

## COPYRIGHT / USAGE

Material on this site may be quoted or reproduced for **personal and educational purposes** without prior permission, provided appropriate credit is given. Any commercial use of this material is prohibited without prior permission from The Special Collections Department - Langsdale Library, University of Baltimore. Commercial requests for use of the transcript or related documentation must be submitted in writing to the address below.

When crediting the use of portions from this site or materials within that are copyrighted by us please use the citation: *Used with permission of the University of Baltimore.*

If you have any requests or questions regarding the use of the transcript or supporting documents, please contact us:

Langsdale Library  
Special Collections Department  
1420 Maryland Avenue  
Baltimore, MD 21201-5779  
<http://archives.ubalt.edu>

## Excerpts from Interview with U.S. Ambassador Zimmerman

*The following excerpts were translated from a reprint which was carried on April 2 in the Belgrade newspaper Politika from an interview which was recently published in the Pristina (Kosovo) based Albanian language newspaper Vujku.*

I feel with that with the breaking up of the Soviet Union, the Kosovo question has become an urgent problem of human rights in Europe. We look at it as a typical colonial situation, where one group of people are treated as subjects whose basic fundamental rights are taken lightly and all of this is being accomplished by an authority from a certain metropolis which is far removed from them. The first time I came to Kosovo was in 1989. There was at least some semblance of distributed local authority, but that question of local authority has since been removed. My feeling is that this kind of situation cannot endure much longer. You cannot have a combination of colonial authority and Communism in the middle of Europe for much longer. You cannot have second class citizens in that part of the Balkans for any longer period of time. Therefore, I feel that time is on the side of the Albanians in Kosovo. I feel that they will achieve their freedom. I cannot foresee within what time frame, however, I am certain that they will accomplish this.

There are two ways in which America can help. First of all we have to let the Serbian authorities know that they cannot anticipate normal relationships with the United States of America, if they do not seriously take into consideration these questions. We will seriously see to it that it is actualized. Secondly, what we can do is to request from the conference in Brussels and other forums to recognize the importance of this question. I feel that Brussels will play a determining role because it has a mandate to the entirety of Yugoslavia with regard to her existence and it has two questions of ethical importance that have to be taken into consideration. One is the problem of Serbs in Croatia. The second is the problem of Albanians in Kosovo. I would not like to infer that these are similar questions, but I feel that Brussels will not be successful unless they entertain both questions. I would say that regardless of the established arrangements which are being created for Yugoslavia, the United States of America will continue to exert pressure for the Kosovo matter. If by the intervention of the United Nations and the European Community, the situation in Croatia is settled, and if they overcome the threats to Bosnia, then I feel that once again attention will be returned to the question of resolving the Kosovo question. And the United States without doubt, will exert its influence on securing such attention.

I feel that these questions are not identical. Indeed, I feel that the threat for the inhabitants in Kosovo is much greater than the risk for Serbs in Croatia. I feel that both questions should be taken into consideration and I cannot agree with Mr. Jovanovic (the foreign Minister of Serbia) when he states that Brussels should not take into consideration Kosovo. I feel that it must, and we will do everything that we can to secure that.

(In answer to another question)

...The first thing that I would like to say is we cannot help the Albanians on Kosovo, if they seek revenge by force. Our constant position has been that throughout Yugoslavia a peaceful solution has to be sought for all of its problems. We have definitely stood up against the Serbian aggression in Croatia and we have warned the Serbian leadership about force in Bosnia and Herzegovina and we have clearly warned the Serbian authorities relative to rights on Kosovo.

Wood  
S. H. H.  
E. H.

A second point which I would like to bring out is that we cannot support one-sided efforts to change borders. From the onset, the United States and the international community agreed that there cannot be a change in borders without democratic methods. From the beginning, we were against the effort to divide Bosnia and to plug in part of Croatia. This was our constant policy, even towards Kosovo. For that reason, we did not support the efforts to proclaim the independence of Kosovo from Serbia. What we have supported, is maximum autonomy of Kosovo from Serbian occupation.

(Response to a question about a proposed vote for a parliamentary election in Kosovo)

I believe that initiative is your choice. If you have decided to hold those elections (for a Kosovo parliament), I hope that the authorities will not stop or thwart them. I cannot guarantee that they will take into consideration the results of the election or that they will accept the status of independence for a Republic of Kosovo. As I have stated, I feel that the best way is for you to attempt to work through the Serbian institutions. This proves to everyone that you are prepared to work in a peaceful and democratic manner.

I know history. I know that there were many periods in the past in which the rights of the Albanian were trampled upon by the Serbs. However, I also know that there were periods in the past when the rights of the Serbs were trampled by the Albanians. However, I do not feel that history can help us in this situation. You are encountering political obstacles. You are under the jurisdiction of Serbia. You have a great contingency of police here and armed forces. I feel that this must be condemned wherever that exists. I feel that under these circumstances, the best thing for you is to accomplish that which you desire, be it independence or autonomy, and that you must operate within the system and I also understand why you do not like this system.

However, for now, I do not see any other option which would be realistic. You have also stated that the Albanians cannot have anything in common with the Serbs. I feel that this is a very tragic situation, and I anticipate from both sides -- both Serbs and the Albanians-- that they will work together.

LIST OF CROATIAN TERRORIST ATTACKS

(from: Jahn Otto Johansen:

Ustasja, J.W. Cappelens Forlag A.S. 1984 (in Norwegian))

The most important terrorist attacks, which were Ustasha responsibility in LAST TWENTY YEARS (up to 1984, Ed.), were:

1962:

- \* Attack on Yugoslav consulate in Bad Goldberg, West Germany. Momcilo Popovic killed.

1963:

- \* Yugoslav citizen Andjelka Vuletina was killed by Ustasha terrorists.

1965:

- \* Andrija Klaric, Yugoslav consul in Munich wounded by an Ustasha assassin.

1966:

- \* Yugoslav consul in Stuttgart Sava Milovanovic killed.
- \* A Yugoslav Stipe Medvedovic killed in Frankfurt.

1968:

- \* Ustashi blew a bomb in cinema theater "20th October" in Belgrade. One person killed, 85 wounded.

1969:

- \* Leader of Yugoslav military corps mission in West Berlin Anton Kolendic and one member of the mission wounded by an Ustasha assassin.

1970:

- \* Yugoslav Niko Mijaljevic killed in Frankfurt.

1971:

- \* Terrorist attack on Yugoslav consulate in Goteborg. Three Yugoslav hostages were held.
- \* Yugoslav ambassador in Stockholm, Vladimir Rolovic, died from gun shot wounds by an Ustashi assassin. One administrator of the Embassy critically wounded.

1972:

- \* A group of 19 armed Terrorists entered Yugoslavia. Thirteen Yugoslavs died and 19 were wounded in clashes with these terrorists.
- \* A bomb exploded in express train from Dortmund to Athens. One person was killed, eight wounded.
- \* Three Ustasha terrorists attempted to kill regional judge from Revensburg, related to the trial of five terrorists.
- \* Yugoslav Bozo Marinac was killed in Solingen.

\* A Swedish airline SAS airplane was hijacked on a domestic flight. Hijackers demanded larger sum of money and release of ambassador Rolovic assassin. Their demands were met.

\* A bomb exploded in a Yugoslav Airline (JAT) plane flying from Kopenhagen to Zagreb. Twenty six people died.

1975:

\* Yugoslav vice consul in Lion, France, Mladen Djokovic, was critically wounded by an Ustasha assassin.

\* A bomb exploded in a JAT office in Shtuttgart, as well as in other offices of Yugoslav companies in Western Europe.

1976:

\* Four Ustasha terrorists hijacked an American TWA airplane. One American police officer was killed, and two wounded.

\* A bomb exploded in front of the garage of Yugoslav General Consulate in Stuttgart.

\* Yugoslav consul in Frankfurt, Edwin Zdovc, was killed.

\* A bomb exploded in front of Yugoslav Embassy in Washington, D.C. Two persons wounded.

\* A bomb exploded in Yugoslav General Consulate in Melburn, Australia. Sixteen Australian citizens were wounded.

\* An assassination attempt on Yugoslav Vice Consul Vladimir Topic in Duseldorf.

1977:

\* Radomir Medic as United Nation mission in New York critically wounded in and assassination attempt.

1978:

\* Two Yugoslav immigrants Ante Cikoja nad Krizan Brkic were killed in New York City and Los Angeles, respectively.

\* Other two Yugoslav immigrants critically wounded in an attack in New York City.

\* Yugoslav Radimir Gazija was killed in Constanca.

1979:

\* Yugoslav Salih Mesinovic was killed in Frankfurt

1981:

\* A bomb exploded in front of Yugoslav Cultural Informative Center in Stuttgart.

\* A Ustasha group "Croatian National Resistance" sentenced in New York for a murder, blackmail and treat against Yugoslav immigrants.

\* A group of Ustasha terrorists were arrested in Edcn, Australija. They were ready to leave for Yugoslavia and execute terrorist attacks.

\* In Switzerland and West Germany, eighteen Ustasha terrorists were arrested.

They were found with large quantities of explosive and weapons.

1983:

A court in New York sentenced seven members of "Croatian National Resistance" to 20 to 40 year term for various terrorist attacks.

[Two, possibly three, events not on the list]

=====  
>From Time, 8 Mar 93, p. 33:

Militants seeking independence for Croatia have struck inside the U.S. in the past. In December 1975 Croatian nationalists were suspected of planting a bomb in a luggage locker at [New York's] La Guardia airport, killing 11 people and injuring 75. [Then describes '76 TWA hijacking ultimately resulting in one death.] In June 1980 Croatian "freedom fighters" detonated a bomb inside the museum at the Statue of Liberty, but no one was injured. All told, Croats committed over 20 acts of terror in the US from 1976 through 1980.

=====  
>From New York Times Index, 1976, entry on Croatia:

Gunman shouting 'free Croatia' shoots Uruguay Amb[assador] to Paraguay in Asuncion, apparently mistaking him for Yugoslav Amb[assador] who was scheduled to make public appearance [June 8, 1976, NYT]

-----  
In addition, there's an article in National Review, 5 Aug 83, "Look Homeward, Terrorist (The Croatian Connection)", by Richard Brookhiser. It lists a bunch of small-scale, yet tragic acts that were directed by ultra-nationalist Croats against more moderate Croatian emigres.

With reference to the Dec 75 La Guardia bomb, it was never published conclusively who was responsible. [Interestingly, like the recent Trade Center bomb, no one called before-hand.] However, several recent sources have mentioned only Croatian nationalists as suspects; namely: the Time article above; Gerald Post, interviewed week of 1-5 Mar 93 on the "Jim Bohannon Show" (Mutual Broadcasting System, US); and some other dude interviewed on NPR's Weekend Edition 27 Feb 93 (the last two were "experts" on terrorism).

So if Croatian nationalists didn't do it, they're getting a lot of bad press. In fairness, the recent Newsweek mentions Puerto Rican nationalists as suspects.

America and Bosnia

INEXPERT GAMES

David Binder, with the "New York Times" for VREME:

America's policy concerning the Yugoslav conflicts is full of contradictory elements

The most sensible remark about the Bosnian conflict by a United States official in the last 17 months came not from a Bush or a Baker or a Clinton or a Christopher, but rather from Dee Dee Myers, the White House spokeswoman, when she was asked in the last week of August whether the Administration was reconsidering its policy.

Miss Myers, 31 years old, replied. "There is no good or easy solution and I think there is disagreement, even among professionals, about the best course of action."

Run it back 20 months and you find that United States has reversed course 180 degrees on Bosnia and Hercegovina--and by extension Serbia and Croatia--at least three times. In December 1991, Washington opposed international recognition of the Yugoslav successor republics, focusing then especially on Slovenia and Croatia, but with messy Bosnia on its mind.

From February through March 1992, Washington pushed for international recognition of the Muslim-led government of Bosnia and Hercegovina in part so that it would have a plausible ground to recognize Slovenia and Croatia (and if possible, but it was impossible, Macedonia). Recognition of Alija Izetbegovic's government in Sarajevo came in the first week of April and so did the civil war.

Fast-forward through the horrors of the Bosnian fighting into 1993. The fresh-born Clinton Administration opposed, then wanly supported the Vance-Owen plan for dividing up the republic. Washington's half-heartedness and its continued one-sided devotion to Izetbegovic's cause helped bring about the collapse of Vance-Owen.

Came the summer, came Stoltenberg-Owen with a plan for partitioning Bosnia and Hercegovina on ethnic lines that virtually duplicated the proposal--accepted and rejected, then again accepted and rejected--put forward by Jose Cutilheiro in the spring of 1992 in Lisbon, Sarajevo and Brussels.

This time, in August, Washington endorsed the very partition it had sharply opposed 17 months earlier. Warren Christopher said so on August 19 in messages to Tudjman, Milosevic and Izetbegovic.

But wait. It's not over yet. In the first week of September, with the collapse of the Stoltenberg-Owen talks in Geneva, Clinton and

Christopher made still another shift, sending demarches to Belgrade and Zagreb implying that they could forget about what was on the Stoltenberg-Owen table, advising Croatia and Serbia that they had to make more territorial concessions to poor old Izetbegovic, and warning of NATO air strikes if Serbs or Croats misbehave toward the Muslims.

"We think that the Serbs and the Croats should show greater flexibility in working to consider and achieve the adjustments that the Bosnian government has asked for in order to find a more equitable settlement," said Mr. Christopher, adding that "the world" would hold Serbs and Croats responsible if their "stubberness and intransigence" prevented an agreement.

"If while the talks are in abeyance, there is abuse by those who would seek to interfere with the humanitarian aid, attack the protected areas and resume the sustained shelling of Sarajevo, for example, then first I would remind you that the NATO military option is very much alive," said Mr. Clinton, both he and Christopher speaking on Thursday.

Jesus, Mary and Allah!

The weird quality of American policy is manifest. Hadovan Paradic is deemed a war criminal running a pseudo-republic and so we won't address demarches or any other kind of message to him (although we let him into New York twice in the spring). Mate Boban may be a war criminal, too, but he hasn't appeared on Washington's computer screen, so we won't write to him either. Milesevic is a war criminal, but he is the Vojvoda of all Serbs, so we can still address him. Tudjman has the makings of a war criminal, but our first (ever, and conceivably last) ambassador to Zagreb, Peter Galbraith, is running around being photographed at war fronts wearing a Croatian HVO helmet while sitting in a Croatian tank turret. So maybe we can still write to Tudjman.

Meanwhile, Clinton is under assault by 100 self-appointed experts and intellectuals from a dozen countries for not bombing Serbs, from large parts of the Jewish community (who have discovered that Bosnian Muslims are lovable compared to the Palestinians), from the assembled cannons of the mighty American press, from various Republican and Democratic members of Congress, and from four young Foreign Service officers who quit the State Department in disgust after dealing with Bosnia (without having learned Serbo-Croatian or living in Yugoslavia).

The Clinton Administration clearly wants to revive peace negotiations in Geneva. It clearly does not want to get sucked into the Bosnian conflict. But next week (Monday) Izetbegovic is due in New York to plead for weapons and bombing at the U.N. and he will probably try to do the same later in Washington. Jose Cutilheiro said in an interview this (last) week that Izetbegovic was already begging the United States for weapons and bombing in April 1992.

It would be nice if Dee Dee Myers were in charge of foreign policy here



## What's News—

and Finance

ARD will review a chief executive offi- day, people close to . The candidates in- rman John Sculley. Victor Pelson, Good- tanley Gault, ex-Ko- an J. Phillip Samper Richard Braddock.

estimate that their would cut the budget in the first five spending tens of bil- insured.

ston named Allen and said it plans to rent regional names a single name.

with remains slow to inflation is well-be- ch of the nation, a ed banks shows.

ake its retired man- their health insur- y is also raising the s it already charges t managers.

l bonds rallied on vs. The Dow Jones 7 points to 3588.93. Treasury's bench- e rose 3/8 point. Its a 16-year low. Gold ter Tuesday's fall.

mily won approval on arrangement at uring center, even es that cutting tar- d cost millions of os. Meantime, the e hostile to Nafta. e the Senate does.

## World-Wide

ISRAEL AND JORDAN AGREED on the framework for a peace treaty.

Officials for the two nations said they reached a tentative accord on the subjects their peace talks would cover, including such issues as land, water and refugees. The agreement was a major breakthrough for the two sides, which had been unable to agree on an agenda during months of negoti- ation. Meanwhile, Palestinians and Israelis continued to seek acceptable language on mutual recognition. (Article on Page A10)

*In Israel, peace talks were overshadowed by a cabinet crisis after the Supreme Court ordered Prime Minister Rabin to fire his interior minister, who is under investigation for corruption.*

President Clinton rebuffed a request by Bosnia's Muslim president to set a deadline for U.S. air strikes if Serbs don't remove artillery around Sarajevo. Clinton pledged to eventually send U.S. troops as part of a NATO-led peacekeeping force. But he said Congress would have to approve such a step. (Related article on Page A10)

A misunderstanding brought Serb and Muslim troops to the brink of renewed fighting on mountain slopes overlooking Bosnia's capital, but both sides backed down when U.N. officials announced that the Muslim-led government army was simply carrying out a normal rotation of troops rather than preparing for combat.


Nearly half of all adult Americans read and write so poorly that they are unable to function effectively in the workplace, according to a Department of Education report. The study said 90 million adults have a low level of literacy. Many of those with low reading, writing and math skills live in poverty.

The Senate approved and sent to Clinton legislation that would provide young people with education aid in return for doing community service work. The vote on the legisla- tion, strongly supported by the White House, was 57-40. The House approved the measure last month. The bill authorizes \$1.5 billion for the program over three years.

South African gunmen killed 25 blacks in three separate attacks around Johannes- burg, police said. The attacks followed a landmark accord on Tuesday that will end white-minority rule in the country. In the bloodiest attack, 10 black gunmen in two minivans fired randomly at commuters in a parking lot, officials said.

## Help-Wanted Advertising

Seasonally adjusted, 1967=100



THE HELP-WANTED ADVERTISING index rose in July to 100, up from 97 in June, the Conference Board reports.

## Some People Plan; Some People Pan The Rise of Planners

While Franklin Makes a Mint, Critics Think the Gizmos Are Mostly a Waste of Time

By ELEENA DE LISSER Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL Roland Wallace is addicted to his little leather-bound planner. Twice a day since 1985, he has painstakingly plotted his life — every minute of every hour of every day — onto its pages. He calls this time "prayer in solitude."

Leo Floros, a Chicago public-relations consultant, wouldn't have a planner if you gave him one. "I'm not about to structure my day and every hour on paper," he says. He finds planning fanatics annoying: "It's overkill with some people."

Planners, those portable calendars that became the rage in the mid-1980s, now bulge from an estimated 15 million U.S. pockets. Electronic versions have followed, and pack thousands of briefcases.

### Shower of Admiration

As planners have proliferated, so have people's passions about them. Some feel as strongly about their personal organizers as they do about their ball teams. Some people take them everywhere: Gary Rigby, a Merrill Lynch employee, admits taking his into the shower. Some think the planner rage is a big waste of time.

Time-saving tools "haven't increased our leisure but increased stress," argues Jeremy Rifkin, author of "Time Wars" and president of the Foundation on Eco- nomic Trends in Washington.

Whatever the case, the world indeed seems to have decamped into two groups: those who plan assiduously, and those who

## Business Bulletin

### A Special Background Report On Trends in Industry And Finance

HAVE A BITE at the supermarket. grocery stores with new dining areas.

Bigger delis, food courts and franchise outlets ring in a growing trend to compete for the dining dollar. In the Chicago area Jewel Food megastore adds house pizza mini-McDonald's, a Panda Express Chinese take-out place and an ice cream shop. J- parent American Stores says several of other chains mull the idea: A Lucky's near San Francisco adds a Taco Bell. S Chicagoland, Dominick's plans to serve dishes as pasta at several of its stores.

Seeking diners is "almost a natural expansion" for grocery stores, says Kathleen Brown of the Food Marketing Institute in Washington. But she notes that methods of taste are "very different" by region. In Maine, Hannaford Bros. food chain considers adding a food court in the form of a deli spinoff in some stores. But in New York food chains like D'Agostino's and the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. say space is dear to add dining facilities.

*Kmart serves up Little Caesar's pizza in about 500 of its stores. Other Kmart's sell hot dogs and such prepared in-house.*

A SMALLER WINE BOTTLE, design for the sober '90s, seeks a place on the table.

Some vineyards try to push wine in 175-milliliter bottles, two-thirds the regular wine-bottle size. Backers say the new size, which holds four, not six, glasses, is well suited to Americans, who are drinking finer wines in smaller amounts. "Consumers are refusing to buy more than they can drink," says Larry Williams of the Jordan Winery in California, which this year began selling cabernet and a chardonnay in the new size.

Mr. Williams contends, too, that the smaller bottle is a better option than the half- or 375-milliliter bottle, which holds about three glasses "not enough for a dining couple." After 2 years of testing, the new bottle gets mixed reviews. Retailers and restaurateurs like but say more wineries need to promote the size for it to be successful. About nine wineries have tried the new size but a few like Kendall-Jackson and Frog's Leap, have since dropped the bottle.

CUSTOM PUBLISHING blooms as marketers fine-tune audiences and control copy.

Are they magazines or catalogs, these glossy publications that mix articles and products? Try "magalogs," suggests a spokesman for Sony Style, a thick, shiny magazine featuring topics like how to pick the right Walkman and getting the most from an answering machine.

# Clinton Defers To Congress On Bosnia Role

By THOMAS E. RICKS  
And CARLA ANNE ROBBINS

Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON — Bosnia collided with Somalia in the U.S. capital, raising questions about American commitments to peacekeeping missions in both countries.

With a rebellion suddenly breaking out on Capitol Hill over the cost and hazy rationale of the U.S. military involvement in Somalia, President Clinton said he would seek congressional approval before sending U.S. troops to act as peacekeepers in Bosnia. In an effort to assuage congressional concerns, administration officials said that any U.S. peacekeeping mission in Bosnia would be under the command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, rather than the auspices of the United Nations as in Somalia, guaranteeing more U.S. military control.

A senior official also said that the administration would be willing to consider a time limit such as a year on the U.S. commitment to Bosnia, with congressional reauthorization a possibility after that.

"If we can get the Congress to support it, then I think we should participate," Mr. Clinton told reporters after his meeting with Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic.

But that support is by no means guaranteed. While discussing the 1994 defense spending bill last night, the Senate erupted into a lengthy debate over an amendment that effectively would require the U.S. to withdraw from Somalia by about the end of next month unless Congress specifically authorizes continuing the mission.

"The time has come for a hard-nosed reassessment of the mission" to Somalia,

said Sen. Robert Byrd (D., W.Va.), the amendment's sponsor. "At some point, we have to call the mission over. Done. Completed."

U.S. officials, meanwhile, insisted that the U.S. was committed to sticking with both initiatives. They had hoped to postpone any debate on Bosnian peacekeeping until after a peace settlement was signed. But the sudden opposition to the troubled Somalia mission, where four U.S. soldiers were killed last month, has apparently forced their hands.

U.S. officials estimate that a NATO peacekeeping force in Bosnia would likely number around 55,000 troops, about half from the U.S., and would almost certainly be fraught with dangers for U.S. troops.

The Senate debate was as much about Bosnia as it was about Somalia. Sen. Paul Simon (D., Ill.), who opposed the Byrd proposal, said that for the U.S. to "high-tail" out of Somalia at a time it is contemplating going into Bosnia would send the message that the U.S. is frightened easily. "The credibility of our country really is at stake," he warned.

But support for the Byrd withdrawal proposal was surprisingly widespread, reflecting growing concern in Congress about the open-ended nature of all peacekeeping missions—and their high financial cost. On top of that, congressional conservatives generally are wary of the Clinton administration's commitment to multilateral peacekeeping efforts, especially ones which place U.S. troops under foreign command.

Conservatives also are provoked because the administration has nominated Morton Halperin, a liberal defense intellectual, to oversee the Pentagon's peacekeeping efforts. Republicans promise that Mr. Halperin faces a tough confirmation hearing over some of his past positions, and over the administration's handling so far of peacekeeping.

*Additional International news on  
Pages A16 and A17.*

# Stay Out of Bosnia

By MARK HELPRIN

The best and the brightest engineered our intervention in Vietnam, and though the phrase by which we know them has become an irony, they may have been right. Now, resting upon fatted credentials, their successors are calling for intervention in Bosnia. But absent the context of global struggle between East and West, their reasoning must be multifaceted, and their arguments sound more like those of a lawyer straining to win his case than a statesman in a crisis who looks for the light of survival.

The war in Bosnia is not a civil war, they say, but unilateral aggression, and only by responding as in the Gulf will we dissuade emerging tyrannies from taking the stage in a world no longer frozen into blocs. The potency of technology administered through air power can halt the atrocities and contain the Serbs' appetite for expansion so adroitly as to preclude dangerous unanticipated consequences. And although intervention is justified by *Realpolitik*, the way is lighted by morality, which is why today's best and brightest come from every band of the political spectrum. This, in turn, the argument goes, makes success in intervention that much more likely.

Would that all this were so, and that American military action against a Slavic state, with Russia its historical patron, would not intensify European volatility and the crisis atmosphere in the former Eastern bloc. Then, intervention might be warranted on purely humanitarian grounds, as in Somalia, although the certainty of humanitarian effect might be just as clouded as it is in Somalia. Would that all this were so. But it is not so.

## A Civil War

What is civil war if not different factions fighting over the country in which they have lived together, spoken the same language and shared the same customs? That each side in Bosnia has declared nationhood makes the conflict between them no less a civil war than the American Civil War, in which the internationally recognized governments of two distinct territories fought to decide the issue of secession.

Unless great power rivals are already

on the scene the U.S. customarily refrains from involvement in civil wars, because they are inwardly focused and tend to find their own angle of repose unless aggravated and internationalized, in which case the body count goes up. We shy from civil wars because it is difficult to find in them a threat to U.S. interests, and their nature precludes the kind of war we are temperamentally suited to fight.

We did not fight in Kuwait because one sovereign state had invaded another, for then we would have taken the field when Arab armies invaded Israel; when Israel invaded Lebanon; Vietnam, Cambodia; the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan; Iraq, Iran; etc. We fought

casualties. Intervention based purely on humanitarian concerns can be justified only if no risk exists that the intervention itself will not make things worse. Unintended consequences can dwarf the human tragedy that stimulated action in the first place. It is heartbreaking, but it is true, that fewer people may suffer if the war in the Balkans is contained rather than if the rest of the world joins in.

This kind of war finds its own equilibrium and comes to a halt if none of the sides imagines that it will be saved by a *deus ex machina* and holds out for more territory than it itself can secure without paying a terrible price in blood. The hope we have extended to Bosnian Muslims has

---

*It is heartbreaking, but it is true, that fewer people may suffer if the war in the Balkans is contained rather than if the rest of the world joins in.*

---

not for principle but for the economic lifeblood upon which the stability of the world depends.

Nor did we fight in Kuwait to deter tyrants. Tyrants tend not to submit to discipline or heed lessons. If that were so, Caesar would have been deterred by the lesson of Pharaoh, Napoleon by Caesar, Hitler by Napoleon, Saddam by Hitler, and so on. Tyrants more than most men feel the pleasure in defiance and they feed upon high risk.

Whatever the U.S. does in Bosnia, the world will not be safe from tyranny. Among other things, none of our options will impress Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Georgians, Tadjiks, Uzbeks, Chechen-Ingush, and any nascent dictators in the former Soviet republics because they know that, in the former Soviet Union, the U.S. and NATO have no freedom of action.

And what kind of tyranny are we supposed to be deterring? Is there a Hitler among the Chechen-Ingush? Who is it, exactly, that must be stopped to spare the West? If the former Soviet Union experiences counter-counter-revolution, its leader will be the one whom we must impress with our fortitude, and he will be no more cowed by our military actions in Bosnia than by the moral authority of the pope. He will instead ask how many divisions we have.

Until they become war protesters, humanitarians usually find it difficult to grasp that internationalization and escalation of limited war drive up the number of

killed as many of them as have Serbs and Croats. Is the principle of Bosnian Muslim self-determination worth the life of either a single Bosnian Muslim or a single American?

If by some magic the U.S. could effortlessly control the realities of battle, perhaps it would be—perhaps idealistic considerations of self-determination for even the smallest minority could make sense. Not surprisingly, the proponents of intervention offer this promise as the elixir with which to swallow their weak arguments. It is the modern equivalent of "home by Christmas," and a powerful appeal given that in the Gulf War it worked.

Air power may temporarily stay the Serbs or Croats, and the most intelligent military option—taking out the bridges—would slow them sufficiently to cut casualties. But in the end it is the rifleman who will decide, though the illusion will persist forever that war can be neat and purely mechanical. Even after a punishing strategic bombing of Serbia, the war would flow back with greater ferocity in the quiet channels where it now takes its toll, for an allied attack would mobilize the Serbs, not discourage them, a task at which Milosevic has yet to succeed.

The centerpiece of interventionist technical argument seems to be the use of counter-battery fire, which is not particularly effective against the man-portable or jeep-mounted mortars in which Serbia is rich if only because the Soviets have counter-battery radars, too. But even if a

technical trick allowed, for example, the relief of the siege of Sarajevo, every bet would have to be insured from the ground. Just as the Muslims have fought on against all odds in the hope that America will enter the war, it would be in the Serbs' practiced interest to throw themselves against whoever opposed them, at whatever cost, to awaken the sympathy of Russia.

Are the best and the brightest really confident that such things will remain under their control, that the war in Europe, which they did not foresee, will not surprise them yet again?

It is now routine for American political leaders to propose extending the responsibilities of the armed forces while simultaneously stripping them of their ability to fight. The fashionable new policy is to speak loudly while carrying a little stick. Intervention in Bosnia might be more promising if the U.S. and NATO retained the deterrent power of five years ago, for the danger lies not in failing to deter the Serbs but rather in the unpredictable forces that may be unleashed if the Balkan war is internationalized.

## Greater Dangers

Instead of extending the life of a tragedy that should have been over long ago, the West should consider what might happen if intervention became necessary in, let us say, Germany. In that case, even the heartbreaking option of simple containment would no longer be available, and, suddenly, all the heavy weapons and major formations that for so many years have been so carelessly dismissed and dismantled would be sorely missed. If the war in Bosnia is to be likened to the Spanish Civil War, its significance is not that anything we do will alter things to come, but that it is a warning that must be heeded in view of greater dangers and more exacting trials. To a statesman, Bosnia will suggest not action but preparation.

As for the best and the brightest, a credential does not constitute an argument; it never has and it never will. Manifestoes followed by lists of names and grand titles should make you feel like the man at dinner with the proverbial awe-inspiring stranger. The longer the lists and the flouzier the titles, the faster you should count your spoons.

---

*Mr. Helprin, a contributing editor of the Journal, is a novelist and a fellow of the Hudson Institute.*



Toronto Globe + Mail

September 17, 1993

## Balkan war

Reporting on the Bosnian quagmire has been extraordinarily biased. Muslim atrocities, rape and ethnic cleansing have gone unreported or underreported, while Serb (and now Croat) sins are splashed on front pages. The Serbs' apparently disproportionate land share in the latest peace plan is presented as an undeserved conquest, though in fact it represents Serb concession, leaving them less land than before the war. Serb land is also rural and often barren; most of the country's resources lie in the Muslim section (Muslims were always concentrated in the cities). To blandly compare acreage is like equating Saharan sand with Manhattan real estate.

Western morality in Bosnia has from the beginning been myopic, driven by incomplete, selective and often manipulated media coverage, and dubious and certainly contestable economic and international assumptions. We accepted internal administrative boundaries drawn by past dictators, with the uppermost purpose of precluding

secession, as new state borders. We gave the right of self-determination to Croats and Muslims (though some neither sought nor welcomed it), but refused to give this right to centuries-old Serb communities (many of whom also preferred the old federation). The original United Nations/European Community-brokered tripartite division of Bosnia, signed by all factional leaders in Lisbon in February, 1992, was dashed a week later, when Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic reneged. Responding to promises of Middle Eastern and U.S. support, he instead launched the offensive that took Srebrenica and swept through Eastern Bosnia, until the tides of battle turned. Returning to the Lisbon formula, UN/EC mediators again secured all-factional agreement. But again, interventionist pressure from the Middle East and Washington allowed Mr. Izetbegovic to hope for more; again, he withdrew from the negotiations.

This is why U.S. Vice-President Al Gore's frequent meetings with Mr. Izetbegovic, but not Serb and Croat leaders, is perturbing. That is why U.S. President Bill Clinton's September meeting with Mr. Izetbegovic and U.S. Defence Secretary Les Aspin's planned visit to Sarajevo is disturbing. Judgments rendered after listening to just one side of a bitterly contested divorce are rarely just. They exacerbate differences; they do not bridge them. Moral and judicial norms demand a different approach.

C. G. Jacobsen, Prof., Director  
Eurasian Security Studies  
Department of Political Science,  
Carleton University, Director  
The Independent Committee on War  
Crimes in the Balkans, Ottawa

RECEIVED OCT 07 1993

## What the West chooses not to hear

THE letter from Tomislav Sunic (September 21) makes breathtakingly cynical statements and thinly disguised threats to continue Croat policy of aggression against the Serbs in Krajina.

The Balkan drama which started with the Croat repression of Serbs in Krajina appears to be regaining focus as the next flashpoint in the tragedy. This was exemplified by the recent Croat offensive in the area of Gospije where, according to UN sources, 11 Serb villages were totally destroyed and 61 Serb civilians, some mutilated beyond recognition, perished.

The same brutal policy of extermination is being applied to the Serbs in Krajina as during the days of the Nazi-backed Independent State of Croatia when more than 700,000 Serbs were massacred. Is Mr Sunic announcing a continuation of this policy of extermination when he "fears of more terrible conflicts?" A conditioning of public opinion for further Croat aggression?

The Serbs in Krajina and Bosnia-Herzegovina are fighting to protect their homes on

land where they have lived for centuries. The international community has already publicly acknowledged its mistake of premature recognition of Croatia, under German pressure, and should now correct that mistake by acknowledging the right of Serbs in Krajina of self determination. This desire of the Krajina people was clearly and overwhelmingly demonstrated in a referendum. If "democracy" means listening to the voice of the people, why is the West so selectively deaf?

Mike Mihailovic.  
Amersham,  
Bucks.

The  
Guardian

## War points

MIKE MIHAJLOVIC (Letters, September 24) makes several excellent points about Tomislav Sunic's one-sided view of the Yugoslav wars. Unfortunately, he is equally guilty in his flattery of the Krajina Serbs and in his misrepresentation of history.

The Nazi-backed Independent State of Croatia was indeed a brutal, murderous and utterly despicable regime, but Mr Mihailovic overestimates the Serb death toll by 100 per cent. A more accurate figure, cited by several respected academics, would be 350,000, horrific enough. This is just one example of the rewriting of history for nationalistic and power-political reasons by all sides in the Yugoslav wars.

More recently the boot has been on the other foot, with the Krajina Serbs, backed by Serbia and the Yugoslav People's Army, guilty of appalling crimes against Croats in the 1991 war. Tens of thousands have been killed, wounded,

maimed, tortured and forcibly expelled. Mr Mihailovic conveniently ignores this.

Neither side is innocent, as the evidence of Croat forces burning and decapitating corpses in their recent offensive demonstrates. The Serb response is to threaten to destroy one of the last Croat communities in the Krajina. Both of these peoples have lived in the area for centuries, both have equally strong claims.

The desire for self-determination has created competing and currently, irreconcilable demands. These are mirrored in Bosnia. If peace is to return compromise by all sides is necessary. Inaccurate historical mud-slinging and blindness to the legitimate concerns of others have greatly added to the bitterness of war in ex-Yugoslavia, and will continue to stand in the way of a sustainable settlement.

John Williams,  
Department of Politics and  
International Studies,  
Warwick University,  
Coventry.

Sept. 24, 1993

Sept. 27, 1993

# Faithful scapegoat

THIS WEEK saw the beginning of the end for the New World Order, and high time, too. That was always a bombastic and chimerical notion, a product of the euphoria engendered by the end of the Cold War, and fortified by the spectacular technological successes of Desert Storm. The idea was that the United States, operating either through the United Nations, or with its blessing, could set the world to rights.

The idea had some basis in international legality, if not in the social and political realities of most of the world. The United Nations, with the elimination of the Soviet veto, was and is effectively at the disposition of the United States, for blessing or covering any course of action to which the United States is strongly committed. Thus American policy-makers were tempted to use the UN for the creation of a worldwide Pax Americana, and yielded to that temptation to a considerable extent.


This week it became clear that Americans are no longer in love with Pax Americana and the UN. The House of Representatives has just joined the Senate in endorsing a resolution that — in substance, though less than explicitly — calls for the withdrawal of US troops from Somalia by mid-November. Bill Clinton, in his address to the UN, indicated that his administration is preparing to bow to the will of Congress, and of the American people. In consequence, he is now dropping the crusade against General Mohamed Aideed, about which a great hullabaloo was being made in August.

General Aideed, with an estimated 800 militiamen at his disposal, has in effect defeated the US and the UN. He has been able to do so because his clansmen, in pursuit of their cause, are willing to sustain casualties on a scale unacceptable to the US and the UN, whose soldiers are risking their lives for an objective that does not stir their emotions or reconcile their families to their loss. It has taken only 15 US deaths in Somalia to turn US policy right round. We do not know how many of General Aideed's clan (and other Somalis) have died: the international media are not particularly investigative in the matter of Somali body counts. But there is no doubt that Somali casualties (including women and children) considerably outnumber American casualties. The point is that an African clan, on its own turf and operating within its own value system, is less easily daunted than an international force.

The manner in which the US-UN war against General Aideed has just

been called off is symptomatic of the actual relationship between the US and the UN. There is a Security Council resolution, passed at the urging of the US, committing UN forces to apprehend General Aideed and bring him to justice. That resolution is still in force, technically, but President Clinton clearly implied that it is now null and void, since it is no longer in accord with US policy. This assumption seems normal to many Americans, but it is deeply frustrating to serious UN people, including the Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who indicated briefly that he remains bound by the Security Council resolution, and committed to General Aideed's capture.

The President, in his address to the General Assembly, coolly placed on the UN itself the blame for the US-fuelled over-expansion of UN peace-keeping activities. As the President



The  
Independent

Oct. 1 1993

# to the world



put it: "The United Nations simply cannot become engaged in every one of the world's conflicts. If the American people are to say yes to UN peace-keeping, the United Nations must know when to say no."

To resist the tendency about which the President was complaining, the UN would have had to say "No" to the United States, which has never been easy for the UN, and has been virtually impossible since 1990. Still, taking the blame for the mistakes of national leaders (especially US presidents) is one of the things the UN is about, and is a large part of its utility to national governments — and, indeed, in rather sad and ironic ways, to the cause of peace. To take the blame, and so save the face of a powerful statesman who is backing away from a warlike commitment, is a classic UN exercise, and perhaps the greatest justification for its continued existence.

The closest precedent for Mr Clinton's General Assembly speech, backing away from General Aided and blaming the UN, is Eisenhower's use of the UN in the Hungary crisis of 1956. Eisenhower had encouraged the Hungarians to revolt and, when they did so, decided sensibly but ignominiously to let them down. So he used the UN to save his face. He was bound by the UN Charter, he claimed, and the UN had failed to live up to that. Mr Clinton's use of the UN this week was based on the same essential principle: the UN as scapegoat.

President Clinton also talked, quite incongruously, of possibly sending 25,000 American troops to Bosnia (under certain conditions). The troops are unlikely to get there, and if they do get there, they will not stay long. If the Americans are about to leave Somalia after 15 lethal casualties, the Serbs are hardly shaking in their shoes.

We may hope that the West as a whole is now emerging from a dangerous mood which has afflicted it over the past three years: a mood of euphoria, bordering on megalomania, in which all manner of fantasies seemed on the verge of realisation, including the end of history itself. The millenarian mood affected Europe for a time, perhaps even more than America. To European leaders, most of whom are still in place, it seemed quite a practicable notion to melt down historic nations into a federation on the lines of the United States, forged by a widely different history, and out of qualitatively different components. This hardly seemed to matter; after all, history had ended, hadn't it?

In this mood, it seemed a good idea, for example, to recognise Bosnia as a sovereign independent state: a likely candidate for membership in European federal union. To put faith in documents, and ignore human nature, human passions and the diversities of human culture was a feature of the period which may now, with luck, be closing.

The classic analysis of this particular syndrome is contained in Edmund Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790). This complex of characteristics (combining with other forces) cost millions of European lives in the wars of the Revolution and the Empire. Our generation may perhaps escape from the consequences of similar follies at a much lower price. If so, some of the credit is due to the United Nations, in its unacknowledged role as scapegoat for the vanities and follies of statesmen. The UN's greatest successes are its failures.