Gocpocho, or velo yourne Epogras. It pe a cybuse

YUGOSLAVIA

PUTTING THE CRISIS IN CONTEXT



A SPECIAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL FOUNDATION

JULY 29, 1991

INTRODUCTION

With the collapse of East Bloc communism ethnic divisions that have long been a source of conflict on the European continent are again emerging. No where is this more in evidence than in the Balkans, where the rise of militant nationalist movements within the Yugoslav republics has resulted in a a civil war that threatens to tear the country apart. Although EEC representatives have been able to negotiate a temporary truce in the region, conflicts between Serbian peasants and local militiamen in Croatia have steadily escalated in violence, and now constitute what military analysts call a "Phase One Low-Intensity Conflict". To date, over 200 people have died in these ethnic clashes. Clearly, the potential for a long and bloody civil war remains.

Despite the brief respite won by EEC representatives, attempts to provide outside mediation for Yugoslavia have lacked an understanding of the historic context of the conflict. As a result, they have been based on a number of false perceptions, and therefore are largely misdirected. These misperceptions have been further compounded by at best uninformed, and at worst heavily biased media reporting from the region.

If there is to be any hope for peacefully resolving Yugoslavia's internal conflicts, it is essential that U.S. decision makers cut through the fog of misinformation and rhetoric, and achieve a better understanding of the origins and scope of the problems that lie at their root. To do this, they must first recognize a number of contemporary realities concerning the current situation. Among these are:

- 1) The conflict between the Yugoslav republics has not arisen from a dispute over whether the nation should be a federation or a confederation. Rather, it arises from disputes over the internal Yugoslav borders which were arbitrarily drawn by Tuo in 1943 in large part to dilute Serbian political influence.
- 2) Claims to the contrary notwithstanding, the issue is not one of democracy vs communism, or for that matter market economics vs central planning. The governments of all of the major republics (Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia) were put in power through open and free elections, and are therefore putatively legisimate in a superficial sense. At the same time, however, all are also essentially authorizarian, with Serbia retaining the communist model, while Croatia implementing a fascist model and Slovenia adopting a socialist structure. Further, all are led by former communists. In short, no matter what they say, none of the current governments actually embraces the fundamental values of American democracy and therefore, none are worthy of U.S support.
- 3) U.S. policy makers must recognize that the current crisis was precipitated by and has been heightened by the actions of Croatia and Slovenia, first moving unilaterally to break away which in turn sparked the initial action by federal troops.— a move ordered with the concurrance of Federal President Ante Mirkovic, a Croatian; then in refusing to permit federal troops to return peacefully to their barracks under a cease-fire agreement; and finally in making clearly unacceptable demands on the nation's joint presidency when it attempted to achieve a negotiated solution. Indeed, even prior to proclaiming their independence, both Slovenia and Croatia had covertly stockpiled large caches of arms in preparation for military action.

- 4) The concerns of the ethnic Serbian minorities in Croatia are founded in both historic experience and contemporary actions of the Croatian nationalist government. Therefore, any policy which results in the independence for some or all of Yugoslavia's constituent elements must take into account such justified ethnic concerns, and assure that the safety and liberty of ethnic minorities are not put in jeopardy.
- 5) A failure of U.S. policy in the Balkans could carry a very high price by opening the door to further ethnic conflict in other parts of the former East Bloc.

In addition to comprehending the contemporary realities related to the Yugoslav crisis, however, it is also essential that U.S. policy makers fully understand the historic factors from which these contemporary elements evolved. Only such an understanding will permit the U.S. to craft a policy that will properly serve its interests.


THE HISTORIC CONTEXT: ORIGINS THROUGH THE FIRST WORLD WAR

In the middle of the sixth century, invasions by the Avars, a nomadic tribe which originated in Central Asia sparked a migration of Slavic peoples from their original homeland in the Pripet Marshes (a region roughly comprised of modern-day south-central Poland and the Ukraine) to the Balkans. The migration of the Slavs to the Balkans cut the land bridge that linked the Byzantine Empire and the west, creating a buffer between the Frankish Kingdom and the Byzantines which was thereafter subject to constant pressures from invading forces. (Illustration page 3)

In 819 AD, the Slovenes were incorporated within the Frankish monarchy, and later the Holy Roman Empire. The Croats were absorbed into Hungary in 1102, and ceased to exist as an independent nation until 1918.

First politically organized around the middle of the ninth century, Scrbia was subjugated by the Byzantines in 924. During the reign of Stevan Nemanja (1167-1196), Scrbia was again able to assert its independence from the Byzantines, and reached its zenith under Emperor Dusan around 1350.

An expanding Ottoman Empire, however, had cast its eyes westward, and in 1361, Suleiman's armies marched into Thrace, capturing the city of Adrianople. Throughout the next century, Adrianople would be the Ottoman Empire's forward base for attacks on the Balkans. Finally, in 1459 the bulk of Serbia, with the exception of Montenegro was conquered and incorporated into the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, until the nineteenth century, of all the once proud Slav states, only Montenegro remained free of foreign domination.



The rise of nationalistic sentiments following the French Revolution inspired new uprisings in the Balkans. In 1804, Serbian peasants demanding autonomy were led by Karageorge in a revolt against the Ottomans. Although they were crushed after three years of fierce fighting, Serbia was made a principality in 1817.

In 1875, the Balkans rose up again, but in this instance, with the help of Russian intervention against the Turks both Serbia and Bosnia were able to win their independence. For Bosnia, though, independence was short lived. In 1908, the Austro-Hungarian Empire unilaterally annexed the province of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This move would prove fateful, because the embarrassment it caused the Czar, who was nominally the protector of South Slavs, became a major factor in his decision to commit Russian forces to the defense of Serbia in 1914

Just four years later, came a second factor which helped set the stage for World War I, the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) in which Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, Romania, and Bulgaria joined forces to drive the Turks out of Europe. Serbia greatly enhanced its the size and prestige in the conflict, causing great alarm within the councils of the crumbling Hapsburg Empire.

Although over three fifths of Austria-Hungary's subjects were Slavs -- Poles, Czeches, Slovaks, Serbs Bosnians, and Montenegrins -- the Austrian and Magyar elites who ruled the nation were unwilling to permit the Slavs a role in governing. This short-sighted policy served only to fuel the fires of the already intense South Slav nationalism that had been growing within the Empire.


Even before the Balkan Wars, Belgrade had been a center for South Slav nationalists. With the victory over the Turks, Serbia, became a veritable fountainhead of inflammatory nationalistic propaganda. This made the Serbs a matter of special concern. While the Serbs were not strong enough to challenge Austria directly, the Hapsburgs feared that covert agitation inspired in Belgrade might spark a successful revolt.

Opinion within the Empire's ruling circles on how to deal with South Slav nationalism was sharply divided, with the General Staff arguing for an invasion of Serbia to settle the "Serb Problem" once and for all, and moderates like Archduke Franz Ferdinand preferring the so-called "trialist solution" which would add a third element to the existing Austro-Hungarian government representing Slav interests. The "trialist solution" was vigorousl opposed on the one hand by the Magyars and Austrian elites, which had no desire to relinquish any of their power, and on the other by extreme South Slav nationalists who wanted to establish a fully independent South Slav state.

As a result, when Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated, Austria's General Staff seized the on the event as an opportunity to end Southern Slav aspirations for independence once and for all. Their first step was to respond to the assassination with a set of demands they knew Serbia could not possibly accept. When the Serbian response to the Austrian diplomatic note proved conciliatory, the Hapsburgs were faced with a dilemma. Diplomatic precedents of the time indicated that a response such as Serbia's would remove any cause for armed conflict. Yet, Austria had already decided on a war to put the Serbs in their place once and for all. In the end, Austria simply decided to ignore the Serbian response.

As a result, Austria attacked Serbia on July 28, 1914. Within two weeks, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Belgium and Montenegro were all embroiled in the war. The conflict that followed would take a heavy toll of the Serbian population. Serbia would lose 30% of its population in the war, including 60% of its adult males.

During the war, as it became clear that the Allies were winning, Croatian and Slovenian representatives in Vienna had begun to call for the creation of a unified, independent Southern Slav state. Working through the "Yugoslav Committee", the Croatian and Slovenian representatives petitioned the Serbian government in exile at Corfu to be included in a post-war state. This would permit them to move from the losing side to that of the victors. In December of 1918 the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes" was proclaimed. Its name was changed to Yugoslavia in 1929.



The new state had a formidable set of problems to overcome. Its population spoke three major languages: Serbo-Croat, Slovene, and Macedonian, as well a host of minor ones such as Albanian and Turkish. The Croats and Slovenes looked down on the Serbs and Montenegrins, viewing them as uncouth peasants. There were also vast religious differences between the Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats and Slovenes, and Moslem Shqiptars. Most important, of all, though was the fact that many Slovenes and Croats, as subjects of the Hapsburg Empire had borne arms against their newfound fellow citizens in the recent war — effectively combining victor and defeated in a single nation. The legacy of this mismatch was two decades of uneasy rule and internal strife.

THE HISTORIC CONTEXT: THE SECOND WORLD WAR

When Germany invaded Yugoslavia in April of 1941, Croatia declared itself an independent state, and embarked on one of the bloodiest examples of genocide in human history. Under the leadership of Dr. Ante Pavelic, the "Independent State of Croatia" operated the Jasenovac concentration camp, the third largest in Europe. Post-war estimates suggest that over 750,000 Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies were exterminated by Croatia's "Ustasha" thugs in a parallel to Hitler's "Final Solution".

The barbarity of the Ustasha slaughter is difficult to contemplate, but was documented in a Secret report prepared by a team of OSS officers led by Lt. Col. Robert H. McDowell that had been infiltrated into Yugoslavia to assess conditions. McDowell a former professor of Balkan history, who was shocked by what he found. His report stated in part:

"The record is only 100 clear that whereas the Germans were primarily concerned with simply killing males, the Ustashi made a general practice of killing by torture women and children, as well as men."

it went on to conclude:

During 1917-1919, in the Caucasus and Turkey the undersigned became very much accustomed to massacre and torture, but the carefully checked stories from Bosnia, reveal an insanity, much beyond the worst of the last war's atrocities.

In addition to the systematic slaughter of Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies initiated by Croatia, the Yugoslav resistance which was initiated by General Draja Mihailovich's Chetniks on May 3, 1941, also elicited a ferocious response from the German occupiers, with between 9,000 and 10,000 Serbian peasants killed during the initial reprisals. According to a declassified Top Secret OSS report:

"It is clear that the atrocities began not as reprisals but as a technique to of discouraging the thought of resistance. As resistance developed, the reprisals made the initial terrorism appear as moderation. In each community, in almost every home visited by the mission, the story was the same — one or more male members of the family murdered in 1941 or 1942 by German troops."

At first, the communists under Tito cooperated with the Germans because of the Hitler-Stalin Pact. They regularly denounced Mihailovich supporters to the Nazis, and attempted to undermine Chetnik activities.

The German attack on the USSR brought a quick reversal in Tito's policies, leading him to have his Partisans join in resisting the occupation. However, he withdrew his forces from Serbia to regions under Italian control where the administration was not as harsh. As increasing numbers of German units were transferred to the Eastern front, though, and forces from Bulgaria, Italy, Romania, Hungary, and Croatia replaced them, both the Partisan and Chetnik forces increasingly were fighting each other rather than the occupiers.

Although the Chetniks were the original resistance movement in Yugoslavia, a decision was made in 1943 to abandon the nationalists in favor of Tito's communists. The move was justified largely on the basis of doctored reports originating with British intelligence sources in Cairo and later Bari, Italy, that suggested the Chetnik forces were not fighting effectively, or were even possibly collaborating with the Germans. It was not until long after the war, when documents were declassified that it became possible to establish that these reports had been fabricated by communists stationed in key positions in the British Intelligence Service in order to position Tito for post-war leadership of the Yugoslav state. Among the most prominent of the communist moles was James Klugman, a close associate of Kim Philby.

Once Tito had exclusive Allied support, he initiated a campaign to assure post-war control of Yugo-slavia in part by storing large caches of arms and equipment for use in the post-war revolution. Moreover, with the defeat of Italy, the partisans principal bases were now essentially in Allied hands permitting them to increasingly turn their attention to fighting the Chetniks rather than the Germans.

Among the key problems Tito knew he had to overcome was the potential political power of the intensely anti-communist Serbs, who constituted the majority of Yugoslavia's population. Here, the communist leader took a more subtle approach, establishing arbitrary borders for the republics that would constitute post-war Yugoslavia in a way which dispersed the Serbian population. Indeed, he was so intent on diluting Serbian political power that the borders he proposed even included an expansion of Croatian territory at Serbian expense effectively validating those established by the Croatian Ustashi!


In October of 1944, with Russian support, the Partisan forces entered Belgrade, and initiated a ruthless campaign to eliminate all opposition. After a fierce and bloody civil war, communist rule was eventually consolidated, and Tito installed as President.


THE POST-WAR PERIOD

In 1948, Tito broke with Stalin and in short order Yugoslavia became a favored client state of the West. The United States, seeing any schism in the communist bloc as serving its interests, began pouring money and assistance into the breakaway communist regime setting a pattern that would persist for decades. Indeed, unquestioning support of Yugoslavia, became one of the bulwarks of the West's response to Moscow. Yet, maintaining this policy required the West to keep a blind eye to much of what Tito actually did.

Although the non-aligned movement ostensibly was formed to oppose all forms of imperialism and colonialism, in practice it associated these ills exclusively with the West. Indeed, it could be said that the non-aligned movement was in fact aligned against the West! Also, it routinely identified itself with the most radical movements in the Middle East and elsewhere, despite their often repressive nature. Moreover, despite heavy support from the West, Tito often acted in ways that were antithetical to Western interests. For example, during the 1967 War, he permitted the Soviet Air Force to overfly Yugoslavia, and provided it with refueling facilities. Later, when Qadafi decided to close the Gulf of Sirte, Yugoslavia provided the contact mines.

Despite Tito's questionable actions, the West continued to loan billions of dollars to Yugoslavia, even though it was always doubtful that the money would ever be repaid. In part it seemed that the Western nations felt they had invested too much in Yugoslavia to abandon their client. As a result, today Yugoslavia's total foreign indebtedness has reached some \$16.7 billion, or over \$700 for every man, women and child in the nation. Of this, some \$3 billion is owed by Croatia, and \$1.8 billion by Solvenia. Even with this Western largesse, however, in 1989 Yugoslavia's overall per capita income was just \$2,535.





The question which remains, though, is what Western policy should be under current circumstances.

THE CURRENT SITUATION

The crisis that now grips the Balkans is the inevitable legacy of Tito's rule. Although painted in the West with a "human face" the fact is that Tito's Yugoslavia remained a collection of totalitarian states, held together in large degree by the force of his personality, the strength of the army, and the brutality of his secret police. With his death in 1980, it was only a matter of time before this artificial construct blew apart.

In recent weeks, certain basic facts have become evident concerning affairs in Yugoslavia.

- 1) The Federal Government can no longer play a meaningful role in the nation's future. It is being ignored by all parties, and being unclected, lacks basic legitimacy.
- 2) The concept of self-determination is not being applied in an even-handed fashion. Solvenes and Croats who want to go their own way, are encouraged by the West, yet other elements of the population who have no desire to become part of another nation, such as the substantial Serbian minority in Croatia, are denied the same right.
- 3) The anti-Serbian bias evident in both U.S. official pronouncements and media coverage has been highly counter-productive, effectively driving democratic elements in Serbia that would otherwise support political and economic reform into an alliance with the communist holdovers.
- 4) The concerns of ethnic Serbs living in Croatia for their safety are well justified due to the systematic campaign of terror and discrimination against its Serbian minority the nationalist government of Croatia has initiated. Indeed, it is reminiscent of the one instituted by the quisling Pavelic regime during World War II.
- 5) The Yugoslav crisis has been accompanied by a resurgence of the old European rivalries that ultimately resulted in two world wars. A fact that bodes ill for the future stability of the European continent. Most important, the current situation in Yugoslavia is in fact a paradigm for the evolving political crisis in the Soviet Union.


MINORITY RIGHTS: AN OVERARCHING ISSUE


Historically the West has been the traditional champion of minority rights, and no where is the maintenance of this tradition more important than in the case of Yugoslavia. The ethnic divisions that characterize that Balkan nation have been a source of conflict and enmity throughout its history. Indeed, Western nations in general, and the U.S. in particular have been quick to criticize perceived abuses of minorities by the Serbian government. Yet, equal, and potentially greater abuses of minority rights by the Croatian government are being ignored. Among the specific, well documented actions of the Croatian government to curtail fundamental rights of minorities are included:

- * The denial of employment to residents other than ethnic Croatians and the requirement that where they are permitted employment, Serbs sign loyalty oaths.
- * The imposition of confiscatory taxes on the property of residents other than ethnic Croatians, and the demolition of Serbian homes along the Dalmatian coast without provocation
- * Press restrictions, including the exclusion of independent reporters from access to sources of information, harassment of Yugoslav journalists working for Western press organizations, the purging of Serbians from the state-run television network, and the closing of the Zagreb office of Tanjung, the Yugoslav press agency.
- The harassment of Eastern Orthodox clergy.
- * Use of terror tactics against Serbian residents, including threats, unprovoked attacks on civilians, and vandalism directed at Eastern Onhodox churches.
- * A move to "purify" the Croatian language by purging Serbian words, and banning the use of Cyrillic characters.
- * The arrest and detention of Serbian leaders without justification or cause.
- * Promotion of a personality cult centered on Croatian president Franjo Tudjman.

These actions are clearly those of a police state, not a "Western-style democracy" as news reports would suggest. Moreover, the suggestions that Croatia is somehow embracing the capitalist ethic appears just as far removed from reality.

Rather than permit genuine privatization of industry, Croatia has instead placed control of most industries in the hands of a few nationalist officials who are positioned to pass out the state's assets to a privileged few.





In short, contrary to the characterization currently popular in the press, Croatia remains an authoritarian state where human rights are largely ignored. A Western diplomat quoted by Blaine Harden in the Washington Post summed up the situation rather directly stating:

" The simplistic view that sees a free democratic Croatia and a bad harbaric Serbia is a lot of crap."

NEO-FASCISM AND THE CROATIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

One of the most disturbing aspects of the ultra-nationalist movement in Croatia is its tendency towards Neo-fascism. Indeed, the Croatian nationalist government has taken a number of actions that have underscored this tendency since taking office. For example, Croatia's president Franjo Tudjman renamed the "Square of Victims of Fascism" as the Square of Croatian Giants. This move was widely interpreted by minorities in Croatia to be an implicit endorsement of the World War II Ustashi who murdered hundreds of thousands of Jews, Serbs, and Gypsies. Tudjman also had Croatia adopt as its flag, the same standard that flew over the Nazi Puppet "Independent State of Croatia". Most disturbing of all, however, are the opinions offered by Croatia's president in various writings.

According to a report published by the Institute for Jewish Affairs, an organization sponsored jointly by the Anti-Defamation League and the World Jewish Congress, in his 1989 book titled "Wanderings of Historical Truth", Tudjman stated

"A Jew is still a Jew. Even in the [Nazi] camps they retained their bad characteristics - self-ishness, perfidy, meanness, slyness, and treacherousness."

Nor was this Tudjman's only troublesome statement. In another book, "Impenetrability Of The Historical Reality", he stated in reference to estimates that 6 million Jews were killed in the Nazi concentration camps:

* The above mentioned estimate of six million dead Jews is based to the greatest extent on emotionally biased testimonies as well as one-sided and exaggerated data of postwar calculations of war crimes, and on the settling of accounts with the defeated perpetrators of war crimes.*

He goes on to say:

"First, throughout the entire history there were always attempts at 'final solutions' of foreign and undesirable racial-ethnic and religious groups by means of extermination and conversion to 'true religion'. Second, examples abound which show that there were many more such mass murders (which can be categorized as genocidal), both in magnitude and diversity after a war has ended than during the war itself. Victors can freely exercise their will after a war, while during the actual conflicts they are limited by the very uncertainty as to how war accounts would be finally settled. Third, every attempt of establishing the appearance of all or some kinds of genocidal acts in just one historical period is a fairly useless task."

Tudjman's most outrageous writing, however, attempts to use the Bible to justify genocide:

"...genocide is a natural phenomenon, in harmony with the societal and mythologically divine nature. Genocide is not only permissible, it is also recommended, even commanded by the word of the almighty Yaweh, whenever it is useful for the survival or the restoration of the kingdom of the chosen nation, or for the preservation and the spreading of its one and only correct faith."

Tudjman has also often attempted to deny that 750,000 Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies were put to death at the infamous Janosevec concentration camp, insisting instead that the actual number was 30,000, and asserting that nationalist forces under Mihailovic killed many more Croatians. This assertion, however, flies in the face of all authoritative estimates, as well as recently declassified reports from OSS operatives sent into Yugoslavia during the Second World War.

Indeed, the rise of NEO-FASCISM in Croatia under the nationalist government, along with all of its hate-mongering has been so dramatic that Mr. Slavko Goldstein, president of the Jewish Community in Croatia reportedly recently resigned as head of one of the republic's new political parties stating:

* I hoped that anti-Semitism and nationalistic hatred vanished in Croatia. I was wrong.*

Given Tudjman's public pronouncements, and the policies of his government, it is easy to understand why Croatia's Serbian minority lives in fear of a renewed holocaust. Indeed, harassment by the illegal Croatian militia has already led over 22,000 Serbs to flee Croatia according to Red Cross figures. Despite this fact, however, no Western government has to date spoken out on their behalf.

THE FUTURE OF YUGOSLAVIA

In looking to the future, it is clear that the Yugoslav state forced together by Josip Broz Tito simply cannot endure. Ethnic hatreds, and economic and political differences mandate a change. For the nations of the West, what is important is to ensure that the change takes place as peacefully as possible. To do this, it is essential that the West does not fuel ethnic passions by appearing to side with any specific group. Yet, to date, the West has done exactly that. Indeed, if anything, Western actions have tended to encourage the nationalistic frenzy that has led to over 300 deaths to date.

The question then, is "What should the West do?"

First, it is important to recognize that the current governments in power in the various republics that constitute Yugoslavia are unlikely to remain in place in the future. Eventually, nationalistic frenzy will give way to harsh economic reality, and the inability of nationalist leaders to make good on their excessive promises will take its toll. Indeed, Slovenia is already beginning to recognize the price it will pay for independence, as wages drop by 25 percent, and exports by a third.

Ironically, although both Slovenia and Croatia have complained bitterly that they were subsidizing the less prosperous provinces and republics to their south, their access to these regions as a protected market accounted for up to one third of their total production. Eventually, the nations that succeed Yugoslavia will have to come to some sort of economic accommodation, and that, more than anything else may eventually lead to improved relations between them.


	ECONOMIC DATA BY POLITICAL UNIT		
POLITICAL UNIT	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPORTS	PER CAPITA INCOME	AVERAGE MON. WAGE
SLOVENIA .	29%	\$12,250	\$533
CROATIA	21%	\$ 7,110	\$512
VOJVODINA	8%	\$ 6,970	\$440
SERBIA	21%	\$ 4,950	\$423
MONTENEGRO	2%	\$ 3,970	\$371
BOSNIA/HERZEGOVINA	14%	\$ 3,590	\$365
MACEDONIA	4%	\$ 3,330	\$300
KOSOVO	1%	\$ 1,520	\$254
Source: PlanEcon			


Secondly, the West must recognize that Yugoslavia's current internal borders were the product of an arbitrary process, designed to meet Tito's political objective of diluting Serbian political influence rather than to serve the actual dreams, hopes and aspirations of that nation's people. Therefore, they cannot be maintained. While the Croatian population of Yugoslavia's should have the right to self-determination, they should recognize a reciprocal right for the Serbian minority that resides within Croatia. Their forced incorporation into a new state where they will clearly be an oppressed minority can only lead to unending bloodshed.

Third, the West should attempt to open a dialog with democratic elements in Serbia. The anti-Serbian bias so much in evidence in the West has forced advocates of democracy into an uneasy alliance with the current nationalist majority. This is counter-productive, and in the long-term will only serve to reinforce the grip of hold-over Marxists on the reins government.

Fourth, the West must stop deluding itself about the nature of the governments of the various republics. As stated earlier, none is a democracy in the Western sense, and none shares Western social and economic values. Therefore, none deserves the West's support.

A fifth and final point that must be considered is the implications a failure to settle the ethnic issues within the Balkans will have for other emerging ethnic concerns within the former East Bloc. The most potentially dangerous of these are found within the Soviet Union, which is comprised of some 128 different national groups, many of which harbor aspirations for independence. Permitting unbridled ethnic conflict to take place in the Balkans could send a signal to these groups the West would live to regret.





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