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the UN peace-keeping force
- hang them up by their
+ execute them one by one
+ bombs come in. Because
+ a force sitting there of
+ people capable of defending
+ the airport for about
+ they're about 250K
+ the nearest safe border.

④

air strikes to effective?
to find the weaponry -
to heavy weaponry. One of the
most favorite weapons used in Bosnia
though is the mortar &

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[REDACTED] mortar is carried in a variety
of ways (MacNeil: these are the shells
I first saw falling in the graveyard)
they were ~~B~~ rifle grenades
which brings a new sort
of dimension to where they come
from but it's hard to tell from the
evidence. But that has been a
weapon in the past. But
generally around the Sarajevo
are the favorite weapon. & they're
carried in ambulances, they're carried
in minibuses, they're carried in
[REDACTED] There are very few rules in

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in the Bosnian war & you'll never be able to target these. We refer to them as backyard mortars - everybody has a 81-82 mil mortar set up in his backyard - has about 10 rounds of ammunition & he fires ~~back~~ & forth or he fires at the other side.

So you're not going to be able to find the "favorite weapons" within that particular conflict - not only that - with all due respect to my pilot friends - God bless them - they do have a habit of leaving

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
the battlefield occasionally & going home for a good night's sleep and to put a CAP (Combat Air Patrol) over top of Sarajevo on a 24-hour basis is neigh on to impossible.


That being the case we still have my old peacekeeping force on the ground in Sarajevo & I'm very concerned about them & they're being left to - being hung out to dry - that's just part of the force at the airport - the other part is if you go due north of the airport & hit the river - that where the rest of them are.

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They're within the range of all the weaponry in and around Sarajevo.

There's a lot more weapons in Sarajevo than just the ones up the mountains. In fact, we've been sitting with them for the last 3 weeks & a number of them haven't fired a round in that time.

④  the UN agree that Milosevic 
 in charge of all the 
 that they are irregular forces out of his control?

I can't speak for the UN but what  say is that as an individual

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who dealt with the Serbs & the
Presidency - the ^{Muslims &} Croats -- on a daily

[REDACTED] sometimes twice a day & dealt

with Gen Mladic, the commander of

the so-called Serbian Army of BiH that

[REDACTED] that we worked out &

the deals that were executed & the

[REDACTED] that was taken on the ground

[REDACTED] he based on his authority

not on FR Karadzic's

It didn't appeal to me that it was

[REDACTED] back to Belgrade for final

[REDACTED] If I could make the point

[REDACTED] If I had ~~to~~ as much energy

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was spent on finding a political constitutional solution as it is on fighting the war & recounting the history of BH & if both sides were forced to sit down at the same table in the same building & not expend the energy on 2-3 hours in London, 2-3 days in London, 2-3 days in Helsinki but to get them to sit down & grind through the pain-staking sort of peace process.

Q How?

Well, the case now is that the Presidency for reasons that are

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understandable for them, will not speak to the other side, they see that as an army of aggression, controlled, as Bill said, by Milosevic & therefore to talk to them would be tacit recognition of their official status.

They will ~~take~~^{talk} to Belgrade, they will ~~take~~^{talk} to the JNA - the Yugoslav Army in Belgrade - but they will not talk to the other side. The Serbs, on the other hand, the particular position they're in ~~now~~, will ~~take~~^{talk} anywhere, at any time, at any level. So it is a matter, in my personal opinion, is to

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get the Presidency to ~~take~~^{talk} to the other side.

(MacNeil: the Presidency of Bosnia - the people who apparently are most vulnerable in this situation)

yes & are fighting a fairly successful campaign ^{within} ~~the~~ Sarajevo. ~~that~~^{the} fact of the matter is that pressure has to be brought -- the Presidency hates to hear me say this -- to talk to the other side. I've never seen a war situation like this resolved unless people talk to each other about it & not for just a couple of hours ~~each~~^{every} day.

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Q What would your advice be ---?

I think I'd probably start with trying to twist the ratchet up a bit on the political pressure. Without ~~telling~~ ^{telling} any takes out of school for about 2 weeks the Presidency had the message (the Presidency of Bosnia) that there was no intervention coming & ~~the~~ attitude changed completely & we were making some progress on where we should go from where we were which is an unacceptable situation. It's a bit of a paradox but the preparations for

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for the increase in the gulf were interpreted by the Presidency over a period of about 48 hours as people getting ready ^{to come} to help them - that's just a communications breakdown or maybe a fake or end-run to Bosnia & they became at least optimistic that intervention was a distinct possibility which I don't think it is & you can't have a sensible political discussion if one side thinks it's coming & the other side thinks it's not. So the message has to go clearly - if that is the President's

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intention - to the Presidency of BH

that there is no intervention on the way nor will be - Then the ground rules

(MacNeil: so don't keep make vague
statements suggesting there ^{may} be some help
coming)

It really blows the negotiation process
- the mediation process that the ON
is involved in

(MacNeil: excuse me for interruption -
~~it~~ only if the Bosnian Presidency
believes there's no moratorium coming over,
the hill, the bogies are not going to
sooner that they've got to sit down

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I talk & you believe that's the only way,
I'm not saying to the US don't intervene
I'm saying that the proper & accurate
message - whatever that message ~~is~~ has
to be - ^{if it is} intervention yes, intervention no,
has to be passed on to President ~~Clinton~~
Now from what you can do from a
practical point to assist - One of
the things that at least can be
considered - It's a shame that the
spotlight is on Sarajevo - It's
suffering less than the vast majority
of villages & towns out there in the
rest of BH but no one's really