COPYRIGHT / USAGE

Material on this site may be quoted or reproduced for **personal and educational purposes** without prior permission, provided appropriate credit is given. Any commercial use of this material is prohibited without prior permission from The Special Collections Department - Langsdale Library, University of Baltimore. Commercial requests for use of the transcript or related documentation must be submitted in writing to the address below.

When crediting the use of portions from this site or materials within that are copyrighted by us please use the citation: *Used with permission of the University of Baltimore*.

If you have any requests or questions regarding the use of the transcript or supporting

documents, please contact us: Langsdale Library

Special Collections Department 1420 Maryland Avenue Baltimore, MD 21201-5779 http://archives.ubalt.edu



H.R.H. CAOWN PRINCE ALEXANDER OF YUGOSLAVIA

FAX COVER SHEET

DATE:

19.6.92.

TO:

Mrs Helen Bentley, Member of the House of Representatives : 202 225 4251

The office of HRH Crown Prince Alexander

(5) total number of pages, including this one

MESSAGE:

The attached memorandum on Prince Alexander's position on the current situation may be of interest to you.

DEVI BI-CROWN FRINCE RELARANCE 13" 0-32 : 13-25 : 144 11 405 2005 : 202 224 4251 4 27

HENORANDUM ON THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS BY H.R.H. CROWN PRINCE ALEXANDER JUNE 1992

Deeply concerned about the direction of events in former Yugoslavia, totally committed to an end to violence and to the establishment of a stable, fair and lasting peace in the area, and determined to contribute to such solution, I wish to draw your attention to the following facts:

1. The current diplomatic offensive against the regime and the policy of Serbia's President Slobodan Milosevic is increasingly acquiring the character of a campaign against the Serb people and Serbia as such. This is unjust and misguided, as the people of Serbia have given ample proof - especially in recent weeks - that they, too, are victims of this regime, rather than its allies.

In this respect, it is noteworthy that only since the end of May the Serbian Orthodox Church has raised its voice against the regime, followed by most members of the Academy of Arts and Sciences, by the University of Belgrade, and numerous other institutions. Bearing in mind the continued stranglehold of the regime over the media - primarily the state television network - such expressions of dissent need to be actively encouraged. The best immediate help Serbia's democrats may hope for right now would be an unambiguous signal that the democratic community of nations is at odds with Milosevic, not with the Serbian people.

- 2. The sanctions against Serbia, adopted recently by the Security Council, are flawed on three accounts.
 - a. They are one-sided, because they treat the Serb side as the only guilty party in the dispute, which it clearly is not. This is obvious from a subsequent report on the Bosnian crisis by the U.N. Secretary-General, which specifically singled out the presence of Croatian regular troops in Western Herzegovina. The need for a balanced view has been emphasized in recent days by prominent figures as diverse as Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev, Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis, and U.S. Representative Jim Moody.
 - b. The sanctions are aimed at the wrong target, because they hurt ordinary people long before they start hurting political leaders. Similar sanctions had been enforced against Iraq, South Africa and then-Rhodesia over the years without much effect, except for the hardship for the common folk.
 - c. These sanctions, furthermore, may prove <u>counter-productive</u>, because they may help Milosevic rally yet again his otherwise declining support. In this way, the U.N. action may postpone, rather than accelerate, inevitable radical changes in Belgrade and Serbia's democratic rebirth.

It is now far from certain whether any government in Serbia would have the ability to control the Serb militias in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In fact, it is also unclear what exactly is expected of Serbia as a precondition for the lifting of sanctions.

SET DISCROPA (RINCE HELARIDER) 10 - 02 - 13 - 00 - 144 /1 403 2000 - 202 224 4231 - 0.

PRINCE ALEXANDER'S MEMORANDUM - 2

3. I have repeatedly stressed my considered opinion that the recently created "rump-Yugoslavia" is not really "new" in that it maintains continuity with Tito's legacy, which was not legitimately based. Its constitutional arrangements are transitory. Only after the change of government in Belgrade will it become possible to have a meaningful constituent assembly, capable of promulgating the new constitution, based on parliamentary monarchy, and proper parliamentary elections.

While this rump-Yugoslavia is clearly <u>illegitimate</u>, it is nevertheless no more <u>illegal</u> than any other successor-state in the area. Therefore, the drive to exclude it from international bodies (U.N., C.S.C.E. etc) is neither justified nor advisable.

- 4. The key to resolving the Bosnian conflict, as well as the issue of the Krajina and Eastern Slavonia, is not in apportioning blame, but in diagnosing and curing its causes.
 - a. The cause of the tragic end-game in Yugoslavia is the decision to recognize former republics of the Federation as independent states. In the event, the principle of territorial integrity of the republics fatally clashed with the principle of self-determination of the people. These internal boundaries, arbitrarily drawn by Tito, punished the Serbs by leaving one-third of them outside Serbia, even in areas where they form a compact and overwhelming majority. Such borders would be incompatible with the principle of democracy because they had never been negotiated upon, let alone ratified by freely elected assemblies.
 - b. On the other hand, minorities within Serbia itself are encouraged to seek "self-determination" with disregard to the principle of territorial integrity of Serbia itself.
- 5. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it must be remembered that the Serbs there are not "invaders" but one third of the region's native population. They are "Bosnians" no less than the region's native Muslims and Croats. Several questions have to be asked which have not been adequately answered by the world community:
 - a. The disintegration of Yugoslavia is commonly ascribed to the allegedly insurmountable contradictions between its ethnic groups. Along the same lines, Bosnia is even less a viable state: contradictions and divergent interests, traditions, and self-perceptions among its ethnic groups are even more strongly pronounced.
 - b. Not so long ago ago many outside observers were rejecting the idea of an all-Yugoslav referendum on the future of the state, because they thought that this would mean the imposition of the will of a majority over the minority. In practice, this was taken to mean that the Serbs should not force the Croats and Slovenes to stay within Yugoslavia simply by outvoting them. And yet, in Bosnia, international recognition was extended on the basis of a simple majority under 60% of the electorate! voting for

PRINCE ALEXANDER'S MEMORANDUM - 3

DI CHOIL I KINCE REDECTO

independence! The Serbs, one third of Bosnia's population, who form a majority in over a half of its territory, were excluded from this decision. Their aspirations were bypassed in exactly the way that would have been deemed unacceptable and unfair to the Croats and Slovenes.

- c. If a simple, unqualified majority was acceptable for this would-be state's creation, would it be deemed sufficient for its undoing too? In the first week of May, in Graz, Bosnia's Serbs and Croats were close to an agreement on dividing the republic between Serbia and Croatia. Would this decision, also based on a simple majority of the population, also be deemed fair, democratic and acceptable? And yet, this is exactly what has been done to the Serbs in Bosnia by the separatists' policy of fait accompli.
- 6. I am extremely concerned by the apparent difference in evaluating the validity of demands and aspirations of different ethnic groups in former Yugoslavia, both in the media and in some government circles (especially on the Hill). I wish to stress the need for an equal right of all parties in the conflict to equal treatment. It is difficult to explain advocating full autonomy, or even outright independence, for the Albanians in Kosovo, while denying the right of the Serbs in the Krajina to enjoy the same rights. There is no moral, logical, or political justification for What is perceived by many of my countrymen as an unequal and unjust attitude.
- 7. Two fundamental facts about the Yugoslav imbroglio need to be remembered when searching for a solution:
 - a. Yugoslavia came together as a voluntary union of <u>nations</u> in 1918, and not as an association of states, or quasistates. Its "divorce" should reflect this fundamental fact, and allow for the right of self-determination of its constituent nations, which is more important than the inviolability of internal administrative boundaries.
 - b. Imposing a solution which would satisfy the aspirations of virtually all ethnic groups in former Yugoslavia, except the largest some nine million Serbs is a disastrous strategy from the purely pragmatic strategy of politics as "the art of the possible." Even if they are forced into submission now, with a Carthagian peace imposed on them by a costly and bloody "Balkan Storm," the Serbs would have no stake in the ensuing new order in the Balkans. This would inevitably cause disequilibrium and strife years from now.
- 8. The United States, being virtually the only super-power left, bears a great responsibility for its words and actions. Any continuation of what is now perceived as an imbalanced and unfair policy will have the consequence of aggravating conflicts, rather than containing them. To blame only one side for the Yugoslav inferno is the same as blaming only Israel for everything that happens in the Middle East, or blaming exclusively the Catholics for whatever happens in Northern Ireland.

PRINCE ALEXANDER'S MEMORANDUM - 4

The United States, an ally of Serbia in two world wars, should be the region's "honest broker." Washington should require all parties to negotiate peace with everything on the table, including the borders.

9. Constitutional monarchy, for the Serbs, is a viable option which is supported by an ever increasing number of people from all walks of life. It is also the best guarantee for a lasting peace in the region. It should be supported by all who wish to see an end to the carnage in the Balkans. A stable, democratic government in Belgrade will contribute to the stability and democracy in the entire region - so sadly lacking, right now, on all sides of South Slav barricades.

* * *

I present this document in the hope that taking into account these points will help the United States adopt a more fruitful and pro-active policy in southeast Europe. This may, in turn, contribute to a fair and lasting solution to the Wars of Yugoslav Succession.

DAVID A. ERNE

1000 NORTH WATER STREET, SUITE 2100, MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN 53202

June 19, 1992

SENT VIA PACSIMILE

Michael Djordjevich, President and Chief Executive Officer Capital Guaranty Corporation Steuart Tower, 22nd Floor One Market Plaza San Francisco, CA 94105-1413

Dear Mike:

I am disappointed to report that I received a telephone call late yesterday afternoon from David Andelman, indicating that Young & Rubicon will not be submitting a proposal to represent us in the public relations and lobbying effort. I am extremely disappointed, since they have huge resources and David is personally well-qualified, having been station chief for the New York Times in Belgrade for three years.

David said the "official reason" the board of directors declined the possible employment was that the firm has so many commitments to other clients that it felt it should not take on a difficult project like ours. I find this difficult to believe and suspect that instead the reasons may be the following:

- 1. The organizational confusion which was demonstrated to David at the meeting Monday evening in Chicago among Serbian Unity Congress, Serb-Net, the Serbian-American Media Center and an executive director. David expressed concern Monday evening that a single organization, with a very small group of decision-makers, would be essential in working with a public relations firm, especially since the situation was changing nearly daily and would require the ability to respond quickly to changing facts.
 - Concerns that we will be anxious to pursue desirable but unachievable goals such as replaying the Holocaust, asking the Pope for an apology, asking the Croatians



Michael Djordjevich, President and Chief Executive Officer June 19, 1992 Page 2

for reparations or asking for Nuremberg trials. I think David had concerns about this, even though I explained to David that while some Serbian-Americans are strongly committed to those objectives, I was confident that those in control would not ask that he pursue them).

3. Concerns about having to work with the Serbian-American Media Center, which I believe David views as well-intended but not well-equipped to undertake the assignment. He expressed serious concern Monday about George Bogdanich's claim for responsibility for having Sudetic replaced by Burns at the New York Times, which David believes is not correct, and George's claim that he participated in the placement of Jim Moody on the McNeil-Lehrer Report, which again turns out to have been incorrect. I personally feel we cannot hire the Media Center in addition to an international agency, especially since the Media Center wants \$10,000 per month, according to George, for its work alone.

David gave me the name of another Washington firm-Powell, Tate--which I will contact for a proposal, and within several days I expect a proposal from the Milwaukee-based firm which has international connections through an organization called World Com. In addition, I have a proposal from Joyce Cusmano in Detroit which I will distribute to you and to Nick as soon as I receive the proposal from the Milwaukee-based firm.

Mike, my feeling continues to be that we should go forward full-blast with our fund-raising campaign. If it turns out that we have raised the vast majority of the funds through Serbian Unity Congress, then I think we have a responsibility to the members of Serbian Unity Congress to retain the public relations firm through that organization alone. On the other hand, if other organizations, including those affiliated with Serb-Net, raise funds that are very substantial in comparison to the funds raised by Serbian Unity Congress, then they should be invited to join us. However, I do not think it is fair to the Serbian Unity Congress members to give others a "free ride" if they can make contributions of only a few tens of thousands of dollars. Worse, the apparently confused organizational structure seems to be scaring away potential contributions and even the public relations firms.

As you know, I thought last week's ad in the New York Times was excellent. I have reviewed a draft of an ad proposed by another group which apparently will appear next week and is

Michael Djordjevich, President and Chief Executive Officer June 19, 1992 Page 3

not bad, but in my opinion is not as good as your ad. Keeping in mind how uninformed the U.S. public is on issues relating to Yugoslavia, I think we should keep the ads very simple, and I am enclosing possible language for a future ad. However, we should keep in mind that members of the Serbian Unity Congress who have contributed for a public relations firm expect that their money is not being used for these ads. Furthermore, we probably should wait until we have retained a public relations firm before spending too much more money on ads, so that the public relations firm can advise us about how we can best spend our limited financial resources.

Obviously, all this requires more conversation between you and me, and with Nick and with Helen, to whom I am sending copies of this letter by facsimile.

Best regards,

David A. Erne

DAE: SAM

Enc.

cc Mr. Nick Trkla Hon. Helen Delich Bentley

YUGOSLAVIA

What's in a Border?

The current borders between Serbia, Croatia and Bosna-Hertzegovina were drawn by the Nazi government in Croatia during World War II and redrawn by the Croatian Communist, Marshall Tito, after the war. Those borders are farther south and farther east than the historic borders which divided Serbia from Croatia and from Bosna-Hertzegovina. They forced many hundreds of thousands of Serbians to live outside the borders of Serbia.

Serbia was an American ally in both World War I and World War II. Croatia and Bosna-Hertzegovina fought against America in World War I, and Croatia declared war on the United States in World War II.

Should the United States enforce the Nazi borders, as redrawn by the Communists, or should it instead consider claims by Serbia, its historic ally, to borders which incorporate a larger portion of its population within Serbia?

We believe the answer is obvious. There should be a ceasefire. Then the border issues should be resolved.

Serbian Unity Congress P.O. Box 5397 Berkely, CA 94705-9991