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Dear Mr. President:

We are deeply concerned that the manner in which international economic sanctions are currently being applied to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has gravely affected the lives of civilians, particularly the most vulnerable, including children, the elderly and the institutionalized. Recent reports from respected international humanitarian organizations such as the World Health Organization, the International Committee of the Red Cross and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees indicate "catastrophic" health conditions; for instance, the mortality rate among infants which has quadrupled since international sanctions were imposed.

The U.N. Security Council resolutions which imposed economic sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia explicitly exempt humanitarian relief supplies; despite this, the bureaucratic exemption review and approval procedures now being applied ensure lengthy delays in the provision of humanitarian supplies. Wittingly or not, these procedures are contributing to a humanitarian disaster which can only further complicate the quest for peace in former Yugoslavia.

According to the International Orthodox Christian Charities, which has provided humanitarian assistance to some of the 500,000 refugees -- Serbs, Muslims and Croats -- in Serbia and Montenegro, the long delays in licensing by the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control make it "virtually impossible to respond promptly in many life-threatening situations" which are in large part caused by sanctions.

According to the few relief agencies operating in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia:

- Shipments of vital medical and food supplies that in the past took a few weeks to process now sit at loading docks for three or more months awaiting licensing approval from the Treasury and State Departments. Although officials from these Departments insist that there has been no change in your Administration's policy about expedited processing of humanitarian exemptions, the labyrinthine bureaucratic procedures now being applied to humanitarian exemption applications effectively contradict stated policy and our country's long and proud tradition of providing humanitarian assistance to civilians in need.
- The efforts recently made by your Administration and other countries to facilitate the work of the U.N. Sanctions Committee are beginning to significantly reduce the delays previously encountered in the final step of the humanitarian exemption process. However, the licensing review procedures applied by agencies of the United States Government continue to cause long delays in the provision of urgently needed assistance in a situation that is quickly becoming a humanitarian emergency.
- Given the all too common practice of negative earmarking by donor countries, much of the responsibility for humanitarian action in Serbia and Montenegro falls to private agencies. And yet, despite compelling humanitarian need, very few private relief agencies are conducting programs in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. While there are a number of reasons for this, the difficulties of operating humanitarian assistance programs under the sanctions regime and

the attendant bureaucratic delays and obstacles, clearly discourage many private relief agencies from operating in Yugoslavia.

UNHCR spokeswoman Lyndall Sachs has stated that "there is a deliberate attempt to make these people suffer." According to the *Toronto Globe and Mail* (9 December 1993):

"the U.S. recently offered the High Commissioner for Refugees several million dollars but specifically instructed that the money not be used for refugees in Serbia."

The U.S. Committee for Refugees, which recently issued a report on the humanitarian and refugee situations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, pointedly notes that such actions "*amount to the misuse of food and medicine as a political weapon against innocent civilians.*"

We add that policies and practices which discriminate against noncombatants are inconsistent with Article III of the Geneva Conventions. Such policies and practices also contradict the humanitarian exemptions of the U.N. sanctions and diminish our international stature in the areas of international humanitarian assistance and human rights.

*The New York Times* quoted an unnamed U.S. official on 8 December as stating that "we want to bring the reality of the war in Bosnia to the Serbs in Belgrade while avoiding excessive humanitarian suffering." We must ask how many more infant deaths, how many more elderly people and refugees claimed by cold and starvation, will it take before the sanctions policy is considered excessive? In a statement on 26 October, the World Council of Churches deplored "the widespread suffering which is the direct result of sanctions."

The issues raised by the U.S. Government's application of economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro could soon be the subject of Congressional hearings. We urge your Administration to take the following steps, already urged by humanitarian organizations, without delay:

- Institute "fast track" approval procedures for licensing by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control and the State Department to permit relief organizations to respond promptly and effectively to humanitarian needs in a manner that can save lives. Within U.S. Government agencies, processing of licenses for humanitarian assistance activities should not exceed two weeks. Procedures similar to those of the U.N. Sanctions Committee, which distinguish between "notification" and "approval" of humanitarian transactions, should be adopted by the Office of Foreign Assets Control to ensure the timely provision of humanitarian assistance.
- As recommended by the U.S. Committee for Refugees, "end the practice of earmarking assistance" for specific republics of former Yugoslavia, and "permit UNHCR to utilize their expertise to designate, as they see fit, recipients for U.S.-donated funds."
- Permit the frozen assets of private Yugoslav companies to be used for the purchase of essential humanitarian supplies.

Finally, we urge your Administration to seriously consider the advice of the World Council of Churches to the United Nations Secretary-General on the subject of sanctions, which is equally valid for U.S. policies:

"A major reason why we are calling on you to reexamine the issue of sanctions is that they have been applied only in Serbia and Montenegro. Such one-sided application needs, in our view, serious re-examination. Sanctions, if imposed, should be applied to all parties which have clearly flouted the norms of humanitarian law and human rights."

The World Council of Churches adds, in the meantime

"There should be a strong determination on behalf of the international community that humanitarian relief for vulnerable populations, which is supposed to be exempt from sanctions, actually reaches them."

We note that UN General Briqueмонт has also called for an easing of the sanctions. Prompt action on the part of your Administration is necessary to save lives and demonstrate our adherence to the principles of the Geneva conventions that we have sought to promote across the globe.

Sincerely,

(Members of Congress)

cc: Al Gore  
Anthony Lake  
Warren Christopher  
Madeleine Albright  
Lloyd Bentsen

**LIFT THE SANCTIONS APPEAL SIGNATURES** (partial list)

<b><u>NAME</u></b>	<b><u>POSITION</u></b>
Doug Bandow	Nationally Syndicated Columnist (CATO Institute)
Robert M. Hayden	Associate Prof. of Anthropology, University of Pittsburgh
J.S. Lockport	Professor of History, Univ. of Maryland
Norman F. Ness	National Academy of Sciences (U.S.A.) Accademia dei Lincei (Italy)
Alex Dragnich	Historian, Vanderbilt University
Paul Shoup	Professor, University of Virginia
Edmund Bator	Retired Foreign Service Officer
Juliet Taylor	Independent Casting Director
Lila Kalinich	Associate Clinical Prof. of Psychology, Columbia University
John Fine	Professor of History, U. of Michigan
Linda Fennimora	Musician
Aaron Simkin	Marketing Analyst
Dan Levy	Lincoln Center Music School
Evers Williamson	Visiting Scholar, Hoover Institution
Mimi Gregory	President, Alliance Francaise
Obrad Kesic	Balkan Area Specialist and Author
Vlade Divac	L.A. Lakers
Walt Dropo	Former Major League Baseball Player
Michael Mennard	Retired Foreign Service Officer
Robin Allison Remington	Professor, Political Science, Univ. of Missouri
George Prica, Jr. M.D.	Clinical Prof. Family Medicine
William G. Salatich	Former President of Gillette Corporation
Rabbi Abraham Cooper	Director of Simon Wiesenthal Center (Los Angeles)
Father Leonid Kishkovsky	Chairperson Europe Committee, National Council of Churches
Yohanan Ramati	Chairman Jerusalem Institute for Western Defence
William Lockwood	Associate Professor Anthropology U. of Michigan
Christopher Boehm	Director Jane Goodall Center Research Center University of Southern California
Raju C. Thomas	Professor of Political Science, Marquette University
Rabbi Cadik Danon	Chief Rabbi of Yugoslavia
Archbishop Iakovos	Greek Orthodox Archbishop North and South American Diocese

The appeal below is being circulated to distinguished academics, government officials, religious leaders, humanitarians, artists and former diplomats. To indicate support, please sign the second page and fax to 312-787-0227 or send a signed copy to: Lift the Sanctions Project, 612 N. Michigan Avenue, Box 76-217, Chicago, Illinois 60611. More than one individual can sign the second sheet of the appeal. For further information, call George Bogdanich at 312-787-0223.

## IN THE NAME OF HUMANITY STOP THE WAR ON THE INNOCENT

In Serbia and Montenegro, the innocent wear no uniforms. They shoot no guns. They shout no slogans. They have committed no crimes. But they are being mercilessly punished by the Sanctions Committee of the United Nations.

These innocent include over 630,000\* Serbian refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Krajina. In addition, thousands of Muslims and Croatian refugees are also sheltered in Serbia and Montenegro, living for the most part with families who have taken them in their homes. The innocent are malnourished. Four million people face imminent starvation. They are without medicine. They are without heat. Old men and women commit suicide. The insane mutilate themselves. Children are turned away from hospitals.

The sanctions policy has become a new evil within the larger evil of an internecine war. No policy that declares war on the innocent can possibly help to bring an end to this terrible conflict. It is time for the international community to reach out with openness and fairness to all the victims, whatever their ethnic background.

Most of the people in Serbia and Montenegro have done nothing to receive summarily such a terrible sentence. Let us begin to end what is a blockade of our own humanity and empathy.

We agree with the World Council of Churches and the Conference of European Churches in their recent appeal to the UN General-Secretary to "re-examine the issue of sanctions", which are "applied only in Serbia and Montenegro," noting:

"Such one-sided application, needs, in our view, serious re-examination. Sanctions, if there is international agreement that they should be imposed, should be applied to *all* parties which have clearly flouted the norms of humanitarian law and human rights."

In the meantime, both the U.S. Government and the UN Security Council must insure that further innocent lives are not lost through sanctions-related delays and blockage of food, medicine and hospital equipment. Provisions of the Geneva Conventions, and the UN Charter must be scrupulously followed.

We the undersigned call upon the United States government and the United Nations Security Council to:

- 1) Cease using humanitarian aid as a political tool.
- 2) Speed up the processing of humanitarian waivers and permits.
- 3) Increase assistance for refugees in Serbia and Montenegro, as well as for the other areas of the former Yugoslavia.
- 4) Ease the process of resettlement of refugees, regardless of their national group.
- 5) Allow the full participation of Yugoslav physicians in all activities of the World Health Organization and other international human rights organizations. End the embargo of medical journals and information to Serbia and Montenegro.
- 6) Allow the use of frozen assets of private, non-government Yugoslav companies for the purchase of humanitarian necessities.

\*From the October, 1993 report of the U.S. Committee on Refugees

Signature(s) - Please print  
name below signature)

Position or Association

Phone number

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Raju C. Thomas	Professor of Political Science, Marquette University
Rabbi Cadik Danon	Chief Rabbi of Yugoslavia
Archbishop Iakovos	Greek Orthodox Archbishop North and South American Diocese



(Draft)

Dear Colleague:

A member of the British Parliament recently described U.S. policy on sanctions toward Yugoslavia as "vindictive and shortsighted". Similar observations have been made recently by analysts for such diverse organizations as the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the Brookings Institution, the Cato Institute, the U.S. Committee on Refugees, Veterans for Peace, the Conference of European Churches and the World Council of Churches.

The issue of whether sanctions have backfired as a policy deserves serious debate. There is one essential issue, however, where they cannot be defended: U.S. sanctions policy has repeatedly delayed essential shipments of food, medicine and hospital equipment -- as much as six months -- to refugees and civilian populations in Serbia and Montenegro. Instead of proceeding on the basis of need, as determined by appropriate UN agencies, the U.S. has earmarked certain ex-Yugoslav Republics for aid at the expense of others.

As a result of these policies and the enormous influence our government has with the U.N. Security Council, thousands of innocent civilians face death from curable and treatable illnesses. Infant mortality has quadrupled and the mortality rate of the general population has increased by 20 percent. The shocking deterioration of a modern health system in Yugoslavia as a result of sanctions has been detailed in reports of the UNHCR, the World Health Organization and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

U.S. sanctions policy violates not only UN resolutions 757 and 820, but also fundamental provisions of international law including:

--Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention which requires free passage of medical supplies intended for civilians and foodstuffs for children under 15, expectant mothers and maternity cases.

--Articles 69-71 of the First Geneva Protocol require that essential humanitarian supplies be provided to civilians in an unoccupied territory, if their survival is threatened.

--World Health Assembly resolutions 41.31 and 42.24 reject any embargo on medical supplies for political reasons.

That this has become a moral, humanitarian issue, is underlined by the fact that the sanctions against civilians in Serbia and Montenegro have been criticized by leaders of all major faiths in Belgrade including Serbian Orthodox Patriarch Pavle, Chief Rabbi Danon, Chief Muslim Mufti Hamdija Jusufspahic and Catholic Archbishop France Perko.

On behalf of all innocent civilians at risk, I urge you to add your signature to the attached letter to President Clinton, which offers specific recommendations on how the U.S. administration can bring itself into compliance with international law regarding the implementation of sanctions and end needless deaths of civilians.

I truly believe that your signature and those of our colleagues can help save lives.

Cordially yours,

# How Serbs lose out on UN aid

BY SCHEHEREZADE FARAMARZI  
The Globe and Mail  
Belgrade

**W**HAT if little Irma Hadzimu-  
ratovic had not been a Bos-  
nian? Would the five-year-  
old Serbian girl with a piece  
of shrapnel lodged in her spine have war-  
ranted the emergency airlift to England  
that brought her to the world's attention  
last summer?

Probably not. Ethnic Serbs are widely  
viewed as the aggressors in the Bosnian  
conflict, and international aid workers  
say that they are paying the price. Just  
like their Bosnian and Croat foes, they  
have lost loved ones and been driven  
from their homes, yet they are not receiv-  
ing an equitable share of the relief flow-  
ing into the region.

They say this is because the United Na-  
tions, generally considered impartial  
when it comes to aid distribution, now ac-  
cepts donations with political price tags  
attached.

Aid agencies complain that donor  
countries — especially the United States  
and Germany — are practicing a policy  
known as "negative earmarking." That  
is, they contribute aid only on condition  
that it not go to Serbia, which is widely  
viewed as the aggressor in the conflict.

"It's a question of good guys and bad  
guys," explains Lyndall Sachs, informa-  
tion officer for the UN High Commis-  
sioner for Refugees in Belgrade, the Ser-  
bian capital.

"Refugees in Serbia are not getting  
anything. We can't do much about it. You  
go out to the field and see the refugees  
and feel helpless."

A UN official in New York says that  
Canada does not earmark its aid, but the  
Canadian donation is not overly signifi-  
cant. On the other hand, the UN High  
Commissioner for Refugees says that the  
United States recently offered the agency  
several million dollars but specifically in-  
structed that the money not be used for  
refugees in Serbia.

Policies like this mean that refugees  
who flee Bosnia for Serbia and Montene-

**BAD GUYS** *Because Serbs  
are seen as aggressors  
in Bosnia, Serbian  
refugees are being  
denied their share of  
emergency relief.*

## THE DISPLACED & DISPOSSESSED

### Refugees across former Yugoslavia

Bosnia - 2.7 million  
Croatia - 800,000  
Serbia & Montenegro - 647,000  
Slovenia - 45,000  
Macedonia - 27,000

Source: United Nations High Commission on  
Refugees

### Of the 510,000 refugees in Serbia

276,000 are from Bosnia-Herzegovina  
194,000 are from Croatia  
37,000 are from Slovenia  
3,000 from Macedonia

Source: Commissariat for Refugees of the  
Republic of Serbia.

gro pay a double price. They leave a  
country torn by war for one that is being  
subjected to economic sanctions ordered  
by the UN.

The sanctions specifically exempt med-  
ical supplies, but little medicine is getting  
through. Aid officials say it takes three to  
four months to receive permission from  
the UN Sanctions Committee in New  
York for a medical shipment.

Iraq and rebel-held areas of Angola are  
also under UN sanctions, but humanita-  
rian organizations there don't need offi-  
cial permission to bring in food and med-  
ical supplies.

The policy on Serbia, says Anne Pesic,  
a Unicef education assistant from Ireland  
working in Belgrade, "violates the UN  
Convention of the Rights of the Child . . .  
the process is so difficult that the child  
dies before the drug gets here."

Alexander Borg-Olivier of UN Hu-  
manitarian Affairs in New York agrees  
that negative earmarking is unfair. But,  
he says, "this attitude does not surprise  
me. It's almost natural that things are the  
way they are and that's because donors  
are less likely to regard Serbs and Montene-  
grans as victims."

To illustrate how this attitude plays  
out, many aid workers point to the Inter-  
national Rescue Committee, a U.S. non-  
governmental relief organization. They  
say its representative was authorized to  
spend \$120,000 a day in Bosnia-Herzogo-  
vina, compared with a mere \$20,000 in  
Belgrade over a four-month period.

As for the UN, it plans to spend  
\$522.6-million in the former Yugoslavia  
over the first six months of next year.  
Here's how the budget breaks down:

- \$270-million in Bosnia-Herzegovina
- \$99.8-million in Croatia
- \$40-million in Serbia
- \$9.5-million in Slovenia
- \$6.2-million in Montenegro
- \$5.1-million in Macedonia
- \$39.8-million for general programs cov-  
ering the entire region.

The aid disparity has begun to spark  
concern in the West. After a visit to for-  
mer Yugoslavia, British MP Robert  
Waring wrote to Prime Minister John  
Major that "it is certainly against the  
spirit in which sanctions were imposed  
against Serbia and Montenegro that chil-  
dren in particular should be denied nec-  
essary medical treatment.

"Operation Irma, as suggested by  
yourself in the name of humanity, was a  
highly desirable move. However, children  
are children whatever their ethnic origin.  
. . . I believe that even-handedness is most  
essential in humanitarian efforts."

The reply from Mr. Major's office con-  
ceded that Serb children are suffering, but  
stressed that "it is our overwhelming pri-  
ority to ensure that medical supplies get  
through where they are most needed,  
which is on the ground in Bosnia."

No one disputes that refugees in Bos-  
nia-Herzegovina need more help, says  
Charles Vincent of the World Food Pro-  
gramme in Belgrade, but "a refugee is a

refugee. . . . A Serb refugee has the same  
problem as a Croatian refugee. There is  
no humanitarian reason to treat them dif-  
ferently."

And the situation in Serbia is wors-  
ening rapidly, says Dr. Neboja Jova-  
novic, head of the children's Olga Dedijer  
clinic in Belgrade. The incidence of chro-  
nic diseases such as tuberculosis is on the  
rise, and the infant mortality rate is four  
to five times what it was before the con-  
flict broke out.

Most hospitals, which are now carrying  
out only emergency operations, require  
patients to bring all their own drugs as  
well as anesthetics and dressing materials  
before undergoing surgery.

UN officials say they try to make their  
appeals based on humanitarian needs but  
they are not in a position to tell donors  
where their money can or cannot be  
spent.

"We put a consolidated appeal for all  
UN agencies and it is up to the donors  
what they want to fund," says a UN offi-  
cial in New York. "They have a lot of lee-  
way as to where that money can be spent.  
You may draw political conclusions from  
that, but the agencies are not necessarily  
being used as a political tool by donor  
countries."

However, some aid agencies manage to  
maintain strict neutrality.

One of them is the International Com-  
mittee of the Red Cross, which according  
to the Geneva Conventions is expected to  
act in total impartiality and neutrality,  
says spokesman Harald Grunbeck.

"This is the spirit that is contained in  
our mandate — to refuse earmarking by  
category of victims."

Ms. Sachs says all agencies should take  
this approach. "If they want us to do the  
job, to sort out the humanitarian prob-  
lem, they should trust us as experts to use  
that money, and not use the UN High  
Commissioner for Refugees as a political  
tool in trying to resolve the crisis."

*Scheherezade Faramarzi is an editor on  
The Globe and Mail's foreign desk who  
recently visited Belgrade.*

Toronto Globe + Mail  
Thursday, December 9, 1993

# Who knows the fate of Filip Baum from old Zagreb?

THE INDEPENDENT  
LONDON

22 JUNE 1994

**Robert Fisk finds secrets of a dark past and discovers how easily the fragile facade of Croatian civilisation can crack**

THE calendar was hanging on the wall of the Croatian Ministry of Culture, a snapshot of old Zagreb for each month. And when I asked the assistant if I could study the pictures, she willingly took the calendar down for me. The illustrations were good quality and portrayed the Croatian capital, which this year celebrates its 900th anniversary, as a place of peace and tranquillity. But studying the captions, I noticed that seven of the twelve were taken between 1941 and 1945, the years when Ante Pavelic's vicious Nazi puppet government ran the so-called Independent State of Croatia with almost unsurpassed cruelty.

There was no reference to this — just a series of innocent photographs with captions indicating the location and date: a line of fine old German taxis in Jelacic Square, coffee-drinkers in a boulevard cafe, a flock of sheep moving through an empty street, two milk carts in Radiceva Street. If a Frenchman wished to celebrate the history of Paris, he might choose similar photographs — but he would not, surely, have selected pictures taken during the German occupation. Under Hitler's surrogate, Pavelic, the Croatian Ustashe slaughtered up to 700,000 Serbs and Jews. Yet the photographs on this calendar seemed designed to legitimise this dark period as a time of calm and stability.

Then, above the weeks for *Listopad* (October), in the photo-

graph of Radiceva Street, I noticed a name. Above the door of a three-storey Austro-Hungarian town-house was a sign: Filip Baum. It was the only human name visible in any of the pictures. Baum is a Jewish name. The date on the photograph was 1941. What happened to him in the Holocaust that had begun to sweep over Nazi Croatia when the picture was taken?

Radiceva Street lies in the old part of Zagreb, above the Catholic Cathedral, and I recognised the building, No 32, behind whose crumbling facade now lived the proprietor of a ballet school, a railwayman and a street vendor. They were not alive in 1941. The old lady who once owned the house — and who could be seen in the 1941 picture peering from a first-floor window — had long since died.

I found the woman's granddaughter, but she had no records of previous tenants. A middle-aged woman from a downstairs flat knew that milk was once sold on the ground floor — hence the milk-carts in the 1941 picture — but she had never heard of Filip Baum. Then, from the back of the building, came an old lady. "I remember Filip Baum," she said. "He was a Jew, very old, very stooped. He had a big beard. He

used to make children's prams out of wood. He worked with his son at the back of the building. But then the Pavelic people and Ustashe took over and he was forced to flee. I heard he went secretly to America." That was all.

She never heard if Filip Baum reached his destination. So I telephoned the secretary of the Jewish community in Zagreb and asked her to check her list of Holocaust victims. Eleven Baums had been murdered by the Ustashe or Nazis, she said, but none called Filip. "Around 11,000 or 12,000 Jews perished and about 3,000 survived. The list is not comprehensive. Most Jews who got away sought safety on the Adriatic coast which was ruled then by the Italians."

So Filip Baum may have survived. But it remained a remarkable irony that the only name in a modern calendar celebrating Zagreb's history should be that of a man who had to flee for his life. Nor did the current occupants of the Radiceva Street house seem particularly interested in his fate. It was before they were born and, although a teacher from the ballet school showed some sympathy, the street vendor was positively hostile when he learned that a reporter was trying to find out what happened to a Jew.

It would be grotesque, almost half a century after the war, to hold Zagreb's modern and largely young population to account for the events of 1941-45. Croatia boasts of its nascent democracy and hopes to join the European Union. Yet on the very afternoon I found Filip Baum's old home, I met a young Belgian army officer who was working as a European Community monitor in the eastern Croatian city of Osijek, badly damaged during the 1991 war with the Serbs.

"The other day, I went to the cinema in Osijek to see *Schindler's List*," he told me. "But once the film started, I couldn't believe what I saw and heard. The audience were mostly young Croats and they were laughing and whistling at the terrible scenes where the Jews were murdered. I wanted to walk out. When it was over, the audience went off to drink beer, very cheerfully; for them it was just one more new film they'd seen. I suppose they've seen so many brutal things, but this is just the same cruelty they show towards Serbs and Muslims. What kind of people behave like this?"

How easily the facade of Croatian civilisation cracks. Two days later, in the Bosnian city of Mostar — at tenuous peace but still di-

vided after Croatian Catholic forces staged a pogrom against the Bosnian Muslims, driving them into a makeshift ghetto in the east — I asked a young woman for directions to the bus station. We were on the Croatian side of the city but as we walked, she said: "My name is Amra. I am 19. I am a Muslim among Christians. I still live here among the Croats. I have finished high school but they will not allow me to go to university." She had long blonde hair and freckles and wore sunglasses. "The Croats can't tell I'm a Muslim from the way I look or from my accent — only from my name. So unless I know people well, I use a false name like Maria."

At the bus station, Amra left me for her dangerous home. In the bus, not far from her road, I passed Croatian houses with the hooked "U" for "Ustashe" on their walls. Filip Baum, I suspect, would have understood how Amra felt.



# Croat death camp gives hate a new twist

In the first of a series, Robert Fisk, recently in the former Yugoslavia, describes a visit to Jasenovac, where hundreds of thousands of Serbs perished in the Second World War



A SOFT, fine rain fell over Jasenovac. Milan, the huge Serbian policeman who was trailing us with two colleagues in a battered blue militia car, turned on his windscreen wipers as we drove down the narrow road beside the old Belgrade-Zagreb railway line.

It was uncomfortable to be followed here, in a place of hatred which was intended to commemorate hatred, where a civil war which was supposed to have ended 50 years ago had burst out of the ground to destroy what was left of one of the Second World War's nastiest extermination camps.

The village is a ghost town of overgrown streets, burnt shops, shattered cottages and a Roman Catholic church in yellow stucco and white trim with its roof blown off. A ferryman oars his boat over the waters of the Sava to replace the dynamited motorway bridge. Beyond him, the Sava, alive only with the sound of

river-birds, slides quietly past the gutted museum of Jasenovac, the grassy mound which represents the crematorium and the railway spur which carried up to 700,000 men, women and children into this place of horror in the Second World War.

Many of them — and this is history — were hacked to death with axes or beheaded with saws. The women were often handed over to professional butchers who hacked them to death with knives. Most of the victims were Serbs, many were Jews. The killers were Croats.

Which is why the Serbian militia car, pattering along behind us in the rain, made a visitor from Croatia a little ill at ease. Why would a foreigner wish to visit the remains of a Second World War concentration camp, let alone one which now lay scarcely a mile from the front line in Serb-held Croatia? Milan climbed out of his car uneasily when we reached the museum. The double-headed Serb eagle on his cap badge, the manner in which his leather belt clasped his powder and royal blue blouse over his trousers, the way in which the trousers were tucked into his boots, gave him a curious appearance: half Cossack, half secret policeman.

Milan wanted to know why

had I come here. And when I told him — that I had last visited this terrible place in 1988, when I was investigating the wartime Balkan activities of the Wehrmacht lieutenant and later Austrian president Kurt Waldheim, that I had returned because I heard the camp's memorial had been destroyed in this new Balkan war — he scribbled it all down in a little notebook, as if I was the policeman and he was the reporter. "Well, this is what the Ustashe did before they left," he said, gesturing towards the broken glass of the damp, empty museum, instantly associating his modern Croatian enemies with the Nazi murderers of Jasenovac. The Ustashe were Nazi Croatia's militia.

When the 1991 conflict caught up with Jasenovac, it was in Croatian hands, but the Serbs crossed the Sava and captured the old killing fields. Not surprisingly, they found the fleeing Croatian forces had wrecked the museum. Perhaps they did not have time to destroy the railway spur and its symbolic old steam locomotive which still stood on its track half a mile

away. The commemorative plaques are still in place; so, too, is Bogdan Bogdanovic's monument to the dead, a massive concrete tulip erected close to the crematorium.

Milan followed us down the wooden path. He pointed to the cone of land covered in grass to the left of the monument. "My uncle was thrown alive in the crematorium there," he said. His colleagues caught up with him.

Pero was slimmer, with hard Slav features, in the same uniform as Milan but clearly his commander.

"My wife's parents were both killed here," he said. "This is a continuation of the Second World War. The war stopped for 45 years because the Croatians needed time to prepare their second genocide of the Serbs."

We entered the base of the huge "tulip". "If Bogdanovic built a memorial now, it would be different," Milan said. "In those days, he had to build it so it wouldn't offend the Croats." Perhaps he had a point. While the Serbs and Croats each claim that the other maintained hegemony over the old Yugoslavia, the commemorative plaques around Jasenovac are written in Latin script. A young Serb called Mile who joined the two policemen had difficulty

in reading the inscriptions to the murder of his own Serbian people — because they were not written in his own Cyrillic script. One of them referred to the "flash of the knife" which killed so many innocents here — but discreetly failed to identify the wielder of the knife.

In the derelict film theatre, a few panoramic photographs remained on the wall; a column of Serbian civilians marching under guard to the camp, three Croatian Ustashe militiamen sawing off a man's head and a German army major drinking with the camp commander. "Our parents made the mistake of forgiving the Croats for what they did in the Second World War," Pero said. "We must never make that same mistake again. We owe this to our children. I haven't seen my own wife and children for more than two years — they are cut off from me in Croatia, on the other side of the line. I haven't seen my own baby son yet."

We later met the archivist of the self-declared "Serb Republic" in Banja Luka who said that, while he feared

most of the wartime Ustashe documents in the Zagreb archives had been destroyed by the Croats, the contents of the Jasenovac museum had been largely saved by the Serbs after the Croat retreat.

But this would not lay the camp's ghosts. In April, a delegation of Jews from Croatia applied to visit Jasenovac to lay wreaths to their own dead at the camp memorial and the Serbs agreed on a list of names. But when the delegation arrived, the Serbs complained that four of the names had been changed.

The United Nations, whose Jordanian battalion is camped outside Jasenovac and which handled the abortive meeting, confirmed that three of the visitors turned up in military uniform. One of them was believed to be a general in the Croatian army.

"What could we do?" a UN officer asked. "The delegation said it was all of them or nothing, and the Serbs refused. So the Jews threw their wreaths into the River Strug on the other side of the front line. They never reached the camp."

*The Independent (London)*  
June 20, 1994

# SERBNET MEDIA CENTER

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THE MEDIA ARM OF THE SERBIAN AMERICAN NATIONAL INFORMATION NETWORK, INC. -SERBNET

## **House Vote on Lifting Arms Embargo – Behind the Learning Curve** by George Bogdanich

At best, the House vote on lifting the arms embargo for the Muslims and Croats is a distraction on the road to a political settlement in Bosnia. At worst, it will pour flames on the smoldering fire that has burned intermittently for two years. Congress, which has been extensively lobbied by Croat and Muslim organizations, is only starting to go through the learning curve about the real issues that separate the warring parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the dangers of taking sides in an ethnic civil war. First, the European negotiators, the Bush administration and then the Clinton White House learned the hard way that the Muslim hardliners who dominate the Bosnian government seek a military victory and have repeatedly sabotaged attempts at political compromise.

The problem is that those parties which have not gone through the learning curve, remain in a position to block a settlement. Last fall, the Clinton administration gave Muslim hardliners encouragement to hold out for a military victory, by rejecting the Owen-Stoltenberg agreement, though both Serbs and Croats had signed it, and independent polls in Sarajevo showed a large majority of Muslims favored it.

The reality of the Muslims' military situation obviously was not a factor in the congressional vote, though the recent military buildup has been widely reported. The *Washington Post* recently documented the continuing large illegal arms shipments (including 60 tons of explosives) to the Muslims from Iran via Zagreb, Croatia. *Jane's Intelligence Review* has reported the revival of the defence industries in Bosnia which helped arm the Muslims' spring offensive in North Central Bosnia. The *Washington Times* recently quoted US intelligence sources indicating that Iran had deployed another 400 well-trained Pasadran ("Revolutionary Guard") soldiers to assist Bosnian Muslims. They join the 2,000 Mujahadeen soldiers previously reported by the German publication *Stern*.

The increasingly close ideological and military alliance of Bosnia's military and political leadership with the Iran's terrorist network was passed over in the congressional debate, which was dominated by domestic considerations. For Republicans, it was a chance to embarrass the Clinton administration, stuck with its campaign promise to lift the arms embargo, even as it privately acknowledged the counterproductive nature of this pledge. A large majority to lift the arms embargo was assured once Republican House leader Newt Gingrich declared his support and Republican House votes began to fall in line with hawkish Democrats.

Those who look to Congress for leadership must nevertheless be discouraged to see how a poorly informed demagogue such as Frank McCloskey has ridden the Bosnia issue to national prominence. A frequent guest on television shows which have shamefully passed over genuine experts on the Balkans, McCloskey has received an incredible amount of airtime for his rabid comments. Last year, on the MacNeil-Lehrer program, EC negotiator Lord Owen, finally had enough. "You don't have a policy," he told the congressman. "You have a rant."

**HANDBOOK OF RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS  
OF THE WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY  
AND THE EXECUTIVE BOARD**

**Volume III  
Third edition  
(1985-1992)**

**38th to 45th World Health Assemblies  
75th to 90th sessions of the Executive Board**



**WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION**

**GENEVA**

**1993**

(3) to report periodically to the Health Assembly on progress in this field.

Reaffirming resolution WHA41.31 on the embargo on medical supplies and its effects on health care;

May 1987

Recalling the decision of the eighty-first session of the Executive Board regarding the effects on people's health of withholding medical supplies;

EFFECTS ON HEALTH OF WITHHOLDING  
MEDICAL SUPPLIES

EB81(3) The Executive Board concurred with the observations put forward in the note by the Director-General on the effects on people's health of withholding medical supplies.<sup>1</sup> It requested the Director-General to take the necessary measures to ensure the provision of medical supplies to any Member State that has notified him that it is being deprived of such supplies by another Member State. If, in spite of his efforts, the Director-General cannot find a satisfactory solution, he should bring the matter to the attention of the Executive Board and the Health Assembly.

1. CONFIRMS resolution WHA41.31 and the principles laid down by the Executive Board's decision EB81(3) rejecting any embargo on medical supplies for political reasons, on account of the effects on health care of such an embargo;

2. APPEALS, in the spirit of paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, to all Member States of the United Nations to abstain from aggression and the use of threats in their international relations, including threats against medical centres and medical production plants;

3. URGES all littoral Member States to refrain from imposing restrictions against the movement of medicines, medical equipment and pharmaceutical raw materials across national boundaries of landlocked countries.

May 1989

January 1988

EB89.R16 The Executive Board,

<sup>1</sup> Document EB81/1988/REC/1, p. 170.

WHA41.31 The Forty-first World Health Assembly,

Mindful of the principle contained in the WHO Constitution stating that the health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security;

Reaffirming that the United Nations General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) concerning friendly relations and cooperation between countries is fully valid for the solution of the problems facing those countries;

Rejecting any embargo on medical supplies for political reasons;

Recalling the note by the Director-General<sup>1</sup> concerning the effects on people's health of withholding medical supplies and the Executive Board's decision on the subject;

CONFIRMS the principles laid down by the Executive Board's decision EB81(3).

May 1988

In accordance with the basic principles of the WHO Constitution which stipulate that one of the fundamental rights of every human being is to enjoy the highest attainable standard of health without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition;

Mindful of the objective of the World Health Organization which is the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health;

Reaffirming resolutions WHA41.31 and WHA42.24 concerning embargo on medical and food supplies and its impact on health care;

Recalling decision EB81(3) of the Executive Board concerning the effects of withholding medical supplies;

Mindful also of the deterioration of the health status of peoples beset by disasters and armed conflicts;

Appreciative of the continued commitment to effective cooperation and dialogue among Member States of the Organization,

REQUESTS the Director-General:

(1) to call upon all Member States of the Organization to help enable the peoples of the world to meet their health needs by all possible means, and to do his utmost to ensure the attainment of this goal;

(2) to urge Member States to refrain in all circumstances and situations from imposing restrictions on indispensable medical supplies and their transit across international borders, and to remind them of decision EB81(3) of the Executive Board in this regard.

<sup>1</sup> See document EB81/1988/REC/1, p. 170.

WHA42.24 The Forty-second World Health Assembly,

Mindful of the principle contained in the WHO Constitution stating that the health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security;

January 1992



## Views and Strategy of Muslim Leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina

"There can be no peace nor coexistence between Islamic faith and non-Islamic social and political institutions. Islam can and must take power as soon as it is morally and numerically strong enough, not only to destroy the non-Islamic power, but also to build up a new Islamic one... Turkey, as an Islamic country used to rule the world. Turkey, as an imitation of Europe is a third-rate country."

--Islamic Declaration of Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic,  
circulated privately in 1970, published openly in 1990

"Alija Izetbegovic and the Moslem leadership also bear a historical responsibility for the breakdown of the consensus between the three Bosnian communities, for they were the first to organize a political party, the SDA, along nationalist lines on May 26, 1990."

--Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia*

"President Izetbegovic's record as peacebreaker speaks for itself. In the summer of 1991, he not only repudiated an initiative for powersharing between the Serbs and Muslims in the mixed areas -- which he had himself helped to negotiate -- but later denounced his fellow negotiators for "selling out" to the Serbs. In early 1992, he demolished the Carrington peace initiative, also after having seemed to support it, and flatly rejected a "cantonization" plan, on the Swiss model allowing each community to run its own affairs."

--Nora Beloff, former chief political correspondent of the London *Observer*, author of *Tito's Flawed Legacy*.

"Izetbegovic...manipulated the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which required the consensus of all three nationalities to proclaim independence."

--Lord Peter Carrington, EC Mediator in interview with *Le Point*,  
Sept. 26, 1992

"The majority of ceasefires I negotiated were broken by the Muslims because their goals were and still are to cause the West to intervene."

--UN Commander in Sarajevo, Canadian General Lewis  
MacKenzie, *Washington Times*

"President Izetbegovic's political aim is not in doubt: he seeks to salvage what he can from the wreckage that his declaration of Bosnian independence has brought on his country. To achieve this, he rejected the peace plans negotiated by Lord Owen and Mr. Vance, calculating that the West would eventually be forced to act against the Serbs. That declaration of independence provoked the war in Bosnia."

--Allan Massie, London *Sunday Telegraph* February 13, 1994

"French General Phillipe Morillon ...Commander of UNPROFOR ...emphatically blamed the Bosnian Muslim government for failing to lift the siege of Sarajevo. In an interview with the Prague Daily *Lidove Noviny*, Morillon said the Bosnian regime wanted to keep Sarajevo a focal point for world sympathy and repeatedly refused to allow UNPROFOR to achieve a ceasefire."

--Peter Brock, *Foreign Policy*, Winter Issue 1993-94

"United Nations officials and senior Western military officers believe some of the worst recent killings in Sarajevo, including the massacre of at least 16 people in a bread queue, were the work of the city's mainly

Muslim defenders -- not Serb besiegers -- as a propaganda ploy to win world sympathy and trigger military intervention."

--Leonard Doyle, London *Independent*, August 22, 1992

"Members of the Bosnian government, however, were quick to understand that most of the world viewed them as absolutely innocent victims. Throughout the war, they have used this perception to undertake offensive actions and then portray themselves as victims. The majority of UNPROFOR members and aid workers who have died during this conflict have been victims of Moslem units and to a lesser extent, Croat ones. While suffering from a catastrophic disadvantage in terms of the amount of weapons at their disposal, they have been the consummate victors of the propaganda war waged around the world."

--Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia*

"Teheran continues to provide Sarajevo with weapons and experts. In early-November 1992, more than 50 expert terrorists and instructors of the HizbAllah and the Tawhid (its Sunni counterpart under Sheik Sha'ban) were sent from Baalbak to Bosnia-Herzegovina to train local cadres and launch terrorist operations on their own."

--*Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy*, August 31, 1994

"In Sarajevo, the Bosnian army provokes the Serbs on a daily basis. Since the middle of December, the Bosnian army jumped another step by launching heavy infantry attacks from Sarajevo to the Serb-held suburbs of the city. The Bosnian Army attacks the Serbs from a safe area, the Serbs retaliate, mainly along the confrontation line and the Bosnian presidency accuses UNPROFOR of not protecting them against Serb aggression."

--Final report of UNPROFOR Commander Briquemont, quoted in British *Guardian* February 8, 1994

"There are even indications...that the (Bosnian) government has manipulated Sarajevo's suffering for propaganda reasons, for example preventing the UN from repairing electricity installation, refusing humanitarian aid in the capital because of the situation in Eastern Bosnia and tolerating market trade with humanitarian aid supplies."

--Tihomir Loza, columnist for *Oslobodjenje*, a pro-government Bosnian daily, quoted Oct. 18, 1993 London Daily *Telegraph*

"The UN Commander in Bosnia has gone on the offensive to persuade the world that Muslims inflated casualty figures in the Serbian assault on Gorazde in a bid to prompt NATO air strikes."

--The London *Independent*, April 29, 1994

"Instead of negotiating, the Pentagon believes, the Muslims are bent on fighting for more land or at least providing a disproportionate response from the Serbs...to draw in US firepower."

--*Newsweek* April 18, 1994

"Charles Redman, the Clinton administration's special envoy was frustrated to find that the (Bosnian) government had abandoned its earlier commitment to accept 51 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina's original territory. 'The Bosnian government has been moving the goal posts since the Carrington days,' says one veteran UN official referring to former British negotiator Lord Carrington. 'Now (the Clinton Administration) is beginning to confront what he, and then (former Secretary of State Cyrus) Vance and (British negotiator David) Owen, dealt with.' "

--*US News and World Report*, May 2, 1994

# YUGOSLAVIA: DIVIDE AND FAIL

By SUSAN L. WOODWARD

**Sanctions seem only to have made matters worse.**

**T**he disintegration of Yugoslavia and the subsequent wars over the territory and borders of new states has posed a major challenge to the available instruments of the international community. Unwilling to use military force, the Western powers have tried a wide range of diplomatic tactics and economic sanctions, first to prevent war from breaking out, and then to try to stop the military aggression, atrocities, and widespread violation of international norms that followed. It is still premature to assess the effectiveness of the sanctions that have been imposed, but it is possible to ask whether economic sanctions are appropriate to this kind of conflict.

There have been four phases in the imposition of economic sanctions to influence the Yugoslav conflicts:

■ In May 1991, the United States made an attempt to prevent the breakup of Yugoslavia by withdrawing economic and financial aid, but promising its reinstatement. At the same time, the European Community (EC) was attempting the same objective, but with the carrot before the stick—offering additional aid if Yugoslavia remained whole. When the EC offer failed to prevent Slovene and Croatian declarations of independence and the Yugoslav army moved to secure the Yugoslav border with Austria and Italy against Slovene troops on June 25–27, the EC then adopted U.S. tactics, withdrawing all economic and financial assistance during the summer.

■ After the wars began in Slovenia and then Croatia in July 1991, the EC imposed trade sanctions against all areas of Yugoslavia as a part of its diplomatic efforts at mediation; as an expression of disapproval for the use of military force to decide border issues; and in another attempt to bring politicians to the table. The United States joined in, imposing

trade sanctions in December. On September 25, 1991, the major powers (chiefly the United States, Britain, and France) also asked the U.N. Security Council to impose a comprehensive arms embargo on all parties in an attempt to end the fighting by reducing the means to wage war.

■ When war exploded in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a result of EC and U.S. recognition of the independence of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Western powers assigned primary responsibility for the war and its atrocities to Bosnian Serbs and to supporters in Serbia and Montenegro. Trade sanctions were lifted on the other four republics of the former country and the new state of Yugoslavia was given two weeks to end the fighting and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, cease all foreign assistance, and stop interfering with U.N. agencies delivering humanitarian relief. On May 30, 1992, Security Council Resolution 757 imposed a universal, binding blockade on all trade and all scientific, cultural, and sports exchanges with Serbia and Montenegro. Their new state was isolated diplomatically, suspended from membership in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and denied the right to succeed Yugoslavia in the United Nations. On June 18, Security Council Resolution 760 exempted humanitarian goods such as food and medicine.

■ On November 16, 1992, in light of widespread violations of the sanctions by land, river, and sea routes, the United Nations acted to tighten enforcement. NATO and Western European Union (WEU) ships began to patrol the Adriatic, and U.S. customs inspectors were installed as monitors on the Romanian and Macedonian borders with Serbia. In addition, neighboring countries, particularly Romania, were pressured to control traffic on the Danube.

But the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina worsened, and political negotiations between warring parties stalled over a political settlement

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proposed by U.N.-EC envoys Cyrus Vance and David Owen. The embargo on Serbia-Montenegro was therefore tightened in April 1993 with the addition of a maritime exclusion zone and a freeze on all financial assets and overseas property, including transport. The assumption remained that Serbian political, material, and logistical support to Bosnian Serbs was the prime cause of the war.

Only the fourth phase represents a classic embargo as an instrument of diplomacy. This final phase included advance warning and a relatively clear statement of purpose and of the behavioral changes expected, all coordinated with other activities as part of an overall policy. Until then, although the purposes could be surmised, there were many in the target countries who insisted, as Dusan Zupan reported in the official Belgrade publication *Tanjug* in April 1992, that the only certainty of the sanctions was their "unknown objective."

Nonetheless, the timing of all phases was driven by events outside Yugoslavia. Conditions for removing the sanctions were never made clear. Punishment loomed more salient than incentive. And disagreements among sanctioning powers caused long delays in implementation.

**T**he reasons for choosing economic sanctions fall into three unrelated categories. The first was Western unwillingness to use military force. Yugoslavia was regarded as of no strategic interest to the major powers; the war in the Balkans, as the Bush administration said repeatedly, did not involve U.S. national interests. Although West Europeans agreed that the Yugoslav conflict was insignificant to their

security and vital interests, they chose to mediate it to demonstrate their capacity for a common EC foreign policy. In any event, since the United States rejected NATO involvement "out of area" and opposed French alternatives of WEU or a Eurocorps, the EC had no military force. By default, attempts by the EC had to rely on economic instruments.

The second reason was the Western explanation for the conflict. Independently of its causes or the role they played in dissolving a state without prior resolution on new borders, the EC and the United States sought to obtain a cease-fire. That required identifying an "aggressor." Behind the application of sanctions was the judgment—made even before Slovenia and Croatia formally declared independence—that the Yugoslav army could not legitimately use force to prevent their secession, and that if it did, this would be an act of Serbian aggression to create a Greater Serbia. Mounting evidence of the work of paramilitary gangs from Serbia in the terror and atrocities against civilians in the border areas of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina added to the perception that the army was an instrument of Serbian policy.

Sanctions aimed to dissuade the leadership in Serbia from this course, by isolating it as an international pariah, by making it economically ever more difficult to continue assistance to the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and by putting pressure on President Slobodan Milosevic. It was thought that if Milosevic left office, either by resignation or through popular pressure, Serbia would adopt a different policy.

The third reason was to protect the authority and instruments of intervention in the face of failure. As the wars continued and the refugees flowed into Europe, and as Western

News media images of a torn and bleeding Yugoslavia spurred the imposition of sanctions. Here, a U.N. peacekeeper carrying a child in the besieged town of Srebrenica, April 1993.

## It was easier for Milosevic to rule in isolation.

publics reacted with horror to pictures of atrocities, news of widespread rape, detention camps, and "ethnic cleansing," this third purpose—completely unrelated to resolution of conflict on the ground—came into focus. This was the need to protect the domestic and international authority of the major powers by appeasing public opinion in Europe, the United States, and in Islamic countries where moral outrage erupted on behalf of the primary victims, the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The major powers moved to reassert international norms, shore up allied unity, and respond in a way that would deter other nations from engaging in similar conflicts in the future.

**T**o the extent that purposes were defined, the sanctions failed. If anything, they have made the situation worse, increasing the likelihood that war will continue and spread rather than cease. The causes of war began with an economic crisis from 1979 to 1989 to repay foreign debt and create a market economy. Unemployment, hyperinflation, and a drastic fall in living standards as well as bitter conflicts over federal and republican budgets led to political, social, and economic disintegration. The further destruction of the economies of Serbia, Montenegro, Vojvodina, Kosovo, and neighboring states only made political control over land and strategic resources more important while worsening the scapegoating and social disorder. Moreover, this ongoing crisis makes it extremely difficult to evaluate the effects of the sanctions, allowing leaders to blame outsiders for all hardships. How much of the decline in production is due to sanctions? How much is due to the collapse of the state and its economy? How much is due to the end of the communist system? How much is due to the collapse of trade with the Eastern bloc and the Middle East?

The immediate cause of war in Yugoslavia was the international recognition of Slovene and Croatian independence, and then of Bosnia-Herzegovina, without consideration for the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina who did not want to leave and thought they had an equal right to national self-determination. The imposition of sanctions against the one party that felt aggrieved by the breakup of its state was unlikely to be understood as just. Further, all parties used military force to achieve their goals, including Slovenia, Croatia, and the Yugoslav army. The presidents of Croatia and Serbia had agreed jointly to divide Bosnia, and the Croatian government had substantial numbers of armed forces and paramilitary units in Bosnia as well.

The timing of sanctions during two Serbian elections strengthened Milosevic sympathizers against what they considered illegitimate interference, while hurting his opposition.

Because the immediate cause of the conflict was the breakup of a state, isolating the impact of sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro from that on other areas of the former country where economic links still exist was not easy. Under ordinary conditions, Serbian dependence on trade for 50 percent of production should have made it vulnerable, but much of its trade was with other parts of Yugoslav territory and with struggling post-communist Eastern countries that were desperate for export revenues. One of the primary explanations for the first sanctions imposed against Serbia was its refusal to sell food to Bosnia-Herzegovina—yet the sanctions aimed at Serbia excluded all trade, including that with Bosnia.

Another cause of the wars was the shifting borders of Europe and the Eastern countries' competition for membership in the European Community. EC judgments about the relative "readiness" of central and eastern European states during 1989–90 created a serious dilemma for Yugoslavia. Although Yugoslavia had open borders and associations with the West long before the Eastern bloc, it looked as if it would be downgraded to the second tier. As former Hapsburg states with Roman Catholic populations, Slovenia and Croatia gambled that they could enter in the first tier if they separated from Yugoslavia. By remaining with Yugoslavia, they would be stuck waiting with the Balkans and Turkey. The sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro seemed to many to confirm this interpretation of the new "border" around the EC, rewarding Slovenia and Croatia and excluding the southern republics.

**E**conomic sanctions depend on particular assumptions about the relationship between economic conditions and political behavior. The idea that increasing economic hardship would motivate Serbian citizens to protest Milosevic's policies in Bosnia and, if necessary, overthrow his rule altogether, presumed a functioning democracy where people had access to uncensored information about the wars and sanctions and could organize to express their views and vote freely.

But Serbia, like the other republics, was not even a state. It was in the initial stages of creating democratic institutions. A decade of economic hardship had nurtured nationalist sentiments and self-defensive feelings on which Milosevic played.

Greater economic hardship requires individ-



## The sanctions worked against previous reforms.

uals to spend more time on daily survival and less on political activity. It reinforces the informal economic networks of family, tribe—or criminal syndicate. It increased the power of the government and of Milosevic personally in the need to ration goods and determine which enterprises will receive subsidies, which workers will be unemployed, and whether farmers, veterans, pensioners, and the army will have an income. Finally, it has encouraged the exodus of middle-class professionals—the group most able to protest and organize independent political action.

The power to interpret the meaning of the sanctions rests with those who control the media—President Milosevic and his government. The sanctions regime made this easier because it forbade external assistance to support an independent media, cut the resources of opposition forces, made newspapers prohibitively expensive, and effectively stopped the flow of information from outside. It also increased problems of law and order, which Milosevic used to justify the police force that protected his regime.

It was actually easier for Milosevic to rule in isolation—popular anger could more easily be directed at the opposition if its anti-Milosevic arguments sounded like those of hostile foreign powers. For many apolitical Serbs who might have opposed Milosevic, the sanctions violated their sense of fair play because other Yugoslavs were also guilty of the charges that were levied. Others, who considered the sanctions just punishment, interpreted the experience in religious terms (as requiring absolution, not political action).

Essentially, the use of sanctions assumed that there would be democratic pressure from below to change the regime or its policies. Instead, the political avenues for debating the future of the Yugoslav states within the former country were preempted by international mediation. Western prejudice was blamed for the dire economic conditions that turned unpaid or unemployed workers into army recruits. And sanctions reinforced the governing myth of Milosevic as martyr to the nation, a national myth that stresses survival against external foes, whatever the odds, and the conviction that Serbia cannot be secure without its own state and military resources. It also broadened Milosevic's political base among criminals, mafia, and the police, while any hint of accommodation lost him support to right-wing extremists.

While middle-class liberals chose to leave the country, those opposition forces that remained lost all means of influence, and the economic elite chose to wait out the sanctions, to demand subsidies, or to make huge profits by running the embargo. The political elite continued to

believe that the primary issue, as they saw it in Yugoslavia during 1986–90, was a matter of persuasion. Once the truth of their case was known, the sanctions would be lifted. As for the realists, it was clear that Europe could not keep Serbia a pariah state forever and that, as the Germans began to insist in early 1992, some accommodation with the largest power in the Balkans would have to be made.

Finally, to the extent that the wars were caused by the end of communist rule and the difficult process of creating open-market economies and democratic regimes, the economic sanctions worked against this goal. Sanctions required the Serbian state to reimpose state monopolies, rationing, price controls, and the central distribution of food, fuel, medicines, and transport, all of which had been abandoned. Entrepreneurship flourished only in illegal activities. The sanctions gave new life to the police and armed forces, whose numbers had been reduced, and it revived a search for Eastern alliances, calling on religious, historical, or anti-Western sympathies—with Russian nationalists, with China, with Greek merchants and politicians, and with former communist networks in Romania and Bulgaria.

At the same time, the goals of liberalization and open borders ran against the means necessary to enforce the sanctions and the arms embargo, creating an additional dilemma between the assertion of international norms and a solution to the conflict.

**T**here are two basic conditions needed for peace in the former Yugoslavia. The first is the development of democratic regimes throughout the territory to reassure minorities, and the second is a means of regional economic integration that counteracts the consequences of nationally exclusive mini-states with freedom of movement for people, ideas, and goods. Both conditions are precluded by the use of sanctions. Whether the sanctions' costs are worth the remote and ambiguous influence they have had over the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina remains an open question.

It is clear that the use of economic sanctions to resolve the conflicts created by the end of the Cold War, the absence of international institutions to guide the breakup of states and the peaceful formation of new ones, and the failure of external actors to complete the diplomatic job they began, have raised new questions about sanctions. These questions should be answered before the next cases of competitive nationalism arise in the midst of economic and political disintegration and balance-of-power politics. ■

I S S U E P A P E R

**EAST OF BOSNIA**  
**REFUGEES IN SERBIA**  
**AND MONTENEGRO**



U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES

SEPTEMBER 1993

# Recommendations of the U.S. Committee on Refugees

## To the United Nations Security Council and Sanctions Committee:

**If sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are to be maintained, appropriate allowances must be made for the timely clearance of humanitarian goods, related equipment, and humanitarian financial transfers.**

This includes not only food and medicine, but operating funds for international and nongovernmental relief agencies, servicing and replacement of medical equipment, and assistance to families that host refugees.

## To the Government of the United States:

**1. The U.S. Congress and Administration should cease earmarking for specific republics the refugee assistance funds the United States provides for those in the former Yugoslavia.**

While the financial assistance that the U.S. government provides to intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations that assist refugees is indispensable, the practice of earmarking that assistance for specific former republics of the SFRY, unless based on actual demonstrated humanitarian need, is not helpful. Such actions can amount to the misuse of food and medicine as political weapons against innocent civilians. While the assistance needs of refugees from Bosnia and Croatia are similar in all the former republics of the SFRY, the economic hardships may actually be greatest in Serbia and Montenegro, the two republics that U.S. appropriations legislation pointedly omits and that have the added strains of sanctions and less involvement by nongovernmental assistance organizations. The United States should allow those organizations assisting refugees in the former Yugoslavia, such as UNHCR, to utilize their expertise and designate as they see fit recipients for U.S.-donated funds.

**2. The U.S. government should permit, in addition to UNHCR, other organizations to refer vulnerable cases for U.S. resettlement. The possibility of resettlement should be maintained for members of all nationality groups, with determinations made on the merits of each case.**

Because UNHCR has not been intimately involved in registering or maintaining files of ex-Yugoslav refugees in Montenegro, Serbia, and elsewhere, it is not yet in a position to refer significant numbers of refugees for resettlement. United States insistence

on UNHCR referrals is arbitrary, dysfunctional, and harmful to refugees. Because of this, other organizations with knowledge of vulnerable cases should be permitted to refer such cases to the responsible processing organization. The United States should not compound the tragedy of "ethnic cleansing" by considering for resettlement members of only one nationality group, provided members of other groups are equally vulnerable in their country of first asylum.

## To the UN High Commissioner for Refugees:

**UNHCR should be more energetic in its approach to resettling refugees who have no opportunity to repatriate and cannot remain in their country of first asylum.**

UNHCR should acknowledge that one component of refugee protection that is needed for refugees from Bosnia and Croatia in neighboring republics of the former Yugoslavia is third country resettlement. Throughout the former Yugoslavia, UNHCR has been reluctant to become involved in serious consideration of resettlement as a durable solution for a significant number of refugees. As the likelihood of return for refugees from Bosnia and Croatia becomes less and less, UNHCR must necessarily devote more of its energies to refugee protection throughout the former Yugoslavia.

## To Nongovernmental Refugee Relief Organizations:

**Nongovernmental organizations that provide services for and assistance to refugees and others should give serious consideration to assisting the more than 600,000 refugees in Montenegro and Serbia.**

Refugees in Montenegro and Serbia are every bit as much victims of war and persecution as are refugees in the other former Yugoslav republics. The possibilities for assisting such refugees are nearly limitless. Simple, low-budget, high-impact social programs for refugees and others would produce significant benefits, not only for those who are assisted directly, but also for the general state of affairs between the people of Serbia and Montenegro and the rest of the world.



## **The "Quiet Genocide" -- Quotes on the Effects of Sanctions Against Serbia and Montenegro**

**"I fear that one half of those in my community who are over 65 will not live to April because of shortages of medicine and fuel."**

--Tsadik Danon, Chief Rabbi of Belgrade to a group of American congressional aides and journalists in August of 1993.

**"Death is the only relief for many of Belgrade's destitute elderly"**

--Toronto Globe and Mail October 22, 1993

**"There is a conscious effort to make these people suffer"**

--Lyndall Sachs, UNHCR, about the denial of food and medicine to civilians resulting from sanctions against Serbia-  
New York Times August 22, 1993

**"The U.S. Congress and Administration should cease earmarking for specific republics the refugee assistance funds... such actions can amount to the misuse of food and medicine as political weapons"**

--September 1993 report on Serbia and Montenegro by the U.S. Committee on Refugees

**"catastrophic...a tripling of the death rate in mental hospitals, a drop in immunization, deaths due to a lack of transportation to hospitals, lack of transfusion equipment and an increasingly limited capacity to perform life-saving surgery. "**

--UNHCR, International Committee of the Red Cross and WHO report on health conditions in Serbia, quoted in New York Times August 22, 1993

**"What is happening in Serbia is murder and the United Nations sanctions are the cause. Over ten million Serbian people are being denied food and medicine... It is essential that all sanctions against Serbia stop immediately."**

--the Greek American newspaper  
Nov. 20, 1993

**"Why is Serbia being sanctioned by the UN? What is Serbia doing that it must cease doing in order to have the sanctions lifted? It has no troops outside its borders, a fact not disputed by major intelligence services. Croatia, on the other hand, has forty thousand troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina helping to pursue Croatia's clearly articulated territorial expansionist aims."**

"Defense and Foreign Affairs  
Strategic Policy" British defense  
magazine December 31, 1992

**"The glass eye of the Western media cannot and will not see the already commenced silent holocaust within Serbia...All this goes on to muzzle any debate on the moral legitimacy to remove sanctions against Serbia".**

--Peter Brock, political columnist  
El Paso Herald Post

**"The general (UN Commander Briquemont) reserved his sole praise for Bosnian Serb Forces ...they have lived up to their agreements with the UN Protection Force. He called for an easing of an international embargo against the new Serbian-led, two republic Yugoslavia."**

John Pomfret, Washington Post  
January 22, 1994

**"To the extent that purposes were defined, the sanctions failed. If anything, they have made the situation worse, increasing the likelihood that war will continue and spread rather than cease."**

--Susan Woodward, Visiting Fellow  
Brookings Institution, in the Bulletin of  
the Atomic Scientists, November 1994

**"Those who impose sanctions are responsible for the harm suffered by civilians."**

Drew Christiansen, Director of the  
Office of International Justice and Peace  
and Gerard F. Powers of the U.S.  
Catholic Conference

RECEIVED JAN 27 1994

# SERBNET MEDIA CENTER

THE MEDIA ARM OF THE SERBIAN AMERICAN NATIONAL INFORMATION NETWORK, INC. -SERBNET

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January 24, 1994

Dear Ms. Bentley:

I have enclosed a comprehensive package that could be sent to your colleagues in congress, including the revised letter to the President that we discussed and a proposed cover letter. You may wish to pick and choose among the different supporting materials I have sent and to make changes in the letters. They are all pretty strong. I've spoke to Alex B. and she knows these are coming directly to you. Several congressional aides and Obrad Kesic are ready to assist in gathering the signatures. I think the timing is right to send these now.

Best Regards,



## THE COST OF BOSNIAN PEACE ENFORCEMENT

Gregory D. Vuksich

While the moral and operational ambiguities of U.S. military involvement in Bosnia are argued daily, there has been little public consideration of the sobering costs involved. Recent experiences in the Balkans and Somalia indicate that a U.S. deployment of the scope now envisioned would cost about \$8 billion, dozens of dead and hundreds of casualties annually, and would limit seriously the capability of American forces to react to contingencies where real, vital interests are threatened.

While the administration recently has made clear its determination not to commit American ground forces to make peace in the region, it has not renounced earlier assurances that tens of thousands of U.S. infantrymen will enforce an agreement signed by the three parties to Bosnia's civil war. Stalled progress at the Geneva talks and potentially limiting preconditions had cast doubt that the pledge would ever have to be fulfilled. Ultimately, however, Bosnia's Muslim nationalist leaders, now caught by the extravagance of their territorial and political claims, will come to terms. The administration will then be pressed to make good its promises.

The best basis for a cost estimate of an operation in Bosnia involving 25,000 U.S. personnel is the like-sized deployment to Somalia from December, 1992, through March, 1993. During this period, the U.S. military services had to seek \$750 million in additional funding. This is an annualized cost of \$2.25 billion.

Most analysts concur, however, that the short duration of

this phase of the Somalia endeavor significantly understates costs in Bosnia. First, large additional expenditures in Somalia were covered by the services out of existing appropriations. Second, Somalia was a short deployment that required little investment in infrastructure to support the force. Once involved in Bosnia, U.S. elements will be there for many years, unable to ignore infrastructure needs or to take incremented costs out of hide. The direct expenditures in former Yugoslavia are likely to be in the range of \$4 billion annually.

American taxpayers will pay additional indirect costs, however. Cuts in the armed forces create a scissors effect in which a structure now stretched too far to respond to other contingencies must also serve as the sustainment base for a major, long-term commitment abroad. Given the 3:1 ratio of sustaining elements to committed elements required to maintain a deployed force, a Bosnian contingency of the magnitude now under consideration will consume about two thirds of the Army's total combat power. Whether by foregoing further defense cuts or by returning units to the active roles, this country will simply have to buy replacements for the two division-equivalent force now under discussion. The annual price tag for a division, depending on type, goes up from \$2 billion. Hence, a hidden but no less real indirect cost on the order of \$4 billion will swell annual costs to about \$8 billion, or about what was saved by cancellation of the superconducting super collider.

Beyond seriously constraining American ability to react to other contingencies where truly critical interests may be at

stake, the Bosnian deployment has other operational impacts.

First, operations in Bosnia will require major involvement of the unique capabilities maintained in the reserve forces. While these citizen-soldiers performed admirably in the Gulf, there is a limit to the number of times the nation can go back to them without jeopardizing their civilian pursuits. The implications of injudicious call-ups are obvious.

Second, there is a real potential that the hollow Army of the post-Vietnam era will recur. Unrelenting personnel turbulence over a period of years will disrupt the professional heart of the force, leaving it struggling to maintain just the fundamentals of its vastly overextended commitments.

Of course, last October's loss of eighteen U.S. soldiers in Somalia makes clear that the most tragic cost will be the lives of American troops. By the end of 1993, the number of U.N. dead in Bosnia was approaching 80; the number of wounded approaching 800. There is no reason to believe that a 25,000-soldier U.S. force would not suffer proportionately.

While these costs are sobering, their impact is dramatically magnified when put further into context.

First, the 25,000 American soldiers now under discussion is a floor. The U.N. has been unable for months to gather the additional 7000 soldiers it sought to defend so-called safe havens. America most likely will be asked to assume an even greater portion of the initial Bosnian NATO force and, as contributing nations fall out over time, only the U.S. will be able fill the void. This will become an American operation.

Second, U.S. forces seem unprepared for the peace keeping role. American impatience and a bellicose approach will be even more costly in a Bosnian context than that encountered in Somalia to date. Given the administration's black-and-white, good-guy-bad-guy predisposition, there seems a markedly greater potential for U.S. personnel to become caught up in deadly and dysfunctional confrontations with one side or another.

Third, forces sent to the Balkans will be there for many years. Cyprus may well be the appropriate analog where Austrian, Canadian and Brit units, among others, remain on a "green line" dividing Muslims and Orthodox decades after their arrival. In northern Iraq, Americans still are providing aid to Kurds under the Gulf War mandate, with no end in sight. The humanitarian mission projected to last several months in Somalia became a "nation-building" endeavor and the administration acknowledged, before the tragic loss of eighteen American soldiers in a single day, that it would have been years before U.S. forces departed. In the new atmospherics, even an additional six-month Somali extension became contentious. Once sent to Bosnia, Americans will remain in former Yugoslavia well into the next millennium, unless they leave as from Beirut in 1983 and as planned from Somalia later this year.

Clearly, the situation in former Yugoslavia is disquieting. Before this country commits its youth and fortune, however, it must consciously examine the inevitable costs, in lives, security and treasure, and then reassure itself that they are acceptable.

## BOSNIAN ERRORS REPEATED IN THE SOUTH BALKANS

Gregory D. Vuksich

The irrelevance of American efforts to end the conflict in Bosnia and Hercegovina is the result of a failure to properly characterize the civil war in that administrative region of former Yugoslavia. Many commentators and practitioners accepted early on that this is a war of aggression and, hence, picked a side. Consistently unable to prescribe effective policy, however, the aggression framework lost any remaining shred of credibility when the international community's two anointed victims, the Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Muslim factions, fell one upon the other as all three sides sought to gobble up territory in the civil war which has engulfed the region. Now, U.S. policy in the south Balkans is poised for a similar debacle, again the result of a comfortable oversimplification of the nature of the conflict which may be brewing in Macedonia, Kosovo and Albania.

The war of aggression notion in Bosnia is based on a theoretical abstraction that international recognition somehow created a viable Bosnian state which was subsequently attacked by outside powers. Practically, however, the people who live in Bosnia and Hercegovina share no notion of political community, the bed rock of internal legitimacy for any meaningful state. Formal legalisms notwithstanding, a Bosnian state against which to aggress does not now and never has existed regardless of how hard some in the international community and one of the contending factions may try to proclaim the requisite national identity. American policy will remain frustrated in Bosnia until it reformulates its fundamental conception of the problem from aggression by one or two to a civil war in which all three parties are equally responsible for the fighting and the peace.

The disconnect between the policy framework and reality in the American approach to the struggle in the northwestern portion of former Yugoslavia is also developing in the southern region. Having mislabelled the civil war in Bosnia as Croatian and Serbian aggression, America seems condemned to frustration anew as policy is again mesmerized by the bogeyman of Serbian aggression, this time supposedly aimed at Macedonia and Albanians living in the Serbian province of Kosovo.

The prevailing American view insists that the most likely spark to a general war in the south Balkans is Serbian cleansing of the Albanian population in Serbia's Kosovo Province or a Serbian attack on neighboring Macedonia. The policy output has been another American line drawn in the sand defending two supposedly innocent potential victims. In concrete terms, it has led to the deployment of a 300-soldier trip wire into Macedonia, initiation of a military assistance relationship with Albania, and a bevy of American emissaries shuttling between Skopje and Tirana.



But, the likelihood of either scenario of Serbian aggression is remote. The Yugoslav Army packed up and returned to Serbia on Macedonia's proclamation of independence. Given the absence of any large and potentially endangered Serb population in Macedonia, the likelihood of an unprovoked Serb attack is minimal.

Serbs attach great cultural significance to the numerous artifacts of their ancient civilization which dot the Kosovo countryside and see themselves, with some justification, as an aggrieved party which suffered under administration of Kosovo by ethnic Albanians throughout the post-World War II period. However, they also recognize, confronted by an Albanian population outnumbering them 9:1, that continuing the tense inter-communal balance in Kosovo is the only means by which Serbs can maintain access to the entire region. In any case, expelling the Albanian majority is infeasible.

The central problem in the south Balkans is the tension arising from the burgeoning Albanian minorities expanding throughout the region and the increasingly threatening approach with which they are perceived to be flirting. This has heightened long-standing, mutually suspicious relationships between the mostly-Muslim Albanians and their Orthodox Christian neighbors in Greece, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia.

Far more than Serb aggression, the most likely catalyst to an explosion in the south Balkans is a calculation among Albanian leaders throughout the region that conditions for radical alteration of the status quo are at hand. American policy, unbalanced and militantly anti-Serbian and increasingly adversarial toward Greece, only adds fuel to the fire. But regardless of where fighting might begin, once started, Albanians throughout the region will almost certainly find themselves pitted against an Orthodox Christian consortium which includes both Macedonians and Serbs.

The irony in the south Balkans is that, as in Bosnia, American policy is being built on a comfortably oversimplified conception of good guys and bad guys which fails to acknowledge some of the defining nuances of the impending crisis. Indeed, American execution of its policies, both in the south Balkans and in Bosnia, makes the outbreak and intensification of fighting more, not less, likely. And, should war erupt in the south, America will find itself caught once again as its two supposed victims, this time Albanians and Macedonians, become primary antagonists.

# UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

By DREW CHRISTIANSEN and GERARD F. POWERS

**N**uclear weapons were the weapon of choice for the superpowers during the Cold War; economic sanctions seem to be the weapon of choice for the United Nations in its aftermath.

Economic coercion is nothing new, nor is the debate over the morality of such weapons. Woodrow Wilson tried to sell Americans on the League of Nations by arguing eloquently for the utility of sanctions as an alternative to war:

"A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will

be no need for force. It is a terrible remedy. It does not cost a life outside the nation boycotted, but it brings pressure upon the nation which, in my judgment, no modern nation could resist."<sup>1</sup>

At about the same time, in a report by the U.S. Committee on Economic Sanctions issued after World War I, John Foster Dulles opposed boycotts on the grounds that they tended to harm the innocent. He proposed confining sanctions to arms embargoes and other specific steps that would embarrass the target state without imposing undue hardships and inequities.<sup>2</sup> Others have proposed that all forms of economic coercion are inherently immoral and illegal.

Given the volume of moral arguments in favor of sanctions on South Africa, Haiti, China, Serbia, Iraq, and many other places in

**How do we  
avoid the  
suffering  
of the  
innocent?**

Managua, 1987:  
U.S. trade sanctions  
against Nicaragua  
resulted in food  
rationing.

IMPACT VISUALS/STEVE CAGAN



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*Drew Christiansen, S.J., is director of the Office of International Justice and Peace and Gerard F. Powers is a policy adviser in the same office at the U.S. Catholic Conference in Washington, D.C.*

## Sanctions often cause a dramatic decrease in the standard of living.

recent years, it is surprising that there has been little discussion of the criteria for a moral analysis of sanctions.

If economic sanctions are morally preferable to the use of military force, then how can we respond to Dulles's objection that the innocent and vulnerable suffer under such policies? What bearing do unintended consequences (for instance, the increase in a dictator's power or the flow of refugees to third countries) have on the choice of sanctions? What protections are there against the unjust use of sanctions, especially by powerful states against small, weak ones?

The most common criticism of sanctions is that they are ineffective and even counterproductive, and hence not a realistic alternative to war. A senior State Department official recently summed up the argument against sanctions: "You cannot show one government that has changed due to sanctions. . . . When the government, the elite and the black marketeers are one and the same, the ones that we really want to hurt do well and the common people get hurt."<sup>3</sup> The correlation between economic pressure and changes in political or military behavior is rarely direct, and sanctions often prove the law of unintended consequences. Not only have the elites in Haiti, Iraq, and Serbia been least affected by the sanctions, there is considerable evidence that they have instead been enriched financially and, in some cases, politically. In all three countries (and in many other cases) the elites and criminal elements who can benefit from skyrocketing inflation or who can control the black market have increased their power—economic or otherwise.

In Serbia, sanctions have tended to reinforce the power of the extreme nationalists—those that they were meant to undermine. Many analysts contend that Western sanctions against Yugoslavia are based on the false assumption that economic pressure will convince Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to sue for peace when, in fact, his political life may depend on a continuation of war.<sup>4</sup> And sometimes sanctions isolate or weaken those most likely to provide a democratic alternative to a repressive regime.

But dismissing sanctions as ineffective does not do justice to the historical record. According to a 1990 study by Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott (*Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*), sanctions were "successful" in about 34 percent of 115 cases studied. The success rate depends on a host of factors. In 52 percent of the cases, sanctions were successful in destabilizing small and shaky governments—one of the objectives in Iraq, Haiti, Yugoslavia, and South Africa. But this success depended in part on


using sanctions in conjunction with other measures, such as covert action. Sanctions involving modest goals, such as improving human rights, preventing nuclear nonproliferation, discouraging support for terrorism, and bringing about the release of political prisoners, succeeded about a third of the time.

While sanctions had only a 23 percent success rate in undermining military potential or achieving a surrender of territory or other major policy changes, they were judged successful in a third of the cases involving military adventures short of major wars, as well as in two civil wars: India's war with Hyderabad and Nigeria's conflict with Biafra. The Hufbauer study found that sanctions tend to be most effective when the goal is relatively modest (thus lessening the importance of difficult-to-achieve international cooperation); when the target country is much smaller than the country imposing sanctions; when the target country is an ally and close trading partner of the sanctioning nation; when the sanctions are imposed quickly and decisively to maximize impact; when the imposing nation avoids high cost to itself, and so maintains support for sanctions; and when sanctions are carefully tailored to the objective sought.<sup>5</sup>

These findings are relevant to the question of whether sanctions are genuine alternatives to military force and other more coercive measures. The relatively low success rate for sanctions when war is the likely alternative suggests that we cannot presume that sanctions are an effective alternative to military force. And the high success rate for destabilization efforts is partly attributable to covert and quasi-military actions, themselves morally problematic. These findings also suggest that sanctions must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

In the case of Iraq, the authors and other experts concluded that the thoroughness with which these conditions were met "strongly suggest[s] that the sanctions could have worked against Iraq given enough time, maybe a year or so."<sup>6</sup> The impact of sanctions on South Africa is hotly debated (see "Squeezing Apartheid" by Jennifer Davis, page 16), but their modest impact can be attributed to the gradual, half-hearted, and selective way they were imposed, and the lack of international consensus. Even if the chance of success is low, as in Yugoslavia, sanctions might be morally preferable to military intervention.

**S**anctions might fail to reverse aggression or protect human rights in a particular case but succeed in other ways: avoiding complicity in immoral policies, expressing moral revul-



sion, showing solidarity with suffering people, or upholding international norms. The effectiveness of sanctions can be evaluated only on a case-by-case basis, but history provides us with situations when sanctions are likely to be effective and when they are not.

The principal moral dilemma posed by sanctions is that the more effective they are, the more likely that they will harm those least responsible for the wrongdoing and least able to bring about change: civilians. Sanctions' impact on the civilian population varies in each case. Are the sanctions being strictly enforced, or has the target country been able to circumvent the sanctions? Can the target country produce food, fuel, medicine, and other basic necessities? Do sanctions allow adequate exceptions for trade in humanitarian goods or for direct relief? Does the target government use its resources to mitigate the suffering of its population? Are the sanctions continued (as is the case in Iraq) after a war has heavily damaged a country's infrastructure, thus exacerbating the impact on the civilian population?

A study published in the *New England Journal of Medicine* (September 24, 1992) claimed that in Iraq, the Gulf War and trade sanctions caused a threefold increase in infant mortality between January and August 1991. Assuming the accuracy of this study, it is unclear whether the increase was due primarily to the sanctions, the war, the civil strife following the war, or to the failure of the Iraqi government to cooperate in humanitarian programs.<sup>7</sup>

What is clear is that even if comprehensive sanctions do not cause deaths and epidemics, they often involve a dramatic decrease in the standard of living. According to the Hufbauer study, in cases where sanctions were successful, the average decline in GNP was about 2.5 percent, a decline comparable to a serious recession, if not a depression. In Iraq, sanctions have reduced the living standard by about one-third; in Yugoslavia, average earnings have been reduced by about half; and in Haiti, about 250,000 export-oriented jobs were lost in 1991.<sup>8</sup> According to a study commissioned by the International Labor Organization, while the worsening unemployment problem in South Africa "cannot be attributed to sanctions, it is fair to conclude that sanctions played a role in exacerbating the situation."<sup>9</sup>

**T**he debate over the wisdom and legitimacy of economic sanctions—especially the comprehensive kind imposed on Iraq and Yugoslavia—becomes most complex when the questions about the sanctions' impact on the target country's population are joined with the moral question: What protections should be extended to civilians? Can comprehensive sanctions be levied so as to protect civilians and still remain effective?

It is generally accepted that the immunity of civilians applies in cases of economic coer-

A Croatian soldier tries out the piano in the remains of a Bosnian music school.

IMPACT VISUALS/TEUN VOETEN

**Sanctions may be aimed at the authorities, but they are aimed through the civilian population.**

cion in which the lives of civilians are placed at risk. But in practice, blockades and sieges often result in tremendous suffering and even the death of "enemy" civilians. This suffering is usually justified by arguments that the civilian population is a legitimate target because it either contributes to the war effort or it shares responsibility for the actions of its government. Thus, the reasoning goes, sanctions appropriately encourage the civilian population to remove the government in power.<sup>10</sup> Such reasoning presumes that the population has consented, at least implicitly, to suffer the risks of the embargo and thus cannot enjoy civilian immunity.

Another argument, which is sometimes legitimate, is that the government under sanctions bears responsibility for the suffering of its people. When dictatorial regimes, as in Iraq, use sanctions to penalize potential opponents and to demoralize the general population, they are to blame for the harm they cause.

As a general rule, however, those who impose sanctions are responsible for the harm suffered by civilians. In a blockade against an entire nation, free exit is not plausible. The Haitian refugee situation has been a vivid demonstration of that. The civilian population cannot be presumed to have consented to its government's actions when there is no way for the population to express disagreement short of rebellion. There is ample evidence in Serbia and Iraq, for instance, that a significant minority or even a majority of citizens do not support their government and, in the case of Iraq, have tried to overthrow their government without success.

In some situations citizens welcome sanctions. Many black South Africans welcomed corporate disengagement and, according to many observers, the general population of Haiti favored the imposition of sanctions by the Organization of American States (OAS) to restore democratic rule. Popular acceptance of sanctions against unjust rule, though inevitably a contested judgment, makes imposed suffering morally tolerable. This does not, however, relieve the sanctioning party of responsibility for decisions to alter or end sanctions because their subsequent harm outweighs their good.

Civilian immunity becomes relevant if the civilian population has no real opportunity to consent or object to a country-wide blockade during war. According to Michael Walzer, in *Just and Unjust Wars*, the sanctions may well be aimed at the political and military authorities, but they are aimed through the civilian population. The besieger "can risk incidental deaths, but he cannot kill civilians simply because he finds them between himself and his enemies." Walzer concludes that "this princi-

ple rules out the extended form of the naval blockade and every sort of strategic devastation, except in cases where adequate provision can be made, and is made, for noncombatants."

The same distinction needs to be made between the government of the offending nation and the "innocent" population in crisis situations short of war. Humanitarian provisions must be made for vulnerable groups. Sanctions may create serious inconvenience for a population, but they may not impose grave harm. Therefore, humanitarian exemptions are necessary for a just sanctions regime.

**I**nternational law and recent U.N.-authorized sanctions have included humanitarian exemptions, but they have been too narrowly defined. The Fourth Geneva Convention (Article 23) requires free passage of medical supplies intended only for civilians and for foodstuffs for children under 15, expectant mothers and maternity cases. Additionally, Articles 69-71 of the First Geneva Protocol (1977) require that essential humanitarian supplies be provided to civilians in an unoccupied territory if their survival is threatened.

It is not clear that recent U.N. sanctions, even with their humanitarian exemptions, have always complied with the minimal standards set out in the Geneva Convention and the Protocol. Only in March and April 1991 did the United Nations lift the embargo on food and materials (for narrowly defined "essential human needs") to Iraq.

In May 1991, the U.N. Sanctions Committee agreed to unfreeze Iraqi assets to pay for its essential civilian goods, and in August the Security Council authorized the sale of \$1.6 billion of Iraqi oil to pay for, among other things, the purchase of food and medicine to be distributed by the United Nations. (U.N. Resolution 661 of August 6, 1991, exempted imports of "supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs.") To date, Iraq continues to object to the conditions for the sale of oil, so this resolution has not been implemented.

What counts as "essential" civilian needs is another question. Some goods such as oil might be considered essential but their import would arguably undermine the effectiveness of sanctions. The Iraq experience makes clear that the exemptions for essential goods should be defined broadly enough that there can be no threat to human health or life. A broader exemption for essential goods might well make sanctions more difficult to enforce and might diminish their effectiveness, but due care for civilian populations seems to require that these difficulties be accepted if



Walzer's condition—adequate provision for civilians—is to be met.

**F**inally, assuming adequate provision is made for basic humanitarian needs, do the good ends of sanctions compensate for their unintended bad effects? This question of proportion is firmly rooted in both moral and legal analyses and places an important—albeit inherently difficult to measure—limit on what can be done in the name of sanctions. Among other things, this criterion means that, if the alternative to sanctions is a major war, even a low probability of success could justify sanctions. Moreover, the more sanctions will cause suffering of civilians, the more sanctions should be tied to narrowly defined and tangible objectives; and the longer sanctions remain in place, the less likely they will be proportionate.

A final moral consideration is that economic coercion has historically been used most effectively by big powers to impose their will on weaker states; this should give any moralist pause. Sanctions might well be imposed in a moral way, yet still be subject to the worst kinds of abuse by unscrupulous states. It is unsurprising that the most vulnerable countries of the developing world have frequently sought international condemnation of boycotts and other forms of "economic warfare" in the name of nonintervention, non-discrimination, self-determination and solidarity.<sup>11</sup>

As sovereignty, noninterference, and other fundamental principles of international order are redefined and redeveloped, the political and legal limits of sanctions should become clearer. If international institutions like the United Nations become more adept at developing collective security mechanisms (including sanctions) in coming years, countries will resort less and less to unilateral measures to defend their interests.

Such progress should not only strengthen international order (some unilateral measures

involve actions that violate international norms in order to safeguard them), it could also limit the abuse of sanctions by powerful nations: when sanctions are employed by international institutions rather than by individual states, there is a procedural brake on any temptation to subvert sanctions to serve narrow national interests, instead of the interests of justice. As David Hendrickson points out in the 1993 volume of *Ethics and International Affairs*, "the necessity of gathering a coalition together to meet any particular crisis provides a certain insurance that the intervening states are aiming for an approximation of the common good and not simply pursuing their selfish interests."

But multilateralism is no panacea, as Hendrickson also notes. The need to seek international legitimacy can sometimes serve as an excuse for not acting when action is justified. And most worrisome, multilateralism can sometimes actually discourage the peaceful resolution of disputes. Obviously, morally legitimate and effective unilateralism is preferable to immoral or ineffectual international action. Multilateralism for its own sake is not the answer. But multilateralism combined with a commitment to the principles of collective security could at least lower the risk that sanctions could be used by the powerful to bully the vulnerable.

A morally legitimate sanctions regime will be both less idealistic and draconian than Woodrow Wilson's vision and more assertive than that of John Foster Dulles. But with Wilson, we believe that as war becomes less feasible as an instrument of policy, as there is wider appreciation of the moral problems with warfare, and as international institutions develop as they were intended, the legitimacy and efficacy of sanctions should grow proportionately. Moral analysis does not provide easy or clear answers to the question: Should we impose sanctions? What it can do is help insure that we ask the right questions. ■

**Do the ends of sanctions compensate for their unintended bad effects?**

1. Barry E. Carter, *International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 9.

2. Patrick Clawson, "Sanctions as Punishment, Enforcement, and Prelude to Further Action," *Ethics & International Affairs*, vol. 7, (1993), p. 20.

3. Stuart Auerbach, "Are Sanctions More Harmful than Helpful?" *Washington Post*, March 28, 1993, pp. H1, H4.

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## SERBIA

*The Belgrade government claims U.N. sanctions have worsened the plight of these mental patients in Toponica*

CVLE-ZAMUR—GAMMA-LIAISON

# 'A Price No One Can Justify'

**Sanctions:** Is American policy hurting civilians more than their leaders in Serbia and Haiti?

**T**HEIR IMAGES EXPLODED BEFORE the world last week. Naked and cadaverous, they huddled in dark and unheated halls, begging visitors for food and cigarettes. The patients at Toponica Hospital, the largest psychiatric institution in Serbia, sat in their own excrement or shivered together beneath thin gray blankets as hospital workers, with no drugs to administer, stood by helplessly. This is what U.N. sanctions have done to Serbia, hospital aides told the Western reporters who were invited by the Belgrade regime for a rare look inside. On average, they claimed, three patients a day die of dysentery, tuber-

culosis and typhus. But they neglected to mention that the inmates at Toponica had also been included in a recent movie about the evils of the trade embargo, a film made by the government-controlled media and distributed to Western charitable organizations. The goal: to persuade the international community to lift sanctions slapped on Serbia for backing aggression in Bosnia.

Are sanctions fair—and do they work? Representatives from the United States and the 12-member European Union must wrestle with those questions this week as they meet in Geneva to consider a phase-out of the embargo as part of a compre-

hensive peace plan for the Balkans. A new Franco-German initiative offers to suspend sanctions if the Serbs stop fighting, let humanitarian aid through and turn over a fraction more territory to the Muslims. Sooner or later, Western leaders will also have to re-evaluate the sanctions against Haiti. A controversial new study from Harvard University concludes that the embargo and a cutoff in aid "may have contributed to as many as 1,000 extra child deaths per month," while causing little harm to the military that ousted the nation's democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and prevented his return.

America is searching for new foreign-policy tools. Economic sanctions are hardly new. But since the United States has become more squeamish about using force, trade embargoes have emerged as a handy, if vexing, approach to crises ranging from Serbia and Haiti to China and Iraq. Sanctions have a decidedly mixed record. They worked in South Africa, helping to bring down apartheid by pummeling the economy and delivering a psychological blow to a country that couldn't tolerate international isolation. But they haven't been terribly successful elsewhere. Cuba and North Korea have both survived, if not prospered.

through decades of U.S. sanctions. Renegade states have remarkable staying power.

Sanctions against Belgrade represent the world's first attempt at a high-tech embargo. U.N. observers have been able electronically to trace every truck and ship that tries to enter Serbia back to their points of origin. About 260 international customs officers from 26 countries, linked via an international satellite system to a communications center in Brussels and a U.N. sanctions commission in New York, monitor all overland traffic. Computers track every ship and barge traveling up and down the Danube. The embargo is by no means airtight, and violations frequently occur. Nevertheless, "from an economic perspective, the Serbian sanctions have been the most successful in modern history," says a senior U.S. official.

The Serbian people are hurting. With hyperinflation approaching 25,000 percent for December, the average Serb has seen his monthly income drop from \$500 to \$15. Nearly two thirds of the country is now unemployed. The West can't take all the credit for bankrupting the economy: for two years, President Slobodan Milosevic has done his bit by draining state coffers to finance Serbian offensives in Croatia and Bosnia.

Yet from a political standpoint, sanctions

have made only a small dent on Belgrade. Originally imposed by the U.N. Security Council in May 1992 to halt "ethnic cleansing" and ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid, the trade embargo has failed on both counts. Western diplomats imagined a scenario in which Serbian civilians, squeezed by sanctions, would get rid of Milosevic by electoral or other means—or, at least, pressure the Belgrade government to cut its ties with nationalists in Bosnia. Neither event took place. No solid opposition movement emerged. On the contrary, sanctions created support for nationalist causes and encouraged Serbs to unite behind Milosevic, holding the United Nations responsible for its ills. "This government is not guilty; it's the fault of the West, which allowed Yugoslavia to be destroyed," says a Belgrade clerk. Defying sanctions is now a patriotic duty. Says a teacher in the Serbian province of Kosovo, "Milosevic really makes us feel good to be Serbs."

In Haiti, nobody needs persuading that the government is a bad one. But the oil embargo has so crippled the country that most people are incapable of making a living, much less of overthrowing their government. "No one can justify the price the Haitian people are paying for political warfare," says Dr. Reginald Boulous, director

of the Haitian Centers for Development and Health. More than 700,000 people, 10 percent of the population, now depend for food on foreign relief agencies; some report a 30 percent increase in their handouts since the coup two years ago. Lucille St. Dory, a 19-year-old street hawker and mother from Carrefour, is one of those dependents. Each month she picks up 10 pounds of soy-wheat mix and two quarts of cooking oil from the Catholic Relief Services in nearby Merger. In July her daughter died of diarrhea, two days after she was born. "The doctors couldn't find a vein to give her intravenous; she was too thin," says St. Dory. "They finally put the needle in her head, but even with that she died."

It's hard to pin the blame on sanctions alone. The Harvard report argues that while the 1991 coup triggered the crisis, the international community exacerbated the problem by failing to make adequate provisions to feed and care for the people whom sanctions would hurt most. "We don't have the institutional mechanisms working out a healthy balance between political and humanitarian goals," says Lincoln Chen, the study's team leader.

## INTERNATIONAL

Last summer it looked as if the embargo had worked; Haiti's military came to the bargaining table at last. "We were all amazed at how easily sanctions spun the army around," says a negotiator of the deal to restore Aristide, a plan the junta agreed to in July, then abrogated in October. "But in fact they had no intention of letting Aristide back." Instead, the military has mounted a new program of political violence against the opposition, killing the country's justice minister and driving out up to 200,000 people from the capital of Port-au-

Prince. "The army has stood up to Clinton and the international community," says a Haitian businessman. "And they are the ones who blinked." So, apparently, did Robert Malval. At the weekend, the Haitian prime minister, who is a pro-Aristide businessman and enjoys the strong support of Clinton, was considering resigning.

Sanctions against Haiti might work better if the United States leaned on the Dominican Republic to seal its borders. But why punish neighbors, which stand to lose billions of trade dollars in an embargo?

That's the complaint of Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and others along the Danube, which claim the clampdown on Serbia has crippled their already shaky economies. Pressure to relieve innocent victims is forcing the West to reconsider sanctions. But lifting them is no easy matter. Not when sanctions serve as a convenient substitute for tougher action.

TOM POST with LAURA SILBER in Belgrade.  
SPENCER REISS, PETER KATEL and J. P. SLAVIN  
in Port-au-Prince. JANE WHITMORE in Washington  
and bureau reports



10/6/93

Dr Hiroshi Nakajima  
Director General  
WHO

Dear Dr Nakajima,

The humanitarian organizations providing assistance in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) appreciate the role of the sanctions in the peace-making process in the former Yugoslavia. Yet, as Heads of the Missions of these organizations, we feel an ethical obligation to draw the attention of our Executive Heads to the detrimental effect of the sanctions on the health of the people and on the health care system of the country where we work. We see this impact in our daily work, we hear from it from our field staff, and we know that it is a major concern of our counterparts from the President of the Federal Republic to the workers in the local health centres.

While the sanctions, in principle, do not cover medical supplies, in practice, they have contributed to breaking the health care system of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The reasons include: the difficult economic situation of the country already before the sanctions; the collapse of foreign trade, with concomitant lack of hard currency; the almost complete dependence of the domestic drug industry on imported raw materials; the delays in getting approval for the import of raw materials and medical supplies; the unwillingness of some traditional vendors to sell to the Federal Republic in spite of a valid approval; the blocking of payments by foreign banks; difficulties on the borders; etc.

The situation is particularly difficult because the Federal Republic also has over half a million refugees, primarily women, children and elderly. Poor nutrition has reduced their resistance; many have chronic diseases. In spite of the collapsing health care system, the country tries to meet their health care needs. The Federal Republic has no chance to recover the treatment costs from the social security system of the republic of origin of the refugees.

The result is that all health care institutions in all parts of the country lack vital drugs, equipment and spare parts. The most affected areas are:

- **Mental health:** inability to maintain appropriate medication has increased aggressive and self-destructive behaviour; lack of long-acting drugs makes community care impossible; most aggressive patients must be chained for lack of sedatives;
- **Chronic diseases:** 4000 hemodialysis patients live in a continuous uncertainty. The overused machines break down and cannot be repaired because of lack of spare parts; the domestic industry, earlier capable of meeting the needs for renewable supplies for entire Yugoslavia, stands idle because the payment for raw materials, approved by the Sanctions Committee, has been blocked.

Transplantation patients risk the rejection of their transplanted organs if they don't get immunosuppressive drugs. Patients suffering from cancer, diabetes, blood diseases, etc face death because of the lack of cytostatic drugs, insulin, etc.

Paraplegic and tetraplegic patients, including children, no longer get physical therapy at specialized institutions because neither the families nor the institutions have fuel for transportation.

- **Diagnostic work-up:** As clinical and microbiological laboratories lack reagents and equipment, diagnosis is often based on clinical symptoms and signs; X-ray film, if at all available, is restricted to patients with fractures and suspected tuberculosis. Lack of spare parts renders both high technology and low technology equipment useless. Many health centres have not been able to use their only eeg or ultrasound for months. Detection of anomalies during pregnancy is no longer possible.

- **Testing of blood:** So far, all donated blood has been tested for HIV but some hospitals already routinely use blood that has not been tested for hepatitis B. Also HIV tests are running out. Many centres cannot monitor blood levels of cytostatic and immunosuppressive drugs because they do not have the necessary test kits.
- **Surgery:** Most elective surgery has stopped. The same applies to surgery relying on high technology diagnostic or operative equipment (e.g., neurosurgery and open heart surgery). Many hospitals require patients to bring with them all the necessary *anesthetics, drugs, dressings, etc.* if they want to have an operation. If at all available, these supplies are very expensive in the private pharmacies and beyond the means of most people. Even for deliveries, women need to bring with them all which is necessary. Post-surgery convalescent periods have been cut down to as short as two days to avoid hospital infections.
- **Environmental, institutional and personal hygiene:** Much of Serbia uses precarious surface water and depends heavily on adequate water purification to prevent water-borne diseases. Water purification chemicals are running out. In many smaller towns, garbage collection has stopped because of lack of fuel. Lack of fuel also means that many hospital laundries have only cold water. Even infectious diseases departments use mere water for cleaning in want of disinfectants. Many refugees have body lice and scabies. In Kosovo, one forth of the population is estimated to have scabies.
- **Uncertainty and demoralization:** The health personnel is demoralized because of not being able to do their best for the patients and uncertain about the future. The young generation feels that their studies have been meaningless. They see their skills rusting, their contacts with the outside world withering and their ability to follow the progress of medicine curtailed. An estimated 1000 scientists and researchers have left the country in recent months because of lack of prospects to exercise their profession.

To meet these needs, the Federal Republic has to rely almost exclusively on intergovernmental humanitarian organizations as very few non-governmental organizations want to work in Serbia and Montenegro.

The official statistics do not yet reveal the magnitude of the catastrophic situation but in some areas, the evidence is clear: tuberculosis incidence increases rapidly; mortality in mental hospitals has doubled, even tripled within less than a year; immunization coverage has dropped particularly in areas where immunization depends on mobile health teams; patients, for instance premature babies, have died because it has not been possible to transport them to appropriately equipped institutions; Rh-negative babies have died because of lack of simple transfusion materials previously imported; the inability to perform cardiac operations has resulted in the death of children with congenital heart defects; some kidney transplant patients have fallen back to hemodialysis.

\*\*\*\*\*

Recalling World Health Assembly resolutions 41.31 and 42.24 that reject any embargo on medical supplies for political reasons and urge Member States to refrain in all circumstances and situations from imposing restrictions on indispensable medical supplies and their transit across international borders, we urge you to draw the attention of the UN Member States, UN Security Council and the Sanctions Committee to the impact of the sanctions on the health of the people. To avoid the punishment of the most vulnerable, notably the sick, women, children, refugees and the displaced, it is imperative that the Sanctions Committee urgently set in motion mechanisms enabling the import of medical supplies, including raw materials, equipment and spare parts, in the most expedient and flexible manner. It is also imperative that the same flexibility be applied to all related financial transactions.

We also emphasize the necessity of an the inter-agency assessment of the status of the health care system as proposed in the United Nations Revised Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Former Yugoslavia. We fear that the failure to take note of the implications on health of the sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) may not only complicate the work of the humanitarian organizations but contribute to an atmosphere that could endanger the peace-making process.


Belgrade 10 June, 1993



Judith Kumin

Chief of Mission

UNHCR, Belgrade



Hannu Vuori

WHO, Area Representative,

Belgrade



Sven Lampell

Head of Delegation, a.i.

IFRC, Belgrade

New York Times  
August 22, 1993

## Medical Care in Serbia Devastated by Boycott

By HENRY KAMM

Special to The New York Times

BELGRADE, Yugoslavia, Aug. 19 — Dr. Bozidar Vljajic bent over the comatose child and glumly checked the equipment that pumped a kind of life into the 4-year-old boy. He was asked if there was any hope.

"No," the pediatrician replied.

But Dr. Vljajic said there was no reason the boy, Dejan Zdravkovic, should not have recovered if the hospital the Mother and Child Institute, Yugoslavia's finest pediatric center, had been able to give him the common anti-epileptic medicine that would have prevented the coma.

Or, Dr. Vljajic added, if Dejan's parents could have afforded to buy the drug on the black market, where those with money can overcome the effects of United Nations sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro, the two republics in what is left of Yugoslavia. Smuggled drugs cost up to five times their normal price, and many families have sold their land, cars or furniture to buy antibiotics, anti-cancer drugs, insulin or anesthetics.

The sanctions resolutions, passed by the Security Council because of Yugoslavia's support for the Serbian nationalists fighting in Bosnia, specifically exempt medical supplies. But doctors, aid workers and international officials here say medicine is not getting through.

### Appeal to Agency Heads

In an unusual appeal to the heads of their organizations, the top representatives in Yugoslavia of three international agencies wrote a letter in June to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Health Organization and the International Federation of the Red Cross. The medical situation here, they said, is "catastrophic."

They cited a rapid increase in tuberculosis, a tripling of the death rate in mental hospitals in less than a year, a drop in immunization, deaths due to a lack of transportation to hospitals, lack of transfusion equipment and an increasingly limited capacity to perform life-saving surgery.

For lack of sedatives, mental hospitals have returned to chaining patients, they said, and diagnostic capacity is declining because equipment, largely imported, has been breaking down and X-ray film is rare. Supplies needed to test for the virus that causes AIDS are running out, they said, and some hospitals perform transfusions with blood that is not tested for hepatitis. Surgery

is virtually limited to emergencies, the letter said.

Moreover, the officials continued, hospital and personal hygiene and water purity are at risk for lack of basic supplies like detergents, disinfectants and fuel to collect garbage and heat water for laundry and washing floors and equipment.

### Delays and More Delays

Yugoslavia depends on imported raw materials for its pharmaceutical industry, and an evident cause of the medical shortages is the embargo on exports, which can earn foreign currency. But the three international officials attributed the situation largely to Serbia's pariah status in the international community.

They cited delays by the United Nations Sanctions Committee in approving requests for imports, former suppliers' unwillingness to sell anything to this country despite approval, blocking of payments from Yugoslav accounts in foreign banks and bureaucratic delays by border and customs officials.

"There is a conscious effort to make these people suffer," said Lyndall Sachs, the local information officer for the United Nations refugee agency.

Dr. Hannu V. Vuori, a Finnish doctor who heads the World Health Organization's office here and was a signer of the letter, said in an interview:

"The Sanctions Committee takes months to give clearance. There are very exact forms to fill out. If you don't tick one box, they just put the form aside and don't even tell you about it."

[A United Nations official in New York acknowledged that there was a problem processing requests for exemptions but said that since May the Sanctions Committee had received 5,000 such requests and that it was important that the paperwork be correctly filed.]

### Many Donations Earmarked

Ms. Sachs said that there was "an alarming lack" of private aid organizations working in this country and that more than half of private donations to the former Yugoslavia were "negatively earmarked," that is, not to be used in Serbia and Montenegro.

Donatella Linari, the representative of the United Nations Children's Fund, said: "It's a complete disaster. Much attention is being paid to Bosnia, but this country is facing a catastrophe."

Many Serbs believe they are being victimized for the failures of political leaders in their country and elsewhere.

"There are few political supporters of the Government here," said Dr. Vla-

jic, who heads the infectious diseases department at Mother and Child Institute. "But regarding the sanctions, we feel deeply that they are not ethical, are even immoral. They ask sick and helpless children to pay for the mistakes of some Milosevic, some Tudjman, some Izetbegovic." Slobodan Milosevic is President of Serbia; Franjo Tudjman, President of Croatia, and Alija Izetbegovic, President of Bosnia.

Mother and Child Institute, a modern 500-bed showpiece, is far better off than most Yugoslav hospitals. It is cleaner, and its patients still receive an adequate diet.

Dr. Vladimir Hrnjak, the hospital's chief cardiac surgeon, said that his team used to perform 400 to 500 life-saving operations a year, but that it could not expect to do more than 150 this year. "There are 400 children on our waiting list," he said. "Some can wait; others are dying."



F4I

# Doctor from new Dark Ages has no cure for genocide

He was a man newly arrived from the Dark Ages, sitting at a nearby table, quietly eating.

For somebody making the equivalent of about \$20 per month, he wasn't dressed too badly. But he didn't seem to enjoy the lush salad, taking bites from a moderately buttered roll before consuming steak and vegetables served by an oblivious waiter with arm loads of dinner plates.

The dessert pastry, covered with different-colored syrups and frostings, surely would crack his stoic expression or break the slow rhythm of his ascending fork which seemed laden with an invisible weight.

But, no. Mostly unnoticed by the hundreds of conventioners, he ate the way a condemned man would eat his last meal. Or a prisoner of war, loving and hating the mockery of ceremonial nourishment.

Dr. Slavko Simeunovic, vice dean and professor of pediatrics and cardiology at Belgrade University, is both a prisoner and condemned.

He is also a grim visionary as a physician who is less able to cure, much less comfort, the tens of thousands of innocent victims — now and soon to come — afflicted with medieval diseases and maladies, which in

a moment modern medicine can but won't alleviate.

"Come see me," he said with gentle, incurable hospitableness, "when you come to Belgrade."

He walked slowly across the ornate ballroom, passing through the large double doors and a security guard who was mildly suspicious about this man in a worn blue suit amid the swank cocktail wear and tuxedos.


The doctor was beginning his trek back from Manhattan to witness — thanks to incessant clamoring by the American media and government — a gruesome winter of inhuman, genocidal and United Nations-inflicted infamy such as his Serbian city and nation have not seen in centuries.

Thankfully, he had been spared any idiotic, though well-intentioned table talk, such as:

Is it true, Doctor, that your salary suffers hyperinflation at 1 percent per hour or a billion percent per year?

Are bodies really being exhumed in Belgrade cemeteries to retrieve old cardiac pacemakers for re-use?

How do old people with pensions of \$3 per month buy meat at \$1.50 per pound, or a pound of butter for \$1.50, or one egg for 10 cents, or a pound of flour for 40 cents, or a pound of sugar



for 20 cents — even when shelves in grocery stores are not empty?

What happens to the health of children under 7 when their caloric intake has dropped by a third of what it was in 1990? And that only 6.5 percent of children in pre-schools and elementary schools — where all children used to get two or three meals daily — are receiving only one meal now of poor nutritional quality? What can you do about the increased rate of low birth weights and numbers of prematurely born babies as a consequence of the nutritional depletion of mothers?

How does a previously modern population handle anemia for the first time among its 10 leading disorders?

What can you do now that infectious and parasitic diseases, which were the seventh most frequent cause of infant death in 1991, increased in 1992 as the fifth-most-frequent cause

of infant deaths?

Is it really true that patients who require surgery must bring with them all necessary anesthetics, drugs and dressings?

Or that the lack of reagents and other materials in clinical and microbiological laboratories — due to U.N. sanctions — has led to an increase in incorrect diagnoses from 19 percent in 1991 to 35 percent in 1992?

Or that a clinic in Belgrade, specializing in children's heart surgery that performed 500 operations in 1991, performed only 150 last year? Who decides which 350 are destined to die?

Or the disappearance of simple batteries prevents treatment of children with hearing defects? ... Or the absence of spare parts to repair dialysis equipment used on over 4,000 patients? ... Or a 600 percent increase of psychoses requiring institutionalization where patients are tied to radiators or beds for lack of sedatives? ... Or depletion of sanction-banned chemicals used to purify public water systems?

If Serbs in Serbia are aggressors in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, why are there 600,000 Muslim, Croat and Serb refugees from Bosnia in Serbia, which is denied U.N. relief and aid?

Are there only victims in Serbia? No victims?

Again, if Bosnian Muslims refuse to sign peace plans, what must Serbs in Serbia stop doing for U.N. sanctions and embargoes of medical aid and equipment to be removed?

Can a disease-ridden, malnourished and desperate Serbian population really do the U.N.'s own dirty work of fallaciously exterminating political figures who've actually been strengthened by U.N. sanctions and bungled New World Order diplomacy?

Have sanctions ousted despots in Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Angola, Cuba, South Africa?

And why are civilized constituencies of the U.N. never outraged about the \$50 billion in damages caused to developing free-market democracies in other Balkan and post-Soviet nations by the sanctions, which instead incite present and future civil wars?

It's a pity the doctor left the banquet without finishing his dessert. Or being asked his opinion about President Clinton's goals for a national health plan for America.

Peter Brock is a political columnist for the Herald-Post. His column appears every Wednesday.

EDITORIAL

## What About The Starving Serbians?

Greek Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias recently returned from his tour of the Balkans. He and the leaders of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Serbia agreed that the United Nations sanctions against Serbia should be lifted immediately.

Seventeen months ago the UN imposed severe trade sanctions, including an oil embargo, on Serbia. Not only have the sanctions kept the Serbians from receiving food and vital medical supplies, but its neighboring countries have been hurt economically.

According to statistics, business between Greece, Serbia and other parts of the Balkans has been devastated by the sanctions. Balkan leaders are asking for, and Minister Papoulias has promised, financial compensation to all the affected countries.

The Minister said that when Greece assumes the European Community Presidency, compensation will be discussed. Papoulias also said that Greece and its Balkan neighbors will keep out of the civil war, and he hopes that peace negotiations will begin soon.

Recently a Harvard University study on the sanctions against Haiti found that instead of helping to restore democracy in Haiti, the embargo deprived Haitian civilians of food and medicine killing as many as 1,000 children a month. This does not include the adult fatalities. With all the horrors the Haitians face, they are at least spared the harsh winters of Serbia. This winter will be one of the hardest and deadliest Serbia will have to face if sanctions are not lifted immediately.

The State Department of the United States estimates that almost three million lives are at risk due to war, disease, malnutrition and inadequate shelter in both Serbia and Bosnia. Lord Owen, the EC mediator in this region, reports that Serbia and Bosnia are headed for a disaster this winter. According to Owen, without a negotiated peace settlement the war will continue and so will severe shortages of food and fuel supplies. If there is no peace millions will lose their lives this winter. He stated that it "baffled belief" that so many lives could be at risk over a "very small" percentage of land. The Bosnian Muslim government has rejected the UN-Geneva peace agreement over a mere three or four per cent of territory. Serbia agreed to the settlement, yet it is still being punished by sanctions.

Most media in Europe and America have been very concerned about starvation in places like Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia. However this same media has shown little concern for the plight of the Serbian people.

What is happening in Serbia is murder and the United Nations sanctions are the cause. Over ten million Serbian people are being denied food and medicine. It is essential that all sanctions against Serbia stop immediately. Food, medicine and fuel supplies as well as all goods must be allowed to enter Serbia at once. The Serbian people have suffered far too long.



# Belgrade physician says red tape holding up medicine for sick kids

By Andrew Borowiec  
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

U.S. officials are investigating charges that bureaucracy involved in the economic embargo against Yugoslavia is hampering the flow of medical supplies and other humanitarian aid.

The probe was sparked by Dr. Dusan Scepanovic, director of Belgrade's biggest children's hospital, who claims that his patients have become hostages in the political maneuvers surrounding the Balkan civil war.

"We are not asking for spare parts for tanks but for medicine, bandages and X-ray machines, all of which has been paid for in hard currency," Dr. Scepanovic said in an interview after contacts with U.S. government officials.

He said before leaving Washington that he received assurances that the United States will try to ease the bureaucratic red tape.

The objective is to speed the shipments of humanitarian supplies officially exempted from the embargo imposed by the United Nations on Yugoslavia, now consisting of Serbia and Montenegro.

"On paper, such items are exempt from the blockade but the reality is different," Dr. Scepanovic said.

The embargo was imposed because of Serbia's role in the civil war in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Among charges leveled against Serbia was the support for Bosnian Serbs and their militia in the siege of Sarajevo and other areas of Bosnia.

During the past few months the thrust of the conflict has shifted, mainly pitting Catholic Croats against Bosnia's Muslims.

To come to the United States, Dr. Scepanovic first had to travel by road to Hungary. He said he had to wait for some 10 hours at the crossing point between Kalebija, Serbia, and Tompa, Hungary, and accused Hungarian customs officials of "smoking cigarettes and drinking coffee" while a 10-mile line of vehicles from Serbia waited.

He said that inspection rules imposed by the U.N. Sanctions Commission often delayed shipments for so long that some medicines arrived after their expiration dates.

He said his hospital on Belgrade's Tirsova Street had to wait a year and a half for the arrival of urgently needed equipment paid for in Germany.

The hospital now lacks most basic items such as chlorine to sanitize water, anaesthetics and vaccines against tetanus and measles.

"Even Western medical publications have stopped coming to Belgrade as part of the blockade," Dr. Scepanovic said.

He described his hospital as "the first children's hospital in the Balkans," now manned by 90 doctors and performing some 5,000 operations a year — compared with 7,000 before Yugoslavia's breakup.

Some 20,000 children are hospitalized there in an average year, Dr. Scepanovic said.

The rampaging mega-inflation in Yugoslavia has reduced his salary from \$1,000 a month a year ago to \$50 a month now.

The cost of a two-week treatment for leukemia in Belgrade costs about \$2,000, he said.

The hospital apparently has no antibiotics and medicines to treat burns, affecting about 100 children brought from the Bosnian war zone, he added.

The Belgrade authorities have been campaigning for months to have the embargo lifted, claiming it is unjustified and blaming it for the economic collapse of Yugoslavia.

During his Washington contacts, Dr. Scepanovic was told that no lifting of the punitive measure could be envisaged before Bosnia's warring factions agree to end their hostilities.

FYI

# Media's glass eye cannot see 10 million Serb victims

**K**iseljak. There's no reason anybody a half-world away should want to remember that name.

But there's a hotel in that small town in the mountains just 20 miles outside of war-racked Sarajevo that has caught the eye of a couple of journalists. The latter — succumbing to the overpowering urge for a bath with hot water, good food, a bottle or two of Danish beer and a peaceful night's sleep — would periodically take a chance and a high-speed ride in an armored car to Kiseljak and check into the Hotel Dalmatia.

If a notebook ever came out of a bag during those few days of luxuriating indolence, it was only to idly record the irony of any, war-deprived Kiseljak where American scotch, cigarettes, soap and newspapers — the scarce stuff of Sarajevo dreams — were available in peculiar abundance.

Also, there was the bonus commodity of good conversation with well-fed, clean-cut and brisk-mannered American men in ill-fitting, American-issue fatigues. They were civilians. Lots of well-fed civilians who only got uncomfortable when talking about anything other than sports. No, they weren't mercenaries. They were there last spring to plan for massive military intervention by the West. There's no reason to believe they've checked out.

Actually, there were stories all the time about the U.S. Agency for International Development and its snoops who were running all over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Doing what? Better not to ask.

Defense Secretary Les Aspin, who quietly signed an agreement recently for U.S. training of and American war-college educations for Albanian army officers, probably knows.

Nearby Albania is another one of these new post-communist converts to messianic democracy. Just a few decades ago, Albanian political and religious dissidents were being scaled inside perforated steel drums and dropped into the Adriatic.

Lately, Germans have swarmed into tiny Albania and are spending millions on new tourist resorts and industry, while the U.S. will cover the costs to teach war-college English to Albanian officers as they exit the Stone Age toward theories of modern military technique and, of course, application. (Undoubtedly, there'll be some new faces pretty soon at Fort Bliss — the Western world's largest air defense training center.)

How and where will all this new theory and technique be used? Why, of course, in fueling the meltdown of insurrection by their Islamic Albanian cousins just across the border in Yugoslav, which is to say, Serbian



Peter Brock

Kosovo. It's all due to U.S. petrophobia — actually, we're only afraid of losing it — to appease Islam.

And the Clinton Administration still pants about how Kosovo will be the last straw before U.S. troops jump into Kosovo — a legal and long-recognized province of Serbia — to save its majority, million-plus Albanian population. Lots of Serbian straws ago, there was a majority Serb population in Kosovo as there had been since before the 8th Century. But especially between 1974 and 1989, there were murders, rapes and other forms of equally effective though subtler coercions by the former Albanian minority which caused the exile of nearly 400,000 Serbs. In the last 10 years alone, 250,000 Serbs were exiled from their ancient Serb heartland of Kosovo!

But there was no rush to teach them English or to throw U.S. war college scholarships at them.

Simultaneously, two other intrigues are stirring. Congress is about to re-

ovate the war powers act, ostensibly to tie up frayed ends after Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, Libya, Nicaragua, Kuwait, Somalia and Haiti. But while enthralled in glazed-eye swoonings over Islamic expansionism in the Balkans, congressional furniture will stay clear of tripping up any presidential stagers to "save" Bosnia or Kosovo.

The second ripple is the sudden criticism by Bosnia hawks in the U.S. toward United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. He hasn't been much of a traditional sidekick for U.S. presidents and their "peacemaking" medicine shows in the Balkans. Boutros-Ghali makes it clear that the U.N.'s business is "peacekeeping" without prerequisites to learn English and Western weapon systems. The general secretary is only in his second year of a five-year term — and he appears uninterested in a second term.

And he had the grit to recently call the U.S. delinquent in payment of its annual \$750 million U.N. membership dues. He makes it equally clear that the U.N. is the only game on the globe — New World Order or not.

No wonder then that a major road-building and road-clearing project by the U.N. in Bosnia last summer never got rolling, owing to Bosnian Muslims who've continued to provoke

shootouts in those areas when Bosnian Serbs were backing negotiations and peace plans. Boutros-Ghali's intentions for the new roads were to feed mainly Bosnian Muslims during what will instead be a winter of horrific starvation and the psychically more devastating possibilities in Kosovo.

Some would like to see Boutros-Ghali replaced by the warrior likes of, say, Germany's Hans Dietrich Genscher.

All of this goes on to muzzle any debate on the moral legitimacy to remove sanctions against Serbia or else to place sanctions against a flagrantly belligerent Croatia. The latter is so far innoculated by German hegemony.

For propaganda purposes, it will be a noisy festival of death in Bosnia with protests against removal of sanctions against 10 million innocent Serb victims and 700,000 Bosnian refugees in Serbia.

For propaganda purposes, the glass eye of the Western media cannot and will not see the already-commenced silent holocaust within Serbia.

The fellows in Kiseljak planned it that way.

Peter Brock is a political columnist for the Herald-Post. His column appears every Wednesday on the editorial page.

# 100 Billion Yugoslav Dinars, but No Meat

By David B. Ottaway

*Washington Post Service*

POZAREVAC, Yugoslavia — Twice a month, a portly, smiling mailman comes to the three-room home of Gorica Stanojlovic and sits at her kitchen table to chat and have a drink of brandy while paying out her pension in cash.

On his visit last Wednesday, the mailman brought her what might seem like a jackpot: 100 billion dinars. But the 78-year-old pensioner was not pleased.

These days, 100 billion dinars is just enough for the elderly woman, living alone, to pay her electricity, telephone and water bills and to buy milk and bread.

"I cannot buy meat at all," Mrs. Stanojlovic said.

Sixteen months after the United Nations imposed sanctions on Yugoslavia for its sup-

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**Serbs used rape as a weapon in Bosnia, the UN war crimes commission finds. Page 2.**

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port of Serbs in the Bosnian war, the country has reached a point of economic exhaustion, with millions like Mrs. Stanojlovic struggling to survive in the face of hyperinflation, acute food shortages, soaring prices and the coming winter.

The office of the United Nations High Com-

missioner for Refugees in Belgrade, the capital of Yugoslavia, estimates that more than 3 million of the 10 million people living in Serbia and Montenegro, the two remaining republics of the Yugoslav federation, are living at or below the poverty line. This includes 1 million pensioners, another 1 million idled industrial workers, 750,000 official jobless, 200,000 welfare cases and 490,000 mostly Serbian refugees from Bosnia.

Yugoslavs are screaming for relief and understanding. But the international community seems to be in no mood to listen to their

See COLLAPSE, Page 2

Continued from Page 1

pleadings as long as Sarajevo, Bosnia's capital, remains under Bosnian Serbian siege and no peace plan is put forward that is acceptable to the Muslim-led Bosnian government.

"Instead of punishing the Muslims, who rejected the latest UN peace plan, we suffer under sanctions," said Ivica Dacic, a spokesman for President Slobodan Milosevic's ruling Socialist Party in the federation's dominant republic, Serbia. "But we supported the plan. Are we responsible because the Muslims didn't sign?"

Mr. Milosevic has made the lifting of the UN sanctions before the onset of winter his top foreign policy priority, according to Serbian and diplomatic sources.

The economy, already in a downward spiral before the sanctions, is now in a free fall. Industrial production and the gross domestic product have both fallen by about two-thirds from their 1989 levels, according to government statistics.

Inflation is out of control. The 100 billion dinars Mrs. Stanjlovic received were worth just \$10 last Wednesday. Two days later, the sum was worth only \$6.

Food stores often lack even bread, sugar and cooking oil. There is no gasoline at service stations, no meat at butcher shops, no cigarettes at kiosks and no money in the banks. Industrial production is expected to fall an additional 30 percent this year.

Hospitals lack everything from gauze and cotton to antibiotics and film for X-ray and scanner machines. "I doubt the UN Security Council would have decided on

sanctions if they knew the impact would be so serious on our hospitals," said Dusan Scepanovic, director of Children's Hospital in Belgrade.

The collective nightmare gripping the country these days is of a cold winter and no heat. The government has applied to the UN sanctions committee to be allowed to import heating oil and gas for the winter, but has had no reply so far.

Yet it is not clear that the government is willing to make the sacrifices necessary to ease the crisis. Diplomats noted that 75 percent of Serbia's budget continues to be earmarked for the military.

The day before Mrs. Stanojlovic got her pension payment, the gov-

ernment raised the price of electricity by 975 percent, cooking oil by 280 percent and sugar by 275 percent.

A few months ago, the government introduced price controls on such basic food items as milk and meat. But farmers, faced with ever-rising costs, rebelled and refused to sell to the stores.

Conditions here in Pozarevac, a city of 45,000 about 80 kilometers (50 miles) southeast of Belgrade, are as bad as in the capital, even though this was once a major food processing center.

Mayor Kosta Jermic said economic activity had fallen by 20 percent because "we cannot supply our factories with fuel, raw materials and spare parts any longer."

*International Herald Tribune*  
*October 21, 1993*

*(No sign anywhere of  
the "rape" story.)*

TORONTO

# HOW SERBS LOSE out on UN aid

Dec 9/93

BY SCHEHEREZADE FARAMARZI  
The Globe and Mail  
Belgrade

**W**HAT if little Irma Hadzimiratovic had not been a Bosnian? Would the five-year-old Serbian girl with a piece of shrapnel lodged in her spine have warranted the emergency airlift to England that brought her to the world's attention last summer?

Probably not. Ethnic Serbs are widely viewed as the aggressors in the Bosnian conflict, and international aid workers say that they are paying the price. Just like their Bosnian and Croat foes, they have lost loved ones and been driven from their homes, yet they are not receiving an equitable share of the relief flowing into the region.

They say this is because the United Nations, generally considered impartial when it comes to aid distribution, now accepts donations with political price tags attached.

Aid agencies complain that donor countries — especially the United States and Germany — are practicing a policy known as "negative earmarking." That is, they contribute aid only on condition that it not go to Serbia, which is widely viewed as the aggressor in the conflict.

"It's a question of good guys and bad guys," explains Lyndall Sachs, information officer for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Belgrade, the Serbian capital.

"Refugees in Serbia are not getting anything. We can't do much about it. You go out to the field and see the refugees and feel helpless."

A UN official in New York says that Canada does not earmark its aid, but the Canadian donation is not overly significant. On the other hand, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees says that the United States recently offered the agency several million dollars but specifically instructed that the money not be used for refugees in Serbia.

Policies like this mean that refugees who flee Bosnia for Serbia and Montenegro

**BAD GUYS** *Because Serbs are seen as aggressors in Bosnia, Serbian refugees are being denied their share of emergency relief.*

## THE DISPLACED & DISPOSSESSED

### Refugees across former Yugoslavia

- Bosnia - 2.7 million
- Croatia - 800,000
- Serbia & Montenegro - 647,000
- Slovenia - 45,000
- Macedonia - 27,000

Source: United Nations High Commission on Refugees

### Of the 510,000 refugees in Serbia

- 276,000 are from Bosnia-Herzegovina
- 194,000 are from Croatia
- 57,000 are from Slovenia
- 3,000 from Macedonia

Source: Commissioner for Refugees of the Republic of Serbia.

pay a double price. They leave a country torn by war for one that is being subjected to economic sanctions ordered by the UN.

The sanctions specifically exempt medical supplies, but little medicine is getting through. Aid officials say it takes three to four months to receive permission from the UN Sanctions Committee in New York for a medical shipment.

Iraq and rebel-held areas of Angola are also under UN sanctions, but humanitarian organizations there don't need official permission to bring in food and medical supplies.

The policy on Serbia, says Anne Pesic, a Unicef education assistant from Ireland working in Belgrade, "violates the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child... the process is so difficult that the child dies before the drug gets here."

Alexander Borg-Olivier of UN Humanitarian Affairs in New York agrees that negative earmarking is unfair. But, he says, "this attitude does not surprise me. It's almost natural that things are the way they are and that's because donors are less likely to regard Serbs and Montenegrans as victims."

To illustrate how this attitude plays out, many aid workers point to the International Rescue Committee, a U.S. non-governmental relief organization. They say its representative was authorized to spend \$120,000 a day in Bosnia-Herzegovina, compared with a mere \$20,000 in Belgrade over a four-month period.

As for the UN, it plans to spend \$522.6-million in the former Yugoslavia over the first six months of next year. Here's how the budget breaks down:

- \$270-million in Bosnia-Herzegovina
- \$99.8-million in Croatia
- \$40-million in Serbia
- \$9.5-million in Slovenia
- \$6.2-million in Montenegro
- \$5.1-million in Macedonia
- \$39.8-million for general programs covering the entire region.

The aid disparity has begun to spark concern in the West. After a visit to former Yugoslavia, British MP Robert Wareing wrote to Prime Minister John Major that "it is certainly against the spirit in which sanctions were imposed against Serbia and Montenegro that children in particular should be denied necessary medical treatment."

"Operation Irma, as suggested by yourself in the name of humanity, was a highly desirable move. However, children are children whatever their ethnic origin. ... I believe that even-handedness is most essential in humanitarian efforts."

The reply from Mr. Major's office conceded that Serb children are suffering, but stressed that "it is our overwhelming priority to ensure that medical supplies get through where they are most needed, which is on the ground in Bosnia."

No one disputes that refugees in Bosnia-Herzegovina need more help, says Charles Vincent of the World Food Programme in Belgrade, but "a refugee is a

refugee. ... A Serb refugee has the same problem as a Croatian refugee. There is no humanitarian reason to treat them differently."

And the situation in Serbia is worsening rapidly, says Dr. Neboja Jovanovic, head of the children's Olga Dedijer clinic in Belgrade. The incidence of chronic diseases such as tuberculosis is on the rise, and the infant mortality rate is four to five times what it was before the conflict broke out.

Most hospitals, which are now carrying out only emergency operations, require patients to bring all their own drugs as well as anesthetics and dressing materials before undergoing surgery.

UN officials say they try to make their appeals based on humanitarian needs but they are not in a position to tell donors where their money can or cannot be spent.

"We put a consolidated appeal for all UN agencies and it is up to the donors what they want to fund," says a UN official in New York. "They have a lot of leeway as to where that money can be spent. You may draw political conclusions from that, but the agencies are not necessarily being used as a political tool by donor countries."

However, some aid agencies manage to maintain strict neutrality.

One of them is the International Committee of the Red Cross, which according to the Geneva Conventions is expected to act in total impartiality and neutrality, says spokesman Harald Grunbeck.

"This is the spirit that is contained in our mandate — to refuse earmarking by category of victims."

Ms. Sachs says all agencies should take this approach. "If they want us to do the job, to sort out the humanitarian problem, they should trust us as experts to use that money, and not use the UN High Commissioner for Refugees as a political tool in trying to resolve the crisis."

*Scheherezade Faramarzi is an editor on The Globe and Mail's foreign desk who recently visited Belgrade.*

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## WORLD

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# Relief agencies warn that Balkan supplies are low

Greatest shortage in Serbia, Montenegro

Associated Press

ROME — As winter approaches in the Balkans, an international relief agency has warned that emergency food supplies for the former Yugoslavia will run out unless Western governments commit themselves soon to providing aid to the estimated 4 million people facing hunger there.

The U.N. World Food Program is seeking some 450,000 tons of food for the Balkans for the first six months of 1994, officials said. So far, governments have pledged less than one-fifth of what is sought, leaving a shortfall of 371,000 tons.

The executive director of the World Food Program, Catherine Bertini, said in an interview here Thursday that because the amount needed is so vast, "we need two to four months' lead time" to buy, assemble and deliver food packages that will reach the former Yugo-

slavia only in January.

Although thousands of people in Bosnia face severe hardships because of the fighting there, the food shortages are worse in neighboring Serbia and Montenegro, the two republics that remain part of federal Yugoslavia, relief officials said.

Donors often feel less comfortable helping a country they regard as an aggressor, officials said, and trade sanctions imposed by the United Nations against federal Yugoslavia because of its backing for nationalist Serbian forces in Bosnia make it difficult to deliver the food that it is authorized to receive.


Food supplies in Bosnia are currently sufficient to meet around 90 percent of its needs, while supplies in Serbia and Montenegro amount to only 56 percent of what is required, they said.

ARNOLD SHERMAN

**PERFIDY**  
— IN THE —  
**BALKANS**

★

**THE RAPE OF  
YUGOSLAVIA**



PSICHOGIOS PUBLICATIONS

CHAPTER XI  
WAR ON CHILDREN

I remembered vividly, several months earlier, the televised after-effects of the mortar shell which had dropped in a Sarajevo school yard while tens of Moslem youngsters were playing soccer. Beautiful children were suddenly transformed into human wreckage. One particular boy, blinded by the ordnance which was programed to explode before hitting the ground in order to maximalize carnage, became the focus for all the senseless brutality and inhumanity that had characterized the civil war in Bosnia. I recalled also the response of the overwrought UN officer who was responsible for evacuating the children to hospitals. He damned whoever had pulled the trigger to everlasting hell.

Never really proven, it was generally reported that the shell had been fired from the Serb-occupied bluffs overlooking the city. It was certainly plausible to assume that that indeed was what happened. It made me feel ashamed and angry – convinced once again that in that unforgiving civil war, there was enough malice and evil to be shared by all the belligerents.

However, young people were not only being killed in Sarajevo. They were being murdered in Serbia as well, only without television cameras to record death rattles. Babies were dying every month – because of lack of basic medical equipment, because of the non-availability of even the simplest drugs, because of the lack of incubators.

Dr. Mima Simic, a thirty-five-year-old psychiatrist in a state hospital, confirmed that the medical situation in the country was more than desperate, it was fatal.

“So many of my patients,” she explained, “require drugs merely to function. We have nothing in the hospitals any longer. Instead of ministering to patients, doctors can only



comfort and solace them. Most of my colleagues are morally shattered by now. Patients are slipping away from us, dying or retrogressing for lack of the simplest, basic medicines. The weakest are going first – infants, young children, the elderly. But soon it will affect everybody.”

A team composed of some of the top medical experts in Yugoslavia prepared a document about the effect of sanctions on the health of a country which had only recently boasted of superlative services. It was a long, sad bit of work. In this instance, the mortar shell was fired by the United Nations, the victims were still often children and the murders continued.

“Is it possible that the world is really ready to coldly implement measures causing a slow death of millions of innocent people? This is a horrible question asked by the population of a country condemned to isolation.

“According to provisions and principles of the international humanitarian law, the right to life and health is a fundamental human right. This right is also guaranteed by the United Nations charter and the World Health Organization constitution. The definition of health accepted by the world is that of the World Health Organization, according to which, health means material, social, psychological and physical wellbeing of the man. It is then needless to ask whether UN Security Council Resolutions 757 and 820 condemned to a loss of life and health citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and together with them refugees and all others receiving health protection in its territory, since they can receive it nowhere else in the former Yugoslavia. And to what are condemned sick people in Yugoslavia by the Security Council sanctions?

“It is a well known fact that Yugoslav health service almost entirely depends on import. About 90% of medicines are produced exclusively on the basis of foreign licences and imported raw materials or half-made products. Other medicines are imported as ready-made products. Over 95% of sanitary material and 90% of medical material are also

imported. Almost all medical equipment is imported, as well as spare parts. In order to function, Yugoslav health service needs to import each month thousands of various medical products – drugs, needles, syringes, various surgical sutures, bandages, tubes, catheters, pacemakers, blood testing equipment, infusion systems. If one is familiar with medicine and health, one knows that for various types of surgeries alone, a number of articles such as tubes, catheters and similar equipment is needed.

“The sanctions, introduced in late May, 1992, imposed a procedure according to which each individual foreign trade turnover of these articles requires approval of the United Nations Committee for the implementation of Sanctions. In order to obtain approval, it is necessary to find a partner who is willing to cooperate, and then obtain approval of his government. And this is not enough! There is the second round of the process with the same procedure for carrying out financial transactions for this purpose. And finally the third round, i.e. obtaining approvals for transport of purchased goods.

“Despite the World Health Organization memorandum according to which financial transactions for health products must be excluded from sanctions, 50% of requests for deblocking of financial resources in foreign banks has not been met since September, 1992. Member countries of the United Nations and the World Health Organization that voted at the assemblies of this organization for the two resolutions under which health cannot be subject to sanctions, either for political or for any other reasons, are competing in making purchase and transport of medical products for the needs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as slow as possible or even impossible. Many vehicles transporting humanitarian assistance are even prevented and stopped, thus discouraging those who collect, send and bring this assistance. In the meantime, surgeries for Yugoslav patients are being postponed and some of them die as a result.

"This country, that until recently had first-class medicine and health protection, has abandoned almost all methods of sophisticated specialist treatment. Babies with heart diseases die since surgery is impossible, operating rooms for open-heart surgeries were not heated during the winter, 1993, and there are long lists of patients waiting for kidney transplantation. Some of them die, and for others death is closer and closer. Even if they are lucky enough to be operated on, it is not certain that they are going to live, since their illness deteriorates due to the long delay. And even if they survive this stage, still there is no hope for them, because there are no immuno-suppressive medicines to prevent rejection of the transplanted organ. Neurosurgeons are carrying out the most complex surgeries, e.g. brain tumor surgeries and similar, without X-ray equipment that would better locate the tumor, thus improving the chance of survival. However, it is not only this highest level of health protection that is the problem. Namely for several months now it has not been possible to implement even routine health protection. Due to the lack of tranquilizers, patients with mental disorders are again tied up and treated with electric shocks, although these are not only abandoned, but also banned methods. Death rate of these patients is rising enormously, and increasingly often when having fits of aggression, they attack doctors and other medical staff, who have no means to calm them down.

"Clinics for contagious diseases are full of patients whose blood has been infected since it has not been tested to hepatitis, while shelves for drugs are empty. Patients suffering from allergy cannot be treated with penicillin, cannot receive any help at all at clinics, since other antibiotics are available only occasionally, when they arrive as part of humanitarian aid. Private pharmacies still have medicines, and patients are buying their own anesthetic for surgery, needles, sutures, cytostatics. For one medicine they give their entire monthly salary, and for longer treatment they sell all they have.

"The following are only some of the effects of the sanctions so far:

"The Institute of Oncology in Belgrade does not have even the most fundamental cytostatics. Although three months ago, \$500,000 was paid to import these medicines, and although all necessary approvals have been obtained, the bank in London has not released these resources. Four months ago a payment was made to the Siemens' account for spare parts for X-ray equipment. No reply has been received from the Siemens yet.

"At cardiosurgical wards for children in Serbia, 41 babies have died since doctors have not been able to carry out necessary surgeries. Dr. Jadran Magic, a doctor at the Institute of the Mother and the Child in Belgrade, who provided this information, explained how tragic it was to decide which baby was to be operated first, and which one to be sent to death. These babies had heavy heart diseases. Who will take the responsibility for babies that are yet to be born, whose diseases, considered 'most ordinary' by the rest of the world, will be impossible to treat, since there will be no means for that?

"As a response to all appeals of Yugoslav doctors and officials and to the WHO resolutions, the UN Security Council Committee for Sanctions banned the import of raw materials for the production of medicines in Yugoslavia in November, 1992, since it allegedly had information that Yugoslav factories exported medicines to Slovenia. After five months of correspondence, the committee informed competent people in the country that only one small private company from Belgrade carried out export transactions for medicines with some similar Slovenian company from Maribor. Needless to say, not even after this has the ban been lifted. This is despite WHO resolutions 41.31 and 42.24, stating that health industry is not subject to sanctions. Yugoslav doctors, therefore, tried to raise their voice and tell the world that sanctions are seriously endangering the most innocent, children and the sick. Appeals were sent to the world public. In the context of

April 7, World Health Day, our country required the World Health Organization to demand lifting of sanctions in the health sector in the United Nations. Doctors have organized peaceful protests in front of the American, Russian, French and German embassies in Belgrade.

"As a response, it happened that a new Security Council resolution on a complete isolation of Yugoslavia was adopted. The resolution contains a provision that humanitarian aid and medicines are exempted from the ban on import. One can but wonder how 'exempted' health sector will be under Resolution 820, when under the more lenient Resolution 757 it was 'exempted' in such a manner.

"The people of Yugoslavia has become a hostage of the international process of solving the war crisis in Bosnia. Isolation put an embargo on humanity, violated the fundamental human rights, and people in one European country are facing death – out of anyone's sight, without a single offered hand. Doctors of Yugoslavia have the following message: 'We shall find a way to sooner or later charge and condemn those who took the lives of our patients or deteriorated their health.'

"For months now there has been a permanent shortage in this country of a whole range of medicines for basic health care. In the hospitals and pharmacies, there are no drugs for cardiac patients, no drugs for malignant diseases, no antibiotics, no tranquilizers and anti-depressants, no drugs to treat hypertension, no drugs to prevent the rejection of transplanted organs; surgical hospitals have no medical supplies, no anesthetics, no anti-shock therapy drugs, no medicaments for intensive care. The semi-illicit private market, the wares of which are of doubtful origin and quality, is the only source of supply for ill people from which they can buy, for instance, everything that they need for an operation, for doctors to be able indeed to perform one. Not only do chronic patients spend all of their earnings or pensions to buy medicines on this market, but they are frequently forced to

sell what little they have, acquired painstakingly, to be able to get treatment.

"Yugoslav doctors have already publicized preliminary surveys which demonstrate a very significant deterioration of the health condition of the population.

"Due to the lack of anti-tetanus vaccines in a hospital in Loznica (on the border between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) a patient contracted this grave and fatal disease. Another patient had an epilepsy seizure for two days, due to the lack of intravenous anti-epileptics. She survived, but with severe irreversible damage to her cerebral functions.

"In one of the dialysis centers, of the 15 kidney patients whole dialysis was reduced from the needed three treatments to two weekly, four died immediately.

"Over only a year the number of tuberculosis patients in Belgrade has increased by 68 cases. At the Emergency Center in Belgrade, over less than a year, the mortality of injured patients went up by as much as 20% because of the lack of medicines and medical supplies for their timely treatment.

"At the Cardio-Vascular Surgery Center in Belgrade, in 1991, 502 open-heart surgeries were performed, and only 203 in 1992. The number of kidney transplants has been reduced by as much as 50% and in medicine, percentages of even 1 and 2% are significant.

"Epidemics of hepatitis, measles, intestinal and other infections are on the rise. Under the impact of Resolution 820 of the UN Security Council, it is expected that the present situation, difficult as it is, will only deteriorate further."

The tragedy of drug shortages throughout Yugoslavia cannot be fully understood or appreciated by reading a medical report, no matter how factual. The dilemma produced by the shortages grows more poignant and real when observed through patients' eyes particularly little patients.

Dr. Slavko Simeunovic, fifty-three, MD, PhD, vice dean of pediatrics and cardiology at Belgrade's University Children's Hospital, could not estimate how many of his tiny patients

had worsened or even died because of the lack of medicines or proper medical equipment.


"There is a terrible antibiotic shortage. Every day there are less cardiotonics available to us. We don't have dieting and nutritional drugs that are essential for the treatment of certain disorders. I have been postponing operating on children with congenital heart diseases because we don't have vital oxygen equipment. And even if the parents locate the \$2,000 needed to buy the equipment, where will they find it? How will they import it?"

"Once, this hospital, and medicine generally in Yugoslavia, was ranked with the best facilities of western Europe. Now it is not only that I cannot perform the operations here by myself, I cannot even recommend sending the children overseas because there is simply not enough money."

No one will venture to guess how many sick people have already died because of the sanctions and the consequent lack of medical drugs and equipment. "We are only certain," the cardiologist continued, "that the very young and the very old are the first to succumb."

The ward was full of everything from infants to toddlers to young children. Parents were worried and frightened, incredulous that their children might be permitted to slip away from them, in this day and age of advanced science, because of a lack of medicine.

"I don't want to suggest that we don't have any medicine at all," continued the doctor, "but our supplies are dwindling every day. We cannot schedule anything anymore. As the medicines drop, so do the expectations of our young patients. The longer the sanctions continue, the worse it will be and the greater the suffering."



Living in Greece since 1987 and foreign correspondent for a number of key American and European publications, Arnold Sherman has been writing about Yugoslavia for years, first as a travel writer and then covering the political upheavals that led to the dismemberment of that country. He was in Croatia and Slovenia while both of the former Yugoslavian republics were nearing secession. He interviewed top Moslem officials in Sarajevo at a moment in history when civil war still seemed unthinkable and spoke to Serb and Montenegrin officials who refused to believe that old Yugoslavia could and would perish.

Born in New York City in 1932, Sherman was news editor of the prestigious American weekly, "Aviation Week & Space Technology" before joining El Al Israel Airlines. His final position in Israel was with the Technion University in Haifa. His writing about high technology earned him the coveted Haifa literary award in 1985 while his poetry and other writings have been anthologized. His books have been translated into five languages.

Sherman admits that he "cannot write dispassionately about Yugoslavia. I was involved in the welter of events from the very beginning. I saw the tragedy unfold and I was called back to witness not only the massacre of people, but the death of a dream".

Ranging from a volume of poetry to five war books about the Middle East as well as novels and travelogs, "PERFIDY IN THE BALKANS" is the 28th book written by Arnold Sherman.



# C.I.A. Doubtful on Serbian Sanctions

By DAVID BINDER  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 21 — In a new assessment, the Central Intelligence Agency has concluded that the economic embargo imposed on Serbia 18 months ago is likely to deteriorate and that the West will probably have to accept the ethnic partitioning of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In the analysis, the C.I.A. also says that there appears to be "no good and politically viable alternative" to the Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, who has been accused in the West of starting the ethnic violence that followed the breakup of the old Yugoslav federation.

He is "probably the only Serb leader the West can deal with and the only one capable of delivering a comprehensive solution" to the Bosnian crisis and Serbia's conflict with Croatia, the agency said.

The analysis was completed early this month, before the elections on Sunday in which Mr. Milosevic's party gained seats in the Serbian Parliament.

## Division of Bosnia

The Bush and Clinton Administrations have supported an integral Bosnia and Herzegovina, and have backed United Nations economic sanctions against Serbia to punish it for its role in the war in Bosnia. The Serbian Government has supplied the Serbian forces that have taken control of about two-thirds of Bosnia. Croatia, which has seized about 20 percent of the country, has avoided international economic sanctions.

A document drawn from the assessment, called a National Intelligence Estimate, says it will be "difficult or impossible to undo" the large population shifts that resulted when hundreds of thousands of Muslims, Serbs and Croats were driven from their homes in the fighting.

Last week, David Kanin, the C.I.A.'s chief analyst for Yugoslavia, alluded to plans by Serbian and Croatian leaders to annex portions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the prospect that Kosovo, an ethnically Albanian province of Ser-

bia, will one day become part of Albania.

"I believe we are moving toward a greater Serbia, a greater Croatia and a greater Albania as result of this war," Mr. Kanin said during a roundtable discussion at the Woodrow Wilson Center, an arm of the Smithsonian Institution here. "The issue is whether to manage it or ignore it."

"We are not trying to manage it," Mr. Kanin said. "We're just ignoring it."

Apprised of Mr. Kanin's public remarks, Kent Harrington, the C.I.A. director of public affairs, said: "We en-



Neum, controlled by Croatia, is one city Muslims want returned.

courage our analysts to participate in academic discussions, but when they do they speak as individuals and do not represent intelligence views. Mr. Kanin's remarks were no exception."

Mr. Kanin's view is also contained in the written intelligence estimate, which sees Croatia absorbing parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and recovering some of Krajina, the area in Croatia that it lost to Serbs in 1991. It sees Serbia acquiring parts of Bosnia now held by Bosnian Serbs and part of Krajina. In addition, it forecasts that Albania might ultimately gain Kosovo and perhaps even some areas of Western Macedonia inhabited by ethnic Al-

banians.

The intelligence estimate appears to have prompted no reconsideration of United States policy on Bosnia.

"There is no debate on these issues," said a top-ranking State Department official who has read the C.I.A. assessment and who is involved in policymaking on the former Yugoslavia. "Sanctions are not a major policy issue. We don't question the boundaries of Kosovo. We are not in the business of re-drawing borders."

The new assessment is not the first time the Central Intelligence Agency has confronted a gulf between its assessment of the Yugoslav situation and the attitude of Government policy makers. In November 1990, the agency completed an analysis predicting — accurately — that the Yugoslav federation would collapse as early as the summer of 1991 and that civil war could ensue. But Bush Administration policymakers chose not to act upon this assessment.

Yugoslavia began to fall apart in June 1991 when Slovenia and Croatia seceded from the federation, and fighting broke out immediately.

In its assessment, the C.I.A. says the sanctions are likely to deteriorate in coming months because Serbia's neighbors are no longer willing to bear the economic sacrifices entailed in enforcing them: severe restrictions on Danube River traffic and the closure of vital rail and road connections between the Middle East and Northern Europe.

Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Macedonia and Ukraine have complained bitterly in recent months to the United Nations that the sanctions are costing them billions of dollars' worth of trade and industrial production. The European Union has proposed easing the sanctions in exchange for territorial concessions by the Bosnian Serbs to the Muslim-led Bosnian Government.

But Administration policymakers remain uniformly in favor of maintaining sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro, its small partner in the truncated Yugoslav federation. Some even wish to tighten the embargo still further, according to officials involved in the policy process.

N.Y. Times Dec 22 '93

EMBASSY OF GREECE  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 19, 1994

The Honorable  
Helen Delich Bentley  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington D.C., 20515  
FAX: (202) 225-4251

Dear Congresswoman Bentley,

Following yesterday's mark-up of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill for FY 95 at the Subcommittee level, during which language was voted on linking U.S. security assistance to Greece's compliance with U.N. sanctions against Serbia, I thought it timely to communicate the facts on this issue to Chairman David Obey. I consider it appropriate that I bring to your attention a copy of this letter herewith attached.

In the light of this very clear record allow me to stress that any linking of U.S. security assistance to the aforementioned non-existing issue is unfair and completely unwarranted.

Yours sincerely,



Loucas Tsilas  
Ambassador of Greece



## EMBASSY OF GREECE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 19, 1994

The Honorable  
David Obey  
Chairman  
House Appropriations Committee  
H-307 Capitol Building  
Washington D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman,

Having received information regarding language included in the Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill for F.Y. 95 providing for the withholding of a quarter of the security assistance (FMF) to Greece, until the submission of a report by the Administration on Greece's compliance with U.N. economic sanctions versus Yugoslavia, I would like to stress most categorically that Greece applies the sanctions with the utmost strictness. This is reflected, among other things, in a letter by Secretary W. Christopher to his Greek counterpart and statements by the State Department spokesman, as well as by the Western European Union. Moreover, the Secretary General of the U.N. Sanctions Committee Mr. Ngobi and the Coordinator, Ambassador Mr. Napolitano praised Greece during the meetings of the Sanctions Liaison group in Vienna, regarding the application by Greece of the Pre-verification System.

This system was, in fact, established following close cooperation between Greece, the U.S., the CSCE and the Sanctions Assistance Mission in an effort to further strengthen the enforcement of sanctions, as well as in order to cope with a problem that was of major concern to us. Namely, Greece which, one should remember, shares no common border with Serbia or Montenegro, was trying to prevent that Greek goods exported to third neighbouring countries were, eventually, finding their way into Serbia, because of these countries' negligence, or other reasons, obviously beyond our control. I have, personally, cooperated closely on this important question with Mr. Leon Fuerth, National Security Advisor to the Vice President. Mr. Fuerth, who coordinates the sanctions effort within the Administration, assured me of his satisfaction over the effectiveness of this cooperation.

I thought it was useful to communicate this letter to the other members of the Committee. We certainly stand ready to provide your staff with more details, including material that may be of assistance to you in this context.

Sincerely yours,



Loukas Tsilas  
Ambassador of Greece

**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL  
CHIEF COUNSEL'S OFFICE  
Treasury Annex, 2nd Floor  
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UNITED  
NATIONS



Security Council

Distr.  
GENERAL

S/RES/820 (1993)  
17 April 1993

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LUNA

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RESOLUTION 820 (1993)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3309th meeting,  
on 17 April 1993

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its earlier relevant resolutions,

Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General on the peace talks held by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (S/25221, S/25248, S/25403 and S/25479),

Reaffirming the need for a lasting peace settlement to be signed by all of the Bosnian parties,

Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Reaffirming once again that any taking of territory by force or any practice of "ethnic cleansing" is unlawful and totally unacceptable, and insisting that all displaced persons be enabled to return in peace to their former homes,

Reaffirming in this regard its resolution 808 (1993) in which it decided that an international tribunal shall be established for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report at the earliest possible date,

Deeply alarmed and concerned about the magnitude of the plight of innocent victims of the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Expressing its condemnation of all the activities carried out in violation of resolutions 757 (1992) and 787 (1992) between the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Serb-controlled areas in the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

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Deeply concerned by the position of the Bosnian Serb party as reported in paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 of the report of the Secretary-General of 28 March 1993 (S/25479).

Recalling the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations,

A

1. Commends the peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the form agreed to by two of the Bosnian parties and set out in the report of the Secretary-General of 28 March 1993 (S/25479), namely the Agreement on Interim Arrangements (annex I), the nine Constitutional Principles (annex II), the provisional provincial map (annex III) and the Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (annex IV);
2. Welcomes the fact that this plan has now been accepted in full by two of the Bosnian parties;
3. Expresses its grave concern at the refusal so far of the Bosnian Serb party to accept the Agreement on Interim Arrangements and the provisional provincial map, and calls on that party to accept the peace plan in full;
4. Demands that all parties and others concerned continue to observe the cease-fire and refrain from any further hostilities;
5. Demands full respect for the right of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the international humanitarian agencies to free and unimpeded access to all areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that all parties, in particular the Bosnian Serb party and others concerned, cooperate fully with them and take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of their personnel;
6. Condemns once again all violations of international humanitarian law, including in particular the practice of "ethnic cleansing" and the massive, organized and systematic detention and rape of women, and reaffirms that those who commit or have committed or order or have ordered the commission of such acts will be held individually responsible in respect of such acts;
7. Reaffirms its endorsement of the principles that all statements or commitments made under duress, particularly those relating to land and property, are wholly null and void and that all displaced persons have the right to return in peace to their former homes and should be assisted to do so;
8. Declares its readiness to take all the necessary measures to assist the parties in the effective implementation of the peace plan once it has been agreed in full by all the parties, and requests the Secretary-General to

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submit to the Council at the earliest possible date, and if possible not later than nine days after the adoption of the present resolution, a report containing an account of the preparatory work for the implementation of the proposals referred to in paragraph 38 of the Secretary-General's report of 26 March 1993 (S/28479) and detailed proposals for the implementation of the peace plan, including arrangements for the effective international control of heavy weapons, based *inter alia* on consultations with Member States, acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements;

9. **Encourages** Member States, acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements, to cooperate effectively with the Secretary-General in his efforts to assist the parties in implementing the peace plan in accordance with paragraph 8 above;

B

Determined to strengthen the implementation of the measures imposed by its earlier relevant resolutions,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

10. **Decides** that the provisions set forth in paragraphs 12 to 30 below shall, to the extent that they establish obligations beyond those established by its earlier relevant resolutions, come into force nine days after the date of the adoption of the present resolution unless the Secretary-General has reported to the Council that the Bosnian Serb party has joined the other parties in signing the peace plan and in implementing it and that the Bosnian Serbs have ceased their military attacks;

11. **Decides further** that if, at any time after the submission of the above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General, the Secretary-General reports to the Council that the Bosnian Serbs have renewed their military attacks or failed to comply with the peace plan, the provisions set forth in paragraphs 12 to 30 below shall come into force immediately;

12. **Decides** that import to, export from and transshipment through the United Nations Protected Areas in the Republic of Croatia and those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces, with the exception of essential humanitarian supplies including medical supplies and foodstuffs distributed by international humanitarian agencies, shall be permitted only with proper authorisation from the Government of the Republic of Croatia or the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina respectively;

13. **Decides** that all States, in implementing the measures imposed by resolutions 757 (1992), 760 (1992), 787 (1992) and the present resolution, shall take steps to prevent diversion to the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of commodities and products said to be destined for other places, in particular the United Nations Protected Areas in the Republic of Croatia and those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces;

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14. **Demands** that all parties and others concerned cooperate fully with UNPROFOR in the fulfilment of its immigration and customs control functions deriving from resolution 769 (1992);

15. **Decides** that transshipments of commodities and products through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on the Danube shall be permitted only if specifically authorized by the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) and that each vessel so authorized must be subject to effective monitoring while passing along the Danube between Vidia/Calafat and Mohacs;

16. **Confirms** that no vessels (a) registered in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or (b) in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or (c) suspected of having violated or being in violation of resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 767 (1992) or the present resolution shall be permitted to pass through installations, including river locks or canals within the territory of Member States, and **calls upon** the riparian States to ensure that adequate monitoring is provided to all cabotage traffic involving points that are situated between Vidia/Calafat and Mohacs;

17. **Reaffirms** the responsibility of riparian States to take necessary measures to ensure that shipping on the Danube is in accordance with resolutions 713 (1991), 767 (1992), 767 (1992) and the present resolution, including any measures under the authority of the Security Council to halt or otherwise control all shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations, to ensure effective monitoring and to ensure strict implementation of the relevant resolutions, and **reiterates** its request in resolution 767 (1992) to all States, including non-riparian States, to provide, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, such assistance as may be required by the riparian States, notwithstanding the restrictions on navigation set out in the international agreements which apply to the Danube;

18. **Requests** the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) to make periodic reports to the Security Council on information submitted to the Committee regarding alleged violations of the relevant resolutions, identifying where possible persons or entities, including vessels, reported to be engaged in such violations;

19. **Reminds** States of the importance of strict enforcement of measures imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter, and **calls upon** them to bring proceedings against persons and entities violating the measures imposed by resolutions 713 (1991), 767 (1992), 767 (1992) and the present resolution and to impose appropriate penalties;

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20. Welcomes the role of the international Sanctions Assistance Missions in support of the implementation of the measures imposed under resolutions 744 (1991), 757 (1992), 767 (1992) and the present resolution and the appointment of the Sanctions Coordinator by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and invites the Sanctions Coordinator and the Sanctions Assistance Missions to work in close cooperation with the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991);

21. Decides that States in which there are funds, including any funds derived from property, (a) of the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), or (b) of commercial, industrial or public utility undertakings in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), or (c) controlled directly or indirectly by such authorities or undertakings or by entities, wherever located or organized, owned or controlled by such authorities or undertakings, shall require all persons and entities within their own territories holding such funds to freeze them to ensure that they are not made available directly or indirectly to or for the benefit of the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and calls on all States to report to the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) on actions taken pursuant to this paragraph;

22. Decides to prohibit the transport of all commodities and products across the land borders or to or from the ports of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the only exceptions being:

(a) The importation of medical supplies and foodstuffs into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) as provided for in resolution 757 (1992), in which connection the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) will draw up rules for monitoring to ensure full compliance with this and other relevant resolutions;

(b) The importation of other essential humanitarian supplies into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) approved on a case-by-case basis under the no-objection procedure by the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991);

(c) Strictly limited transshipments through the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), when authorized on an exceptional basis by the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991), provided that nothing in this paragraph shall affect transshipment on the Danube in accordance with paragraph 15 above;

23. Decides that each State neighbouring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall prevent the passage of all freight vehicles and rolling stock into or out of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), except at a strictly limited number of road and rail border crossing points, the location of which shall be notified by each neighbouring State to the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) and approved by the Committee;

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24. **Decides** that all States shall impound all vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft in their territories in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and that these vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft may be forfeit to the seizing State upon a determination that they have been in violation of resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) or the present resolutions;

25. **Decides** that all States shall detain pending investigation all vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock, aircraft and cargoes found in their territories and suspected of having violated or being in violation of resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) or the present resolution, and that, upon a determination that they have been in violation, such vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft shall be impounded and, where appropriate, they and their cargoes may be forfeit to the detaining State;

26. **Confirms** that States may charge the expense of impounding vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft to their owners;

27. **Decides** to prohibit the provision of services, both financial and non-financial, to any person or body for purposes of any business carried on in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) the only exceptions being telecommunications, postal services, legal services consistent with resolution 757 (1992) and, as approved, on a case-by-case basis by the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991), services whose supply may be necessary for humanitarian or other exceptional purposes;

28. **Decides** to prohibit all commercial maritime traffic from entering the territorial sea of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) except when authorized on a case-by-case basis by the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) or in case of force majeure;

29. **Reaffirms** the authority of States acting under paragraph 12 of resolution 787 (1992) to use such measures commensurate with the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to enforce the present resolution and its other relevant resolutions, including in the territorial sea of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);

30. **Confirms** that the provisions set forth in paragraphs 12 to 29 above, strengthening the implementation of the measures imposed by its earlier relevant resolutions, do not apply to activities related to UNPROFOR, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia or the European Community Monitor Missions;

C

**Desires** of achieving the full readmittance of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to the international community once it has fully implemented the relevant resolutions of the Council.

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11. Expresses its readiness, after all three Bosnian parties have accepted the peace plan and on the basis of verified evidence, provided by the Secretary-General, that the Bosnian Serb party is cooperating in good faith in effective implementation of the plan, to review all the measures in the present resolution and its other relevant resolutions with a view to gradually lifting them;

12. Invites all States to consider what contribution they can make to the reconstruction of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

13. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.