

N4T: 1-10-93

U.S. Helped Defeat Serbian Challenger

To the Editor:

We shouldn't be surprised at Milan Panic's defeat in the Yugoslav elections, as you seem to be in "No Easy Out for Bosnia" (editorial, Dec. 23). Nor should we blame the voters for it. In a way, despite Washington's alleged support of his candidacy, we have helped his defeat.

To start with, we approved Mr. Panic's travel to Belgrade to assume the position of Prime Minister in a country with which we maintain a questionable diplomatic relationship and where we have no ambassador in place. What kind of support were we giving him?

We strengthened the economic sanctions during the electoral campaign without making it clear that they would be abolished should Mr. Panic win.

We implicitly contemplated the possibility of bombing the Serbs if they did not change their stand.

Last and psychologically most important, on the eve of the elections we published the list of Mr. Panic's opponents (Slobodan Milosevic's supporters), branding them criminals. It is we who hold that a person is innocent until proved guilty.

News reports from Belgrade said Mr. Panic's supporters were aghast when they heard Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger's announcement, while President Milosevic's forces claimed a touchdown. To anyone familiar with the Serbian mentality, call it even stubbornness — odd as it may sound — we goofed. Our tactic was wrong and ended by antagonizing the voters rather than attracting them to Mr. Panic.

It is unfortunate that we did not use

a more knowledgeable, diplomatic approach in this important and delicate matter.

MILLORAD DEVIK
Chevy Chase, Md., Dec. 26, 1992

Croatian Anti-Semitism

To the Editor:

Your Dec. 18 article about President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia speaks of his efforts to foster nationalism in his people to justify annexation of Bosnian territory. Mr. Tudjman has also expressed blatantly anti-Semitic views and tried to whitewash the Nazi puppet state of Croatia, which participated eagerly in Hitler's policy of killing Jews.

Croatian Jews, Mr. Tudjman wrote in his book "Wastelands: Historical Truth" (1988), used their supposed traits of "selfishness, craftiness, unreliability, miserliness, underhandedness and secrecy" to gain control of the Jasenovac concentration camp (where tens of thousands of Yugoslav Jews and others perished) and victimize others. Jews, he alleged, are commanded to "exterminate others and take their place" because they consider themselves the chosen people. Israeli policy toward the Arabs, according to him, makes them nothing less than "Judeo-Nazis."

President Tudjman asserts that the bloodthirsty Ustashi regime that ruled Croatia and exterminated its Jews a half century ago "reflected the centuries-old aspirations of the Croat people." This does not bode well for a new, enlarged Croatian state.

DAVID A. HARRIS
Executive Vice President
American Jewish Committee
New York, Dec. 24, 1992

~~NYT: 12-1-92~~
NYT: 12-1-92

On My Mind

A. M. ROSENTHAL

Deaths in Sarajevo

SARAJEVO, Bosnia and Herzegovina

But if the water is cut for days and weeks how do you get some to drink and wash? Does your wife have to go out and stand at a tap?

For a moment I thought that the Bosnian official driving us through the streets while we crouched low against the snipers had not heard. But he had.

He replied in sentences with such long pauses between them that they seemed almost different conversations.

"No. She does not. She does not go out. She is dead. Fifty-seven days, killed by a shell. Over there. It is a war. It will end. Ten, fifteen years."

Something has ended already. Sarajevo has died, twice. The shells of Bosnian-Serbian artillery, the endless pop-pop of snipers in the hills firing at human beings in the streets, has killed Sarajevo as a living city. Ghosts are left — ghosts of closed shops, blasted office buildings, pocked homes, listless walkers, in shattered streets.

The idea of Sarajevo — that has died too. Its death will bring years of war to what once was Yugoslavia and most likely will spread wider and deeper in the Balkans.

The idea simply was that people of different religions and backgrounds swept up in the same space on earth by history, migration, war, conquest, whatever, could actually work out political and human understandings that would permit them to forgo slaughtering each other and their nations.

The people of the city, those who could not break through the Serbian siege, are being suitably punished for ever cherishing Sarajevo or the strange idea for which it stood and lived. Later — tomorrow, the next day, another column — there will be time enough to think through where justice lies in this death of the city and the rending of a whole nation — if it matters.

For Bosnia's Muslims, the truth is that the Serbs, maddened by dreams of control over the entire hodgepodge that was the Yugoslav nation, slaughtered the Muslims, burned them out, imprisoned them — all to erase in Bosnia any vestige of Muslim separateness or memory.

For the Serbs, in Bosnia and in

Serbia, the truth was that it was their Bosnia as well as the Muslims', but no, the Muslims would not have it that way and so schemed to create an independent country that would subjugate Serbs to Muslim domination.

For this difference in vision more than 100,000 people have died, mostly Bosnian Muslims, and a million or more Bosnians, Serbs, Croats are living as refugees, or praying that they are lucky enough to become refugees.

Scores of thousands of others are shivering in Serbian or Muslim prison camps, not believing that freedom is at hand but knowing that the cold death-bringing weather most certainly is.

Some things are clear. The Bosnian

The city
perishes
— along
with its
strange dream.

Muslims are the greatest sufferers by far. But hundreds of thousands of Serbs have fled their Bosnian homes and also wander in bitter search of home and bowl. It is man-made disaster. It is a war not of religion but of hatred, deliberately spread by the leaders of the nations of the old Yugoslavia.

Most of them — not including the President of Muslim Bosnia — were Communist party hacks. They understood that hate and ethnic fear were as good as Communism to keep them in office. They were the people who brought devastation to the parts of the old Yugoslavia as they helped Tito bring tyranny to the whole of it. If there is a hero among them, that fellow is hiding.

Should the West — meaning the United States — try to help effectively, which would mean military as well as humanitarian help? Or is it simply a reality that hatred and blood feud are not near running themselves out and that the best thing to do is provide

food and medicine and then discreetly walk away?

Right now, in decent respect for the people who survive in Sarajevo, it is humanly appropriate to talk about the condition of their lives.

The condition is fear.

God knows how many shells and bullets crack into this city every day. And of course everybody lives in knowledge that only He knows which one of the shells and the bullets is spent for which person and when it will arrive.

Can the sniper really see you, even your face? The soldiers who fire the artillery shells may not see you but can they really see your car? And if they cannot see you or your car, will you be killed by someone who does not even know that you are there?

Bravado is not armor. President Alija Izetbegovic stands facing the National Library, showing the ruin to Elie Wiesel, who has come to witness. Somebody points out that they are all in clear view of the very gunners who blasted the library and suggests that maybe they ought to duck out. Everybody does.

Sarajevo fear starts long before arrival. We were able to fly into Sarajevo because Mr. Wiesel's voice, determination and reputation moved U.N. officials, Serbs and Bosnians to give permission.

They all said they would do their best to spread the word along the line of flight not to shoot at the United Nations plane. But of course it occurred to everybody to wonder whether the instructions got to every teen-age irregular with a shoulder launcher and whether the notice would be a barrier to shooting or an attraction.

U.N. officers said they could not answer that question. But they did provide flak jackets and helmets. They told us not to move anywhere without them. They took us in armored cars from airport to the city.

We saw along the way that the people of Sarajevo had neither flak jackets, helmets or armored cars. Their leaders had not thought to provide them while they worked out Yugoslavia's destiny.

Neither did the people have something even more important in Sarajevo, the one sure guarantee of continued life — passage out. □

11-11-92

Topics of The Times

Destructive Diplomacy

As the Serbian butcher Slobodan Milosevic rushes to finish carving up Bosnia, he's getting plenty of help from his Croatian apprentice, Franjo Tudjman. Mr. Tudjman is selling out his nominal allies in Bosnia, snatching scraps for himself. And his henchmen are adopting the technique of ethnic cleansing to consolidate control over the bits of Bosnia they've seized.

In these circumstances, President Bush's choice of Mara Letica to be the next American Ambassador to Croatia is startling for its destructive bias.

Ms. Letica, a Croat-American, is the daughter of Mr. Tudjman's chief fund-raiser in the U.S. and a niece of one of Mr. Tudjman's closest advisers. To confirm her appointment would do far more than pander to Croat voters in the U.S. It would ratify Mr. Tudjman's aggression. If the President does not quickly withdraw the nomination, the new Senate will be wholly justified in rejecting it, with contempt.

Rocking the Vote

Twenty-one years ago, Congress passed the 26th Amendment giving 18-year-olds the right to vote. Unfortunately, younger voters haven't had much impact on Presidential politics since then. In the last election, only a third of all those 18 to 24 voted. The music channel MTV, the Public Broadcasting System and the Fox network therefore deserve praise for their innovative efforts to build registration among young voters.

MTV alone has registered 100,000 young people with its "Choose or Lose" campaign. It has also interviewed candidates, discussed issues of concern to younger voters, explained the electoral process and offered a political

primer on terms like "spin doctor" and "flesh pressing." Senator Al Gore answered questions that ranged from the economy to his views on homosexuality. MTV also presented a profile called "Facing the Future With Bill Clinton." Today, MTV reporter Tabitha Soren is scheduled to meet with President Bush.

A PBS show called "Why Bother Voting?" began in September as part of the network's election-year coverage. It uses young comedians. Fox's "Rock the Vote," which also began in September, features popular young musicians and other celebrities.

The purpose is to make voting hip. But maybe something more than "temporarily hip" will eventually emerge — an entire generation committed to political participation.

Mr. Foley Keeps a Pledge

The search for a new administrator of the House of Representatives dragged on for months. But with the naming of a 34-year Army veteran with extensive management experience, Lieut. Gen. Leonard Wishart 3d, Speaker Thomas Foley has made good on his pledge to install a nonpartisan professional manager by the opening of the 103d Congress in January.

Mr. Foley moved to create the new post last April, after the House bank scandal dramatized the poor management of House affairs. In a nod toward bipartisanship, he gave the House minority leader, Robert Michel, veto power over the administrator's selection. Last month the House adjourned with the two leaders still pondering.

Their ability, finally, to agree on a qualified administrator holds promise for institutional reform and for an end to the partisan sniping that too often dominated this year's House session.

ert Strauss has decided to come home. Whatever his reasons for leaving Moscow, Mr. Strauss feels he can "do more good" for the Russians from his office in Washington.

That is certainly worth trying. And one of his biggest jobs, he wisely says, would be to lower expectations in the United States about what the new Russia can quickly accomplish.

But what a terrible moment for the United States to be left ambassador-less in beleaguered Moscow!

An ambassador of stature and experience is desperately needed — to reassure Russia's hard-

ing and to direct Western aid and advice where they're needed most.

An ambassador could also encourage Russia's leaders to back away from the precipice of hyperinflation. And a new envoy could wrap up a treaty to codify deep cuts in U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arms.

These and other issues require urgent attention; they will not wait for the U.S. Government to complete its leisurely transition.

President Bush and President-elect Bill Clinton need to agree on a new ambassador — or at least a high-level interim replacement — to dispatch to Moscow now.

to the Editor:
"A Bush Pardon Now: Unforgivable" (editorial, Nov. 12) argues against President Bush's pardoning former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. I have known Mr. Weinberger for many years, and while I write in support of him as a friend, I believe that he should be pardoned for other reasons.

Our country has been deeply involved for a number of years with the churning political events of the Middle East. Our Government has made some good decisions and taken some

bered for his spelling of h he was hono Indiana Un from all over about his vis Willkie so operation and championed c rights when it so.

Rush The writer is Willkie and a ana University

Topics of The Times

A Star Is Born

He doesn't look like Madonna — although, given her infinite variety, she may choose one day to look like him. He doesn't sing like Madonna, dance like Madonna, strip like Madonna or propose to free Americans of their Puritan heritage like Madonna. Never mind. Socks Clinton is a star.

If he weren't, would he have figured so hugely in the nation's newspapers this week? There he was, lured from his home by catnip and surrounded by five crouching, kneeling or prone photographers — all of them trying hard for a really swell shot of the President-elect's daughter's cat.

Socks Clinton, unlike Madonna, did absolutely nothing to attract the world's attention. Furthermore, he will continue to do absolutely nothing. If guests at the White House hope to see him, he'll probably hide. Anyone who expects him to be cute on command has never met a cat.

Despite his adoptive family's determined efforts to shield him from the press, Socks Clinton will stay famous all the time Chelsea Clinton's father is in office. Nonetheless, his will remain a cat's life: snoozing followed by eating followed by snoozing followed by pushing corks across the kitchen floor. At times he may be impelled to claw the leg of a chair. But he will never have to claw his way to the top.

Correction on Mara Letica

An item in Topics of the Times on Nov. 2 incorrectly described Mara Letica, President Bush's nominee for ambassador to the former Yugoslav state of Croatia.

The article gave two grounds for opposing her nomination. It referred inaccurately to her father as the chief U.S. fund-raiser for Croatia's President, Franjo Tudjman. Her attorneys say that neither she nor her father has ever raised money for Mr. Tudjman, his party or his Government. And the editorial described her, also incorrectly, as the niece of a longtime Tudjman adviser.

We regret these errors. At the same time, we remain of the opinion that Ms. Letica lacks the independence such an appointment calls for. Her father has served officially as a special representative of President Tudjman for economic matters. And Ms. Letica was described warmly as "a passionate lobbyist for Croatia" in an Oct. 25 article in a Croatian weekly by Slaven Letica, a former adviser to Mr. Tudjman though no relation to Ms. Letica.

"I understood she was named Ambassador of Croatia to the USA. when I finally understood [she] was the US ambassador to Croatia," Mr. Letica wrote, with those emphases, "I decided that this was the most beautiful diplomatic gesture of the American Administration in the last two years." President Bush, and the public, would be better served by less gesture and more disinterest.

Marathon Winner Made Head

To the Editor:

It is unfortunate, to say the least, that your Nov. 3 sports pages assert that Willie Mtolo, men's winner of the New York City Marathon, isn't making big headlines back home. You state: "In the white press of Johannesburg, Mtolo's feat was reported only in the sports section, not on the front page."

As the New York correspondent of The Star, Johannesburg, who covered the event for all 11 of the Argus Group's newspapers, I had an interest in how Mtolo's spectacular victory was played. The Star, South Africa's biggest daily newspaper, carried the result on its front page under a double-column headline "Mtolo Wins New York Marathon."

The Times welcomes letters from readers. Letters must include the writer's name, address and telephone number. We regret that we cannot acknowledge or return unpublished letters. Those selected for publication may be shortened for space reasons.

This report to my own length review of the lead story through (as described to sage that day) over the boorish African nation France and Britain India's national

The New
Col

229 West 43

ARTHUR OCHS SULLIVAN
and Chief Editor
WALTER E. MATTHEW
LANCE R. PEARSON
LAURA J. COOPER
DAVID L. GORHAM, Jr.
and Chief Financial Officer
MICHAEL E. RYAN, Sr.
RICHARD G. THORNTON

11-19-92

NYT: 1-26-93

Before We Step Into a Bosnian Quagmire

To the Editor:

Re "Criticized as Appeaser, Vance Defends His Role in the Balkans" (front page, Jan. 19): Just as the Clinton State Department, heir in some ways to the Carter State Department, takes over foreign policy, Cyrus Vance, architect of the Carter philosophy, is under attack for doing what he does best: stalling for time while trying to limit damage from a mess most of the world has neither the patience nor wish to understand.

I have never been an admirer of Mr. Vance until now. As a Serbian-American outraged by the criminal, almost suicidal policies of President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia and his holdover Communist henchmen, I am equally angered at the West's shortsighted, bellicose response to the tragedy in the Balkans. The same pundits who shuddered at United States involvement in Vietnam would drag us into a Balkan conflict aimed at punishing the Serbs.

Only Mr. Vance, Britain's Lord Owen and Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali seem to appreciate that in the Balkans nothing is black and white. Resolving gray areas of ethnicity, religion, geopolitics and history mired in almost unimaginable violence and passionate hatred requires more than genuflecting to public opinion. Haven't we learned any-

thing? That Mr. Milosevic and many of the Serb paramilitary leaders in Bosnia deserve to be brought up on charges of war crimes is beyond doubt. So do Muslim and Croat leaders whose forces devastate Serbian populations. Mr. Vance and other statesmen understand that and do not seek to appease any of them.

But they also know that the Serbian people — long the region's staunchest supporters of Western pluralism and Christian values in the face of Communist dictatorship and Muslim fundamentalism — run the danger of being wiped out by the Western reaction to misguided Serbian political leaders. And they seem alone in comprehending how the West's premature, German-driven recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia gave those self-serving leaders fuel for the flames of the Serb people's nationalist and religious fears.

Mr. Vance practices the vanishing art of diplomacy with skill, eschewing the sound-bite school of the quick fix for the laborious — and apparently unpopular — world view. We who believe in the survival of the Serbs as a people can only pray he holds sway, and that his former disciples, like Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher, take a page from their former teacher.

NICK PETERS

Montclair, N.J., Jan. 19, 1993

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Doubts about Serbian rapes

SIR — It is high time that the blood-curdling allegations of Bosnian Serbs raping Muslim women as a deliberate policy of intimidation were challenged. My own inquiries have led to an admission from a senior German official that there is no direct evidence to support the wild figures of rape victims.

The EC first espoused the rape atrocity issue at the EC Edinburgh summit last month and, according to Danish and British participants, the initiative and the dossier were exclusively German.

Frau Wild, who is in charge of the Bosnian desk in the German Foreign Affairs Ministry, says the material came partly from the Izetbegovic government and partly from the Catholic charity Caritas: that is, from Muslim and Croat sources.

No effort has been made to seek corroboration from more impartial sources. All that we do know is that, in this dreadful civil war, women from all three communities have been raped.

The figures vary considerably. Patrick Bishop says that "35,000 Muslim women have been violated, according to conservative estimates" (article, Jan. 17). Dame Anne Warburton puts the figure at 20,000, and Shirley Williams 50,000. Such stories have con-

tributed more than anything else to the American and European enthusiasm for war against Serbia.

The Foreign Office's press department concedes that these figures are totally uncorroborated. When I suggested that it should issue a denial, it referred me to the Danes, currently chairing the EC.

Copenhagen agreed that the reports were unsubstantiated, but this seems not to have bothered Danish politicians. Belgrade has even asked for the Danish Foreign Minister, Mr Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, to be replaced by somebody less anti-Serb.

The most likely explanation for German behaviour is that they need to "satanise" the Serbs in order to cover their own responsibility for pitching Yugoslavia into civil war. In the interests of EC consensus at the time of signing the Maastricht Treaty, the British Government endorsed the break-up of Yugoslavia without consulting the Yugoslav electorate.

If Labour or the anti-Maastricht Tories had been more effective, the Government would never have been allowed to grovel to the Germans, and Lance-Corporal Edwards would still be alive.

NORA BELOFF
London NW6

Nora Beloff is a former chief political correspondent of the OBSERVER, and the author of several books on Eastern Europe, including "Tito's Flowed Legacy."

In Paraguay, Little Has Really Changed

To the Editor:

In "Asunción Journal: Remember Paraguay? It Is Rejoining the World" (Dec. 24), you do not point out that President Andrés Rodríguez is a walking-talking protégé of the former dictator, Gen. Alfredo Stroessner, and that nothing of substance in Paraguay has changed in nearly 40 years.

I am a frequent visitor there. Paraguay remains a safe harbor for smugglers, expatriate fugitives and others who pay General Rodríguez, his family and conspirators currency in exchange for entry, protection and anonymity. This has gone on for years.

With the United States-sanctioned overthrow of General Stroessner in 1989, Mr. Rodríguez, General Stroessner's lieutenant, promised governmental cleansing and social reform. This has meant phantom progress, typified most recently by Mr. Rodríguez's throwing expendable generals to the wolves in civilian courts. And that occurs only when the trail of corruption from these generals has led too closely to the iron gates of the presidential palace or to any of the sprawling estates of the President's family and friends.

There has been no cleansing in Asunción. The streets of the dusty capital are still filled with fear, anger and resentment of government. Paraguay will never rejoin the world until Mr. Rodríguez joins General Stroessner in Spain.

JOHN C. KAUFMAN
San Francisco, Dec. 29, 1992

How Tiny Parks Dept. Subsidizes Board of Ed

To the Editor:

In "School Custodians' Dirty Tricks" (Op-Ed, Dec. 18), John Fager indicts New York City school custodians for profiteering, rather than performing. New Yorkers are deprived of custodial services in another way.

Fully a quarter of New York City school playgrounds are so-called "jointly operated playgrounds," maintained by Department of Parks and Recreation workers, rather than school custodians.

There is nothing joint about the operation of these playgrounds. An agreement between the Parks Department and the Board of Education dating from 1938 has become a situation in which Parks has spent \$100 million in the last 15 years to rebuild and \$4.5 million each year to operate these playgrounds. Meanwhile, the Board of Education has contributed nothing for reconstruction and no maintenance work.

Instead of providing a healthy model for future cooperation in maintaining open spaces, these "joint" play-

grounds are part of a trend that places Parks at the bottom of city priorities — suffering the greatest budget and staff cuts while bearing the burden of providing all of us with light, air, greenery and relief from grit and concrete.

In effect, the tiny Parks Department is subsidizing the mammoth Board of Education. Worse, poorly paid parks workers are subsidizing well-paid custodians by doing maintenance work for them. The Mayor and Board of Education should redress this imbalance at the next budget negotiations.

LINDA DAVIDOFF
Executive Director, Parks Council
New York, Dec. 29, 1992



The New York Times
Company

229 West 43d St., N.Y. 10036

ARTHUR OCHS SULZBERGER, Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer

WALTER E. MATTSO, Vice Chairman

LANCE R. PRIMIS, President

European Community Holds Balkan Key

To the Editor:

Beyond whatever short-term military intervention is feasible and appropriate in the former Yugoslavia, and beyond war crimes prosecution for a few identifiable individuals, a third international strategy can shift the geopolitical balance back toward peace.

Tangible and effective pressures can be imposed more broadly on aggressive actors in the Serb-Croat-Bosnian setting by explicitly tying future recognition of state borders to international norms of behavior.

Consider a thread in reports of some observers from the Bosnian theater: in recent months there have been many instances of violence visited upon representatives of the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross by various combatants, but apparently none against representatives of the European Community (many have been present in the region). In the Balkans one often sees the European Community flag — 12 gold stars circled on a blue backdrop — displayed with a wistful star-in-waiting in the corner, representing hopes for entry into the European economic federation.

Acceptance into the European family represents each incipient state's best hope for the future. The possibility of being barred from that acceptance is very sobering.

There thus could be a dramatic impact on the Balkan wars if the world community, and the European Community in particular, declared

directly and unambiguously that there will be a form of potential state accountability — that no nation-state will be accepted as a full member of the community of nations, or of the European Community and the Council of Europe, so long as its claimed borders were established through a process involving proven war crimes in the current conflict.

This strategy would give special importance to the independent commission set up by the Security Council to investigate war crimes in the Bosnian theater.

The economic future of these societies in transition can in this way be held hostage to the behavior of their representatives in the war zones — irregulars, as well as official military units, group actions, where individuals cannot be identified, as well as where individuals can be held responsible, and not just for the time that the conflict goes on, but also for future negotiations when the guns have gone silent.

As the European players and the Clinton Administration consider the problematic military options and the possibility of a handful of individual prosecutions, they would also do well to consider such a broader accountability strategy. This approach would apply more effective suasions and deterrence upon those warring populations, and not coincidentally serve to reinforce the international rule of law.

ZYGMUNT PLATER
Prof., Boston College Law School
Newton Centre, Mass., Jan. 5, 1993

Oh, Please Don't Paint That Bridge Bright Red

To the Editor:

Your Dec. 28 "About New York" column, on painting the Hell Gate railroad bridge, fails to mention that the New York City Art Commission has the final say on the selection of a paint color.

It is to be hoped that the commission will use its good judgment to arrive at a color that suits the environment, similar to the time 12 years ago when a furor was raised concerning the color of bridges because another bridge spanning the East River had been painted (without obtaining Art Commission approval) a totally inappropriate color.

The basic decision is always whether the bridge should be the focus of attention for the riverscape or of the background. In the past, bridges have been painted to blend into their backgrounds. With bridges painted as infrequently as they are (in this case, not since 1917), to select a bright red color is, in my opinion, a mistake that we would all have to live with for a long time.

I hope the commission will approve, as it did 12 years ago, an

The Times welcomes letters from readers. Letters must include the

U.S. and Europe Have Different Balkan Aims

To the Editor:

"While Europe Stalls . . ." (editorial, May 12) states that it is a "mystery" why the governments of Western Europe are unwilling to take any action to assist the United States in the Bosnian crisis. I do not believe there is any mystery; the governments of Western Europe simply do not share a common interest with the United States in resolving this crisis.

The crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a result of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Without a central Yugoslav government to mediate disputes among Serbs, Croats and Muslims, civil war became virtually inevitable. This was particularly true in Bosnia, where more than half the population is composed of Serbs and Croats, but Muslims control the government.

Much of the blame for the collapse of Yugoslavia lies with the governments of Western Europe, principally Germany. The European Community, led by Germany, rushed headlong to accord recognition to the break-away republics of Slovenia and Croatia without any consideration to the bloody civil war that was the inevitable consequence of the breakup of Yugoslavia. It should not come as any mystery that the governments of Western Europe are now unwilling to remedy the disaster for which they are, in large measure, responsible.

What was the interest of the European Community in helping foster the disintegration of Yugoslavia? I believe it was simple economic self-interest. "East Europe's Low Wages Luring Manufacturers From West Europe" (front page, May 11), about the vast investments Western European manufacturers are making throughout Eastern Europe. Since the collapse of Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Croatia have followed in the paths of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic as economic colonies of Western European (principally German) financial interests.

The only long-term solution to the

Bosnia crisis is to re-establish a stable national government in Yugoslavia, and that is precisely what the European Community has no desire to see. Thus, Western Europe is content to do nothing or allow the United States alone to become militarily embroiled in the Bosnian civil war.

This does not mean the United States should give up efforts to end the Bosnian tragedy. However, our efforts should not focus narrowly on opposition to the Bosnian Serbs; the Bosnian Croats have demonstrated that Bosnian Serbs have no monopoly on the practice of "ethnic cleansing." Rather, our objective should be re-establishment of a stable, legitimate Yugoslav government recognized by all parties, capable of restoring law and order to the region.

Our ally in this should not be the European Community, but Russia. It is the one country in the world that has the power, influence and credibility to overcome the influence and fears of extreme Serbian nationalists,

the harbinger of a new era in America's relationship with Europe. With the end of the cold war, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has become largely irrelevant. The principal concern for the United States is no longer Soviet military expansion, but economic competition. In this new global context, the expansion of Western European — once again, principally German — economic influence through Eastern Europe is cause for concern for the United States.

It may be time not merely for peaceful coexistence with Russia, but even outright alliance. Such an alliance would provide a valuable counterweight to expanding German economic influence in Eastern Europe and would enable the United States and Russia to accelerate the dismantling of the bloated military establishments largely responsible for sapping the economies of both.

The Bosnian crisis gives President Clinton an opportunity to consider a radical redirection of American foreign policy in the post-cold war era. It may also allow Mr. Clinton to solve the conundrum of having to deal with international crises while still remembering that "It's the economy, stupid."

STUART E. ABRAMS
New York, May 13, 1993



thereby bringing about a lasting solution to the Yugoslavia conflict.

The crisis in Bosnia and the conduct of the European Community in resisting efforts to resolve it may be

History's Bad Example

To the Editor:

I admire the good will of Flora Lewis in "A 19th-Century Balkan Solution" (Op-Ed, May 1), but her view of Balkan history betrays a certain innocence. I too yearn — in vain, I fear — for a revival of the Concert of Europe to patch up the shattered remnants of Yugoslavia, but the Congress of Berlin in 1878 will hardly serve as a model.

Following the victory of the Russians over the Turks in 1878, Bismarck and Disraeli organized the congress to "revise" the Treaty of San Stefano. In plainer language, Austria, Germany and Britain conspired to strip the Russians and their South Slav protégés of conquests that threatened their own imperial interests in the Balkans and the Middle East. This created many problems and crises that increased the likelihood of European War:

- Newly independent Serbia found expansion checked when the congress handed over to Austria, arch-enemy of the Slavs, the occupation and administration of Turkish Bosnia-Herzegovina. Result: the crisis of 1908, when Austria annexed the province.

- "Greater Bulgaria" was partitioned, deprived of effective Russian protection and turned into a field for Russian-Turkish-Austrian rivalry. Result: revolt in Bulgaria, war with Serbia and crisis of 1885.

- The Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, dampened down by the Concert of Europe but too late to prevent the explosion of Teutonic-Russian rivalry in the Balkans and its expansion into global conflict in 1914.

- Worst of all, the congress began Bismarck's destruction of the old understanding among the three rulers of Eastern Europe (Germany, Austria and Russia). His alliance with Austria, formalized in a secret treaty a year later, led to the fatal division of Europe among Germany, Austria and later Italy in the Triple Alliance, and the French-Russian Alliance, later joined by Britain.

Looking at the dismal failure of the "Concert of Europe" since 1990 in the Balkans, one finds it hard to see why we should take the shortsighted imperialists of the Congress of Berlin as our role models in the Balkans — or anywhere else.

JOHN BOVEY
Cambridge, Mass., May 13, 1993

The writer is a retired Foreign Service officer.

'Peace With Honor'

To the Editor:

The grand, 19th-century-style European conference Flora Lewis suggests as a solution to the Bosnian civil war (Op-Ed, May 1) is problematic.

Disraeli described the settlement that he was instrumental in reaching at Berlin as "peace with honor." An anonymous observer overhearing the remark commented: "Yes, the peace that passeth all understanding and the honor that is common among thieves."

BROOKE MCMURRAY
New York, May 3, 1993

On My Mind **5-25**
A. M. ROSENTHAL **93**

Preventing More Bosnias

Two tragedies are taking place in Bosnia. The first is the slaughter of its people. The second is the failure of the officials responsible to think seriously about how to prevent future slaughters in future Bosnias.

Maybe that is because those officials are still on the job — in all three sides in the civil war, in Europe and in the U.S.

Europe helped set the fire of civil war and it should have been Europe's to put out. But Washington, ranging from silence to utter incomprehensibility, dithers away the one plan for peace.

The record is clear. In December 1991, three men gave separate warnings to the European Community. They were Lord Carrington, the British diplomat; the U.N. Secretary General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, and Cyrus Vance.

Germany was then demanding swift recognition of the independence of Croatia, part of the Yugoslav quilt patched together by Tito. Do that, said these men, and there will be war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnian Muslims sent the same warning.

Germany prevailed — and what the Secretary General had called the Bosnian time bomb went off.

Until then, Serbian and Croatian Christians of Bosnia had been living in the same small area with other Serbs and Croats who had converted to Islam centuries ago — not always in brotherhood but not at war with each other since the Nazis set many Croats and Muslims against Serbs.

Bosnia's present Muslims feared that with quick European recognition of Croatia, expansion-minded Serbia might swallow them. So they tried to get out, with a declaration of independence, even though they were less than half the population.

Christian Serbs in Bosnia preferred war to living as a minority in a new nation in what they had considered their own home. With heavy help from Serbia, they attacked. But they committed such outrages that they convinced the world they were invaders, although they were fighting in their native land.

The only peace plan for creating a mixed Bosnia — the original Muslim hope — came from the U.N. team of Mr. Vance and Lord Owen. It provided for everything the current safe havens idea alone does not — military withdrawals, arms reduction, return of refugees to their homes, a central government.

President Clinton and his aides attacked the plan. Most of American journalism said it was Munich and the solution was a good sound American bombing of the Serbs.

Mr. Clinton threatened that. But fortunately he could not figure out what he would do the day after the bombings. So he finally agreed that Vance-Owen was the path.

By then Bosnian Serbs had fought up from control of 40 percent of Bosnia to 70. They knew they could not be driven out except by the ground war the West did not want — not even the

The warnings of December 1991.

journalistic and Congressional killer-doves. So they sent a message to Washington, in the clear: Go to hell.

Now Europe, Russia and the U.S. propose safe havens. By themselves they would lead to partition — a slice each for Serbs and Croats and one for Muslims, while it lasts. But if they are made the first step to carry out the phased overall Vance-Owen plan, safe havens could keep alive the dream of the Muslims for one independent Bosnia.

Still now it has to be asked: Did the West really ever care about that dream, or see great self-interest in it? Never — not until Western stumbling and Serbian atrocities made it a stomach issue.

More stomachs will be turned by civil combat in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Kashmir, the Middle East, Africa. It is not Western business to put out independence movements, or protect each one.

But countries that will have to rescue new nations in trouble should take an advance peacekeeping step: Impose a waiting period between declaration of independence and diplomatic recognition or U.N. membership.

During that time, the applicant should be examined for its chances of survival militarily or economically. If that is questionable, an international trusteeship should be created — a specified period of protection and help, with specified goals.

So, to say it again: Since to save lives everybody has to pass an exam to drive a car, why not a test for nationhood, and help in passing it, to save a lot more lives? The need is plain, the warnings of December clear, and the only question is — after how many more Bosnias? □

Learning the Hard Way in Bosnia

By Charles William Maynes

WASHINGTON eastern policy in the former Yugoslavia has been a failure. In this moment of deplorable paralysis at NATO and the U.N., what lessons can we draw from that failure?

Lesson No. 1 is that the U.S. was wrong to sabotage West European efforts to create defense capabilities outside NATO. The U.S. just last year resisted the idea of a French-German Eurocorps because it feared weakening NATO, the only European organization that the U.S. dominates.

But Bosnia shows that the real effect of the U.S. position has been to let everyone off the hook. The U.S. denounces the Europeans' timidity that it worked so hard to promote; the Europeans criticize America's seeming irresponsibility for limiting U.S. military involvement to attacks from the air while European countries have troops on the ground delivering humanitarian supplies.

Lesson No. 2 is that in the transition taking place in Eastern Europe, the Bush Administration's cautious position in recognizing new states in the former Yugoslavia was correct. In particular, Germany's premature insistence that the West recognize Croatia without also insisting on guaranteed rights for minorities was disastrous. Sequentially, Serbs in Croatia, Muslims in the remaining Yugoslavia and Serbs in the new state of Bosnia-Herzegovina panicked.

Indeed, in societies as riven with ethnic conflict as many in Eastern Europe, majority rule without explicit protection for minorities is a terrifying prospect. Clearly, that is the root of the problem in the former Yugoslavia, where Croats, Muslims and Serbs agree only about one thing: To live as a minority in a state controlled by the others is dangerous, even deadly.

Lesson No. 3 is that conflicts like those in Bosnia-Herzegovina have only three solutions. One is the complete triumph of one side. The second is a bloody struggle leading to a new balance of power. The third is the

Charles William Maynes is the editor of *Foreign Policy* magazine.

imposition of an outside protectorate, which compels the parties to live with one another. By refusing to accept either of the last two solutions, the West has indirectly endorsed the first — but is ashamed to admit it.

This week's fumbling attempt by Western foreign ministers to create Muslim "safe havens," inconclusive-

ly debated yesterday at NATO, reflects only the latest retreat in the effort to persuade, not force, the Serbs to behave decently.

There is a final lesson. Although ethnic conflict in Europe has deep roots, it is difficult to believe that the demise of Communism alone has brought about this new nightmare.

Demagogic leaders fueled the fire, and the world should not forget who they are. But even more noteworthy, for decades most Europeans were too rich to hate. Even in the East, popular concern about irritating or unacceptable differences was displaced by the common drive to recover from the devastation of World War II.

Now, deteriorating economic conditions are exacerbating ethnic conflicts, even in Europe's richest societies. Rising racism is changing the popular image of the Continent. Eliminating the psychological causes of ethnic conflict will take generations. The immediate goal must be to tamp it down.

American leaders have to understand that the Europeans are more likely to act responsibly if they are given more responsibility for their own defense. The U.S. should encourage the Europeans to develop the Eurocorps and to strengthen other forms of intra-European security cooperation, while reaffirming America's more fundamental commitment through NATO to prevent the rise of any single hegemonic power on the

Four lessons of a policy fiasco.

Continent. If the U.S. wishes to remain a European power, it must be willing to accept the same risks as Europeans, on the ground as well as from the air.

International institutions should take urgent steps toward providing additional legal protection for minorities. Until they change, the Serbs must be isolated diplomatically and economically, but pressure must also be applied to Croatia, since the apparent lack of Western concern about how Croats treat Serbs and Muslims feeds the Serbs' sense of unfair isolation. That point is critical, for unless we can encourage a perception that the West cares about how others treat Serbs as much as it cares about how Serbs treat others, any peacekeeping force will be seen as biased — and as a target for attack.

Finally, the leaders of the world economy need to work harder to create conditions that make Europeans think of things other than hating their neighbors. The U.S. and other major economic powers must get the world economy moving again so that Europeans can put aside ancient hatreds and return to the postwar task of getting rich. □

Bosnia — Their War, Not Ours

By Ronald Steel

LOS ANGELES
For months, the Clinton Administration has wobbled between pity for the civilian victims of a merciless war and fear of plunging the nation into a conflict it neither understands nor can resolve.

Under relentless pressure by influential legislators and journalists — many of whom insisted that we had no national interest in Vietnam or Kuwait — to “do something,” the President prodded the European allies to join in military action against the Bosnian Serbs. But European refusal has apparently now led to second thoughts about the wisdom of such a policy.

Indeed, with the participation of

Russia, which has a historic and geopolitical concern with any conflict in the Balkans, a path may be opening that could contain the violence and protect the Muslim minority. It is a striking sign of how far we have left the cold war behind us that the U.S. has recognized that a viable Yugoslav settlement requires Russian involvement.

Mr. Clinton is right to resist pressure to intervene militarily. Now he should explain why this is the prudent, even the humane, course.

While the causes of this war are complex, the reasons for nonintervention are not. First, one country did not invade another; this is a civil war among the three ethnic groups of Bosnia, aided by their cousins in Serbia and Croatia. In many ways it continues the Yugoslav civil war, suspended in 1945 by the iron hand of Communism. It is intensified by borders that

do not correspond to ethnic realities.

Second, Bosnia-Herzegovina became independent in 1992 in a referendum bitterly opposed by the Serbian one-third of the population and with only tactical support by the Croatian one-fifth. It was hastily and irresponsibly granted international recognition under Germany's prodding, as Croatia had earlier been, despite the absence in both countries of real guarantees to Serbian minorities. The survival of a state created under such conditions — opposed by more than half its citizens — does not involve a high moral principle.

Third, while “ethnic cleansing” is an ugly policy of forced population transfer, intensified by a brutality endemic to Balkan wars, it is not genocide and not the Holocaust. The Holocaust was a systematic effort to eradicate a whole people from the face of the earth. The Bosnian conflict is about the demand of ethnic groups to control the territory they live in. It is too bad that Bosnia is not a “gorgeous mosaic” (as Mayor David Dinkins would say) of happy tribes, but we cannot create it for them.

Fourth, this war, like others, is the conduct of politics by other means. The politics of the Bosnian Serbs and Croats is to dismember the state and attach the relevant parts to the motherland. The politics of the Muslims is to dominate the state and get the Americans and Europeans to do for them what they cannot do for themselves. The Bosnian foreign minister recently declared the intention of the Muslim-dominated government to reclaim the entire territory by force.

That is the Muslims' political objective. What is ours? The victory of the Muslim minority over the Serbs and Croats of Bosnia who want to dismember the state? Forcing Serbia and Croatia to accept a state whose own citizens do not? Guaranteeing the present frontiers? Stopping the killing and then going away? Or maintaining a permanent army of occupation, which will make us the target of all three factions? No one is answering these questions. Yet we are being urged to risk American arms and lives without a clue as to what kind of a settlement is workable or worth the costs.

Fifth, “clean hands” intervention through U.S. air strikes or arming the Muslims won't solve the problem. The former will kill innocent people and make little impact on those who believe they are fighting for their ethnic survival. It certainly will not yield any political settlement. Further, there is the problem of where to draw the line. Do we bomb only Bosnian Serbs but not Bosnian Croats, who are doing their own “ethnic cleansing”? And if the Muslims gain the upper hand and commit atrocities do we bomb them?

The other “clean” course, arming the Muslims, is worse. It will expand the killing, since that is its purpose, fortify the Bosnian Croats, through whose territory any overland arms shipments must pass, flood the area with Iranian and Afghan “freedom fighters” trained in regional wars, quite possibly bring the Serbian and Croatian armies into the fighting and perhaps touch off an Albanian uprising in Kosovo. In an effort to “level the field” without dirtying our hands, we could end up igniting war throughout the region.

Small wonder that the Europeans, who know more about Balkan wars than we do, resist this “solution.”

It is not the job of the U.S. to guarantee a state whose own citizens refuse to live together. We must not send Ameri-

cans to become targets of ethnic hatred in Bosnia as we did so disastrously in Beirut and the British continue to do in Northern Ireland. Ultimately Bosnia, which from the beginning was based on wishful thinking and cynical manipulation by politicians, will have to be partitioned: one part to Serbia another to Croatia and a Muslim principality — a Balkan Monaco or Lichtenstein — centered on Sarajevo.

Neither morality
 nor security
 is the issue.

This is not an idealistic solution. It will require a transfer of populations that will involve considerable hardship for many. Yet such transfers are not unprecedented in modern European history. In 1945, millions of Germans were expelled from Poland and Czechoslovakia to provide territorially secure states. International guarantees should be extended to this Muslim enclave, either through a small U.N. force or through NATO. It should not be protected by an American army, just as the prestige of the U.S. must not be engaged in the hopeless task of trying to enforce a settlement that the participants themselves refuse to live with.

For too long, the President has allowed himself to be pushed by interventionists, pummeled by headlines and TV images, reduced to evasions and tossed about by events. What he can do is limited: intensify nonmilitary pressures on the Serbs and Croats, such as sanctions, and support a political settlement that will end the slaughter, even if it does not resolve the dispute.


To move much beyond that would bitterly divide the nation, imperil his Presidency and unleash furies in the Balkans of which the current war is only a pale harbinger.

Morality and national security are not incompatible, but neither are they self-evident. We look to the President to distinguish between the nation's needs and the world's demands. The issue in Bosnia is not the President's courage — ordering planes into battle is easy — but his wisdom and sense of proportion. More than the ethnic feuds of the Balkans hinge on that.


Ronald Steel is professor of international relations at the University of Southern California.

Military Intelligence

By Matthew Martin




Smart Bomb



Smarter Bomb

m.m.

Bestial Words, Bestial War



Ruth Marter

By Svetlana Slapsak

TLJUBLJANA, Slovenia here is much debate in the United States about politically correct speech: Which is more harmful to democracy, the expression of racist stereotypes or the measures taken to discourage such expression? I have been a very strong advocate of free expression. Yet I am convinced that the war in what used to be Yugoslavia is a war of words.

All the bestialities of this war were triggered by words — clichés put forward by intellectuals and eagerly appropriated by politicians. These words undermined an informed and refined democratic public discourse that was slowly developing after Tito's death and opened the way for the destruction of the institutions and social mechanisms that kept the multinational culture alive.

Contrary to what one hears, many features of the Yugoslav state were designed to meet the needs of minorities. On the federal level, there were 10 official languages (only in the army was one language — Serbo-Croatian — recognized). Television and radio, public services and publishers addressed all majorities and minorities. Mixed marriages were not an exception but the rule, and many children of mixed marriages identified themselves only as Yugoslavs.

But today, merely saying "Yugoslav" offends all sides. The Croatian yellow press has even invented a word for those who dare to remember what the country used to be: "Yugozombies."

By the time Slobodan Milosevic came to power in Serbia in 1987, in a kind of Communist Party coup, the language of Communist ideology was dead, devoid of meaning and persuasiveness. But a new discourse, simplistic and strong, was invented by intellectuals. To nationalist Serbian writers, Albanians were "bestial," the Croats "genocidal"; both Croats and Slovenians were "Machiavel-

lian" and Slovenians, "slavish." At the same time, Slovenian and Croat prose labeled Serbs "barbaric," "Balkan" and "Byzantine." These writings by intellectuals were recycled by journalists; soon, draftees were sent to be killed with writers' words on their lips.

From the beginning of the nationalist wave, it was my position that as a Serb my primary duty was to criticize Serbs. Serbian responsibility in this war is great, and nationalist intellectuals in Belgrade bear special blame. The Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences made a noteworthy contribution to the war effort with a 1987 secret memorandum that outlined a "national program" — making a paranoid case for Serbian nationalism based on historic "injustices" done to Serbs, especially those living in Kosovo.

When attacked, as they were immediately, members of the Academy insisted that the text was only a draft. They seemed to want to avoid responsibility for its lack of serious analysis and extremist views. Interestingly, the first to attack the memorandum were Mr. Milosevic's ideological guards, but in no time he and the Academicians were reconciled.

Eventually several Academicians became members of Parliament or advisers to Serbian President Milosevic. For instance, Mihajlo Markovic, a Marxist dissident who taught at Ann Arbor and other American universities, became the "brains" of Mr. Milosevic's party, and has used most of his rhetorical power to attack the Serbian peace movement. During the student uprising in 1992 in Belgrade, he attacked a professor for being a Jew.

Another Academician, writer Dobrica Cosic, is now President of Yugoslavia. A onetime privileged favorite of the Tito regime, whose boring novels we all had to read in school, Mr.

Cosic was kicked out of the Communist Party in 1966, accused of Serbian nationalism. He then became a kind of eminence grise for nationalists.

Dissidents used to gather in his Belgrade villa, advising and sometimes helping those in trouble. But when I asked for advice in 1988 — I had just been fired from my job and been denied a passport for the sixth time since the 1968 student movement — Mr. Cosic scolded me because, in my capacity as president of the Writers' Union Committee for Freedom to Write, I had made a

Intellectuals in Belgrade poisoned politics.

statement in favor of a Kosovo Albanian prisoner of conscience named Adam Demaci.

During the 80's, Mr. Cosic invented some of the most dangerous slogans used to promote war. According to him, "Serbs gain in war and lose in peace." He used this slogan in the most recent session of the self-designated Serbian parliament of Bosnia, in a speech supposedly aimed at convincing its members to sign the Vance-Owen peace plan.

Another Cosic slogan is that the Serbian national question is "a question of democracy." In other words, everything Serbs do, they do for democracy. Mr. Cosic holds up a mirror to the Serbian people that reflects a gloomy collective portrait of warriors who think only of glory, national aims and generally abstract achievements, but who are surrounded by tricky "Westerners" who manipulate them by means of politics, knowledge and diplomacy.

Matija Beckovic, a poet, former president of the Writers' Union and the youngest member of the Academy, supported the referendum that gave absolute power to Mr. Milosevic in 1990. He also coined some of the

catchiest nationalist slogans, like "Serbia: the nearly slaughtered nation." He's also proposed building a monument in Belgrade to encase the bones of fallen Serbs (from all areas and historic periods) in glass and concrete, so that the world can see how many bones there are.

The internationally acclaimed author Milorad Pavic, another member of the Academy, also has helped the cause of Serbian cultural propaganda. Using surrealist metaphors, his famed and complex "Dictionary of the Khazars" offers a highly stylized rendition of Serbia's suffering. This writer, who a decade ago bragged of his family roots in the Croatian aristocracy, frequently characterized the dissident movement as vulgar. His most recent novel, not yet translated, plays with the idea that "Serbs forgive but they don't forget."

The Serbian and Yugoslav dissident movement, which displayed remarkable solidarity for more than 20 years, simply could not cope with this new nationalist discourse. Some of the people who we once protected as fellow dissidents have become one with the war criminals, like Vojislav Sesel, member of Parliament for the Radical Party in Serbia and leader of one of the paramilitary groups operating in Bosnia and Croatia.

There is a visible opposition in Belgrade, people who take untold risks with every word of criticism and protest they utter or write. The nationalists consider them worse enemies than Croats and Muslims. These dissidents have periodicals like *Vreme* and *Republika*, and programs on Belgrade TV and radio. I was one of them for years. But I can criticize my own and their position of a few years ago, for we did not create a critical vocabulary adequate to stand up to nationalistic jabber.

Too many refused to dirty their hands with political debate — although there were plenty of nationalist intellectuals willing to lend their authority to political initiatives. Too few of us were in opposition to the nationalists. Fear, repulsion, concern for our careers — there were an number of reasons why many did not act to thwart the false prophets who have destroyed public discourse and civilization in Serbia, not to mention the destruction they caused in Bosnia and Croatia.

We should have taken out the garbage when we first noticed the stench.

Svetlana Slapsak is a novelist and essayist.

Who started the fight in Balkans?

Jack Valenti watches the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina and sees history replayed.


Valenti, a top aide to President Lyndon Johnson, flew with the 12th Air Force tactical bomber squadron over Yugoslavia during World War II. "The world has changed, but the terrain hasn't," he tells me. "It remains surly, mean and unwholesome."

Much like some of the people on the ground.

Valenti worries that his friends in the new Democratic Administration run the risk of repeating the mistakes of the Kennedy-Johnson years which led to a deepening commitment to South Vietnam and a quicksand war that divided America, ruined Johnson's domestic agenda and scuttled his presidency.

"Some Administration officials are saying we can't let aggression go on because it will spill over into other parts of Europe," says Valenti. "We heard that a lot 30 years ago. When there were already 16,000 U.S. forces in South Vietnam, David Brinkley asked President Kennedy in September, 1963, whether he believed in the 'domino theory.' Kennedy said, 'Yes.'"

Valenti notes that, like Vietnam, the terrain in Bosnia-Herzegovina is inhospitable and it would not be easy for our planes to successfully bomb and neutralize Serbian artillery positions. "We had trouble finding SCUD missiles in Iraq," he says. "How do



CAL THOMAS

you find targets in the mountains?"

As President Clinton mulls over what policy to pursue and considers bombing runs, he might wish to read a letter Ho Chi Minh wrote President Johnson on Feb. 15, 1967. Johnson thought bombing North Vietnam would bring Hanoi to the peace table. But Uncle Ho made it clear he could neither be bombed back to the Stone Age (as Gen. Curtis LeMay urged) or bombed into peacemaking: "The Vietnamese people will never yield to force nor agree to talks under the menace of bombs."

Those warring in the former Yugoslavia have demonstrated no less resolve than Ho Chi Minh.

The problem with comparing conflicts is that analogies can quickly break down.

Bosnia, of course, is not like Vietnam or the Middle East, and it's difficult to understand what is going on or what to do about it without reading a history of the region.

One of the best and most useful recent books written on the area is

Bosnia, of course, is not like Vietnam or the Middle East, and it's difficult to understand what is going on or what to do about it without reading a history of the region.

"Serbs and Croats: The Struggle for Yugoslavia" by Alex N. Dragnich, former public affairs officer in the American Embassy in Belgrade.

Dragnich notes that religious, ethnic and nationalistic conflicts in the Balkans have existed since the 14th century. More recently, "The competing interests of five empires - Ottoman, Russian, Austro-Hungarian, British and French - served to prevent or hold back the peoples of the Balkans in their attempt to realize their national ambitions."

Dragnich faults the European Community and the United States for creating the current situation. Following the loosening of communism's grip in Europe, Yugoslavia began to break up into ancient patterns. Dragnich writes, "Yugoslavia's demise was hastened by 'friends' (European Community) who offered their good offices, ostensibly to promote a peaceful solution, but, pressured by Germany and Austria to recognize Slovenia and Croatia without delay, they did not wait for the outcome of

the negotiations.

"It is almost unbelievable that several sovereign states in Western Europe, ignoring basic principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, took it upon themselves to speed up the destruction of another sovereign European state."

The United States played its part in that destruction, writes Dragnich, by joining the EC countries in recognizing Slovenia and Croatia, in April, 1992, and moved ahead of the EC in extending diplomatic recognition to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"To the Serbs of Montenegro and Serbia," writes Dragnich, "this was the final irony. After all of their human and material sacrifices in the Balkan wars as well as in two world wars as allies of the West, they were being told by the European Community and the United States that they should be satisfied to leave nearly three million once-liberated compatriots to the whims of other masters." Dragnich says the hasty recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the United States and EC led to the current bloodshed.

This situation will not be easily resolved - and it could be made worse by American bombing. President Clinton should not bomb any targets. Ho Chi Minh would have advised against it. Jack Valenti does.

Cal Thomas' column, which appears regularly in the Times-News, is distributed by Los Angeles Times Syndicate, Times Mirror Square, Los Angeles, CA 90053.

THIS IS THE VERY FIRST TIME THAT THE MEDIA HAS PERMITTED FOR SOME TRUTH TO BE TOLD!!!!

THERE IS A LOT MORE THAT SHOULD BE TOLD, IF THEY ONLY WOULD ALLOW MORE TRUTH, SO THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD HAVE REAL FREEDOM OF EDUCATION, AND BE ABLE TO MAKE THEIR OWN JUDGEMENTS, RATHER THAN HAVE THE MEDIA PRESENT THE SIDE THAT PAID THE MOST, AND THEN--FORCE THE READER/VIEWER TO SEE THAT ONE SIDE

OVER AND OVER AGAIN AND AGAIN BURNING INTO THEIR SUB-CONSCIENCE MIND!! PURE BRAIN WASHING!!!!

Learning the Hard Way in Bosnia

By Charles William Maynes

WASHINGTON eastern policy in the former Yugoslavia has been a failure. In this moment of deplorable paralysis at NATO and the U.N., what lessons can we draw from that failure?

Lesson No. 1 is that the U.S. was wrong to sabotage West European efforts to create defense capabilities outside NATO. The U.S. just last year resisted the idea of a French-German Eurocorps because it feared weakening NATO, the only European organization that the U.S. dominates.

But Bosnia shows that the real effect of the U.S. position has been to let everyone off the hook. The U.S. denounces the Europeans' timidity that it worked so hard to promote; the Europeans criticize America's seeming irresponsibility for limiting U.S. military involvement to attacks from the air while European countries have troops on the ground delivering humanitarian supplies.

Lesson No. 2 is that in the transition taking place in Eastern Europe, the Bush Administration's cautious position in recognizing new states in the former Yugoslavia was correct. In particular, Germany's premature insistence that the West recognize Croatia without also insisting on guaranteed rights for minorities was disastrous. Sequentially, Serbs in Croatia, Muslims in the remaining Yugoslavia and Serbs in the new state of Bosnia-Herzegovina panicked.

Indeed, in societies as riven with ethnic conflict as many in Eastern Europe, majority rule without explicit protection for minorities is a terrifying prospect. Clearly, that is the root of the problem in the former Yugoslavia, where Croats, Muslims and Serbs agree only about one thing: To live as a minority in a state controlled by the others is dangerous, even deadly.

Lesson No. 3 is that conflicts like those in Bosnia-Herzegovina have only three solutions. One is the complete triumph of one side. The second is a bloody struggle leading to a new balance of power. The third is the

imposition of an outside protectorate, which compels the parties to live with one another. By refusing to accept either of the last two solutions, the West has indirectly endorsed the first — but is ashamed to admit it.

This week's fumbling attempt by Western foreign ministers to create Muslim "safe havens," inconclusive-

ly debated yesterday at NATO, reflects only the latest retreat in the effort to persuade, not force, the Serbs to behave decently.

There is a final lesson. Although ethnic conflict in Europe has deep roots, it is difficult to believe that the demise of Communism alone has brought about this new nightmare.

Demagogic leaders fueled the fire, and the world should not forget who they are. But even more noteworthy, for decades most Europeans were too rich to hate. Even in the East, popular concern about irritating or unacceptable differences was displaced by the common drive to recover from the devastation of World War II.

Now, deteriorating economic conditions are exacerbating ethnic conflicts, even in Europe's richest societies. Rising racism is changing the popular image of the Continent. Eliminating the psychological causes of ethnic conflict will take generations. The immediate goal must be to tamp it down.

American leaders have to understand that the Europeans are more likely to act responsibly if they are given more responsibility for their own defense. The U.S. should encourage the Europeans to develop the Eurocorps and to strengthen other forms of intra-European security cooperation, while reaffirming America's more fundamental commitment through NATO to prevent the rise of any single hegemonic power on the

Four lessons of a policy fiasco.

Continent. If the U.S. wishes to remain a European power, it must be willing to accept the same risks as Europeans, on the ground as well as from the air.

International institutions should take urgent steps toward providing additional legal protection for minorities. Until they change, the Serbs must be isolated diplomatically and economically, but pressure must also be applied to Croatia, since the apparent lack of Western concern about how Croats treat Serbs and Muslim feeds the Serbs' sense of unfair isolation. That point is critical, for unless we can encourage a perception that the West cares about how others treat Serbs as much as it cares about how Serbs treat others, any peacekeeping force will be seen as biased — and as a target for attack.

Finally, the leaders of the world economy need to work harder to create conditions that make Europeans think of things other than hating their neighbors. The U.S. and other major economic powers must get the world economy moving again so that Europeans can put aside ancient hatreds and return to the postwar task of getting rich. □

Charles William Maynes is the editor of *Foreign Policy* magazine.

Heritage

Friday, March 12, 1993

"Justice, Justice Shall Thou Pursue . . ."

DAN BRIN, Editor HERB BRIN, Publisher

BOB LUPO, Executive Editor

TOM TUGEND, Senior Associate Editor

... you ... at my side as we move.

World War II never ended in the Balkans

By Herb Brin

World War II never ended in the Balkans. That's what the troubles are all about in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. And the guns of terror are still pointing in all directions.

After visiting the war zones of Bosnia-Herzegovina, my advice to the West is this: Don't turn away from the Serbs, whose civilization, often frightful for the Jews — and often beautiful — parallels much of the course of Jewish history on the continent.

Ah, but where were Jews ever accorded unimpeded golden moments of peace? Spain, England, France? Lithuania? Ukraine? Russia, Russia, Russia?

Germany?
Austria?
Poland? Poland?

Radoslav A. Artukovic, whose father, Andrija, was the supreme individual slaughterer of mankind as founder of the Ustasha in Hitler's puppet state, Croatia,

is carving out a special niche for himself as a hater of the Serbs.

As part of a Croatian apparatus, Rad monitors HERITAGE weekly. Subscribes to HERITAGE for two years at a time. Often he says nice things about us. That's the way it is.

Inspired by news events reported over Belgrade TV last week, which had Herb Brin soaring on prime time television via world satellite, Rad sent in a batch of faxes showing that an article in Midstream magazine spent most of its 3,500 words in a blast at the Serbs. Rad thus concludes by *reductio ad absurdum* that Croatia is a great and peaceful nation and that Rad's murderous father didn't do it.

Which, of course, he did.

Dr. Philip J. Cohen, a dermatologist and immunologist, writing in Midstream places much of the responsibility for the huge Serbian and Jewish losses in Croatia during World War II on the Serbian people themselves.

A twisting of history.

Andrija Artukovic, as interior minister,

of the Independent State of Croatia, masterminded the deaths of more than a million Serbs and 60,000 Jews and Gypsies.

It doesn't take a magnum leap of logic to realize that survivors of that terrible genocide would not take too kindly to another Croatian state which uses the Ustasha banner for its flag.

And perhaps it is also understandable, that Germany would be the first European nation to recognize Croatia. As it was.

And it's also understandable that, with a legacy of such terror, the Serbs would not take it all very lightly.

That's what the shooting in the Balkans is all about.

And now in Rome there are those who propose making the Pope of Silence into a saint.

Will it come to pass, one day, that Germany will return the black swastika to its red banners over Berlin?

World War II never ended in the Balkans.

Don't Arm Bosnia

By Claiborne Pell
and Lee H. Hamilton

WHEN the Bosnian Serbs unleashed their fierce attacks on Gorazde last month, sentiment grew for the United States to lift the embargo that is keeping arms from reaching the Bosnian Muslims. The Senate is to take up that debate today.

Bosnia has suffered much in this vicious war. Lifting the embargo would be a way of showing support and sympathy for its beleaguered Government and people. It seems like an

Diplomacy works (believe it or not).

easy, cost-free solution. But it is a bad idea. Lifting the embargo will neither level the playing field, as proponents argue, nor help the Bosnian cause.

While President Clinton says he wants to lift the embargo, he has also repeatedly said that he will not do so unilaterally. No permanent member of the United Nations Security Council supports lifting the embargo. Yet some members of Congress now advocate unilateral action.

Claiborne Pell, Democrat of Rhode Island, is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Lee Hamilton, Democrat of Indiana, is chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

What would happen if the U.S. acted alone to lift the arms embargo? First, it would Americanize the war, signaling that the U.S. was entering on the side of the Bosnian Muslims. We would become responsible for Bosnia's fate.

Second, unilateral action would encourage others to violate sanctions elsewhere, in particular the embargoes on Iraq and Libya. To Bosnia's detriment, it would encourage other countries to violate trade and financial sanctions against Serbia.


Third, to lift the embargo now would send exactly the wrong signal at a fragile and pivotal moment in the peace talks.

For the Muslims, it would hold out the unrealistic prospect of better weapons, U.S. intervention — even victory. The Bosnian Government would lose interest in a negotiated settlement. The Serbs, understanding that the Muslims might get more arms, would move swiftly to crush Bosnian Government forces. Both sides would be tempted to intensify a war that neither can win. Peace elsewhere in the Balkans would be undermined.

That's not all. The U.N. Protection Force in Bosnia would come under fire. Those with troops on the ground, including Britain, France and Canada, would come under heavy domestic pressure to withdraw. If the U.N. forces left, the humanitarian mission in Bosnia — on which two out of three Bosnians depend — would be at risk, and the U.S. would be blamed.

NATO, meanwhile, is working closely with the United States on a strategy of force and diplomacy for a peace settlement in Bosnia. If we lifted the embargo unilaterally, that strategy would fall apart, opening a serious rift in the alliance. And relations with Russia would suffer, since Moscow would find itself under great pressure to provide arms to the Serbs.

Lifting the embargo is not as easy



Hans-Georg Rauch

as it sounds. Who would provide the weapons, and how would they be delivered to the landlocked Bosnian forces? And who would train the Bosnians?

The legal basis for lifting the embargo is shaky, too. Proponents selectively cite the U.N. Charter, saying it guarantees the right of "individual or collective self-defense." But it also

says this right cannot negate Security Council action to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Despite setbacks, we now have our best opportunity in three years to try to end this war. Diplomacy is working: since February there has been an end to the sieges of Sarajevo and Tuzla, a peace agreement between Muslims and Croats in Bosnia, a formal ceasefire between the Croatian Government and Serbs in Croatia, a dramatic overall reduction in fighting throughout Bosnia and an end to the shelling of Gorazde. Talks on a comprehensive peace are at a delicate stage. Only those talks can end the fighting.

The U.S. does not want to become a party to this war. We do not have vital national interests; what we do have are pressing humanitarian and political interests in ending the fighting. A negotiated settlement is precisely what the Administration, NATO the European Union and the U.N. are trying to pursue. Our frustration with the peace process should not compel us to choose a course that would prolong, intensify and widen the war. □

FAX COVER SHEET

**Accident Prevention Group**

15980 Via Tazon ■ Suite 110 ■ San Diego, CA 92127

Phone: (619) 592-0189 ■ Fax: (619) 592-0585

TO:	Helen Delich Bentley	FROM:	Vojin Joksimovich
COMPANY:	U.S. Congress	DATE:	May 29, 1992
FAX #:	(410) 337-0021	TIME SENT:	
CONFIRM:		TOTAL PAGES:	2
		(including cover sheet)	

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/MESSAGE:

Dear Helen:

Attached please find a copy of my article published by the San Diego Union-Tribune today. It will also run on Sunday in Escondido's Times Advocate and it was also offered to the Seattle Times.

I would appreciate your call this weekend (619-489-0156) with regard to the results of your mission to Belgrade.

I will be in Washington next week and would like to invite you for lunch on Thursday June 4th at 12:30. Please let me know if this is doable.

Many thanks in advance,



Vojin

Bosnia pits reality vs. truth

BELGRADE, Serbia—It's anybody's guess.

Maybe if the Serbs were a fancier people, if they had offered up more than one Nobel laureate, authored foppish verse, built big money dynasties, produced a demented, syphilitic artist with a passion for daffodils or cooked with truffles, more of us would know how to find the place, at least know it exists.

Maybe some of the journalists who have mobbed this city recently to cover the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina would have visited or written about the Serbian version of reality in this blood bath.

Maybe then some of us would have an actual idea of what is going on in this lovely, tortured corner we call the Balkans. Maybe not.

Mention seal pups, mountain gorillas or genocide at the right cocktail party and people get weepy, offer money, canned food, someone else's sons.

They attend movie premieres, rock concerts, refuse Oscars, buy and wear tacky, politically correct buttons.

They talk, maybe even listen, about the Holocaust, Cambodia, Vietnam, Somalia, the Sudan, the American Indian and Sarajevo.

Mention a million or so slaughtered Serbs, the Ustasha or a Croatian-run death camp called Jasenovac and, like as not, they retreat, mumbling about phones and doing lunch.

Especially here, reality, like beauty, is closer kin to perception than truth.

The only truth may be that Bosnia-Herzegovina is a dark and bloody land—and has been for a thousand years. A place where deadly men—Serb adherents of Eastern Orthodoxy, Roman Catholic Croats and ethnic Serb or Croat Muslims, remnants of 500 years of Turkish rule—hunt each other. Hunt the others' kin.

It is a land of charred and broken homes and cities, shattered lives and families and lost dreams. A place of death and suffering, hunger and cold. There is an almost unbearable loneliness and, for those who called it home, an incredible emptiness that gives way to resignation.

Muslim forces control about 10 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatian



Jim Parker Commentary

regulars and irregulars hold about 30 percent and Serb fighters at least 60 percent.

All sides have seen and done, continue to do the unspeakable in a centuries-old blood feud. Ancient enemies sweep—ethnically cleanse—the land.

The place Bosnians called home is history.

The slim, but urbane Muslim majority clings stubbornly to a besieged city and a dwindling scattering of mountain villages.

They pay daily with lives for an attempt to establish an independent state.

They are scared, cold and hungry. Water, when available, is hand carried. Serbian mortars, artillery, rockets and snipers kill and maim their men, women and children. Sometimes there is no bread.

Daily, what is left of Muslim Bosnia begs for Western military intervention.

The Croats maintain a fractious alliance of convenience with the Muslims. They fight a historic Serb enemy, pushing them from land where they may have lived for hundreds of years. Land that is theirs.

On the other side a large Bosnian-Serb minority, armed and supplied by an economically faltering Serbia, wages a fight older than most Western nations. Their fight is for the survival of a people.

They seek to kill the Muslims and Croats, or at least push them from the land, to hold or take farms and villages where their families may have lived for hundreds of years. For now, they keep thousands of Muslim and Croat fighters contained in and around Sarajevo.

They hunker in frozen bunkers, subsisting mostly on onions, potatoes and, when available, bread.

They stink of sweat, urine, wood

smoke and onion. Their eyes are red-rimmed.

Some of the Serbs are political extremists, nationalists. Many are not. They are just about everyone's bad guys, if not fall guys.

They attack here, hold there and ask why, after siding with the allies in two world wars—against Turks and Croats—they are now outlaws.

Television, radio and newspapers bring us the Croat and Muslim version of this reality, usually defined by such code words as "Serb aggression," "atrocities," "starving Muslims," "desperate villages."

But the Serbian reality is delivered by a plain storefront on a side street in Belgrade.

"Genocide Against the Serbs" is an exhibit that shows how almost one million Serbs were butchered during World War II by a Nazi puppet Croatian regime. The actual killing, the exhibit claims, was done by uniformed Croat and Muslim Ustasha units.

There are photos of dead, frequently mutilated Serbs, hundreds, thousands. Often the photos include smiling executioners, frequently holding severed trophy heads.

Serbs, like Jews, swear never again.
The last room of the five-room exhibit sets about detailing the torture, rape, murder, mutilation and disappearance of several hundred Serbs, mostly at the hands of Croats, in 1991.

Then there is the photo identifying Muslim fighters celebrating with the head of a Serb fighter.

Muslims and Croats have had infinitely more success at selling their perceptions than the Serbs with theirs.

But Serbs believe a different reality. They swear by it, kill, and die for it.

A fact of hard life in a hard land.

MAY-29-92 FRI 9:27

P. 01

Biased media shortchange Serbia

By VOJIN JOKSIMOVICH

Reporting by the media on the tragic Yugoslav crisis has been simplistic, mostly inaccurate, naive and brazenly one-sided.

While the Yugoslav army, Serbian irregulars and the Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic are far from blameless, the blame has to be shared with the Croatian and Bosnian presidents, the German-led European Community (EC), the Vatican, the United States and such Muslim countries as Libya, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran.

In view of the latest tragic mortar attack Wednesday on people waiting in line for food in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is past time for the American media and the U.S. State Department, which have been miserably serving the President, to play a constructive role by advocating a healing process between the warring sides in Yugoslavia, as opposed to propagating bellicose threats and ostracizing Serbs.

Russia and China will not tolerate military intervention other than a U.N. peacekeeping mission similar to that in Croatia. The U.N. Security Council resolution and Russian position at CSCE (the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) clearly demonstrate their resolve. Anyway, a military solution would have required substantial commitment and willingness to endure large-scale casualties.

Serbs are no pushovers; even Hitler recognized this fact as exemplified by his allocation of more time and military might for the invasion of Yugoslavia than that of France. Intervention would be comparable to the decision to send in Marines during Lebanon's civil war.

The American media should start with an intensive education process about the millennium-old ethno-religious complexities in the Balkans leading to the present tragedy.

To begin, there never has been a Bosnian nation. Orthodox Serbs are not

a small minority in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They account for 39 percent of the population, as opposed to the 31 percent frequently quoted, and hold title to 64 percent of arable land.

The Serb Muslims, not Slavic Muslims, who overtook Orthodox Serbs as the largest ethnic group in Bosnia and Herzegovina only after World War II (helped along by genocide of hundreds of thousands of Christian Serbs), are grossly misled by their leadership who wish to recreate Bosnia as a Muslim fundamentalist state with little room for Christians at all, and then only as second-class citizens.

Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic put his cards on the table in his 1990 Islamic Declaration, with statements

A local Serbian American speaks out about who's to blame and how healing can begin.

such as: "It is a national function of the Islamic order to gather all Muslims and Muslim communities throughout the world into one. This desire means a struggle for creating a great Islamic Federation from Morocco to Indonesia, from tropical Africa to Central Asia," and, "To keep Jerusalem, the Jews would have to defeat Islam and the Muslims, and that, thank God, is outside their power."

Furthermore, Izetbegovic's associates, such as his Foreign Minister Haris Silajdzic, have close links with Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi.

Is it rational to expect Serbs and Croats, who constitute a majority, to be subjugated in the center of Europe?

The media and the State Department, instead of ostracizing the Bosnia Serb and Croat agreement, should have supported it as a first step in the heal-

ing process for the German-led dismemberment of Yugoslavia accomplished by virtue of retiring German Foreign Minister Hans-Dieter Genscher's browbeating of his EC counterparts.

By the time the EC orchestra, conducted by Genscher, completed playing the "Imperial March" and U.S. Ambassador Warren Zimmermann stopped dancing the Strauss waltz, Europe was supposed to have its own Kurds; the Serbs. This apparently was being done in the name of the new world order.

The internal borders of Yugoslavia are a sham created by the Communist dictator Marshal Tito during the civil war in 1943 to "divide and conquer" the Yugoslav peoples. I contend that obdurate insistence by the EC and the United States in relying on Tito's arbitrary borders as the basis for dismemberment of Yugoslavia is a root cause of the current carnage.

The EC, not led by Germany but by France and England, with support from the United States and Russia, should redefine policies suitable to the Balkan peoples' character and circumstances. The Serbs would trust their traditional allies. In doing so, we should recognize the rights of all the Serbian people to live in one entity: the new Yugoslavia. Alternatively, the Serbs will fight on and others will be drawn in. Milosevic's grip on power will be cemented and the progress toward democracy reversed.

Serbia has reached the mid-point toward democracy. This was accomplished in less than 18 months since the first elections were held in December 1990. We cannot afford to see a reversal. Through diplomacy, as opposed to punishing the Serbian nation, Milosevic may be convinced to step down in the interest of the Serbian nation, providing such an offer is made by the United States.

During a recent meeting with Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, Serbian-American leaders were told to pray.

We can do much more than that, and the State Department should take advantage of our willingness to offer comprehensive knowledge of ethno-religious complexities in the region.

JOKSIMOVICH is a Serbian-American who was born and raised in Belgrade and served in the Yugoslav army. He left Yugoslavia in 1965 and moved to San Diego in 1972 where he is a nuclear engineer and businessman.

COLUMN LEFT/
ALEXANDER COCKBURN

Stage Is Set for Expanded Intervention

■ The bombing over Gorazde could be a bump on the road to peace, but more likely signals a wider war against the Serbs.

The weekend NATO bombing of Serbian forces around the eastern Bosnian town of Gorazde comes as the consummation of a protracted, furious campaign here for vigorous military intervention on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims.

After teetering on the edge of the knife, amid advice by U.S. military officials not to mount air strikes against Serbs around Gorazde, the Clinton Administration reversed its posture of only last week and committed F-16Cs in two strikes. As we shall see, this was the finale of a set-up by the Bosnian Muslims.

The actual raids won't make any difference in the local tactical situation. So the real intent is to signal what Henry Kissinger used to call "U.S. resolve."

But resolve for what?

With the secession—amid Western encouragement—of Slovenia and Croatia from the old Yugoslav federation, and the prompt recognition by the West of the breakaway in April, 1992, of the Muslim-dominated republic of Bosnia, bloodshed was assured. The Serbs in the Krajina enclave in Croatia and in the fragile ethnic and religious mix in Bosnia felt that their position had become impossibly precarious. The war, with all its horrors, began.

The deal pushed by the United States this spring fostered a closer relationship between the Croats and the Bosnian Muslims. The Serbs in their enclave in Croatian Krajina would acknowledge Croat suzerainty, but receive guarantees of some form of autonomy. As envisaged in all the peace plans, the Serbs in Bosnia would hold about 50% of Bosnia. Serbian concerns would thus be allayed.

But the Serbs could be reading this very differently. U.S.-fostered ties between Croatia and the Bosnian Muslims mean that arms now flow unimpeded through Croatia to the increasingly formidable Muslim forces, which are commencing onslaughts against the Serbs.

Furthermore, Croatia could start pressing down on the Serbs in Krajina, evoking once again memories of the terrible massacres of World War II.

02 P. 02
The Serb attack on Gorazde reflects their fear that the diplomatic and military balance of forces has turned against them and that a U.S.-Croatian-Muslim coalition will engineer all the perils Serbs feared back in 1992.

They have good reasons to sense a double-cross. The Western press have

L A TIMES

4/12/94

['The Serbs] have good reasons to sense a double-cross.'

been overwhelmingly blind to Serb concerns and partial—often grossly so—to the Bosnian Muslims as the latter maneuvered toward U.S. military intervention on their side, which is now taking place.

Take the Feb. 5 shelling of the marketplace in Sarajevo that killed more than 60 people and decisively strengthened the hand of those urging intervention.

BBC correspondent John Simpson, writing in the British weekly the Spectator for April 2, describes how Bosnia's President Alija Izetbegovic failed to appear at a Feb. 8 cease-fire meeting among all parties brokered by the U.N. commander, Lt. Gen. Michael Rose. It seemed that once again, as so often before, Izetbegovic was trying to torpedo any cease-fire or settlement.

Rose, according to Simpson (himself no friend of the Serbs and writing in a fanatically pro-interventionist periodical) sprang into his armored car, made haste to Izetbegovic's quarters and closeted himself with the Muslim president, who proceeded to the peace meeting shortly thereafter.

Simpson writes that according to one "insider" (one would surmise, Sir Michael himself) the British general "threatened to question publicly whether the Serbs really had been responsible for the marketplace explosion." Rose officially denies the story and the Muslims are saying nothing. Experienced correspondent Misha Glenny has also hinted at Muslim culpability.

The Serbs' attack on Gorazde was preceded last week by Muslim attacks on Serbs in central Bosnia. The Serbs said they would retaliate unless the Muslims guaranteed a cease-fire. The Muslims offered only a 24-hour truce. The Serb attacks on Gorazde followed, with—according to the London Financial Times of last Friday—U.N. officials on the spot admonished by their bosses to downplay the Muslim provocation.

The Bosnian Muslims and their U.S. public-relations firm have been successful in manipulating opinion here. The stage is now set for larger intervention against the Serbs.

A pessimist or a cynic could see across the rubble of President Clinton's domestic policies and the Whitewater mess the outline of a more bellicose foreign stance. Today, bombs over Gorazde; tomorrow, bombs over North Korea. The Clinton Administration may feel that Serbia's sponsor, Russia, is toothless as Boris Yeltsin slumbers through his twilight. They should beware. As veterans of the Korean War will recall, China is a different matter.

Alexander Cockburn writes for the Nation

OPINION/ESSAYS

The UN is pushing its ultimatum. But this congressman and former US Navy combat pilot says airstrikes are no video game

The Truth About Bombing in Bosnia

By Randy Cunningham

THREE hundred air missions over Vietnam and five air-to-air victories taught me harsh lessons about surgical airstrikes: Chiefly, air missions are hardly surgical. Targets are destroyed much less frequently than one might suppose. If we embark on these strikes in Bosnia — or worse, if we allow the United Nations to direct American airstrikes for us — our pilot losses could be great and our impact low.

Let me first state what airstrikes are not: They are not Star Wars, video games, or precise and painless operations. Airstrikes are deadly and costly. The planes are flown by real people. In training operations alone one out of five United States Navy fighter pilots are killed. They leave families behind. As a Top-Gun instructor and Adversary Squadron commander, I attended chapel services for lost comrades.

In war, it's worse. Dying for your country is serious enough, and every combat pilot knows that risk. Under no circumstances should we put our military men and women under UN command.

But why are airstrikes not more effective? Imagine speeding in a car across an interstate overpass at 700 m.p.h., dropping a golf ball out of the window and in the cup dug into the cross-street below. That is about as close as one can get to a real airstrike. Except in a real airstrike, the enemy is shooting at you, and you are flying in three dimensions, not driving in two.

Wielding air power is very difficult, even for the most talented military commander. Fortunately, our experiences in Vietnam and the Persian Gulf teach us quite a bit.

The jungles of Vietnam hid deadly artillery and surface-to-air missiles all too well. We normally flew on clear days. We could see the missiles coming and take evasive action. But in the Balkan winter we would be flying beneath an overcast sky, and our aircraft would be silhouetted against the clouds. (Flying under cloud cover in mountainous Bosnia would be risky even without enemy fire.)

In late 1971 in North Vietnam I flew in Operation Proud Deep, a massive strike that required Navy pilots to bomb Hanoi's supply depots and airfields. Despite bad weather, we were ordered to fly. Blinded by overcast, we were sitting ducks for surface-to-air missiles the size of telephone poles, rocketing toward us at twice the speed of sound. Anti-aircraft artillery was another threat. In five days, we lost over a dozen aircraft and pilots. Target destruction was minimal.

We were ordered to break the most common-sense rule of air power: Never attack through an overcast sky. In the Balkan winter, overcast is the order of the day, and the mountains there bristle with anti-aircraft artillery. Military planners

would be tragically foolhardy to ask our pilots to place their lives at such extraordinary risk.

But even on the clearest days, surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft attacks are a constant danger. On May 10, 1972, after I had downed three enemy MiGs over North Vietnam, I turned my F-4 Phantom back toward the carrier Constellation in the

South China Sea. Still 40 miles inland, a surface-to-air missile I saw too late exploded near my plane, disabling most of my controls. I barrel-rolled the burning aircraft until we reached the mouth of the Red River. My Radar Intercept Officer Willie Driscoll and I ejected just as the plane exploded. As we parachuted down, we watched the Viet Cong assemble on the beach, ostensibly to take us prisoner. But a Marine Corps helicopter rescued us in the water, just in time. If our pilots get shot down over Bosnia, I can't believe they

would be as lucky or as blessed as we were to avoid capture.

Operation Desert Storm began with a blistering six-week air attack. Pilots dropped more tons of bombs in those six weeks than we did in all our years in Vietnam. And each Desert Storm bomb was generally more effective, thanks to high-tech targeting equipment not available to Vietnam-era pilots. The air war of early 1991 severely weakened the Iraqi army for Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf's masterful ground assault.

Even so, military writer Rick Atkinson, in his Gulf-war history "Crusade," finds that after millions of air missions, including thousands purposely sent on "Scud patrols," battle damage reports cannot conclusively say if we destroyed a single Iraqi Scud site.

And that was over open Iraqi desert. Our F-117 stealth fighters attacked heavily

defended sites at night. But the ancient city of Sarajevo lies deep in a valley that is surrounded on all sides by steep, forested mountains, where Bosnian Serbs have placed heavy artillery. Surreptitious low-level nighttime raids would be nearly impossible.

Flying at 600 knots toward Mt. Zuc, four miles north of Sarajevo, the most eagle-eyed, well-equipped American pilot will have awful trouble finding even one artillery piece, much less destroying it. And should our pilots find and target an artillery piece (there are surely tens of thousands of guns in those mountains), they must fly toward the target, dodging small-arms fire or missiles from the ground. The pilot has to release the ordnance at just the right moment, then pull up and away while dodging more missiles.

Even under optimum conditions, it's treacherous. And it can take days for battle damage assessments to determine whether the target was hit.

Can our pilots bomb from high altitude? Yes, but great altitude decreases accuracy. "Carpet bombing" from B-52s is a weapon of terror. Don't count on "smart" bombs to do the job. More than 95 percent of the bombs the allies dropped on Iraq were the conventional "dumb" kind.

But let us assume that despite all these concerns, airstrikes are ordered. The Bosnian Serbs can read history: As the North Vietnamese did, they will place their artillery in residential areas. They may even gather UN peacekeepers (read "hostages") around critical weapons sites. Americans will not stomach such horrors. We are not a warlike nation. Even our warriors much prefer peace, and would recommend staying out of wars if, as in Bosnia, our interests are not at stake.

Defense Secretary William Perry and Joint Chiefs Chairman John Shalikashvili both caution against American airstrikes. Experience shows that these missions just won't work, and they'll get our pilots killed. A similar commitment of ground troops would prove costlier, in human lives and dollars, than Vietnam.

■ Rep. Randy Cunningham (R) of California is a member of the House Armed Services Committee. He retired from the Navy in 1987 with the rank of commander.