, the hillsides are heavily vegetated. A tank moves back and forth, and is difficult to spot. Also, there is often cloud cover that greatly complicates air missions. So people who think you could easily expand the bombing and significantly affect military events on the ground are inaccurate. It's not an easy proposition.

General Rose told me that with the military situation that has developed, this is the very time in which negotiations must be stressed to end this ongoing tragedy. There is some momentum here.

□ 1150

He said that certain actions taken by the United States could interrupt the momentum toward a settlement and prolong the fighting on the ground if we raise false hopes.

For instance, he said that every time the United States makes a strong statement we encourage one party or the other to institute a military action. He said, "every time that happens, it endangers my U.N. people on the ground." He said:

You don't have anybody on the ground participating in this action, and your statements precipitate military action that endangers people on the ground.

He said:

I implore you to go back and tell the President of the United States to negotiate with the Russians and with the ECa settlement, and do it as quickly as possible. There is a window of opportunity right now to try to settle this very desperate, tragic situation.

I said, "What about lifting the embargo?"

He said:

Here is the problem. Both sides have arms. One side may have more heavy equipment than the other, but regarding the Muslims that do not have the heavy equipment, the only people that could supply it is the United States. There is nobody else in the world that could supply that equipment. And to do it, you would have to fight your way through if you took it through on the ground.

We see what happens when we get involved in that kind of a match. It esca-



lates to the point where the United States is drawn in. We become the enemy.

The Somalia, which was a fairly primitive military situation, the United States thought it was going to go into Somalia and we would control the situation completely. We became the enemy. They killed a number of American service people trying to provide humanitarian aid, with all the good intentions in the world.

All of us have good intentions. All of us would like to see the fighting stopped, but what we would be doing is forcing one side or the other to take action against us.

A Stinger missile will fire and shoot down a C-130, or whatever type airlift airplane it happens to be, very easily. If they have hand-held missiles, believe me, they will shoot down American aircraft. The United Nations will not be able to maintain a presence in that area if we go too far.

For instance, when we went into Sarajevo, anybody who thinks that area is not controlled by the Serbs is wrong. We went through three checkpoints. They made us get out of the automobile. The Commander said to me, "Look at the hillsides. They can shoot us anytime they want to."

We sit back here and we can watch television and we can say how wonderful it is for the United States to take action in this particular situation, but if you are in Sarajevo or in Gorazde and you are serving with the U.N. forces, a unilateral lifting of the embargo means the U.N. forces and the United States are taking sides. It would be a tragic mistake for the United States to do so. We would lose our neutrality and our ability to broker a settlement.

Mr. Chairman, I would urge the Members of this Congress to vote against the amendment offered by my good friend, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCloskey].

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN], the ranking member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. He is a primary coauthor of this amendment, and I am so much in his debt.

(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment to end the arms embargo of Bosnia because we have been witnessing aggression and genocide in Bosnia on a scale not witnessed in Europe since the worst days of World War II.

Inaction in the face of this barbarism is not an option. We must take action to end this tragedy in Bosnia.

Let us no longer accept the fiction as we have in the past 2 years that all that is required is a little more patience—just a few more weeks to give the diplomats time to negotiate a settlement. For 2 years we have been pa-

tiently awaiting a negotiated settlement. But all that such waiting has brought to Bosnia is more death and destruction.

Regrettably, it is anticipated that the latest cease-fire will be no different than past cease-fires. The Bosnian Serbs have already publicly indicated that they intend to resume fighting within 30 days.

Bosnia cannot afford more patience.

If we agree that we will wait no longer and that we must do something, there really are only two options.

One is to end the arms embargo so that the people of Bosnia can acquire the wherewithal to defend themselves. The McCloskey-Gilman amendment will do precisely that.

The other option would be to send United States forces into Bosnia to end the aggression and genocide.

It appears that the administration has already started us down the road to direct U.S. military involvement. What were the United States airstrikes around Gorazde, and our shooting down of three Serbian aircraft, but the first step onto the slippery slope to direct United States military involvement? This is why the references we've heard today to Vietnam are misplaced. It is the administrations' current policy that will drag us into a Vietnam-style Quagmire, not lifting the arms embargo.

The substitute to the McCloskey-Gilman amendment originally offered by Chairman HAMILTON at least had the virtue of acknowledging that direct U.S. military involvement is the alternative to lifting the arms embargo. The original Hamilton substitute contains an authorization under the War Powers Resolution for our United States Armed Forces to engage in hostilities while conducting air operations in Bosnia. It also contemplated the deployment of United States ground forces in Bosnia.

The original Hamilton amendment was withdrawn and replaced by the weaker language which we will vote on later today. The obvious reason for this switch is that there was not sufficient support in the House for the original language.

And that is instructive. If there isn't support for the real alternative to lifting the embargo—if his House and the American people are not going to favor direct United States military involvement—then a vote against the McCloskey-Gilman amendment is in fact a vote to do nothing about the aggression and genocide in Bosnia.

And that, to my mind, is a morally untenable position to take.

There should be no question about whether ending the embargo will make a difference in Bosnia.

The Bosnian government has repeatedly asked us to take this step, knowing better than anyone else what ending the embargo will mean—both the risks it will entail and the opportunities. The Bosnians have repeatedly stated that this is the single most im-

portant step we can take to help them to resist the aggression and genocide now being inflicted upon them.

It has been the Clinton policy for over a year to end the arms embargo. Surely he would not have adopted this policy if there was any truth to the opposition's arguments.

The President's policy would make no sense if there were no way to get weapons into Bosnia; or if the Bosnian Government forces could not be trained to use the weapons; or if getting the weapons into Bosnia would not make any difference in turning back the aggression and genocide. To suggest these things is to suggest that the President's policy over the past year has been at best seriously misguided, and at worst a cruel joke—a cynical ploy to buy more time while more people die.

The only difference between the McCloskey-Gilman amendment and the President's policy is that our amendment would implement the policy unilaterally, without waiting for the U.N. Security Council to formally rescind the embargo.

Our amendment calls on the United States to provide leadership in the face of the moral crisis in Bosnia.

Opponents of the amendment are telling us we should wait for the United Nations to provide leadership.

I fear if we do that we will be waiting for a long time.

The McCloskey-Gilman amendment relies on Bosnia's right under article 51 of the U.N. Charter to defend itself against aggression as the legal basis for unilaterally ending the embargo. Those who contend that Bosnia's right to defend itself has been extinguished by the action the United Nations has taken to date do not fully understand article 51.

Bosnia is not compelled to stand by and allow itself to be annihilated because 2½ years ago the United Nations decided to impose an arms embargo on a country that no longer exists. We are not compelled to stand by, allowing that annihilation to occur.

As for the claim that our opting out of the arms embargo of Bosnia will invite other countries to opt out of U.N. embargoes we support, such as that of Iraq, all I can say is that those situations are entirely different. It is absurd to suggest that there is no difference between Bosnia, which is the victim of continuing aggression, and Iraq, which was the perpetrator of aggression. There can be no equating Bosnia with Iraq.

In fact, there is no need for us to continue debating the question of international law presented by the arms embargo. The Congress already has had that debate and reached a decision. We already have found that continued application of the U.N. arms embargo to the Government of Bosnia violates article 51 of the U.N. Charter and is illegal under international law.

That finding was contained in section 520 of the recently passed Foreign Relations Authorization Act. That section



went on to urge the President to unilaterally terminate U.S. participation in the arms embargo.

The McCloskey-Gilman amendment will implement the advice we so recently gave the President. In addition, it will authorize—but not require—the President to provide up to \$200 million in military assistance by way of drawdowns from Defense Department stocks. Those drawdowns can be made without increasing our budget deficit.

Mr. Chairman, I submit we can make a difference in Bosnia, by voting in support of the McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, as I understand it, the timekeeper has now corrected the amount of time, and this gentleman has 10 minutes remaining, rather than 13 minutes, am I not correct?

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. That is correct.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I would indicate to my distinguished colleague that it would be the intention of this gentleman to close the debate.

Further, as I understand it, under the rules, this gentleman has the right to close debate. Am I not correct, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman is correct, he has the right to close debate.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I would ask, is the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] saying that he is going to have one 10-minute speaker in conclusion?

Mr. DELLUMS. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. FISH].

Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for yielding time to me. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to strongly urge my colleagues to support the McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment, which provides for the immediate and unilateral lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Let us once and for all dispel the myth that all sides are equal in what some still attempt to portray as a civil war. Our irresolute policy to date has only encouraged violence and ethnic cleansing. In short, Mr. Chairman, alternatives to lifting the arms embargo have not worked.

For over 2 years we have witnessed the ravages of aggression and genocide in Bosnia. Over 200,000 people are dead or missing and presumed dead; 85 percent of this total were civilians, and perhaps most staggering is the fact that nearly as many children have died as have combatants.

Against this backdrop, it is unconscionable that we continue to deny the Bosnians the opportunity to obtain the necessary means to defend themselves. The continued imposition of an arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina, a sovereign nation, in the

face of a well-armed aggressor is reprehensible and should end without further delay. Mr. Chairman, we are already a year later. As for taking sides, Elie Wiesel observes "Neutrality helps the oppressor, never the victim."

Mr. Chairman, the Bosnians have demonstrated their determination and courage to defend their country and all that it stands for. Their Prime Minister has asked for our help. I urge my colleagues to vote "yes" on the McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment which calls for the kind of resolute action required to pave the way for a truly just and lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia. At the same time, I urge rejection of the Hamilton amendment which effectively endorses the failed status quo.

□ 1200

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. GLICKMAN], the distinguished chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, who has been following the Balkan conflict intensely.

(Mr. GLICKMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I strongly support the position of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. MCCLOSKEY] and I very much respect my colleague, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, but the fact of the matter is this amendment is not inconsistent with negotiation and settlement. It actually strengthens the ability of the United States to have influence in the United Nations in getting the parties together.

I think from a standpoint of negotiation, it makes sense. But there is the old expression "Actions speak louder than words." The world has spoken against the atrocities and brutality in the Balkans but has done nothing about it. They look to us.

Mr. Chairman, I have traveled a lot in my role as chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the world still looks to us. They say it is great other countries are involved in the Balkans, but only one nation has the moral leverage, the moral ability to influence the world and the power to stand behind it and get something done, and that is the Americans.

Mr. Chairman, we have got to act like a moral leader, not just talk like a moral leader, and this is a good place to begin.

It was the Italian poet Dante who said, "The darkest place in hell is reserved for those who in a period of moral crisis claim neutrality."

Mr. Chairman, it is time for us to stop being neutral about atrocities, about killing of people based upon the color of their skin or who they are or what they believe in. It is time for America to stand up. We can do it with this amendment.

There is some risk in terms of the increased arms in the region, but nothing ventured without some risk will ever

make any difference to anybody, anyway. We not only owe it to the people in the Balkans but we owe it to people around the world who are facing atrocities based upon who they are or where they were born or what they believe in that America will not allow this to continue.

Mr. Chairman, I support the amendment and I hope it passes.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. NADLER].

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, we are told that we are dealing with ancient ethnic quarrels here that we cannot hope to fathom. The truth of the matter is that we are dealing with a classic case of aggression across an international border, against a member state of the United Nations, plus the instigation of domestic insurgency, not very different from what we faced in Kuwait.

We have twice before this century had immoral arms embargoes. In the 1930's when the Fascists revolted in Spain, we had an arms embargo against the loyalists while Hitler and Mussolini armed the Fascists. In 1948 we had an arms embargo against Israel, and thank God to the Czechoslovaks who supplied arms so that the seven invading armies did not succeed.

Now we are imposing an arms embargo against the victims of aggression and the victims of genocide while the aggressors have plenty of arms. We are told that lifting the arms embargo might lead to greater bloodshed. That is like saying that we should not have let the defenders of the Warsaw ghetto have arms against the Nazis.

Mr. Chairman, I am a member of the Holocaust Memorial Council. I have many victims of the Holocaust in my district. We always say never again, we must learn never again, but it is happening again, and what are we doing about it? At least let us arm the Bosnians. This amendment unfortunately does not do that. The amendment simply lifts the arms embargo and leaves everything else up to the discretion of the President. But let the Bosnians defend themselves against the Fascist aggressors. Let those aggressors pay a price.

We are told lifting the arms embargo could lead to destruction of the peace negotiations. What peace negotiations? As I look at them, they are simply trying to have a fig leaf for the surrender of land made free of Bosnians to the Serbian aggressors. We might as well be telling the Czechoslovaks to cede the Sudetenland to the Germans or telling England in 1940 to lay down its arms, leaving the Nazis supreme in Europe.

Let us erase the stain of neutrality with regard to genocide. Let us erase the stain of complicity with regard to genocide. Let us end this embargo which is the handmaiden of genocide.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York [Ms. SLAUGHTER].



Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Chairman, the debate that should have taken place about 2 years ago at the end of the cold war was what was the United Nations going to be? We have sent in again to this conflagration in former Yugoslavia people dressed in suits and blue helmets and we have watched as they have been totally ineffective. Imagine what it was like for them to have been escorting the Vice President of Bosnia to the airport, in a United Nations carrier which was stopped on the street, the back door opened and the man shot to death in front of them. Time after time we have watched convoys of food and medical supplies be turned back because the Serbs would not let them go on where they were needed.

I received a letter myself from a surgeon in a Sarajevo Serbian hospital. "Please tell your President we are operating in the dark, in the cold. We have no ability to sterilize the instruments, we have no antiseptic, no antibiotics. We are using hacksaws to cut off limbs." While we have watched this for 3 years one side has been pounding the other, the other side being unarmed by U.N. decree.

The President of Bosnia was here not long ago, he looked us all right in the eye and he said, "Whether you like it or not, America, you have the moral imperative. You have always stood for that, you have always said you have it and now it is time for you to use it. You cannot get away from it and you cannot escape it."

Mr. Chairman, until we decide what the United Nations is going to be, whether they will really be able to prepare to keep the peace, it is time for us to follow what human rights organizations and most of us here believe has to be done and that is lift the embargo. Thousands of innocent people have been murdered and we just let it happen. It is indecent, inhumane, and we must not prevent people from protecting themselves. Verbal communication did nothing. The United States said at one point they were going to drop food in this area no matter what anybody thought about it. At that moment the Serbs began to rush to New York to the United Nations to talk. But did we pay any attention to that? No.

One day we have a compelling interest but the next day we do not. We have dithered back and forth with our allies making the case over and over, since we have no troops on the ground, we literally have nothing to say there. Lift the embargo and let us insist that the U.N. peacekeepers be equipped and trained to do their work.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. WILSON].

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.

Mr. Chairman, it was said earlier in the debate that the great problem with lifting this embargo would be that it would somehow Americanize this war

and it would somehow place America in the position of taking a position.

I would just like to say that in a war as brutal and vicious as this one where there is destruction of churches, where people are forced to leave their land, where there are death camps again 50 years later, there are death camps, I have seen the victims of the rape camps myself. There is ethnic cleansing. There is genocide. This is good versus evil, and if we do not want to Americanize this, then what do we want to Americanize? We have to stand for something.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to my dear friend, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. HASTINGS].

(Mr. HASTINGS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express my support for the McCloskey/Bonior/Gilman/Hoyer amendment to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The 2-year-long embargo has done little toward ending either the war or the atrocities committed against the Bosnian Moslems. Two years worth of international diplomacy have achieved almost nothing. And during this 2-year peace process/negotiating period, more than 200,000 Moslems have been slaughtered.

If we are not interested in sending in our own troops to end the conflict we can at least ensure that this besieged minority has the ability to defend itself. Two years worth of one tactic is enough: It is clear that diplomacy alone is not working.

I have heard the argument that if we lift the arms embargo we will intensify the warfare rather than end the warfare. That by providing arms to the Moslems we will enable them to launch a full-scale war against the Serbs. I admit that this might, in fact, be true.

But the alternative is to continue to allow one side to slaughter another. We have watched this happen for the past 2 years and we all know that it will continue despite diplomacy.

We come to this well every day to decry the holocaust, to express outrage about Rwanda, to complain that people are hungry and homeless and sick and poor. We complain about all of these things, yet most of us probably feel that we are powerless to help. Well we are not powerless to help. People are being killed in Bosnia. If we can't help end the war we can at least help the Moslems help themselves.

I do not want to be responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. But neither can I stand by and watch hundreds of thousands of people die because of the status quo. Support the McCloskey amendment.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. ROHRABACHER].

□ 1210

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, we have heard a lot of talk today about America becoming involved in a conflict so far away from our shores.

Let us note that if we do not permit victims to defend themselves, we are more likely to get involved in sending our troops into conflicts like the Balkans. We do not want to Americanize this war. What we want to do is permit the people who are being victimized and slaughtered to be able to defend themselves. What could be better than that?

We should end this immoral arms embargo. It is immoral because it treats the victims and aggressors alike in the end that will drag in America's troops if, indeed, those people cannot defend themselves.

This policy has led to genocide, because it has left the aggressor with a monstrous advantage.

We are being told America cannot act. Well, America can act. We should be the leaders of the free world.

The new world order has turned into a nightmare of bungling, indecision, and cowardice. We must end this immoral arms embargo so victims can defend themselves, and the United States does not have to send troops everywhere in the world.

Please, vote yes for McCloskey-Gilman.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. ENGEL].

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, it is said that Nero fiddled while Rome burned. For the past 2 years, we have been fiddling while the people of Bosnia have burned.

I do not want to know about diplomatic niceties. I know 2 years ago we should have been doing what I hope we are about to do now.

I went to Skopje. I met with these people. They told us atrocities that you just cannot believe.

If this were 2 years ago, perhaps there would be time for diplomatic niceties. But there is not time anymore.

If we will not help them, if we will not defend the people of Bosnia, let us let them defend themselves.

Vote to lift the arms embargo.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, in conclusion as to our side on this very important debate, I yield 4 minutes, the remainder of our time, to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR], a Member for whom I hold massive esteem, a man whose great courage and integrity cannot be exaggerated.

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Chairman, we have heard a lot of hopeful talk this morning about the Bosnian cease-fire that was signed yesterday.

We have been told that the Geneva Agreement is the beginning of a new round of peace talks.



Well, let me read to you a quote from somebody we have not heard from yet in this debate.

Let me read you what the Bosnian Serb Government had to say this morning about the 1-month cease-fire they agreed to just yesterday.

Through their news agency, the Bosnian Serb leaders said, and I quote:

The Geneva Agreement is merely a 1-month calm before an unprecedented storm and a prelude to total conflict. After that it will become clear to one and all that there is no formula according to which two victors can emerge from this war.

That is what the Bosnian Serb leaders themselves had to say about their cease-fire.

We have heard time and time again on this floor today that now is not the time to act in Bosnia.

That now is not the time to lift the arms embargo.

That we must be patient and wait to act.

Well, I agree, Mr. Chairman. Now is not the best time to act. The truth is, we should have acted a long time ago.

But for over 2 years, we just sat back and waited.

Waited as tens of thousands of innocent civilians were starved in mass concentration camps.

Waited as thousands of young girls were systematically raped by Serbian soldiers.

Waited as Serb snipers in places like Gorazde and Sarajevo gunned down innocent children in cold blood.

And now opponents of this amendment are asking us to wait a little longer.

Mr. Chairman, how many innocent people have to die in Bosnia before we do something about it?

Are 200,000 dead Bosnians enough? Are 16,000 slaughtered children enough? That is how many have died in the past 2 years.

How many times can we turn our heads and pretend we just don't see?

There have been over two dozen ceasefires the past 2 years. The peace process has started and stalled countless times. We have watched the Serbs break agreement after agreement. And still we have done nothing.

Nothing, as Serb aggression has run unchecked as Serb tanks have rolled through the Bosnian countryside, taking town after town, village after village, and still they kept coming, turning Bosnia into a modern-day Sudetenland.

And the worst part, Mr. Chairman, is that the Bosnian people have had to face it all with both arms tied behind their backs, because the arms embargo we enforce has denied them the very weapons they need to defend themselves.

There are those who say we should not lift the arms embargo today because it will involve us in the war.

But let us be honest: We are already involved in the war.

By keeping this embargo in place for so long, not only have we forced the

Bosnian people to fight tanks and mortars with guns and knives but we have helped tilt the balance of the war in favor of Serbian aggression.

To have imposed the arms embargo in the first place was incomprehensible. But to have kept it in place for so long, after so much suffering, is utterly shameful.

Mr. Chairman, the people of Bosnia are not asking us to send in troops.

They are not asking us to defend them.

They are simply asking for the right to defend themselves.

And we have no right to deny them that.

By passing this amendment today, we will simply extend to Bosnia that right which is guaranteed to every other sovereign national under the U.N. Charter—the right to self-defense, and the even more fundamental right to self-determination.

It is time the Serbs learn that the world will not stand for its aggression.

To those who say that lifting the embargo will disrupt the peace process, I say you are wrong: Lifting the embargo will not weaken the peace process, it will strengthen it.

The reason peace talks have failed the past 2 years is because the Serbs have had no reason to negotiate. They face no opposition on the battlefield, so they have had no incentive to stay at the negotiating table.

We woke up this morning to headlines of a new cease-fire and hope for peace in Bosnia.

But within hours after those headlines appeared, before the ink was even dry, the Bosnian Serbs disavowed the agreement and threatened to unleash an "unprecedented storm \* \* \* a total conflict."

Let us never forget that we have been down this same road before.

Just 4 months ago, in early February, we applauded a cease-fire in Sarajevo. But a few hours later, we mourned as a shell ripped through a Sarajevo market, killing 68 innocent civilians.

Just 2 months ago, we welcomed three separate cease-fires in Gorazde. But then we watched in horror as Serb snipers used homeless families for target practice, and Serb shells rained down on children lying in hospital beds.

More than two dozen times the past 2 years, we have seen cease fires broken and peace talks fail.

By our actions here today, we can and must strengthen the cause for peace.

Mr. Chairman, we began this week by remembering one of the proudest days in our history.

Schoolchildren all across America learned how 50 years ago, their grandparents saved the world from tyranny and genocide.

But 50 years from now, schoolchildren will study this time.

And they will look back and wonder where American leadership was when genocide reared its ugly head again.

They will want to know why we sat back and watched children be slaughtered and families torn apart.

They will want to know why the U.S. Navy blockaded the shores of Bosnia so arms could not enter and innocent people could not defend themselves.

And somehow, the excuses that there were barriers too difficult to overcome or that we could not get our allies to go along with us will seem empty. We have a chance to change some of that here today.

Fifty years after the world said "never again"; now is our time to stand up to tyranny and genocide in the world. And we cannot wait any longer.

Because if we do not, if we do not lift this embargo and at least let the people of Bosnia defend themselves, then the blood of Bosnia is not just on the hands of the Serbs.

It is on all of us.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time for the purposes of concluding debate on this issue.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, let me make several observations.

First, good and decent human beings have arisen in the well of the House on both sides of this aisle, people whom I respect with a great sense of sincerity.

Second, Mr. Chairman, there have been a number of eloquent and articulate, compelling, and compassionate statements made during the course of this debate.

Third, Mr. Chairman, what should not be negotiable, debatable, or discussible is that all of us believe that the killing and the dying should end.

The question before us is how to do it. And, second, does the action contemplated in the amendment before the body take us to that place?

There have been a number of brilliant statements, Mr. Chairman, but let me look specifically at what this amendment does and whether it takes us to the goal and objective that has been eloquently spoken by a number of people in the well.

This amendment unilaterally, Mr. Chairman, and I underscore for the purposes of emphasis, unilaterally, the United States would lift its participation in the arms embargo against Bosnia, and it would authorize up to \$200 million in aid and the trainers to train Bosnian soldiers on using the equipment.

□ 1220

So, Mr. Chairman, all of us want to end the killing and the dying. This is unilateral lifting of the embargo. This is a complex issue. This gentleman has thought long and hard on this matter, and I would like to share with you, Mr. Chairman, the significant reasons why I believe this is going down the wrong path.

No. 1, it violates the first rule of peacekeeping, Mr. Chairman. With this vote, we would effectively become



Bosnia's allies. We would violate the cardinal rule of peacekeeping, "Choose no sides, make no enemies."

Mr. Chairman, we are the last peg standing, we are the great superpower. We must learn as a Nation how to engage in peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement. We must not continue to drag the baggage of the cold war into the post-cold war activity. Choose no sides, make no enemies.

Mr. Chairman, this would harm multilateral efforts generally, including Korea. This would harm multinational efforts generally, including our current effort at bringing the world community in line with bringing sanctions against North Korea for violating its obligations under the nonproliferation regime. We ought to at least try to present some cogent, consistent strategy and face to the world.

Third, lifting unilaterally weakens other embargoes. Mr. Chairman, any time the world comes together on a multinational basis to impose an arms embargo, we ought to walk gently and cautiously before we unilaterally engage in lifting the embargo. If we would lift the embargo on Bosnia unilaterally, what would stop other nations who could move to lift other embargoes such as those on Iraq and Libya? We would lose the moral high ground on this issue. Mr. Chairman, a moral and legal basis for seeking to enforce these embargoes.

What happens, Mr. Chairman, down the road a little further when some other nation decides to step outside of internationally imposed arms embargo and we rise to great moral heights and say, "Why are you doing this?" The response would be, "Why are you attempting to raise this question with us? When it served your purposes, you stepped outside of the multinational embargo."

The issue here is not whether you lift or do not lift, this amendment deals with unilateralism, and you have got to address that issue.

Mr. Chairman, fourth, it would remove our leverage with Serbia. Our unilateral lifting of the embargo on Bosnia would give the green light to others to ignore the embargo on Serbia. One would have to be a fool or naive, Mr. Chairman, to assume that lifting this embargo takes place in a vacuum. One action causes another reaction. We do not live in a vacuum.

Mr. Chairman, reacting to an action taken on this matter by the other body, the Russian Duma has already voted that it would be its sense that Russia should unilaterally lift sanctions on Serbia. While their actions will not implement such a policy, I am trying to point out that it shows the problem.

Next, I believe it would increase the bloodshed. Providing arms to Bosnia really solves nothing. But it will certainly increase the bloodshed. In the months before the Bosnians master the weaponry that we give them, the Serbs may attack all out and overrun still

more Moslem territory. If the Serbs fail to do so, the Bosnians would likely use the weapons to try to settle scores. Either way, there will be more blood-letting.

Mr. Chairman, make no mistake about it, you do not walk away from this action with clean hands. There is blood. And this action, in my opinion, increases the potential of that. We ought to be about bringing people to the negotiating table. Those who have written in support of this, who are articulate spokespersons for a peaceful, diplomatic solution to the problems must understand that simply lifting the embargo and stepping away is not a neutral act, it is not an act that does not stain you with the same kind of blood because of the disincentive.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that it would derail the newly established 1-month ceasefire and the possibility for an agreement on an even longer ceasefire. We ought to be about ceasefires, to try to stop the killing and the dying and the maiming.

It would infuriate our allies: If we violate the embargo, we infuriate our own allies, especially Britain, Canada, and France, who have troops on the ground, unlike us, Mr. Chairman, and who fear this action will cause the resumption of war, with their troops stuck in between. Our allies have clearly warned us for months that we will be blamed for the deaths of their sons if we violate the embargo. We cannot turn a deaf ear to this, Mr. Chairman. We would not, if the shoe were on the other foot, want them to turn a deaf ear to us.

Mr. Chairman, humanitarian effort could be stymied: The European troops on the ground in Bosnia allow humanitarian relief to get through. If we lift the embargo and the European troops are fired upon, we can expect them to pull out, thereby effectively ending humanitarian relief effort and leading us to a swift increase in civilian deaths. Make no mistake about it.

Our allies may press us for further military actions. Let me explain. Before our angry allies withdraw, they may press us for further military actions to support their troops who may be withdrawing under fire. That must be contemplated. This would almost certainly include an escalation in air strikes flown by U.S. pilots, an action which could further entangle us in the war and would likely cause greater casualties.

Aside from that, the likelihood is that it is also a distinct possibility that we would be called upon to put American troops on the ground as a short-term defense of our withdrawing allies. We would almost be bound to respond positively, considering that it is our unilateral lift that placed them in harm's way in the first place. Such an involvement would certainly cause a serious risk of casualties and would so completely engage us in the fighting as to remove almost any possibility that we could play a role as an active

broker for a negotiated solution. Mr. Chairman, that is the role of a great superpower.

It would likely kill more Bosnians. Let me further explain. This action would not save the Bosnians and may end up killing more. The Serbian reaction will likely be to resume the war immediately, before arms can be delivered and Bosnians can be trained to handle them. I would make a note, Mr. Chairman: It is not rifles and mortars that the Bosnians need, but tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers. It will take weeks and months to provide individual Bosnian troops with the skills on these weapons. Based upon our own training experiences, it would probably take more than a year for the Bosnians to learn the unit skills needed to employ them effectively.

Having set this train in motion, we will be morally responsible for the fate of the Bosnians. If the butchering resumes during this extended period of training, will the supporters of this amendment be willing to send U.S. troops to save the Bosnians from a fate worse than they face now?

It would seem to me that it would then become a moral imperative to do so. So, we are locked in, Mr. Chairman.

Further, it sucks us deeper into the quagmire. Some have spoke to this. If \$200 million is insufficient to turn the tide, what do we do then? Will we use unilateral air power to save the Bosnians if they are being overwhelmed?

Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. OLVER). The gentleman is recognized for an additional 5 minutes.

Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the Chairman and would like to conclude my comments.

Would we use unilateral air power to save the Bosnians if they are being overwhelmed? If that does not work, will we send in ground troops? Or will we say, "Nice try," but leave the Bosnians to fate?

This could further endanger American lives. Let me further explain. This amendment authorizes us to train Bosnian troops in Bosnia, thereby increasing the threat to American troops. This makes us more an ally of the Bosnians, an escalation of taking sides.

The goal should be to seek a ceasefire. Mr. Chairman, brilliant comments notwithstanding, this is a war and intervention amendment, not a peace or peacekeeping amendment. It has those implications. We should continue to build on recent successes that brought an end to the sieges at Tuzla, Sarajevo and Garazde, to end the shelling and to continue to support this 1-month ceasefire with the hope that it would increase.

□ 1230

Mr. Chairman, this amendment, in my opinion, is a disincentive to negotiate. It provides no incentive for the



Bosnian Government to seek a negotiated settlement. In fact, the Bosnian Government could view this as an opportunity to launch offensive operations to regain territory in line with their three territorial imperatives.

Mr. Chairman, the Bosnians have three territorial imperatives. They are land locked by virtue of their fighting on the ground. They need to go south to the Adriatic Sea, north to the Danube River, and east to Sarajevo. By virtue of their coalition with the Croats, they now have access to the Adriatic Sea for trade and economic purposes. They do not have access to Sarajevo, the capital, nor to the Danube River for economic and trade purposes.

These matters, it seems to me, can be solved at the negotiating table, not on the battlefield. By lifting the embargo, Mr. Chairman, it becomes a disincentive to move to the table to stop the killing because then you give greater weapons, greater potential for greater fighting and greater struggling prior to coming to the table. The result is more people dying and more deaths.

We ought to be about negotiation. We ought to be, as a great nation, about trying to move people in that direction so those matters can be dealt with.

Mr. Chairman, it undercuts diplomatic efforts, and that has already been addressed, and I would not go further than that, but let me, in the closing part of it, try to respond to this reference to the right of self-determination. It has been raised on several occasions, but I would suggest to my colleagues that it has been taken out of context.

Proponents say we should support this amendment because the U.N. Charter gives every country the right to self-determination. They quote article 51:

"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of self-defense."

But, Mr. Chairman, that is only the first sentence of this article. The second sentence says:

"Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right shall not in any way affect the authority of the Security Council to take \* \* \* et cetera, et cetera, "such action as it deems necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."

I would submit, Mr. Chairman, that this completely alters the meaning, so it is not about simply reading sentence No. 1. It is reading it in total context, and those in these Chambers who are students of evolution of the United Nations and the evolution of this proposition with respect to the right of self-defense must, on the basis of intellectual honesty, read that matter in its total perspective.

The intent of the U.N. Charter is in favor of collective measures for defense. Self-defense is most relevant in periods prior to collective actions, which in this case the Security Council has already taken. The U.N. Allies, allied course of collective actions, sanc-

tions safe zones, humanitarian assistance, and a course of negotiation as the best course of defense in Bosnia.

Proponents also imply that the Security Council only placed the embargo on Bosnia accidentally because it voted on the embargo in 1991, before the full collapse of Yugoslavia. But since then the Security Council has reaffirmed the embargo on Bosnia again and again.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, with all of these arguments I am concluding, and all of my colleagues have listened carefully to this debate, but I say, "Take action based upon the complexity of this matter."

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

THE CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. OLVER). The gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, for purposes of debate only, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE].

(Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, it is always a stimulating experience to hear the learned gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] speak on any subject, particularly on this one. I would just like to respond to a few of the things he said.

"Choose no sides." That is the first rule of peacemaking. The first, most famous chooser of no sides was named Pontius Pilate, and he is legendary.

"I don't see any moral high ground." another good phrase in treating aggressor and victim identically. It seems to me the doctrine of moral equivalence ought to have gone out with the end of the cold war. That was Paul Warnke's idea of the Soviets and the United States being two hamsters on a treadmill.

Unilateralism. Let me tell my colleagues, "When Israel took out the nuclear reactor in Iraq, the whole world suffered from terminal ambivalence. They deplored the violation of protocol, and secretly they loved it. They loved it." Unilateralism, yes, blessed unilateralism.

I suggest that there are all kinds of peace, and peacemaking is wonderful, but the peace of the morgue, the peace of the jailhouse, is not to be suffered, and America is too important and too moral a country to aver its eyes from genocide and ethnic cleansing, and so I hope and pray that the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCLOSKEY] is adopted, and the subsequent amendment, about which I will have more to say later, is defeated.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HYDE. If I have any time remaining, it is a pleasure to yield to the gentleman.

THE CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE] has expired.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS].

Mr. DELLUMS. First, I would like to thank the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE], my colleague, for his very generous remarks.

Second, Mr. Chairman, I simply say to my colleague that I believe the role of peacekeeper in the post-cold war world is very important. What I was simply trying to suggest is that at the point where we take sides, or make enemies, we no longer become credible as a peacekeeper trying to bring all parties to the table. Once we choose sides we are no longer credible as a peacekeeper, and I am simply suggesting that the role of the peacekeeper is a vital and important role and an increasing responsibility we are going to be called upon to perform as the world moves toward the 21st century.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. HYDE. One must always in justice be able to distinguish the aggressor from those aggressed against.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, for purposes of debate only, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. WOLF].

[Mr. WOLF addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as I have remaining to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCLOSKEY].

THE CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. OLVER). The gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCLOSKEY] is recognized for 1 minute.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman very much for yielding his time to me.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I think we have had a fine debate here on all sides of this issue, but as to the extended statements of the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, I think the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] knows as well as everyone that there is a moral responsibility at certain levels to violate an unjust law. We are saying that this arms embargo is unjust, it is illegal, it is immoral, and it is really nonbinding as a matter of humanitarian sense. That is common sense on its face.

Again this provision commits no troops. It remains discretionary with the President. In essence, it does nothing more in that area than the President has the right to do now.

I would note, with all this talk about the embargo, that there is no embargo, there is no interdiction, and there is nothing being forced with all those armed supplies and, yes, personnel going from Serbia into Bosnia.

Mr. Chairman, I ask the Members to vote yes on McCloskey-Gilman and vote no on Hamilton in the ensuing debate.



Mr. TOWNS. Mr. Chairman, life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is not only an American dream, but a universal aspiration. For 2 years, the Bosnian Moslems have been denied the right to make that dream come true. Serbian aggression has been relentless even while negotiations were in progress. Ending the arms embargo will finally allow the Bosnians to defend themselves—a right no one should be denied. The embargo, which violates international law, will be rectified by the McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment. By enabling the Bosnians with a means to fight their aggressors, the need to send United States troops will be unnecessary. As the situation now stands, the United States, by enforcing the embargo, has already intervened. It is time to make this intervention a positive one. To stand by and allow Serbia to continue committing these atrocities is barbaric. With a country whose policy includes rape as an act of war, it is imperative that this aggression be stopped. The Bosnian Government has put the number of casualties at 220,000, with the number of women raped totaling between 35,000 to 50,000 and those who have been displaced at 1.25 million.

It is a depravity indeed that we as Americans, living according to a constitution which clearly defines our inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, are forcing the Bosnians to live a life worse than death.

— Mr. LIGHTFOOT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in reluctant opposition to the amendment. I understand and deeply admire the intent of those offering this amendment. It is difficult to view the ongoing carnage in Bosnia and not want to do something to help.

But the ramifications of this amendment, no matter how well intended, go beyond just arming the Bosnians. This debate must be based on the cold, hard reality of the current situation and not on emotion. Approval of this amendment would effect other ongoing U.N. embargo's, change the relationship between the United States and Russia and possibly put American troops at risk.

I simply do not see how this House could take action to unilaterally lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and then expect other nations to honor U.N. embargo's on Haiti, Iraq, Libya, and one day North Korea.

Further, policy changes like this do not occur in a vacuum. Surely Russia, with its ethnic ties to Serbia, could not be expected to maintain its embargo if we do not maintain ours.

Finally, I am concerned that lifting the embargo puts us on the slippery slope toward full scale intervention. The Department of Defense has concluded the type of weapons the Bosnians need could not be shipped without the willingness of other nations. Those supplying the weapons would themselves be exposed to enemy fire. And which nation would supply the training needed to effectively use the weapons?

If you believe that lifting the embargo is the only fair thing to do, then I urge you to support the Hamilton amendment.

Let me say this in conclusion. A no vote to this amendment should not be construed as support of the Clinton policy. It has been a disaster of a policy, born in the minds of people who always think they can have it both ways. This President has failed to demonstrate to the American people why intervention in Bosnia is a national interest. I will not

support this amendment nor will I support American troops as peacekeepers in Bosnia.

But this House should also not attempt to have it both ways. Lifting the arms embargo is not a solution, it just makes us feel better. If you are not prepared to demonstrate our national interest in Bosnia, if you are not prepared to act on that interest, then I believe you should support a negotiated peace and stop leading the Bosnians on.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in opposition to the McCloskey amendment. Like all of my colleagues, I have been horrified to watch the violence and turmoil that have marked the brutal civil war in Bosnia, and I have been deeply saddened by the tragic loss of life that has occurred there. I strongly believe the United States must do all it can to end this terrible war and bring peace to this troubled region.

However, I do not believe that by lifting the arms embargo unilaterally, the United States will be promoting a peaceful resolution of this terrible conflict. The peace talks in Bosnia are currently at a fragile stage. By lifting the embargo unilaterally, the United States may undermine any possibility of achieving a diplomatic solution to the conflict. Moreover, by introducing new arms into the region the United States would effectively widen and intensify the war, increasing the killing and destruction in this already devastated area. Attempting to level the killing fields is not the key to peace in Bosnia.

We must decide as a nation whether we want to work with the international community or against it. The United States agreed to impose an arms embargo on this region as a member of the United Nations. We did not decide to impose the embargo unilaterally, and we did not impose it against our will. If we pass the McCloskey amendment, we will be telling the world that we will participate in multilateral sanctions only when it is convenient for us. This would set an extremely dangerous precedent by sending the message that compliance with United Nations resolutions is not mandated, but optional.

In a Dear Colleague letter on this matter, the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee dramatically illustrated the danger of the United States acting unilaterally to lift the arms embargo. In the words of the chairman,

Just last [month], the Russian Duma voted overwhelmingly to lift economic sanctions against Serbia if the United States lifts the arms embargo. Turkey has complained bitterly about the arms it suffers through the sanctions against Iraq. It could easily use the U.S. unilateral action as justification to lift Iraq sanctions unilaterally. Compliance with the Haiti sanctions already has been called into question: how can the United States argue against the Dominican Republic's actions if we do the same elsewhere?

If the United States, as the world's only superpower, chooses to ignore international law, how can we rightfully expect other nations to comply? Why should other countries observe sanctions against North Korea; Libya, or Iraq if the United States ignores those in the former Yugoslavia?

Let's work to end the war in Bosnia, but let's do it in conjunction with the international community, and without widening the war and increasing the killing. Please join me in voting "no" on the McCloskey amendment.

Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the McCloskey amendment, and against the Hamilton amendment.

Mr. Chairman, one of the most memorable moments of my first term in office was to listen to Elie Wiesel's speech at the dedication of the Holocaust Memorial Museum, just 1 mile from this Chamber.

Who can forget when Mr. Wiesel turned to President Clinton and said "Something, anything must be done to stop the bloodshed (in Bosnia), Mr. President, it will not stop unless we stop it."

Well, the time has come—today—for this House to do something to try to put an end to the suffering and the slaughter in Bosnia.

I reject the argument that lifting the embargo will intensify the war.

In the first place, this really hasn't been a war at all. This conflict has consisted of wanton attacks on the civilian populations of a sovereign state that has been unable to defend itself.

As our distinguished colleague STENY HOYER has pointed out, the number of children killed is roughly the same as the number of combatants.

And, by allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves, we will decrease the possibility that U.S. troops will have to be sent in to enforce a shaky peace agreement.

Mr. Chairman, in 1948, another infant country recognized by the United States, the State of Israel, was the victim of an unjust international arms embargo.

Just as the Serbs inherited the weapons of the dissolved Yugoslavian Government, the Arab nations that surrounded and attacked Israel were armed to the teeth with the weapons left by the departing British.

It wasn't until the Czech Government broke the embargo and began shipping some arms to Israel that the balance of power tilted slightly and Israel was able to fight back and ultimately win its war of independence.

In 1948, an international arms embargo almost destroyed the fledgling State of Israel.

In 1994, another embargo is contributing to the slaughter of innocents in another independent State.

Let's take a stand today to stop the bloodshed. Support the McCloskey amendment.

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, the war in Bosnia has raged for more than 2 years now. Over the past 26 months, we have heard reports and seen pictures of massive human suffering, organized rape and murder, deliberate targeting of innocent, unarmed civilians, and the unconscionable practice of ethnic cleansing. Two hundred thousand Bosnians have died in the fighting, 2 million have been forced from their homes and now are refugees, and 70 percent of Bosnia is occupied by Serb forces. Secretary of State Warren Christopher has called the war in the former Yugoslavia "the conflict from hell." I agree with him.

I do not agree, however, with the current policy of denying the Bosnians the right to defend themselves in the face of such relentless and brazen Serb aggression. I do not agree that the best the United States can do is hope all sides accept a fundamentally unjust peace agreement which will, in all likelihood, fall apart. And I do not agree that the United States should condone an embargo which permits the Serbs to wage a systematic and ruthless genocide on the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina.



Mr. Chairman, history is filled with examples where the action of one country, or of even one person, changed the course of events which followed. The French, during the Revolutionary War, aided the American colonists against the British. Without French support, the United States might still be under British control. President Roosevelt, during World War II, instituted the Lend-Lease Program to help the British fight off Hitler. Without United States help, Britain may have fallen and the Nazi Party today would be Europe's only political party. The United States, in the 1980's, armed the mujahidin in Afghanistan against Soviet invaders. Without these arms, the Afghan rebels would not have been able to triumph over the Soviets.

Mr. Chairman, our past teaches us that critical moments in world history require decisive action. The war in Bosnia requires a decisive response. Will historians write that if the United States had lifted the arms embargo, the disaster in Bosnia would have been avoided? I urge my colleagues to support the McCloskey amendment.

Ms. DELAUTO. Mr. Chairman, we've waited long enough. The people of Bosnia and Herzegovina have waited long enough. They've held on through years of unimaginable suffering. Through mass rapes and executions. Through the endless Serb bombardments. Through the violations of countless U.N. safe zones.

They have struggled through this against staggering odds. Ill armed, ill equipped, haggard, and hungry, they have fought off the advances of their aggressors through sheer courage and determination. We all know. We have seen them countless times on television footage. Holding on to what is left of their country. What is left of their families.

And in all of this they have asked precious little. They want simply to defend themselves. But they can do little against the far better armed Serbs unless they have a chance to arm themselves. Yet the arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia prevents that. It keeps in place the overwhelming advantage in arms and equipment that Serb forces had when the hostilities began.

We cannot allow this to continue. To tie the hands of the victims of a new and horrific assault on the moral sensibilities of mankind—ethnic cleansing. Support the McCloskey amendment. Give the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina the chance to defend itself. It is the very least we can do.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I am voting today for the McCloskey amendment to unilaterally lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian Government. The United States must send a clear message to the Serbs that we expect their full cooperation at the negotiating table and will not tolerate their continued aggression against the Bosnian people.

It is clear that talk alone has not brought about peace. For 2 years, the United States and other democratic nations have worked for a negotiated settlement. Recently, the negotiations in Geneva have again raised hopes that a political settlement may be reached. The fact remains that 2 years of negotiations have failed to stop Serbian aggression and the horror of ethnic cleansing. More than 200,000 Bosnians have died over the past 2 years. We must do more to stop the killing.

Passage of the McCloskey amendment will keep the pressure on the Serbs to end their

campaign of aggression. The United States must make it unmistakably clear that we expect the Serbs to agree to a fair peace settlement.

I urge the House to adopt the McCloskey amendment.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. All time has expired.

The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. MCCLOSKEY].

The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 244, noes 178, not voting 17, as follows:

[Roll No. 222]

AYES—244

Abercrombie	Frost	McCandless
Ackerman	Galleghy	McCloskey
Allard	Gallo	McCurdy
Andrews (NJ)	Gekas	McDermott
Baker (LA)	Geren	McHale
Ballenger	Gilchrest	McHugh
Barcia	Gillmor	McInnis
Barrett (NE)	Gilman	McKeon
Bartlett	Gingrich	McMillan
Barton	Glickman	McNulty
Becerra	Goodlatte	Meehan
Beilenson	Goss	Menendez
Bereuter	Grams	Meyers
Berman	Greenwood	Mfume
Bilbray	Gunderson	Mica
Billey	Gutierrez	Miller (FL)
Blute	Hall (OH)	Mink
Boehlert	Hansen	Molinari
Boehner	Hastings	Mollohan
Bonilla	Hayes	Moorhead
Bonior	Hobson	Moran
Boucher	Hoekstra	Myers
Brown (OH)	Hoke	Nadler
Bryant	Holden	Neal (MA)
Bunning	Horn	Neal (NC)
Burton	Hoyer	Obey
Byrne	Hunter	Olver
Callahan	Hutchinson	Ortiz
Calvert	Hyde	Owens
Camp	Inhofe	Oxley
Cardin	Istook	Tackard
Carr	Johnson, E. B.	Pallone
Castle	Kaptur	Parker
Clayton	Kasich	Pastor
Clyburn	Kennelly	Paxon
Coble	Kim	Payne (NJ)
Coleman	King	Peterson (MN)
Collins (GA)	Kingston	Pickoff
Coppersmith	Klein	Pickle
Costello	Klink	Pombo
Cox	Klug	Porter
Coyne	Kolbe	Price (NC)
Crapo	Kyl	Pryce (OH)
Danner	LaFalce	Quillen
de la Garza	Lambert	Quinn
de Lugo (VI)	Lancaster	Rahall
DeLauro	Lantos	Ramstad
Diaz-Balart	Laughlin	Ravenel
Dickey	Lazio	Regula
Dingell	Leach	Ridge
Dooley	Levin	Roberts
Doelittle	Levy	Rogers
Dorman	Lewis (CA)	Rohrabacher
Droter	Lewis (FL)	Romero-Barcelo
Dunn	Lewis (GA)	(PR)
Engel	Lewis (KY)	Ros-Lehtinen
English	Linder	Rush
Everett	Lipinski	Santorum
Ewing	Livingston	Sawyer
Fawell	Long	Saxton
Fazio	Lowey	Schaefer
Fields (LA)	Lucas	Schiff
Fingerhut	Machtley	Schumaker
Fish	Maloney	Sensenbrenner
Ford (MI)	Manton	Serrano
Ford (TN)	Margolies-	Sharp
Frank (MA)	Mezvinsky	Shaw
Franks (CT)	Markey	Shays
Franks (NJ)	Martinez	

Skeen	Talent	Walker
Slattery	Tanner	Walsh
Slaughter	Taylor (NC)	Waters
Smith (NJ)	Tejeda	Weldon
Smith (TX)	Thomas (CA)	Wheat
Snowe	Thomas (WY)	Wilson
Solomon	Thompson	Wolf
Spratt	Thurman	Wynn
Stearns	Torrice	Yates
Stenholm	Trafficant	Young (AK)
Stump	Upton	Young (FL)
Sweet	Vento	Zeliff
Swift	Volkmer	Zimmer

NOES—178

Andrews (ME)	Furse	Nussle
Andrews (TX)	Gedden	Oberstar
Applegate	Gephardt	Orton
Archer	Gibbons	Payne (VA)
Armey	Gonzalez	Pelosi
Bacchus (FL)	Goodling	Penny
Bachus (AL)	Gordon	Peterson (FL)
Baesler	Green	Petri
Baker (CA)	Hall (TX)	Pomeroy
Barca	Hamburg	Poshard
Barrett (WI)	Hamilton	Rangel
Bateman	Hancock	Reed
Bentley	Harman	Reynolds
Bevill	Hastert	Richardson
Bilirakis	Hefley	Roemer
Bishop	Hefner	Rose
Blackwell	Herger	Rostenkowski
Borski	Hilliard	Roth
Brewster	Hinches	Roukema
Brooks	Hoagland	Rowland
Browder	Hochbrueckner	Royal-Allard
Brown (CA)	Houghton	Sabo
Brown (FL)	Hughes	Sanders
Buyer	Hutto	Sangmeister
Canady	Inglis	Sarpanis
Cantwell	Inslee	Schroeder
Chapman	Jacobs	Scott
Clay	Johnson (CT)	Shepherd
Clement	Johnson (GA)	Shuster
Clinger	Johnson (SD)	Siskiy
Collins (IL)	Johnson, Sam	Skaggs
Combest	Johnston	Skelton
Condit	Kanjorski	Smith (IA)
Conyers	Kennedy	Smith (MI)
Cooper	Kildee	Smith (OR)
Cramer	Kleczka	Spence
Crane	Knollenberg	Stark
Cunningham	Kreidler	Stokes
Darden	LaRocco	Strickland
Deal	Lehman	Studds
DeFazio	Lightfoot	Stupak
DeLay	Lloyd	Synar
Dellums	Mann	Taylor (MS)
Derrick	Manzullo	Thornton
Deutsch	Matsui	Torkildsen
Dicks	Mazoli	Torres
Dixon	McCollum	Underwood (GU)
Duncan	McCreery	Unsoeld
Durbin	McDade	Valentine
Edwards (CA)	McKinney	Velazquez
Edwards (TX)	Meek	Visclosky
Ehlers	Michel	Vucanovich
Emerson	Miller (CA)	Watt
Eshoo	Mineta	Waxman
Evans	Minge	Williams
Farr	Moakley	Wise
Fields (TX)	Montgomery	Woolsey
Filner	Murphy	Wysden
Flake	Murtha	
Fowler	Norton (DC)	

NOT VOTING—17

Barlow	Huffington	Sundquist
Collins (MI)	Jefferson	Tauzin
Faleomavaega (AS)	Kopetski	Towns
Foglietta	Morella	Tucker
Grandy	Portman	Washington
	Royce	Whitten

□ 1307

The Clerk announced the following pair:

On this vote:

Miss Collins of Michigan for, with Mr. Tucker against.

Messrs. PENNY, BILIRAKIS, GENE GREEN of Texas, HANCOCK, and DUNCAN changed their vote from "aye" to "no."



Mr. BUNNING, Mrs. CLAYTON, and Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi changed their vote from "no" to "aye."

So the amendment was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

## PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Chairman, I was unavoidably detained on the Senate side. Therefore, I missed rollcall No. 222. Had I been here, I would have voted "yes."

## PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. PORTMAN. Mr. Chairman, I missed today's vote on the McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment. Had I been in attendance, I would have voted "aye."

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 printed in part 3 of House Report 103-520.

## AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. HAMILTON

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. HAMILTON: Page 308, after line 24, add the following:

## TITLE XII—PEACE IN BOSNIA

## SEC. 1201. PURPOSE OF UNITED STATES EFFORTS.

The focus of United States bilateral and multilateral economic, political, military, and diplomatic efforts should be to move all parties toward a negotiated peaceful settlement of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina that provides for a viable Bosnian state.

## SEC. 1202. MEASURES TO ENHANCE THE DEFENSE OF BOSNIA.

(a) RENEWED AND ADDITIONAL UNITED NATIONS AND ALLIED ACTIONS.—The President, working with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations Security Council and pursuant to the Security Council's authority to adopt measures for the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security, should take such steps as are necessary to enhance the ability of the people of Bosnia to contribute effectively to their defense, including by—

(1) continued collective enforcement actions carried out in connection with NATO; and

(2) securing additional authorization to enhance Bosnian self-defense, which may include suspension of, or a limited exception to, the international arms embargo with respect to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

(b) CONSULTATIONS.—After consulting with permanent members of the United Nations Security Council on the status of current NATO and United Nations efforts to achieve the purposes described in section 1201 and further measures that might be taken to achieve these purposes, the President should:

(1) advise the Congress on the measures taken by the United Nations Security Council to maintain international peace and security within the meaning of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter with respect to Bosnia-Herzegovina; and

(2) consult with the Congress on the further actions that would be useful to address the serious situation prevailing in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the order of Tuesday, May 24, 1994, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr.

HAMILTON] will be recognized for 30 minutes, and a Member opposed will be recognized for 30 minutes.

The gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE] is opposed to the amendment, and will be recognized for 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON].

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, the House has just adopted the McCloskey amendment, which lifts the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. The question now rises on the Hamilton amendment.

Mr. Chairman, let us be very clear with respect to the procedure here. We are operating under the king of the hill procedure. If my amendment is adopted, it, of course, prevails. If it is defeated, then we go back to the McCloskey amendment.

Madam Chairman, I say to my colleagues who voted for the McCloskey amendment, and who favor lifting the embargo, that my amendment provides a better way to do it. We can accomplish the goal without the negative impacts of the McCloskey amendment.

Mr. Chairman, if we are serious about helping the Bosnian cause, if we are serious about lifting the arms embargo and helping the Bosnian Moslems defend themselves, we should do it multilaterally in the context of the United Nations, and with, not against, our NATO allies.

My amendment leaves open the option, Madam Chairman, of lifting the arms embargo, but it also recognizes the critical need to work multilaterally with our allies and with the Russians in order to achieve a negotiated settlement to the conflict.

My amendment is very clear that the focus of U.S. policy should be to move the parties toward a negotiated settlement, and not toward war. The approach that I propose in this amendment I think has several advantages over the McCloskey amendment.

First of all, the Hamilton amendment helps the peace process, it does not torpedo it, since all of the major parties to the peace process would have to approve lifting the arms embargo.

We have heard again and again from the President and from all of his top advisers and all of our people who have been involved in the negotiations that lifting this embargo unilaterally will undercut, will destroy the peace process at the very point when this peace process is making progress. Admittedly, it is fragile, but progress is being made.

The Hamilton amendment will assure that humanitarian aid goes forward. We have had a lot of problems in Bosnia, and humanitarian aid has not always flowed smoothly, but the fact of the matter is that two out of three Bosnians today depend on that humanitarian aid.

Mr. Chairman unilaterally lifting the embargo means that the French and the British and probably the Canadians will pull their troops out. The humani-

tarian effort will come to an end. We will have to take responsibility for it. The advantage of my amendment is that it ensures that humanitarian aid continues.

If the United States unilaterally lifts the embargo, as we voted a moment ago, the UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia will surely collapse. The Hamilton amendment builds on the work that has been done with our allies in NATO, and it has been a tough, tortuous path, I have to acknowledge that, but it builds on the relationship we have created with Russia, moving toward a peace settlement.

Unilaterally lifting that embargo will damage our relations with key allies a crucial time. The advantage of my amendment is that we continue to work with our allies.

Does anybody believe that we are going to solve the problem in Bosnia unilaterally? Does anybody believe that we are going to solve the problem in Bosnia today without our European allies? Does anybody believe we can solve the problems in Bosnia today without the help of the Russians who are so close to the Serbs? I think not.

Madam Chairman, the Hamilton amendment will also have the advantage of ensuring that all current U.N. sanctions will remain in effect. If we go back to the McCloskey amendment, all of those sanctions against Libya, against Iraq, the sanctions against Haiti, the sanctions now in place against Serbia, the sanctions that may become in place in North Korea will be jeopardized.

My amendment will protect all current U.N. sanctions, and the sanctions I have recited, I think all in this room would agree are very much in the American national interest.

□ 1310

The Hamilton amendment will assure that we do not suddenly and without careful debate involve the United States in a massive new foreign aid program. The McCloskey amendment provides for an open-ended, very large military program of foreign assistance. My amendment does not have that. Their amendment is a down payment on a new military aid program which our Department of Defense says would go to at least \$3 billion and would require 1,400 to 1,500 to 2,500 American personnel in Bosnia. If we vote for the Hamilton amendment, we are voting for the best opportunity to end this war that we have had for 3 years. I know it is delicate, I know it is fragile, but we have the best chance to stop the killing.

My friends on the other side of this question like to take the moral high ground, and I have not the slightest doubt that they are acting from the very best of motivations. But I am unwilling to concede the moral high ground to them. We are trying to stop the killing. That is what we are trying to do. Surely that is moral, is it not? All people say that if we lift this em-



bargo, we are going to intensify the war, and by intensifying the war, that is another way of saying we are going to be killing a lot more people. I do not concede the moral high ground. This peace process is moving forward. Agreement has just been reached on a month-long cease-fire. We hope it will lead to a more durable cease-fire. We all know that we are at a very critical point.

The choice we have before us, then, remains very stark. Allowing the McCloskey amendment to stand is going to be a signal from this Congress that we want the war to go forward. Adopting the Hamilton amendment will say that we want a negotiated peace.

I urge my colleagues with one of the most important foreign policy votes of this session surely, I urge my colleagues to take a very careful look at this, look at the impact the McCloskey amendment would have on the American national interest and vote, of course, according to their best judgment, and I hope that judgment will be a ringing "aye" on the Hamilton amendment.

Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE].

(Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HYDE. Madam Chairman, I just fail to see what is moral about disarming one side in a combat. I have trouble rationalizing that.

Madam Chairman, in our time we have seen the phrase "ethnic cleansing" enter the vocabulary of hate—a description even Hitler would have been proud of. Serbians have used rape on a massive scale as a cruel instrument of terror. In the surrounded enclave of Gorazde, the civilian population was subjected to relentless shelling by Serbian artillery which targeted the municipal hospital and the headquarters of humanitarian relief organizations, killing scores of innocent people.

Bosnia's map is a constantly shifting mosaic of desperate enclaves—a landlocked archipelago that is home to the most beleaguered of humanity. Heavily armed Serb invaders continue to slaughter defenseless men, women, and children, without the slightest hesitation or remorse. It is a one-sided war that grinds on unmercifully.

President Clinton argues that the United States cannot lift the embargo unilaterally, but must bow to the will of the U.N. Security Council, which remains immovable. Where is U.S. leadership? We are in a time of endless palaver, paralysis, indecision, and no follow-through.

The President and his Secretary of State have repeatedly stated that they favor lifting the arms embargo on bleeding and shell-shocked Bosnia. However, both cite U.N. Security Council

resolutions as immovable obstacles to that end. I believe this is a fundamental misreading of the situation. In July 1991, our Government launched a policy of preventing the transfer of all weapons and related equipment to Yugoslavia. In January 1992, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 727 applying the embargo to any successor States emerging from Yugoslavia. While these actions were designed to still the conflict, they instead denied arms to Bosnian Moslems facing already heavily armed Serbian—and later Croatian—aggressors. The ensuing slaughter goes on, unabated.

It seems, under this administration, we are losing—or have already lost—the capability and the inclination to form our own U.S. foreign policy, and instead have become an element—a mere element—of U.N. policy.

This subservience was made shockingly clear when 15 Americans died from friendly fire over Iraq this April and the Vice President offered his condolences to "the families of those who died in the service of the United Nations."

The United Nations indeed. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter acknowledges every country's inherent right of self-defense. To deny Bosnia that right is immoral and a failure of leadership on our part. If defending yourself is only just, we are now obstructing justice by keeping in place this immoral embargo.

We cannot call ourselves the leader of the free world with a straight face any more.

We see unspeakable inhumanity and we are reduced to shrugging our shoulders, frowning our brows, and folding our arms. This embargo must be lifted. We cannot let timid and paralyzed nations and self-important U.N. bureaucrats prevent us from doing what we know is both right, and in our own self-interest.

Lifting the embargo will also reduce the likelihood that American military personnel will be called upon to risk their lives in Bosnia. Let Bosnians defend Bosnia rather than putting our military forces into the fray under the control of incompetent U.N. bureaucrats, as this administration seems eager to do.

The Hamilton amendment is entitled "Peace in Bosnia." It states that the purpose of all United States efforts in Bosnia should be to support a "negotiated peaceful settlement of the conflict." But, the only peace it offers is the peace of the graveyard. It provides not one incentive to the Serbs to negotiate seriously a just settlement of the conflict. Instead, it calls for more of the same: consultations with the U.N. Security Council and, oh yes, negotiations. It tacitly endorses the Clinton administration's strategy to pressure the Bosnian Government to accept the dismemberment of its country. Peace at any price is more than the Bosnian Government is willing to accept, and we ought to reject it too.

The Hamilton amendment is not a ringing endorsement of freedom and the right of self-defense—it is an invitation to high tea at the United Nations. Let us send our regrets. Support McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer and reject Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Madam Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. JOHNSTON], the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa.

Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida. Madam Chairman, I appear here in somewhat of an ambivalent position because I feel the embargo should be lifted but I do not think it should be lifted unilaterally, and I have expressed my opinions in the past to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCloskey], and my frustration of what is going on in this country.

The Europeans told us 3 years ago that Yugoslavia was a European matter and that we should stay out of it. Then, when I went to the NATO conference 1½ years ago, they said, "Why aren't you invading?" We cannot do this unless we are willing to assume the sole responsibility for the events in Bosnia, the United States. We cannot do this unless we are willing to abandon our European allies that are there.

How can the President appear before the French Parliament and say, "Please keep your forces there," and then the next day for us to unilaterally pull out from the embargo and go in there and jeopardize all these people's lives? We cannot do this unless we are willing to threaten the viability of international sanctions, as the chairman said, on Haiti, on Iraq, and in 2 weeks probably the President will go to the United Nations and say we should have an international embargo on North Korea, and they turn around and say, how can we unilaterally pull out of the sanctions on this country of Bosnia?

□ 1320

You cannot do this unless you are willing to unilaterally remove yourself from leadership that brought us the gulf war victory. Unless we are willing to risk all of these things, we must act in a multilateral basis. We must support the Hamilton amendment.

The United States is legally bound, now, listen to this, by the United Nations Charter, article 25, approved by international treaty and approved by the U.S. Senate, to support and enforce U.N. Security Council resolutions. Are we ready to abandon the foundation for all multilateral sanctions? Are we ready to abandon multilateral leadership and be the sole policeman of the world?

These are the things that are at stake.

I am frustrated, as I said earlier. But I think that this is a serious mistake legally and in the international community to unilaterally pull out of this. We must support the Hamilton amendment.



Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN].

(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GILMAN. Madam Chairman, the House has just taken a courageous step. We have voted to do something about the aggression and genocide in Bosnia by unilaterally ending the arms embargo of that country.

Now the House is being invited by Mr. HAMILTON essentially to reverse itself.

The Hamilton amendment is instant oatmeal. Members now are being asked to take back the vote they have just cast and vote against ending the embargo, by voting for another amendment that pretends to do something about the arms embargo but which in fact is designed to keep the embargo in place.

Under the king-of-the-hill procedure contained in the rule, a vote for the Hamilton substitute is a vote to supersede the just-passed McCloskey-Gilman amendment. Unlike the McCloskey-Gilman amendment, which ends the arms embargo once and for all, the Hamilton substitute says only that the President should talk to the United Nations about ending the embargo.

I submit, the President has been doing just that for over a year and with nothing to show for it.

Let there be no mistake about this: the Hamilton substitute keeps the arms embargo in place.

If the House votes to approve the Hamilton amendment after having just passed the McCloskey-Gilman amendment, the House will have made a colossal flip-flop.

The American people are watching. The victims of aggression and genocide in Bosnia are waiting. Let us not flip-flop. I urge my colleagues to stand by their prior vote and vote down the Hamilton substitute.

Mr. HAMILTON. Madam Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. TAYLOR].

Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Madam Chairman, I hope that the Members with the many pursuits and the many requests on their time are taking the time to listen to this debate. Because I think it is one that has extremely far-reaching consequences.

I have never been to Yugoslavia, nor have I been Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But as a member of the Committee on Armed Services, I have had the opportunity to hear a former commander of U.N. troops in Yugoslavia and to visit personally with a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of our Nation.

A little over a year ago, a General MacKenzie, a Canadian in charge of NATO forces in Yugoslavia, came before the Committee on Armed Services and summed up his remarks by saying, "Ladies and gentlemen, you have three serial killers. One has killed 15, one has killed 10, and one has killed 5, and I do

not buy the argument that we need to rush in and save the one who has killed 5." That is a quote from General MacKenzie before the Committee on Armed Services.

Later that year, based on those disturbing words, I cornered the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, when this same Congress a year and a half ago was considering military intervention in Yugoslavia. I said, "General Powell, should we get involved militarily in the former Yugoslavia?" Being the good general that he is, he dodged the question. So I repeated the question, because again, it is not his job to make foreign policy. After four attempts, Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, "No. We should not get involved in the former Yugoslavia."

Ladies and gentlemen, Colin Powell may well be the standard-bearer for the minority party in 2 years for President. He was a great Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He did a wonderful job.

He went on to say that there are 10 years' worth of weapons in the former Yugoslavia that are there right now with the embargo. There are plenty of weapons in the former Yugoslavia.

Giving weapons to one side, taking sides as the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services has pointed out, putting American lives at risk is not going to help.

Let me go one step further and say that I have heard a rumor on the House floor today that some people are supporting lifting the ban because they want to embarrass the administration. Let me, as the Democrat who has the worst voting record with this administration, say something, that I hope anyone who votes for this lifting of the ban in order to embarrass the administration, if one American life is lost, has the courage to go see the family of that service person who comes home in a body bag and say, "I am sorry you lost your child, but I wanted to embarrass our President." That is no way to run our country. And those fine young men and women who serve our country right now who practice airdrops in the dark, who spend months at sea in submarines, they deserve better than that.

Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. KING].

Mr. KING. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Madam Chairman, Members of this House, I rise in strong opposition to the Hamilton amendment.

For the past 3 years Serbia has carried out brutal, naked aggression and genocide against the people of Bosnia, and tragically the West has done nothing.

Indeed, if we look at it, it is almost a tragic replay of the 1930's when Hitler was taking the Rhineland, Austria, Sudetenland, finally Czechoslovakia, and in each instance, the world leaders, specifically Neville Chamberlain, would say, "This is the last act of ag-

gression. And besides, if we took any action, it would upset the peace process." The same argument is being made today.

The fact is the peace process has not worked. The fact is that the innocent people of Bosnia are being decimated and destroyed by the Serbian war machine. We are doing nothing. Unfortunately, both the previous administration and this administration are sending out terribly mixed signals. On one day we will bomb, light bombing of Serbian installations. The next day the President says we are not taking sides.

We should take sides, because this is a clear moral issue. If the United States is to stand for anything in the post-cold-war era, it should stand for standing up and resisting aggression.

This amendment is titled "Peace in Bosnia." It reminds me of the Roman historian Tacitus who said, "They gave us a desert and called it peace." The Serbs are giving us a desert of war in Bosnia, and we are calling it peace.

It is time to stand up for our principles. It is time for the United States to show leadership. It is time to send a message to the world we will no longer allow aggression to go unchecked.

The only action the West has taken is to deny weapons to those who are under attack themselves. How can this ever be justified morally? No wonder the leaders in Korea do not take us seriously when they see what a mixed message we are sending.

I would just ask all of my colleagues who voted for the McCloskey amendment to vote "no" on the Hamilton amendment. If you do not, you will be sending the same mixed and confusing signal that this administration has been sending day after day.

Madam Chairman, I ask my colleagues to vote "no."

Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida. Madam Chairman, on behalf of the committee chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Indiana [Mr. ROEMER].

(Mr. ROEMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROEMER. Madam Chairman, I rise in support of the Hamilton amendment for three reasons.

But I also have a great deal of respect for the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. MCCLOSKEY], who has been so knowledgeable and has so much passion on this issue and has visited the country so many times.

I support the resolution offered by the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] for three reasons. First of all, Madam Chairman, we have been celebrating for the past 2 weeks Normandy and D-day, and we have read and we have heard about Juno and Sword beaches, of Utah and Omaha.

□ 1330

That was leadership, ladies and gentlemen, United States leadership with our allies, the Canadians and the British. That was the consummate defini-



tion of leadership; not doing it alone, but leading others, compelling others to be involved in the liberation of a continent.

So I think when we talk about leadership, we do not just talk about unilateral leadership, we talk about multilateral leadership and alliances and convincing others on the merits to get involved.

Second, timing: We have a historic agreement between the warring parties. Will it hold? There are no assurances that it will hold, we are not certain that it is going to hold, but if we are as cynical, as skeptical about the Middle East or South Africa, then we would not have seen some of the miracle that has occurred, especially in South Africa, if we had been so skeptical about what might happen in that country.

Third, I think when we have heard from so many on the Republican side about micromanagement, about telling the President he must do A, B, C, especially under President Bush, I think it is only fair to apply the same standard here and not tie President Clinton's hands in this manner.

Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. MCCURDY].

(Mr. MCCURDY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MCCURDY. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Madam Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Hamilton amendment.

For 3 years we have pretended that the war in Bosnia is a civil war, rather than a war of Serb aggression.

For 3 years we have pretended that negotiations would bring an end to that aggression.

For 3 years we have somehow persuaded ourselves that we should deny arms to the Bosnian Government even as its people were systematically massacred and driven from their land.

It is time to end the charade that is our Bosnia policy.

For me, the issue we face today is a simple one. The embargo is wrong. It was wrong when it entered into force. It is wrong today.

As long as we continue to abide by this embargo, we insult the principle that is the very cradle of our Nation: The principle that, if it so decides, a people has the right to declare independence and build for itself a new future, a sovereign future, a future on its own terms and according to its own values.

Our forefathers invoked this principle over 200 years ago to justify the independence of the young United States.

The brave Bosnian people are desperately attempting to invoke that same principle today.

And the question for us is simple: Will we stand for them, or against them?

Our history, our values, our consciences allow only one answer. Vote against the Hamilton amendment.

Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida. Madam Chairman, I yield 3½ minutes to the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS].

Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Madam Chairman, I would like to engage the Chair in a colloquy.

I am concerned that the language of section 1202 of the gentleman's amendment might imply a war powers authorization to the President for the use of United States military force in Bosnia. I would like for the gentleman to clarify that issue.

Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida. Madam Chairman, will the distinguished gentleman yield?

Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I thank the distinguished chairman for his inquiry.

It is not my intention in offering the amendment to imply any war power authorization for United States military force to act in Bosnia. This subsection of the amendment would only have the Congress advise the President that he should continue to work with the United Nations and with NATO on collective measures to achieve our policy goals on Bosnia.

Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the gentleman for that clarification.

Madam Chairman, with that clarification, I would like to make a few points. First, as I understand the Hamilton amendment, it calls upon the President to work multilaterally to find a peacefully negotiated solution. I read this amendment, as provided in section 1, that the clear policy of the U.S. Government is to seek a peaceful negotiated settlement. This is why I can support the amendment, especially in light of the colloquy I have just had with my distinguished colleague.

In the current environment, where a cease-fire negotiation has progressed to achieve a 1-month cease-fire with the possibility of even a further extension of cease-fire, this would reiterate our commitment to seeking such solutions which are the only effective way, as I perceive it, to halt the bloodshed and to end the conflict.

It takes steps in a multilateral concept that would meet our overall current policy and national security commitments. It preserves flexibility during a period of negotiation, it protects recent goals, and finally it requires congressional consultation in this matter.

In the closing remarks, I would like to divert from just a specific consideration of the Hamilton amendment and say to all of my colleagues here that you delude yourselves when you believe that there is some midcourse that does not require a major commitment. If you want to end the killing and the

dying, then whether I agree or not, at least I can respect the intellectual integrity of the position that says, "We want to go into Bosnia to wage war." That is a legitimate position. I oppose it. I believe that we ought to aggressively go in and try to help wage peace, to bring them to the negotiating table.

But, Madam Chair, you delude yourself when you believe that there is some way that you can, on a neutral basis, with clean hands, back into this situation. We should not be foolish or naive in that respect. Lifting the embargo is a commitment, but at least you ought to try to do it with your eyes open. But this midground that says we are neither fish nor fowl is bizarre in the extreme.

If you want to go in and end the killing by more killing and war, that is one thing. That is one thing. If you want to end the killing peacefully, as this gentleman chooses to do, then you take that course. But this midrange, this sort of a political stance that says, "I don't have any stains on my hands, that I can sort of neutrally walk through this and say that I am saving lives," does not make sense. At the end of the day, going down this road is a road to war.

What the Hamilton amendment is attempting to do is to put at a minimum tying the international community's hands and say that it is the policy of this Nation to try to find a peaceful negotiated settlement. We are the last peg standing in the post-cold-war world. Our responsibility ought to be to achieve peace, not encourage war.

Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. MORAN].

Mr. MORAN. I thank the distinguished gentleman.

I would say to my respected colleague, the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, that he deludes himself if he thinks that this Nation can maintain a pacifist stance in light of the unlawful aggression that we see in Bosnia. You delude yourself if you think that we can avoid having to take a position between right and wrong, having to stand up against—when we know that something is right, we have to stand up for our principle even if it involves risk.

Mr. DELLUMS. Madam Chairman, as a matter of personal privilege, would the gentleman yield? The gentleman invoked this gentleman's name.

Will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. MORAN. I did not invoke the gentleman's name, but I have some things to say, and I do not want to—I did listen for 15 minutes to the chairman.

Mr. DELLUMS. This gentleman did not personalize the debate, either.

Mr. MORAN. Well, go ahead, Mr. Chairman, I will ask for more time.

Mr. DELLUMS. That is all right.

I yield back to the gentleman. I am simply saying let us fight on the merits, not personal issues.



Mr. MORAN. The chairman is quite correct, and I accept his remarks.

Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. MORAN. But I will say to my colleagues that there will be a time throughout our history when we have to stand up and make a decision between what is right and wrong and when we have to take some risk.

□ 1340

Assuming a position of neutrality at a time of moral crisis is not a virtue, and we should be ashamed if we do not have the wherewithal and the will to stand up and take a position. Bosnia is fighting to maintain a multiethnic democracy. Two years ago, almost 25 months ago, Admiral Border recommended, when Dubrovnik was being shelled, that we sink the two war ships because this was pure unlawful aggression, and it would continue unless we take a stance, and the previous administration chose not to, and this is where we are today.

Madam Chairman, if we continue to avoid conflict, avoid risk, avoid making a decision between right and wrong, we will be in worse shape 2 years from now. Madam Chairman, the people listening to this should understand that Bosnia, while we have no immediate strategic interest, no particular economic interest, we have a principled interest.

I ask my colleagues, "Do you know what the Prime Minister of Bosnia is? Muslim, as is the majority of the country. But the representative of the Presidency is Serbian, the Speaker of the Parliament is Croatian, and the Bosnian Ambassador to the United States is Jewish." This is a multiethnic democracy trying to survive. They are besieged by unlawful aggression.

The concept of a greater Serbia; we know it is wrong. We have to stand up for principle. Defeat the Hamilton amendment.

Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. ROHRBACHER].

Mr. ROHRBACHER. Madam Chairman, this body just voted to lift the embargo. This vote would undermine that moral stand. It is time to lift the immoral embargo that has led to the bloodshed and genocide of Croats and Bosnian Moslems.

Whose idea was this embargo in the first place? Does anyone really remember that? I remember whose idea it was. It was the Serbians' idea in the first place. We accepted an idea that was proposed by the Government of Yugoslavia when it was dominated by the Serbians, and now that they got their embargo, once they had it, once we put their idea into place, the tanks begin to roll, and the artillery begin to fire. The aggressor, by this embargo, was left with a total advantage in artillery and tanks.

That advantage is what caused this situation to degenerate into genocide

and to degenerate into the worst blood-letting and killing of noncombatants that we have seen in decades. Madam Chairman, it time to lift the immoral embargo. It is time for the United States to provide some leadership.

They say that we will be doing this alone. Well, no, we will not be alone. We will be on the side of women and children and not combatants who now cannot defend themselves because we have put the victim and the aggressor in the same category. That is immoral. It is an immoral embargo; it is time to lift the immoral embargo.

Madam Chairman, the United States has always stood, always stood, for principle. When we stand for this wishy-washy type of situation which we cannot take interest in, we are afraid to get involved, we will be dragged into this because what will happen is situations like this will be permitted to go from a situation of crisis into a catastrophe because innocent people are not permitted to have the weapons to defend themselves. If innocent people cannot defend themselves, eventually American troops will be dragged in.

Madam Chairman, we should lift the immoral embargo and permit the victims to defend themselves. This is the American way.

Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. HOUGHTON], a former member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

(Mr. HOUGHTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOUGHTON. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida [Mr. JOHNSTON] for yielding this time to me.

Madam Chairman, I hate to go against my leader over here, the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN], but I am afraid I am going to have to, and also the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON] who, I am sure, will be very unhappy with what I am about to say, but I agree with the Hamilton amendment. I think it hits the issue headon and it does not put us all out there by ourselves. That is very, very important.

There is a tremendous amount of frustration here. As my colleagues know, we see the killing going on, we want to lift the embargo, we do not want to sit on the sidelines, obviously we want to exert some leadership. But despite this frustration, Madam Chairman, we have got to recognize that an awful lot of people would like to throw this thing right in our lap and say, "Go to it, U.S.A. You can handle it." And then where are we?

Our first responsibility is to ourselves, and we realize we cannot do anything we want, although we may want it internally. I say to my colleagues, "Once you decide to work with the allies, you have got to work with the allies because, if you don't, then when you need them, where are they?"

So now the two sides have agreed. They are going to sit down tomorrow, and U.N. mediators are going to be able to try to work out a long-term peace.

Now one can say, "Well, we have had other agreements, and they have collapsed." Why? Because there have been no provisions for enforcement, but what is the alternative? Do we go it alone? Do we want to be out there by ourselves? Do we forget the embargo? Do we split the allies? Do we widen the conflict?

Sadly, despite our strength and our basic feeling, a sort of Kennedy-esque strength, wherever there is a right, we are going to correct that wrong.

I say to my colleagues, "Please let's be part of the world. Our heart says, 'Let's vote down the Hamilton amendment.' Our head says, 'Yes, support it,' and I will go with my head."

Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York [Ms. MOLINARI].

Ms. MOLINARI. Madam Chairman, there has been some concern that, if the United States acts to unilaterally end the arms embargo, then other nations will lift sanctions against other countries such as Haiti, Iraq, Libya. We will not enforce sanctions against North Korea. Let us think about this for a minute.

Haiti, Iran, Libya, Iraq, North Korea. Bosnia? What did Bosnia do to get sanctioned along with the rest of those criminal governments? My colleagues, they sought democracy, they sought freedom from communism, hardly a justifiable comparison of nations in our American response.

"Bosnia, trust the United Nations," says the Hamilton amendment this time. "Forget the violated no fly zone; Bosnia, forget the violated ceasefires; Bosnia, forget the bombardment of the safe areas, forget the over 40 broken United Nations resolutions. This time trust the United Nations to defend you as you seek democracy." The Hamilton amendment would encourage us all to trust those same U.N. decisionmakers who over 15 months ago promised a war crimes tribunal and to date has not appointed a prosecutor or investigated one case of criminality, not one.

I plead with my colleagues and say, "If you are sickened by seeing footage of 6-year-old children being slaughtered as they sleep, or 72-year-old women who are victims of rapes, and if you do not want to send American troops into Bosnia to end these atrocities, and you can no longer trust the United Nations to do the right thing, there is only one thing left. End the arms embargo. It is time for America to summon the courage to act, even, by God, if no one else in this world will."

Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. WOLF].

(Mr. WOLF asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)



[Mr. WOLF addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

Mr. PETERSON of Florida. Madam Chairman, I yield 3½ minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. OBERSTAR], a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for the time.

Madam Chairman, I have studied and followed events in the former Yugoslavia and since the breakup probably all my life. I was raised Slovenian of an immigrant family in northern Minnesota. I know some of the language. I know a lot of the people and the peoples that live in the land of the South Slavs.

There are bitter rivalries, ancient hatreds, a divisiveness built on a religious diversity, diversity in the way they write their language, diversity in the way they speak the language of the South Slavs, complexities of geography, and a history of suffering.

We use the word, "decimate," with somewhat reckless abandon, but in World War II the peoples of Yugoslavia were decimated. One million, seven hundred thousand of a population of 17 million died, most at the hands of the Germans but a very large number at the hands of internal war and conflict. What is going on today is an extension of conflicts that arose during World War II and that go back deep into ancient history.

Our role has been kind of a stop-and-start role. We have not managed the policy of post-Tito Yugoslavia and the South Slav peoples very well. One thing we did that was effective was to commit to air strikes. I was an early advocate of taking that action. This was not done when it should have been done back in the Bush administration, and it was not done when it should have been done in this administration, but when it was done, it was effective.

This embargo and the conflict over Bosnia were centered around the reality that in Tito's Yugoslavia was the arms production center of Yugoslavia and the Serbs wanted to get hold of the arms production area, and the reason the conflict has continued as long as it has is that the Bosnians learned how and knew how to make arms and are still doing it, and they have persisted.

If we lift the embargo, more arms will pour into the Serbs, but the real question is, where do the arms come from for the Bosnians, from Iraq, from outside sources, or from the United States? The whole burden then devolves upon the United States. We become the one that broke the embargo, and then it is our problem to resolve it.

Are we prepared to send in ground forces? Not this body. I do not see the spine, I do not see the steel rod in the back here to send in ground forces. I do not see much of a steel rod or backbone in this body to send in air strikes either.

So we must decide today whether we must keep the embargo in place and

avoid sending troops in and keep America's commitment to other countries to act multilaterally rather than unilaterally.

Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK].

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Madam Chairman, first, I think this body is out to vote against the Hamilton amendment because it would be very inconsistent with the vote we just cast for the McCloskey amendment, and we just ought as a matter of institutional policy to try to keep to an absolute minimum the number of times we really look silly. I know sometimes it is unavoidable, but I do not see why we would want to venture into it voluntarily, and there is simply no rational way to be for both positions.

Second, I think the best way to get peace is in fact to offer the Bosnians a chance to buy arms. You do not break up a fight by grabbing one guy's arms. In fact, what we are trying to do here is bring peace.

As long as there is an imbalance, the Serbs are more likely to persevere, and there is the argument that says, "No, if you're for peace, you should never send one side arms." But let us think of a situation in which there is one side which we believe to be morally correct in a fight, one side which we think is threatened with aggression and where we decide that the best way to bring a secure peace is to sell arms. I am talking about Israel. The two models seems to be very similar. With regard to the Middle East, most of us believe that making American arms and other arms available to Israel has in fact meant less likelihood of war because potential aggressions were deterred by that armament.

The Serbs have shown a healthy respect for arms on the other side. Despite what the Pentagon predicted, air strikes have been a deterrent to the Serbs. So will sending in weapons. The question is not whether there will be negotiations. Ultimately there will be. The question is, from what relative positions of strength will the two sides negotiate?

The arms embargo gives the Serbs an unearned advantage. Lifting the arms embargo makes it much more likely first, that there will be negotiations right away, and second, that they will eventuate fairly.

Madam Chairman, I believe that lifting a one-sided embargo—and this is a one-sided embargo because it affects only one side—lifting that is the best way to bring about peace.

Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. HORN].

(Mr. HORN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HORN. Madam Chairman, I have great respect for the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, but I ask my colleagues to vote against his amendment.

During this morning's briefing on Bosnia, I listened with close attention to the words of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the acting Secretary of State. I must confess that I had a definite feeling throughout that hour-long session. That feeling is one that many in the British Parliament must have felt when Prime Minister Chamberlain came back from meeting with Herr Hitler at Munich. It was a feeling of disgust.

I want the Members to know that this is a bipartisan feeling of disgust, because I felt the same way during the Bush administration when that President—just as the current President—failed to take the initiative when we could have nipped a lot of this problem in the bud.

Those who argue for multilateral removal of the arms embargo are telling us it will never be removed. It should be obvious to all that the Security Council of the United Nations will never remove that embargo. It is not going to be removed. If we pass the Hamilton amendment, we are signing the death warrant for Bosnia. So much for multilateralism.

We have heard a lot about peace in Bosnia and how near it is. But what kind of peace is it? Is it the peace of the dead and the conquered.

In terms of military from this country having to go to Bosnia, no one is talking about that. The Bosnians are not talking about that. What they are saying is, "We would like some arms so we can defend our men, women, and children," and they deserve those arms.

□ 1400

This problem should have been handled by our intelligence community the way we handled the Afghanistan problem when Afghanistan was occupied by the Soviet Union. We armed those freedom fighters. They drove the world's second superpower out of Afghanistan.

Madam Chairman, we should not continue to think disgusting things about the policy of this country, regardless of who occupies the administration. What we should do is vote against the Hamilton amendment and sustain the McCloskey-Gilman amendment.

Mr. HAMILTON. Madam Chairman, I yield myself 2½ minutes.

Madam Chairman, I yield myself these 2½ minutes for making a comment. The statement has been often made on the floor today that the Bosnian-Moslems are defenseless. I think it is probably accurate to say that at one time they were defenseless. But may I also suggest that that statement now is very, very much out of date.

They received nearly \$2 billion in arms last year. Prior to the recent agreement that was signed between the Moslems and the Croats in March, the very well-armed Bosnian forces had the Croats on the run. And the military



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situation today in Bosnia, for anybody that is following it closely, knows that it has been static for months. There have been small gains and small losses by both sides. But what very clearly it is not, it is not a situation today where the Bosnian-Moslems are at a huge disadvantage and are defenseless.

Now, second, we have had the statement made very frequently here that lifting the embargo will level the playing field in Bosnia. A lot of judgments can be made about that, but let us be clear about where our U.S. military is. Their judgment is categorical. The judgment is that unilateral lifting of the embargo will not level the playing field. And, most assuredly, \$200 million additional foreign aid assistance from the United States to the Bosnian-Moslems will not be sufficient. It should also be made clear that our military people believe that if you have that program, one of the options would involve 1,500 to 2,400 American military personnel on the ground, and they would have to be, of course, protected, which means additional troops.

One other point has been made, and I want to be as candid about this as I can. The statement has been made that it is not possible to lift the embargo multilaterally. I think that is an accurate statement as of today. The Security Council, however, imposed the embargo, and the Security Council can lift the embargo.

Only when the peace efforts have been exhausted can we win the necessary international support to lift the embargo. So long as those peace efforts are going forward, I think it is correct to say that it cannot be lifted multilaterally. If the peace negotiations fail, then I think the multilateral lifting of the embargo would be achieved.

Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. SCHUMER].

(Mr. SCHUMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SCHUMER. Madam Chairman, I think that this is one of the most difficult proposals that we will have to vote on, and I have been thinking a great deal about it. I would say in terms of the practical arguments, does this help the Bosnians or not, we can hear both sides on that. But ultimately you have to listen to the Bosnians themselves. They believe it will.

So we can rationalize and debate, but the people who are asking for our help and who have been slaughtered say that it will help them. Who are we to judge that it will not?

The real argument that throws me back a little by the supporters of this resolution is the one made with eloquence by the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, and that is, shall we break our international agreements? How will this affect not Bosnia, but future agreements, where others want to

break them and we say "Don't." And they will say, "But you did it here."

That is a very difficult argument to overcome. But I think we are thrown back to thinking about the Nuremberg laws, and to thinking about when is it a citizen's responsibility, whether we be citizens in this chamber or citizens on the streets and somewhere in the world community, about when it is proper and appropriate to say that world law has allowed such horror and such havoc to occur, allowed it to occur, but that we must not stick with it? And that in each legislator's case in terms of this resolution and the treaties that it involves, must be to say to himself or herself that every so often, very rarely, not lightly, heavily, in fact, we must sometimes say that those international agreements and treaties have allowed such misery and such destitution to occur, that we must ignore them, even knowing the consequences that will occur down the road.

My colleagues, this is such a case. I urge defeat of the Hamilton amendment so the McCloskey amendment can stand.

Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCLOSKEY].

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Madam Chairman, I appreciate the time.

Madam Chairman, obviously it is with a sincere sense of qualms that I am ever at odds with my distinguished chairman, Mr. HAMILTON, on an issue of significant importance such as this.

But I would just to some degree echo other speakers and say for once in our lives, please, let us not try to have it both ways. We really cannot be both for the McCloskey amendment and the Hamilton amendment. The McCloskey-Gilman amendment tells the President, as far as our participation, the arms embargo should be lifted as to Bosnia.

Regardless of what has been said in previous debates, it commits no troops, no equipment. It is all at the discretion of the President. It is not an open-ended commitment, as the chairman said in his earlier remarks.

I would note also that it was interesting to hear from the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. OBERSTAR] with his Slovenian antecedents, and see Mr. OBERSTAR oppose this resolution to in essence lift the arms embargo because we all know, when the Serbs went into Slovenia, they left in 9 days, and there are no Slovenians being tortured, raped, or otherwise being oppressed by Serbs, because they were run out by an armed citizenry.

Also it really beggars the imagination to compare besieged Bosnia, as the great gentlewoman from New York, [Ms. MOLINARI] referred to along the lines of Iraq and Korea and what not.

What sins have the Bosnians committed? All they ask for is the right to defend themselves. They are not really asking for the United States to be the Lone Ranger and come to their rescue.

We should assert more leadership. Yes, there should be air strikes.

But one thing we should not be doing, Mr. President, is to participate, as was reported today, in a real politic to break up Bosnia, a state which we say is sovereign, which the United Nations says is sovereign, and say yes, Serbia, you can add this to a greater Serbia.

Please vote no on the Hamilton amendment. Let us have a clear voice for once.

Mr. HAMILTON. Madam Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the distinguished majority leader, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. GEPHARDT].

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mrs. KENNELLY). The gentleman from Missouri is recognized for 4 minutes.

(Mr. GEPHARDT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GEPHARDT. Madam Chairman, I rise to favor the amendment by the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON], and I rise with a great respect for the Members who have supported the McCloskey amendment and the Members who want us to defeat this amendment. All of them who have spoken, and not spoken, like all of us, want the violence to end. They want children to be saved. They want the genocide to end. And that is the issue. The issue is not what we are trying to do; the issue is how to get there. And I argue that if we continue what we have been trying to do, we have the best chance to achieve peace.

□ 1410

That is what we have been doing: Peace, the end of war, the end of violence. It has not been an easy path. The sides are unequal, the desire for violence is great, the hatreds and feelings are age-old and historic. It is not so easy to do this, but with ups and downs, we have been lurching forward to greater peace. By lifting the embargo unilaterally, I argue we will have an increase in violence necessarily, and we will have the end of the efforts at peace.

I talked to Mr. Hunter, who is the Ambassador to NATO, today, and he said there is no doubt in his mind that if the embargo is unilaterally lifted by the United States, that the European countries will pull out in a moment, as quickly as they can, the entire peace-keeping apparatus which is on the ground today.

Some will argue that if we can even the sides and get military equipment in on the side of the Moslems, that will bring about a greater move towards peace, that that will end the war. I do not believe that. I believe it will increase the war making, and then we will be asking the question on this floor, should we send in more, should we become more involved, should we be using more air power, and even should we be introducing troops on the ground to be in the war itself, trying to bring it to an end.



I do not think there is anyone in our country who is prepared to answer those questions in the positive. So with the greatest respect for the people here today who are advocating the lifting of this embargo, I urge Members to vote for this resolution.

As we look at this, let us remember that we have accomplished a lot here. This awful war has not expanded to Macedonia, to Kosovo, to other places in the region. It has been contained, to the extent it has been contained. We have made progress to bringing about peace.

We are in a new world, and we truly do not know how to do this yet. I think we must continue what we have started. We must continue to stand for peace. We must continue to stand with the people who are trying to bring about a negotiated settlement, which is beginning to go forward as we speak in this Chamber today.

Madam Chairman, I urge Members to vote for this amendment. Stay the course and let us bring about peace and not war.

Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield my remaining time to the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER].

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER] is recognized for 2½ minutes.

Mr. HOYER. Madam Chairman, this has been a serious and important debate, as my friend, the gentleman from the Committee on Armed Services, says so often. It is a debate about the new world order, as the majority leader has just said. It is a debate about what that new world order is.

However, I suggest that there is an old, old historical lesson, and that is the lesson that tyrants never respond to weakness. Tyrants throughout history have responded to dissembling and conflicting messages by further aggression, further genocide, further killing, further breaking of international law.

Madam Chairman, my friend, the majority leader, who has no closer ally on this floor than I, as I would suggest, nor does the President, who is my friend and who I respect, but on this issue we disagree. The majority leader raises the question how to get there. Yes, he focuses on the essence of the issue that confronts us, how to get there.

For 2 years now, perhaps 3, we have looked the aggressor in the eye and said, "If you go a step further, we will take definitive action." They took two steps and we backed up three. It is inevitable in that scenario that the aggressor will continue, because he does not see the consequences of his action.

Haris Silajdzic, the Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina, says:

We are under assault. You must not give us help in the sense of sending people, but do not continue to prevent us from defending ourselves.

We are now ready to vote. Let us not, my friends in this House, once again say to the aggressor, to the individual branded by our Government, by our

State Department, as a war criminal, let us not say to him, "This day, once again, we backed down." Let us not say, "We were pretending when we voted for McCloskey."

Let us continue to stand for principle. Let us continue to stand for strength. Let us continue to stand for the principles in almost every international document which say that we will confront aggression and genocide where we find it. Vote "no" on Hamilton.

Mr. DELLUMS. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Madam Chairman, we have come to the end of a very significant and very important debate. This gentleman walked into these Chambers nearly 24 years ago, against the backdrop of the Vietnam war. I was elected to come here to raise my voice in the name of peace, not an easy thing to do in 1971, when the overwhelming majority of my colleagues were supporting the prosecution of the war in Vietnam.

I say that as a prelude to making these comments. My colleague who just preceded me in the well pointed out the need for strength. With that I do not disagree. What I would argue, as vociferously and as eloquently as I can, is that peace is also strength.

The fallacy is that some way our strength only lies in our capacity to kill and to maim, that in some way strength is in tanks and armaments and bombs and missiles. There is strength and power in the willingness to negotiate, in the ability to come together around the negotiating table to find a political solution to a problem.

Too often in these Chambers peace has been a weak idea. Too often war and killing has been seen as a strengthening idea. However, I would assert in the first few moments of my discussion that peace is also a strong idea, and one should not have to back away from the desire to attempt to wage peace in a situation where people are dying.

My second point, it is very clear that all of us in these Chambers, from left, right, and center, both sides of the aisle, want to stop the killing and the maiming. The point of it is, How do we do it?

I said earlier to the point of redundancy, if there are Members here who say, "We want to commit American troops to wage war in Bosnia," that is a position; or those of us who say, "We want to attempt to aggressively try to wage peace to end it," that is also a legitimate position.

However, Madam Chairman, to assume that the only position left for a great Nation like the United States is to say, "Lift the embargo and let them engage in self defense," I would submit that that in and of itself is an impotent act, because it says that we have no capacity on the international stage, in the world community, to bring our significant power and moral persuasion and political persuasion and economic

capability to a situation to try to end the killing and the dying short of war.

My colleagues are misguided who believe that the only thing we can do is slide backwards into war. That is what lifting this embargo is all about. If you are going to confront it, confront it cleanly, confront it up front, confront it head on; but to assume that the only thing you can say is "Well, here are some weapons, you go kill yourselves further, you go die further," that is not the only posture we can take. We can aggressively attempt to mobilize the world community, to try to bring the world together in the context of Bosnia to try to solve the problems finally.

□ 1420

Madam Chairman, I hope to leave these Chambers some day with my integrity as a peace advocate intact, but it is not easy when people are dying to be a peace advocate. It is not easy to do it when people are not dying. It takes some heart, it takes some courage, it takes some dignity, it takes some integrity to stand up and say peace, nonviolence, negotiation, peaceful settlement, bringing people to the table is a way to end the killing. It is bizarre in the extreme to think that we can end killing by aggressively pursuing more killing. This is not an incentive for peace, this is not an incentive for negotiation. For those who think unilateral lifting of the arms embargo is anything other than an effort at war and an effort at intervention, they are deluding themselves.

Mr. Chairman, at a bare minimum, the Hamilton amendment needs to be accepted because it respects multinationalism in a world that is becoming increasingly multinational, but finally it embraces the notion that America's goal in that region of the world is to find a peaceful way to solve that problem.

Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Madam Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR].

Mr. BONIOR. Madam Chairman, I thank my friend, the gentleman from South Carolina, for yielding.

I thank my colleagues on both sides of the aisle. The people of America should know that this has not been a partisan debate. Far from it. People from both sides of the aisle share common views on this issue.

I would say to my friend, the gentleman from California who has spoken with great eloquence and a differing point of view from my own, that he has been and still is one of the great champions of peace in this institution. Nobody can deny that. Nobody can take that away from him. I am proud that I have stood with him for the 18 years that I have served in this institution on virtually every one of his efforts. But there comes a time, as my other friend who just talked has mentioned,



that peace at any price is not acceptable. It is not acceptable.

Madam Chairman, I wish the approach embodied in this amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana would work.

I wish it would end the killing and stop the war.

But I think most of us know deep down in our heart that it won't.

And we know that for one reason: because it has not worked for the past 2 years.

The approach embodied in this amendment, not the amendment itself but the same approach, peace at any price, has led to 200,000 dead, 16,000 kids being slaughtered and 2 million homeless the past 2 years.

If you think the people of Bosnia should continue to go unarmed and outgunned, vote for this amendment.

This amendment is nothing more than an endorsement of the status quo.

But if you believe the United States has to show strong leadership in times of great moral crisis, and it is a time of great moral crisis:

If you believe the Bosnians have a right to defend themselves;

If you really believe the arms embargo must be lifted, then vote against this amendment, because the McCloskey amendment we already passed is the only measure that will truly help the people of Bosnia defend themselves.

Madam Chairman, we began this debate thinking and mentioning many of us on the floor this afternoon, about the week past, remembering one of the proudest days in our history.

Schoolchildren all across America learned how 50 years ago, their grandparents saved the world from tyranny and genocide.

But 50 years from now, schoolchildren will study this time. And they will look back and wonder where American leadership was when genocide reared its ugly head again.

They will want to know why we sat back and watched children be slaughtered and families torn apart.

They will want to know why the United States Navy blockaded the shores of Bosnia so arms could not enter and innocent people could not defend themselves.

Madam Chairman, this body took a courageous stand to lift the arms embargo. We must not falter now. We must not send mixed signals. It is time for clear and consistent leadership. I urge my colleagues to vote "no" on the Hamilton amendment.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mrs. KENNELLY). The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON].

The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that the noes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. DELLUMS. Madam Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 181, noes 242, not voting 16, as follows:

[Roll No. 223]

AYES—181

- |              |               |                |
|--------------|---------------|----------------|
| Abercrombie  | Gordon        | Penny          |
| Andrews (ME) | Green         | Peterson (FL)  |
| Andrews (TX) | Hall (TX)     | Petri          |
| Applegate    | Hamburg       | Pomeroy        |
| Armey        | Hamilton      | Poshard        |
| Bacchus (FL) | Hancock       | Rangel         |
| Baessler     | Hastert       | Reed           |
| Baker (CA)   | Hefner        | Reynolds       |
| Barca        | Heger         | Richardson     |
| Barcia       | Hilliard      | Roemer         |
| Barlow       | Hinchee       | Rose           |
| Barrett (WI) | Hoagland      | Rostenkowski   |
| Bateman      | Hochbrueckner | Roth           |
| Bentley      | Houghton      | Roukema        |
| Bevill       | Hughes        | Rowland        |
| Bihakis      | Hutto         | Roybal-Allard  |
| Blackwell    | Inglis        | Sabo           |
| Borski       | Insee         | Sanders        |
| Brewster     | Jacobs        | Sankmeister    |
| Brooks       | Johnson (CT)  | Sarpalius      |
| Browder      | Johnson (GA)  | Sawyer         |
| Brown (CA)   | Johnson (SD)  | Schroeder      |
| Brown (FL)   | Johnson, Sam  | Scott          |
| Buyer        | Johnston      | Shepherd       |
| Canady       | Kanjorski     | Shuster        |
| Canwell      | Kapture       | Sisisky        |
| Chapman      | Kennedy       | Skaffs         |
| Clay         | Kildee        | Skelton        |
| Clement      | Kleczka       | Smith (IA)     |
| Clinger      | Kreidler      | Smith (MI)     |
| Collins (IL) | LaFalce       | Smith (OR)     |
| Combest      | Lambert       | Spratt         |
| Conyers      | LaRocco       | Stark          |
| Cooper       | Leach         | Stokes         |
| Cramer       | Lehman        | Strickland     |
| Cunningham   | Lewis (FL)    | Studds         |
| Darden       | Lightfoot     | Stupak         |
| Deal         | Lloyd         | Synar          |
| DeFazio      | Long          | Tanner         |
| Dellums      | Mann          | Taylor (MS)    |
| Derrick      | Manzullo      | Thornton       |
| Deutsch      | Matsui        | Torkildsen     |
| Dicks        | Mazzoli       | Torres         |
| Dixon        | McCollum      | Underwood (GU) |
| Durbin       | McCrery       | Unsoeld        |
| Edwards (CA) | McDade        | Valentine      |
| Edwards (TX) | McKinney      | Velazquez      |
| Ehlers       | Miller (CA)   | Vento          |
| Emerson      | Mineta        | Visclosky      |
| Evans        | Minke         | Vucanovich     |
| Farr         | Mink          | Waters         |
| Fields (LA)  | Moakley       | Watt           |
| Filner       | Montgomery    | Waxman         |
| Ford (MI)    | Murphy        | Whitten        |
| Fowler       | Murtha        | Williams       |
| Furse        | Norton (DC)   | Wise           |
| Gederson     | Nussle        | Woolsey        |
| Gephardt     | Oberstar      | Wyden          |
| Gibbons      | Orton         | Yates          |
| Gonzalez     | Payne (NJ)    |                |
| Goodling     | Payne (VA)    |                |

NOES—242

- |              |              |             |
|--------------|--------------|-------------|
| Ackerman     | Camp         | Engel       |
| Allard       | Cardin       | English     |
| Andrews (NJ) | Carr         | Eshoo       |
| Archer       | Castle       | Everett     |
| Bacchus (AL) | Clayton      | Ewing       |
| Baker (LA)   | Clyburn      | Fawell      |
| Ballenger    | Coble        | Fazio       |
| Barrett (NE) | Coleman      | Fields (TX) |
| Bartlett     | Collins (GA) | Fingerhut   |
| Barton       | Coppersmith  | Fish        |
| Becerra      | Costello     | Flake       |
| Benenson     | Cox          | Ford (TN)   |
| Bereuter     | Coyne        | Frank (MA)  |
| Berman       | Crane        | Franks (CT) |
| Bibb         | Crapo        | Franks (ND) |
| Bibby        | Danner       | Frost       |
| Blute        | de la Garza  | Galleghy    |
| Boehner      | de Lugo (VI) | Gallo       |
| Bonilla      | DeLauro      | Cekas       |
| Bonior       | DeLay        | Geren       |
| Brown (OH)   | Diaz-Balart  | Gilchrist   |
| Bryant       | Dickey       | Gillmor     |
| Bunning      | Dingell      | Gilman      |
| Burton       | Dooley       | Gladrich    |
| Byrne        | Doornick     | Graham      |
| Callahan     | Dorman       | Goodlatte   |
| Calvert      | Dreier       | Goss        |
|              | Duncan       | Gurns       |
|              | Dunn         | Greenwood   |

- |                 |               |                |
|-----------------|---------------|----------------|
| Gunderson       | McCurdy       | Rohrabacher    |
| Gutierrez       | McDermott     | Romero-Barcelo |
| Hall (OH)       | McHale        | (PR)           |
| Hansen          | McHugh        | Ros-Lehtinen   |
| Harman          | McInnis       | Rush           |
| Hastings        | McKeon        | Santorum       |
| Hayes           | McMillan      | Saxton         |
| Hobson          | McNulty       | Schaefer       |
| Hockstra        | Meehan        | Echenk         |
| Hoke            | Meek          | Schiff         |
| Holden          | Menendez      | Schumer        |
| Horn            | Meyers        | Sensenbrenner  |
| Reyer           | Mfume         | Serrano        |
| Hunter          | Mica          | Sharp          |
| Hutchinson      | Michel        | Shaw           |
| Hyde            | Miller (FL)   | Shays          |
| Inhofe          | Molinari      | Skeek          |
| Istook          | Mollohan      | Slaughter      |
| Johanson, E. B. | Mocchhead     | Smith (NJ)     |
| Kasich          | Moran         | Smith (TX)     |
| Kennelly        | Morella       | Snowe          |
| Kim             | Myers         | Solomon        |
| King            | Nadler        | Spence         |
| Kingston        | Neal (MA)     | Stearns        |
| Klein           | Neal (NC)     | Stenholm       |
| Klink           | Obey          | Stump          |
| Klug            | Olver         | Swift          |
| Knollenberg     | Ortiz         | Swift          |
| Kolbe           | Owens         | Talent         |
| Kyl             | Oxley         | Tauzin         |
| Lanaster        | Packard       | Taylor (NC)    |
| Lantos          | Pallone       | Tejeda         |
| Laughlin        | Parker        | Thomas (CA)    |
| Lazio           | Pastor        | Thomas (WY)    |
| Levin           | Paxon         | Thompson       |
| Levy            | Peipert       | Thurman        |
| Lewis (CA)      | Peterson (MN) | Torricelli     |
| Lewis (GA)      | Pickett       | Traficant      |
| Lewis (KY)      | Pickie        | Upton          |
| Linder          | Pombo         | Volkmer        |
| Lipinski        | Porter        | Walker         |
| Livingston      | Portman       | Walsh          |
| Lowey           | Price (NC)    | Weldon         |
| Lucas           | Pryce (OH)    | Wheat          |
| Mahtley         | Quillen       | Wiener         |
| Maloney         | Quinn         | Wolf           |
| Manton          | Rahall        | Wynn           |
| Margolies-      | Ramstad       | Young (AK)     |
| Mezvinsky       | Ravenel       | Young (FL)     |
| Markey          | Rogula        | Zeliff         |
| Martinez        | Ridge         | Zimmer         |
| McCandless      | Roberts       |                |
| McCloskey       | Rogers        |                |

NOT VOTING—16

- |              |            |            |
|--------------|------------|------------|
| Boucher      | Grandy     | Slattery   |
| Collins (MI) | Hefley     | Sundquist  |
| Fondit       | Huffington | Towns      |
| Faleomavaega | Jefferson  | Tucker     |
| (AS)         | Kopetski   | Washington |
| Foglietta    | Royce      |            |

□ 1447

The Clerk announced the following pair:

On this vote:

Mr. Tucker for, with Mr. Towns against.

Mr. RIDGE and Ms. ESHOO changed their vote from "aye" to "no."

Mr. LEACH changed his vote from "no" to "aye."

So the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Madam Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. GOSS].

(Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GOSS. Madam Chairman, I would ask why are we having another vote on Haiti today? There has been no change in the Goss amendment which passed this House on May 24. Is it because the vote is too close, as some have implied on the other side of the aisle? I say to that, "Nonsense." The Goss amendment passed 223 to 201, a 22-vote mar-



LEE H. HAMILTON, INDIANA  
CHAIRMAN

SAM GEJDENSON, CONNECTICUT  
TOM LANTOS, CALIFORNIA  
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, NEW JERSEY  
HOWARD L. BERMAN, CALIFORNIA  
GARY L. ACKERMAN, NEW YORK  
HARRY JOHNSTON, FLORIDA  
ELIOT L. ENGEL, NEW YORK  
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, AMERICAN SAMOA  
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, MINNESOTA  
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, NEW YORK  
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, CALIFORNIA  
ROBERT A. BORSKI, PENNSYLVANIA  
DONALD M. PAYNE, NEW JERSEY  
ROBERT E. ANDREWS, NEW JERSEY  
ROBERT MENENDEZ, NEW JERSEY  
SHERROD BROWN, OHIO  
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REPUBLICAN CHIEF OF STAFF

One Hundred Third Congress  
Congress of the United States  
Committee on Foreign Affairs  
House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

JUN 15 1994

June 13, 1994

Honorable Helen Delich Bentley  
1610 Longworth House Office Building  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Helen:


Thank you for your support on the Bosnia amendments to the DOD Authorization Bill which the House debated on June 9th.

This was not an easy issue for any of us, and I regret that we were not able to carry the day. I was pleased, however, that the margin of defeat was smaller than it might have been.

Thanks for your help in achieving that result, I am very grateful.

With best regards,

Sincerely,



Lee H. Hamilton  
Chairman

LHH:RB:ds





AUG

## Embargo the Aggressors, Not the Victims

By Albert Wohlstetter

*Lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia—applying it instead to the well-armed Serbian aggressors—would be among the most constructive moves the Clinton administration could make toward ending the Balkan War.*

The standard lame excuses for continuing an embargo against the Bosnian victims of Slobodan Milosevic's genocide have been met head on by an increasing number of leaders of prior U.S. and European governments and many experts on international law, on strategy, and on Balkan and Ottoman history.

But it is not enough to resist forcefully all the bad arguments for continuing an embargo in United Nations Resolution 713 that never validly applied to Bosnia. Better to enforce the *valid* U.N. demands to stop the flood of arms, ammunition, and soldiers sent by Serbia, the genocide's source, to its proxies in Bosnia and Croatia. That flood, financed by drug deals, smuggling, and a network of pickpockets roaming Europe, flagrantly violates, among others, U.N. Resolutions 752, 757, 819, 820, and 838. The world's democracies and the U.N.'s bureaucrats turn a blind eye to these valid U.N. demands.

Yielding to these U.N. demands would follow the principles of jujitsu, the Japanese system of wrestling in which leverage is applied in such a way so that the opponent's strength is used against him. That is only sensible, given the stubborn way present European and American leaders, deploring ethnic cleansing, stamp their feet and lean

all their weight on the same thin excuses for the inexcusable embargo against the victims of ethnic cleansing.

### Not Just Ancient Hatreds

President Clinton has scolded Congress for imposing "simplistic bumper-sticker solutions on conflicts like Bosnia." Such conflicts, he said, resulted when the Cold War's end "lifted the lid from a cauldron of long-simmering hatreds" that now bloody "the entire global terrain."

Describing Bosnia as simply the spontaneous boiling over of ancient hatreds, however, uses the standard, misleading bumper sticker. It hides a plainly authoritative but less "simple" truth: In ex-Yugoslavia, hatred simmered overwhelmingly on the side of the paranoid nationalists who enabled Milosevic to seize control of Serbia in the 1980s. "Cleansing" of non-Serbs began in Kosova and Vojvodina as part of his program to connect in a "Greater Serbia" every patch of ex-Yugoslavia with a significant number of Serbs.

In Bosnia, Orthodox Christian Serbs, Roman Catholic Croats, and Muslim Slavs, as well as Jews driven from Spain by the Inquisition, have lived side by side for centuries. The Bosnians have been fighting for



more than two years to defend their right to continue to live together.

Their right to receive arms for their self-defense has been supported by 109 members of the U.N. General Assembly; no country was willing to vote against it. It also has been supported by 90 out of 100 U.S. senators; by almost as many Democrats as Republicans in the House; and not least by the Clinton administration, which recently helped broker a new federation of Croats and Bosnians for their common defense against Milosevic—the most constructive American move so far in the Balkan war. For Mr. Clinton to say that lifting the embargo to let the Bosnians or the new federation get arms for their common defense would be “unilateral” is simply a whopper.

His administration, reversing itself once more, has recently joined a “contact group” led by François Mitterrand, John Major, and whoever is in charge in Russia. (Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev increasingly represents those Russians who see Yugoslavia as a model for using Russian minorities in the former Soviet republics to reassert Moscow’s domination.) The contact group is for keeping the Bosnians from getting arms and for compelling them to accept an ethnic partition, even though U.N. and European Union mediators have admitted that any ethnic partition would quickly break down as Serb-held Bosnia became part of armed Serbia.

The West is ignoring, among other U.N. actions, that:

- U.N. 752 “demands” that interference by units of the “Yugoslav” (that is, Serbian) army, brought in from outside Bosnia, cease immediately and that all irregular forces in Bosnia be disbanded and disarmed. And that Bosnia’s and Serbia’s neighbors (Croatia is a neighbor) take swift action to do this.

- U.N. 757 “decides” that “all States shall prevent” any activities promoting the export or transshipment of any commodities or products originating in Serbia and Montenegro after May 30, 1992. What is more, 757, unlike the arms embargo against Bosnia, is valid. But the U.N. has never even tried to enforce it.

- a Jan. 8, 1993 U.N. statement refers to “flagrant” violations of U.N. 724 by Serbian vessels carrying oil to Serbia from Ukraine by way

of the Danube, and to Serbian threats to detain Romanian vessels if Romania doesn’t allow more such violations.

- U.N. 819 reacted to the continued deliberate attacks on innocent civilians in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica by Serb military units surrounding it. It said that the Serbian evacuation of civilians from there was “part of its overall abhorrent campaign of ‘ethnic cleansing.’” It demands that Serbia stop supplying arms for this campaign and that the attacks stop.

- U.N. 820 “decides that each state neighboring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall prevent the passage of all freight vehicles and rolling stock into or out of...Serbia and Montenegro.”

Some of these resolutions address demands directly to Serbia’s neighbors. Bosnia and Croatia can implement some of these directly, for example, by disbanding and disarming Serbian irregulars and disguised members of the Serbian army. And while they cannot directly stop Russian and Ukrainian violations along the Danube, or Greek violations through Bulgaria and Macedonia, they can drastically lessen their effect.

They can do this by retaking Brcko, the bottleneck in the narrow Posavina Corridor that connects Serbia to its proxies in the Krajina region of Croatia and to its proxy stronghold in central Bosnia. If the contact group were now to demand that Bosnian and Croatian forces pull back from Brcko or be bombed by NATO, it is the contact group and NATO that would be violating the valid demands in U.N. 820, among others.

NATO patrols in the Adriatic, under the U.N. secretary-general’s control, enforce the invalid U.N. 713 arms embargo against Bosnia and Croatia. By limiting arms to the new federation, NATO prevents Bosnia and Croatia from fulfilling the demand of the valid embargo in U.N. 757—that all nations prevent the transshipment of arms from Serbia to preserve its illegally seized territories in Bosnia and Croatia.

Bosnia has one rifle for every three soldiers and few of the infantry weapons needed to stop the tanks and heavy artillery of the much smaller, poorly motivated, and undisciplined Serbian invaders. Armed with modest complements to, and increased numbers of, the anti-tank and

anti-artillery weapons that Bosnians and Croat soldiers are already trained to use, the new federation could easily cut the transshipment of arms from Serbia through the narrow bottleneck at Brcko. In support, a U.S.-led coalition could help enforce the U.N. 757 embargo against Serbia by precise air interdiction of transport to and within Bosnia, and by discriminate attacks on concentrations of forces in Serbia.

### **Ethnic Division Won't Work**

In July, the contact group announced G7 support for trying to coerce one more proposed ethnic division of the indivisibly mixed population of Bosnia. Any such division would fail, as the mediators have admitted, as Serb Bosnia became part of an armed Serbia. To enforce it

would take huge U.S. and other ground forces ("peacekeepers") forever.

It's high time instead to try a little U.N. "jujitsu." Enforce the valid U.N. demands that Serbia withdraw the men, arms, and supplies it keeps sending into Bosnia. The ground forces of the new Bosnian-Croatian federation formed to resist Serbia's proxies greatly outnumber them. The Bosnians and Croatians need mainly arms to defend themselves and a decisive transient strategic use of U.S.-led airpower. End the invalid embargo.

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[from the *Wall Street Journal*, June 28, 1994]

Albert Wohlstetter is University Professor Emeritus, University of Chicago, and an adjunct scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.

1994 - # 31



## DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION

# Conferees Finesse Decisions On Bosnia and Bombers

Artful compromises that deferred final decisions on two contentious issues allowed Senate-House conferees to knit together a \$263.8 billion compromise version of the annual defense authorization bill on Aug. 10.

On the festering question of whether the United States should break the U.N.-sponsored arms embargo against Bosnia, the bill (S 2182) would urge — but not require — the president to seek a U.N. decision to lift the embargo if Serbian forces in Bosnia have not accepted by mid-October an internationally sponsored settlement to the ethnic civil war. (*Bosnia policy*, p. 2362)

On another issue, the measure ordered a high-level Pentagon review of whether the Air Force needs more long-range bombers than projected budgets would allow. It would earmark up to \$125 million to study options for acquiring additional bombers and to keep intact for one year critical parts of the network of companies that build and equip such planes.


Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn, D-Ga., had earmarked \$150 million in the Senate version of the bill expressly to preserve the option of buying more B-2 stealth bombers.

Deferring to the adamant stance of House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ronald V. Dellums, D-Calif., the compromise bill prohibited using any of the \$125 million in bomber industrial base funds for components in anticipation that future budgets would buy additional B-2s, beyond the 20 planes previously approved.

Even so, Nunn insisted that some of the funds could go to B-2 subcontractors, which would make it easier and cheaper to build additional copies.

The Bosnian embargo and B-2 production were among the most contentious issues confronting the defense authorization conferees. On most big-ticket items in the bill, the Senate and House were in substantial agreement.

For instance, both chambers backed President Clinton's request for an aircraft carrier, approving \$2.4 bil-



## BOXSCORE

**Bill:** S 2182 (S Rept 103-282); HR 4301 (H Rept 103-499), Fiscal 1995 defense authorization.

**Latest action:** House-Senate conference agreement on S 2182 reached Aug. 10.

**Next likely action:** Adoption by House and Senate, possibly the week of Aug. 15.

**Reference:** Weekly Report, pp. 1874, 1812, 1725, 1535, 1320.

lion in new budget authority plus \$1.2 billion transferred from the fiscal 1994 budget.

And both authorized a 2.6 percent pay raise for military personnel, instead of the 1.6 percent raise proposed by Clinton.

### Bomber Modernization

Noting that the Pentagon would rely heavily on long-range strategic bombers carrying non-nuclear weapons for rapid intervention in a distant conflict, the House and Senate Armed Services panels both complained that the administration's budget request shortchanged the bomber force.

The so-called "bomber industrial base" fund, which Nunn intended as a foot in the door for additional B-2 production, was the most prominent reflection of that concern. But its effect may be largely symbolic: Additional B-2 production appears to be highly unlikely, unless the administration presses hard for more planes.

Thus far, however, Defense Secretary William J. Perry has vigorously resisted Nunn's effort to resuscitate B-2 production, contending that there is no prospect that future defense budgets will be large enough to pay for more of the big planes.

Nunn concedes the funding problem. But he insists that the Pentagon should give up other air and naval forces if necessary to pay for what he predicts will be a revolutionary increase in combat effectiveness represented by stealthy B-2s carrying super-accurate "smart" bombs.

Aside from the B-2 production base issue, conferees earmarked \$136 million for various other projects to beef up the bomber force. The bill would:

- Block administration plans to save money by temporarily taking some existing bombers out of regular service.
- Accelerate the deployment of the JDAM smart bomb.
- Earmark \$78 million for various "interim" smart bombs that bombers could carry pending JDAM deployment.

The conference also approved \$305 million to wring the bugs out of the TSSAM — a stealthy cruise missile with a range of more than 100 miles intended to be launched from bombers or ships to scatter small warheads over enemy columns. The budget requested \$606 million for TSSAM, including funds to begin production. Subsequently, however, the Pentagon acknowledged that production would be premature and revised the funding plan along lines that were accepted by the conferees.

### Other Provisions

The compromise bill also resolved the disagreements over the following issues:

• **C-17 cargo jet.** Both chambers had approved the request for six planes, but only the Senate had approved a contract modification that was negotiated to settle several legal issues in dispute between the Pentagon and C-17 builder McDonnell Douglas Corp. The conference report approved the contract settlement.

• **Peacekeeping costs.** Following the lead of the House, the conferees rejected Clinton's request that the Pentagon pay \$300 million of the U.S. government's assessment to cover the cost of U.N. peacekeeping operations. In the past, such costs have been funded from the State Department budget.

By Pat Towell



tion bill in its treatment of the Navy's plans for near-term modernization of its carrier-based air squadrons, approving:

- \$876 million to buy 17 additional F/A-18 jets, a reduction of \$58 million and seven planes from the request.

- \$189 million to upgrade existing F-14 jets, a reduction of \$141 million from the request. Like the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Appropriations panel denied the funds that had been earmarked to modify these fighter planes to drop "smart" bombs on ground targets.

The House took the opposite tack, approving the ground-attack modification, but denying funds requested for the more modest upgrade that the Senate bill funded.

The bill also provides \$1.41 billion, as requested by the administration, to continue developing enlarged "E" and "F" models of the F/A-18. And to continue developing the Air Force's F-22 fighter, it appropriates \$2.4 billion — \$61 million less than was requested.

It provides \$241 million, \$40 million more than was requested, for a joint Navy-Air Force program intended to develop prototypes of future combat planes.

The bill appropriates \$229 million — \$61 million less than requested — to buy four Hawkeye radar planes, which are smaller counterparts of the Air Force's AWACS designed to operate from carriers.

Noting that these planes were projected to cost 22 percent more than the Navy paid for Hawkeyes funded in fiscal 1992 (in addition to the cost of inflation) the committee barred the Navy from spending the money unless it certified that the price had been reduced by at least 20 percent.

Like the Senate's version of the companion authorization bill, this measure adds to the budget request \$100 million to put back in service three ultra-high-speed SR-71 photo-reconnaissance planes, which the Air Force retired in 1990 for budgetary reasons.


"The SR-71 could have mapped Iraq in three hours [during the 1991 Persian Gulf War] and provided intelligence that was not available to the United States planners," the committee said.

### Naval Forces

The bill includes \$2.28 billion of the \$2.45 billion requested for an aircraft carrier. The ship's total cost would include an additional \$832 million appropriated in fiscal 1993 and \$1.2 billion appropriated in fiscal 1994.

For three destroyers equipped with the Aegis missile defense system, the bill provides \$2.66 billion — \$37 million less than was requested.

It appropriates the amounts re-



LOCKHEED

Three high-speed, high-altitude SR-71 spy planes, retired in 1990, would be returned to service under the bill.

quested for two types of cruise missiles with which destroyers now can strike distant targets that previously could be attacked only by a carrier's airplanes:

- \$302 million for 217 Tomahawks, with a range of several hundred miles;
- \$69 million for 58 smaller Harpoons.

The bill also provides the amounts requested for shipborne anti-aircraft missiles:

- \$258 million for 202 long-range Standard missiles;
- \$64 million for 240 short-range missiles, intended as a last-ditch defense.

To develop improved anti-missile defenses for amphibious landing transports and other less heavily armed ships, the bill provides \$403 million, a \$29 million increase over the request.

To develop a new nuclear submarine smaller than the *Seawolf*-class ships currently under construction, the bill approves the request for more than \$500 million, which is scattered across several Navy research and development projects.

To maintain the smaller sub force currently planned, no new subs would

need to be purchased for years. But to keep the submarine construction complex intact, the Clinton administration plans to buy one more *Seawolf* in fiscal 1996 and the first of the new, smaller subs in fiscal 1998. Still, the Appropriations panel ordered the Navy to review that plan, contending that it would be cheaper to continue buying additional *Seawolf*-class ships, given the high cost of designing a new ship and building the prototype.

The Senate panel also added to the bill \$146 million to cover unanticipated increases in the cost of ships funded in earlier budgets.

### Air and Sea Transport

As requested, the bill appropriates \$2.47 billion for six additional C-17 long-range cargo jets, plus \$190 million to buy components that would be used in additional planes funded in future budgets. And in its report, Senate Appropriations expressly endorsed a complicated agreement negotiated between the Pentagon and McDonnell Douglas Corp. that is intended to settle many contractual disputes currently besetting the program.

The House approved the purchase of six planes, but withheld endorsement of the proposed settlement. It also sliced \$466 million from the funding request, most of which was earmarked to implement that deal.

On the other hand, the Senate bill includes none of the \$104 million requested — and approved by the House — to test the feasibility of buying existing wide-body jets off the shelf to complement the C-17 force. Senate Appropriations noted that the \$98 million appropriated for this project in fiscal 1994 had not yet been spent.

The Appropriations panel added to the bill \$50 million to buy components for a large helicopter carrier that could carry 2,000 Marines and the aircraft to haul them ashore.

The Navy plans to fund this Mississippi-built ship in the fiscal 2000 budget, but proponents insist that it would cost \$700 million less to buy it now, in sequence to six previously funded sister ships.

As requested, the bill includes \$497 million to continue developing the V-22 Osprey, a hybrid airplane/helicopter intended by the Marine Corps as a troop carrier. ■



# Defense Spending

(HR 4650, as passed by the Senate, in thousands of dollars)

	Fiscal 1994 Appropriation	President's Request	House Bill	Senate Bill
<b>Personnel</b>				
Army	\$ 21,296,177	\$ 20,601,170	\$ 20,737,470	\$ 20,629,770
Navy	18,330,950	17,580,983	17,692,537	17,638,483
Marines	5,772,317	5,778,571	5,816,671	5,806,471
Air Force	15,823,030	17,218,579	17,311,379	17,031,179
National Guard and reserves	9,401,570	9,296,094	9,335,445	9,339,609
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>\$ 70,624,044</b>	<b>\$ 70,475,397</b>	<b>\$ 70,893,502</b>	<b>\$ 70,445,512</b>
<b>Operations and maintenance</b>				
Army	15,802,057	17,766,814	17,836,504	17,475,806
Navy	19,860,309	21,176,570	21,316,555	21,275,770
Marines	1,857,699	1,918,395	2,097,395	1,968,965
Air Force	19,093,805	19,026,623	18,913,050	18,786,243
Defense agencies	9,456,801	10,208,413	8,945,266	9,986,654
National Guard and reserves	8,119,478	8,869,306	8,941,421	8,840,275
Environmental restoration	1,962,300	2,180,200	1,880,200	2,034,075
Humanitarian assistance	48,000	71,900	60,000	71,900
International peacekeeping contribution	—	300,000	—	—
Former Soviet Union threat reduction	400,000	400,000	—	400,000
Other	16,338	8,670	16,570	521,670
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>\$ 76,616,787</b>	<b>\$ 81,926,891</b>	<b>\$ 80,006,961</b>	<b>\$ 81,361,358</b>
<b>Procurement</b>				
Army	6,932,223	6,090,239	6,617,616	6,423,799
Navy <sup>1</sup>	15,957,001	16,223,561	16,026,045	15,661,476
(By transfer)	(761,101)	—	(1,200,000)	(1,200,000)
Marines	364,461	422,178	452,178	403,410
Air Force	18,199,354	18,218,025	16,105,778	17,372,448
National Guard and reserves	1,200,000	—	796,200	952,000
Defense agencies	1,810,039	1,744,916	3,020,616	1,894,916
Defense Production Act	200,000	—	—	—
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>\$ 44,663,078</b>	<b>\$ 42,698,919</b>	<b>\$ 43,018,433</b>	<b>\$ 42,708,049</b>
<b>Research, development and testing</b>				
Army	5,427,546	5,260,082	5,456,498	5,304,329
Navy	8,365,786	8,934,718	8,598,958	8,790,331
Air Force	12,314,362	12,349,362	10,728,533	12,151,011
Other	9,083,797	9,680,851	9,683,951	9,159,503
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>\$ 35,191,491</b>	<b>\$ 36,225,013</b>	<b>\$ 34,467,940</b>	<b>\$ 35,405,174</b>
<b>Intelligence programs</b>				
CIA retirement and disability	182,300	198,000	198,000	198,000
Community Management	151,288	93,084	83,084	105,084
National Security Education Trust Fund	10,000	14,300	—	8,500
Other	60,000	—	—	50,000
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>\$ 403,588</b>	<b>\$ 305,384</b>	<b>\$ 281,084</b>	<b>\$ 361,584</b>
<b>Other programs</b>				
Defense conversion	—	—	1,401,944	—
General provisions	-618,958	-312,031	-17,869	104,992
Revolving and management funds	2,643,095	1,777,638	1,949,038	1,618,000
Chemical agents destruction	389,947	575,349	562,949	590,149
Drug interdiction	868,200	704,200	713,053	700,100
Inspector general	137,601	128,098	142,098	140,872
Defense Health Program	9,626,072	9,922,059	9,895,159	9,808,239
Korean Readiness Account	—	—	250,000	—
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>\$ 240,544,945</b>	<b>\$ 244,711,179</b>	<b>\$ 243,564,292</b>	<b>\$ 243,414,029</b>

<sup>1</sup> Includes Marine as well as Navy ammunition.

SOURCE: Senate Appropriations Committee



reciprocal exchange visits of U.S. officers and their counterparts in the former Soviet states was dropped from this bill, because it had been included in the Senate's version of the foreign operations appropriations bill. (*Foreign operations bill, p. 2369*)

The committee eliminated the \$300 million requested for part of the U.S. assessment to pay the cost of United Nations peacekeeping operations.

### Ground Combat

In one of its most dramatic initiatives, the Senate panel ordered the Army to select a single contractor to manage both of its new combat helicopter programs. One is development of the Comanche armed scout, currently run by a Boeing-Sikorsky consortium; the second is modernization of the larger Apache attack helicopter to carry the Longbow target-finding radar, a McDonnell Douglas project.

The committee contended that the Army's long-range budget plans could not pay for two programs run by competing companies. The funding shortfall would be exacerbated, the panel argued, by the fact that the production lines for the Comanche and the Longbow modification both would have to start up cold, since projected Army budgets will have terminated current production programs.

To bridge that production gap in the case of the Longbow modification, the committee added to the bill \$77.6 million to buy six additional Apaches. That was largely offset by a \$72 million cut in the funds requested for Longbow production. The bill would appropriate \$237 million in development and procurement funds to gear up for Longbow production.

The bill also includes the \$525 million requested to continue Comanche development.

It provides \$99 million of the \$112 million requested to equip with missiles some older scout helicopters that previously had been upgraded with new target-finding electronics. But the Senate eliminated \$225 million that the House added to the bill to upgrade more of the older scout craft.

The bill provides \$230 million to upgrade 58 M-1 tanks to "A2" models with upgraded electronics for night

combat. This is \$108 million (and 24 tanks) more than Clinton requested and the House approved. The Senate bill also adds to the request \$35 million to keep open the Connecticut plant that built the gas turbine engines used in M-1s.

The bill provides \$116 million, as requested, to buy 148 additional ATACMS artillery rockets, designed to strike targets more than 60 miles away. And it appropriates \$119 million, \$10 million more than requested, to con-



Fifty-eight Army M-1 battle tanks are to be upgraded for night combat with \$230 million provided in the legislation.

tinue development of BAT homing warheads — 3-foot-long gliders designed to be scattered over enemy columns by ATACMS and other types of missiles.

To buy two additional JSTARS radar planes — Boeing jetliners equipped to locate ground targets far behind enemy lines — the bill provides \$411 million, \$5 million less than the request. But for components to be used in future JSTARS production, the bill provides \$219 million — a \$100 million increase over the request. The addition is to buy up to a dozen used jetliners for future modification into JSTARS planes.

It also provides \$192 million, as requested, to continue JSTARS development.

The bill makes some additions to the budget — and redirects some of the funds requested — to boost the number of anti-tank missiles that would be purchased, providing:

- \$134 million for nearly 1,300 Hellfires, an increase of \$12 million (465 missiles).

- \$28 million for 1,000 smaller TOWs. The administration requested that amount, but for the purpose of closing

down the TOW production line.

- \$214 million for nearly 900 shoulder-fired Javelins, an increase of \$83 million and nearly 500 missiles.

In addition, the bill more than quadruples funding for small-arms production, adding \$70 million to the Pentagon's budget request. It also added \$10 million to continue production of mortars and \$9.5 million to continue production of 9mm handguns.

However, the Senate bill drops \$285 million the House had added to keep several ammunition production lines humming.

### Air Combat

The Appropriations Committee ordered the Pentagon to contract with an outside think tank to compare the effectiveness of alternative long-range bomber forces in meeting the goal of fighting two major regional wars, nearly simultaneously.

Citing the effectiveness of the F-117 stealth fighter in striking Iraqi targets in 1991, the committee speculated that "a cost-effectiveness analysis of all the alternatives could demonstrate that the overall capability of the stealthy B-2 over-rides its high acquisition costs."

The bill provides the \$793 million requested to continue flight tests of the B-2 bomber and to buy specialized maintenance and training equipment. And it adds \$150 million to preserve the option of buying additional B-2s in future years.

It would appropriate \$356 million to continue developing a stealthy missile, designated TSSAM. A key element in Pentagon plans for blunting large-scale ground attacks against U.S. allies, TSSAM is intended to be launched from several types of bombers and warships, with each missile able to scatter several homing warheads over targets more than 100 miles away.

The administration had requested \$606 million for TSSAM, more than half of which was earmarked to begin production. But the Air Force has reshuffled the program to take account of technical problems. The House denied all TSSAM funds.

The bill mirrors the Senate version of the companion defense authoriza-



### Personnel Issues

The bill would fund a force of nearly 1,526,000 active-duty personnel and more than 979,000 National Guard and reserve members — essentially the number requested by Clinton.

It would add to the request \$465 million to provide a 2.6 percent military pay raise rather than the 1.6 percent hike assumed by the president's budget. The higher raise conforms with current law, under which the annual pay increase would amount to roughly one half of 1 percent less than the rate of inflation.

Complaining that the budget assumed that an excessive number of officers would remain on duty and that the average rank of officers would increase, the Senate Appropriations Committee sliced \$230 million from the personnel funding request. The panel also cut \$223 million from the amount the Air Force requested for incentive programs intended to encourage enlisted personnel to leave the service voluntarily. The committee said the budget underestimated the number of members who would leave the Air Force without any incentives.

Noting that the Pentagon's civilian payroll was shrinking faster than the budget assumed, the panel cut \$521 million from the amount requested for civilian pay. And to encourage that rapid retrenchment, the bill included \$177.5 million more than was requested for "early-out" incentive programs for civilian employees.

As one illustration of the hundreds of small adjustments that appropriators routinely make in the Pentagon's budget request, the committee told the services to stop paying flight pay to generals and to personnel with more than 25 years of service. Arguing that flight pay was intended to give trained air crew members an incentive to stay in the service, the panel said such incentives were superfluous in the case of very senior personnel. The change would save \$500,000.

The panel also added funds to boost Guard and reserve operations in the states of key senators, including:


- \$19 million for two reservist-manned amphibious transport ships to shuttle troops from Pearl Harbor to training grounds on the island of Hawaii in the home state of Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Daniel K. Inouye, D.

- \$21.5 million to beef up National

Guard squadrons of C-130 cargo planes in the home states of Appropriations Committee Chairman Robert C. Byrd, D-W.Va., Majority Whip Wendell H. Ford, D-Ky., and Military Construction Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Jim Sasser, D-Tenn.

### Operations and Maintenance

In keeping with the prevailing emphasis on maintaining the combat-readiness of the force, the bill provides the amounts requested for "operating



The bill adds \$16 million to train more AWACS plane crews. A Pentagon report said some crew members were overworked.

tempo" — routine activities measured in terms of the number of hours per month that pilots fly, the number of days per quarter that ships are under way and the number of miles per year that tanks are driven.

But in fiscal years 1992-94, even though Congress appropriated the training funds the Army budgeted so that tanks could be driven an average of 800 miles per year, the service cut back on tank operations so it could use some of that training money to cover base housekeeping costs, which were deliberately underfunded in the budget request. (*Weekly Report*, p. 336)

In its report, Senate Appropriations ordered the Army to obtain approval from the congressional defense funding committees before it reallocated any funds appropriated for unit training.

The panel also added to the budget request \$92 million to cover potential shortfalls in some of the budget accounts that the services had been beefing up with money transferred out of their training accounts.

It also added \$16 million to fund Defense Secretary William J. Perry's order that the Air Force expand its pool of trained crew members for the AWACS radar plane. A Pentagon investigation cited overworked AWACS crew members as one factor in the accidental destruction by U.S. fighters of two U.S. Army helicopters over Iraq in April.

The bill includes \$236 million more than was requested for overhauls of

ships, planes and tanks. And it added \$86 million to the Air Force's budget request for rebuilding jet engines and other major components.

It also adds \$500 million to the amount requested for maintenance and repair of facilities.

Touting the importance of high morale to combat readiness and the importance of family welfare in keeping up morale, the Appropriations panel added \$142 million for child care and other family support services.

The committee also made several reductions it justified in terms of the ongoing reduction in the size of the active-duty force. For instance, it cut \$25 million from the funding for Army and Air Force training; \$15 million from the budget for war colleges attended by the most promising mid-rank officers of each service; and \$65 million from the amount earmarked for communications networks on bases.

The Appropriations Committee also made several of the meat-ax cuts it routinely imposes to give agencies an incentive to realize operating efficiencies. Among these were reductions of:

- \$85 million from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, the Pentagon's bookkeeping agency.

- \$141 million from the Defense Logistics Agency, which purchases small items and consumables such as fuel for the services.

- \$108 million from the budgets for base operation costs associated with administrative units within the services.

- \$113.5 million from the request for computer services.

- \$49.5 million from the request for travel.

The bill includes \$2.03 billion to clean up toxic and hazardous waste on military bases, \$146 million less than was requested. It provides the entire \$1.78 billion requested to ensure that the services' operations comply with environmental laws.

It includes the \$400 million requested for the so-called Nunn-Lugar program to assist former Soviet republics in dismantling the nuclear and chemical weapons arsenals they inherited. The Appropriations panel also added to the bill \$30 million for NATO initiatives intended to foster working relationships between that alliance and states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

The \$46 million requested for re-



## ... Toward Ending Bosnia Arms Embargo

still enforcing the embargo. But the administration felt compelled to go along because Dole's amendment had been picking up support from senators from both parties.

In May, the Senate had adopted a similar proposal by Dole 50-49. But it muddled that result, much to the administration's relief, with another 50-49 vote on a nonbinding amendment urging Clinton to seek a U.N. resolution lifting the embargo. (*Weekly Report*, p. 1233)

On July 1, the Senate rejected an amendment by Dole to the defense authorization bill that would have mandated U.S. arms shipments to the Muslims. The administration prevailed by a whisker as the Senate defeated that amendment 50-50. (*Weekly Report*, p. 1812)

The House had approved a mandatory lift-the-embargo amendment as part of the defense authorization by 66 votes on June 9. That set the stage for the hard-fought House-Senate conference on the issue.

Lawmakers of both parties have grown increasingly frustrated by the Serbs' defiance. A pair of Democrats who voted with the administration in July — Paul Wellstone, Minn. and Jim Exon, Neb. — signed on as cosponsors of Dole's amendment to the defense appropriations bill.

### Gore at the Ready

The compromise on the defense authorization bill stole some of the drama from the votes on the spending bill. Still, the administration took no chances: Vice President Al Gore was in the chair in case his vote was needed.

It wasn't, as both amendments sailed through

by comfortable margins.

Not surprisingly, the debate mostly covered old ground. Dole charged that Nunn's amendment would do too little to pressure the Serbs. He said that even if Clinton is forced to end U.S. military enforcement of the embargo, the United States could still provide intelligence to NATO personnel monitoring the arms ban.

"Theoretically, if the CIA picks up some intelligence on arms shipments to the Bosnians, it could share it with other NATO allies, such as the British and French, who support the U.N. arms embargo," Dole said.

Nunn echoed the administration's argument that contravening the embargo to arm the Muslims would weaken compliance with U.N. sanctions elsewhere.

By putting teeth in his alternative rather than proposing a mere sense-of-the-Senate amendment, the Armed Services chairman managed to gain support from wavering Democrats and others who have advocated a tough line against the Serbs.

Exon, who serves with Nunn on Armed Services, ended up voting for Nunn's proposal and against the amendment he had cosponsored. Several other members of the committee supported Nunn, as did Wellstone.

After the Senate handily approved Nunn's amendment, the vote on Dole's proposal was largely anticlimactic. There was a widespread sense that, because of anticipated opposition from House conferees on the defense appropriations bill, the provision stood little chance of becoming law.

—Carroll J. Doherty

**"The bottom line is that the Senate is overwhelmingly in favor of lifting the embargo. . . . Most people would prefer to do it multilaterally, but an increasing number are giving up on that route."**



—Sen. Sam Nunn

force stationed in Somalia to provide security for a U.S. diplomatic mission. (*Vote 278*, p. 2378)

The Senate tabled (killed) by a vote of 53-47 an amendment by Jesse Helms, R-N.C., that would have limited military assistance to Colombia until the president certified that the Colombian government was fully cooperating in the war on drugs. (*Vote 275*, p. 2378)

By voice vote, the Senate adopted the following amendments:

- By Hank Brown, R-Colo., ensuring that high-ranking officials of the government of Taiwan can enter the United States for official purposes.

- By Brown, making Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia eligible for certain kinds of allied defense cooperation with NATO.

- By Brown, expressing the sense of

Congress in support of progress toward democracy in Bulgaria.

- By Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., requiring the president to report to Congress on specific political, military and economic standards that countries of Eastern Europe would have to meet to become members of NATO.

### Other Amendments

The Senate also adopted a few dozen other relatively minor amendments, many of which merely earmarked for specific projects some portion of the funds provided by the bill.

It rejected, 21-77, an amendment by John McCain, R-Ariz., that would have required profitable civilian sporting events — such as the Olympic Games — to reimburse the Pentagon for the cost of support services

provided by military units. The bill includes \$10 million for Pentagon support of the 1996 Olympiad in Atlanta. McCain's amendment was vigorously opposed by Georgia Sens. Nunn and Paul Coverdell, R.

It approved by voice votes two amendments relating to an office complex being built for the National Reconnaissance Office in the Virginia suburbs of Washington:

- By David L. Boren, D-Okla., requiring that any intelligence agency construction project slated to cost more than \$300,000 be clearly identified in administration budget requests.

- By Richard H. Bryan, D-Nev., halting work on the National Reconnaissance Office facility pending further congressional review. (*Story*, p. 2369)



## Senate Puts Clinton on Zigzag Course . . .

Congress may not be ready to force President Clinton to end U.S. compliance with the U.N. arms embargo in Bosnia. But it has given Clinton little choice but to move in that direction.

For the second time in three months, the Senate on Aug. 11 cast twin votes advocating seemingly contradictory policies toward Bosnia.

First, the Senate approved, 56-44, an amendment to the fiscal 1995 defense appropriations bill (HR 4650) calling on Clinton to seek a U.N. Security Council resolution terminating the arms embargo against Bosnia's outgunned Muslims. (*Vote 279, p. 2379; funding bill, p. 2361*)

Then the Senate adopted a tougher amendment that would force — not urge — Clinton to contravene the arms ban beginning Nov. 15. The vote on that amendment, sponsored by Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole, R-Kan., was 58-42. (*Vote 280, p. 2379*)

Dole tried to draw a clear distinction between the two proposals. But a sizable portion of the Senate obviously didn't agree. Nineteen senators — 12 Democrats and 7 Republicans — voted for both amendments.

Still, Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn, D-Ga., who crafted the first amendment, asserted that Congress had given clear guidance on the overarching issue of whether the embargo should be lifted.

"The bottom line is that the Senate is overwhelmingly in favor of lifting the embargo and is torn between doing it unilaterally and multilaterally," Nunn said after the votes. "Most people would prefer to do it multilaterally, but an increasing number are giving up on that route," he said.

Under increasing pressure from Congress, Clinton on Aug. 10 vowed to introduce and support a U.N. resolution scrapping the embargo by the end of October. The arms ban, which was imposed on the former Yugoslavia in 1991, has worked to preserve the advantage of the better-armed Serbs in their war against the Muslims.

In a letter to congressional leaders, Clinton said: "It

has been my long-held view that the arms embargo has unfairly and unintentionally penalized the victim in this conflict and that the Security Council should act to remedy this injustice."

But the president has repeatedly voiced concern that unilateral action by the United States to circumvent the arms ban would embolden other nations to evade U.S.-backed sanctions against countries like Iraq.

In his letter, Clinton was cool toward the unilateral approach. If the Security Council does not go along with the administration's promised lift-the-embargo resolution, he vowed only to consult with Congress about acting alone to break the arms ban.

### Nunn's Compromise

The Senate's votes followed weeks of intense, closed-door negotiations over the arms embargo by House and Senate conferees on the companion fiscal 1995 defense authorization bill (HR 4301). (*Story, p. 2368*)

Nunn engineered a delicate compromise in the final version of the bill that was intended to prod Clinton toward a more active approach without imposing a deadline for unilateral action. Nunn then offered that proposal on the appropriations bill as an alternative to Dole's amendment, which the administration strongly opposed.

But Nunn's compromise also forced the administration to make significant concessions. If the United Nations fails to lift the embargo against the Muslims by Nov. 15 — and the Serbs continue to reject an internationally brokered peace agreement — the administration would have to stop militarily enforcing the arms ban.

In other words, Nunn's compromise would not eliminate the prohibition on shipments of U.S. weapons to the Muslims, but it might eventually halt U.S. ships and planes from blocking arms shipments by other countries.

State Department officials expressed concern over the proposal, saying it could create tension with NATO allies

Bumpers denounced Milstar as a "Cold War relic," emphasizing that it had been designed in the early 1980s to survive a prolonged U.S.-Soviet nuclear war. But supporters countered that the satellite had been stripped of some of its nuclear war-oriented features and given more capacity to transmit military communications during a conventional war. "The Milstar of today is a far cry from what was envisioned during the Cold War," said Nebraska Democrat Jim Exon.

Another Bumpers amendment, rejected 40-60, would have eliminated funds earmarked to continue production of Trident II submarine-launched missiles. (*Vote 274, p. 2378*)

The Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, led by Chairman Daniel K.

Inouye, D-Hawaii, and senior Republican Ted Stevens, Alaska, successfully spiked this floor amendment. But when it drafted the Senate's version of HR 4650, the subcommittee had accepted Bumpers' argument that the Navy was planning to buy too many spare copies of the guidance system that is intended to let each Trident II missile deliver eight nuclear warheads at different targets with great accuracy. So the Senate bill eliminated from Clinton's request \$385 million earmarked for Trident II guidance systems.

By a vote of 38-60, the Senate rejected an amendment by Malcolm Wallop, R-Wyo., that would have boosted from \$18 million to \$120 million the funds earmarked for a program to equip Navy warships to intercept short-range (or "theater") ballistic missiles at a

great distance. (*Vote 277, p. 2378*)

As reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee, the bill provides \$2.83 billion of the \$3.25 billion requested for anti-missile defense projects. It also provides an additional \$120 million, the amount requested to develop the so-called "Brilliant Eyes" missile attack warning satellite, but transfers this project from the anti-missile program to the Air Force.

### Other Foreign Policy Issues

Beyond the Bosnia-related provisions, the Senate also adopted several other foreign policy-oriented amendments to the defense bill.

Among these was an amendment by Dirk Kempthorne, R-Idaho, adopted 54-44, that would require the withdrawal by Oct. 1 of the small U.S.



## APPROPRIATIONS

# Senate Follows Clinton's Lead With \$243.4 Billion Bill

*Service members to get slightly higher pay raise  
as shrinkage of the military continues*

As the House had done in June, the Senate on Aug. 11 approved a Pentagon funding bill for fiscal 1995 that follows not only the broad outlines of President Clinton's defense budget request but also most of the significant details.

Passage of the bill (HR 4650) by a vote of 86-14 came after four days of on-and-off debate that frequently focused more on foreign policy issues than on the military's spending priorities. (*Vote 282, p. 2379*)

The Senate's version would appropriate \$243.4 billion to fund all Defense Department military operations except the construction of facilities and family housing, which is covered by a separate appropriations bill. (*Construction bill, p. 2370*)

The funding total is \$1.3 billion less than Clinton had sought and \$2.9 billion more than fiscal 1994 spending. (*Chart, p. 2366*)

The bill continues the gradual contraction of the military that began with the end of the Cold War and that Clinton decided to accelerate.

At the same time, the measure contains some hints of the difficulty Clinton faces in trying to hold down Pentagon spending in the future without damaging the military's readiness to fight a war. For example, both the House and Senate approved a 2.6 percent pay raise for the military next year. Clinton had sought to hold the increase to 1.6 percent.

In mid-July, Defense Secretary William J. Perry said that Clinton's future defense budget requests should be increased to allow annual military pay raises that keep pace with inflation. (*Weekly Report, p. 1995*)

## Rwanda Mission, Bosnia Policy

The Senate spending bill includes \$170 million of the \$270 million the administration requested to reimburse

*By Pat Towell*

**DEFENSE**

**BOXSCORE**

**Bill:** HR 4650 — Fiscal 1995 defense appropriations (S Rept 103-321).

**Latest action:** Senate passed, 86-14, Aug. 11

**Next likely action:** House-Senate conference committee.

**Reference:** Senate committee action, Weekly Report, p. 2159; House passage, p. 1816.

the armed services for the cost of relief operations in and around Rwanda. The bill includes a provision that would require U.S. forces to be withdrawn by Oct. 1, unless the administration requests and Congress specifically authorizes a longer stay.

In its report (S Rept 103-321) accompanying the bill, the Senate Appropriations Committee urged the administration to insist that the United Nations credit the \$170 million against accumulated U.S. assessments by the international organization that are past due.

The defense bill also provided the Senate with a venue for one more round in the long sparring match over whether Congress should force Clinton to break the U.N.-mandated arms embargo on Bosnia. As it had done in late July, the Senate equivocated:

- By 58-42, it adopted an amendment by Minority Leader Bob Dole, R-Kan., and Joseph I. Lieberman, D-Conn., that would require Clinton to end the embargo by Nov. 15. (*Vote 280, p. 2379*)

- And by 56-44, it adopted an amendment by Armed Services Committee

Chairman Sam Nunn, D-Ga., and Majority Leader George J. Mitchell, D-Maine, that would urge, but not require, Clinton to seek international agreement to end the embargo if Serbian forces refused to accept an internationally sponsored settlement of the Bosnian civil war (*Vote 279, p. 2379; Bosnia debate, p. 2362*)

Both the Senate's defense appropriations bill and the House version closely track the counterpart defense authorization bills (S 2182, HR 4301) approved by each chamber.

A Senate-House conference on Aug. 10 hammered out a compromise version of the authorization bill, resolving some of the more contentious issues, such as the Senate's effort to preserve the option of funding additional B-2 stealth bombers in future budgets. (*Defense authorization, p. 2368*)

Nevertheless, the Senate-House conference on defense appropriations will have its own agenda of differences to resolve. One of the more difficult knots to unravel may be the House's decision to slash \$900 million from the budget for Pentagon-sponsored research conducted by universities.

Lobbyists for large, research-oriented schools have worked furiously to overturn the cut, and they were largely successful in the Senate version of the bill, which restores all but \$79 million of the funds cut by the House.

## Major Weapons Amendments

On Aug. 10, the Senate rejected three amendments that would have significantly altered the Appropriations Committee's funding recommendations for major weapons programs.

By 38-62, it rejected a proposal by veteran Pentagon critic Dale Bumpers, D-Ark., that would have cut funds from the bill with the aim of forcing the Pentagon to curtail deployment of the Milstar communications satellite and speed its effort to develop a less expensive replacement. (*Vote 272, p. 2378*)