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**A PROPOSAL TO SETTLE CONTESTED CLAIMS
AMONG CROATIA, BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND SERBIA &
MONTENEGRO**

October 9, 1992

News item:

RTw 09/24

GENEVA, Sept. 24, Reuter - Serb and Croat religious leaders on Thursday urged an immediate end to fighting in former Yugoslavia and condemned the forced expulsion of ethnic minorities as inhuman.

"We do not only appeal for but demand....immediately and without condition a stop to the inhuman practice of ethnic cleansing, by whoever it is being incited or carried out," the leaders said.

In a statement issued after a one-day meeting near Geneva, Patriarch Pavle of the Serbian Orthodox Church and Catholic Cardinal Franjo Kuharic of Zagreb also demanded a halt to destruction of churches and mosques by different sides in the conflict.

"Equally and with one mind and voice we condemn all crimes and distance ourselves from all criminals, irrespective of which people or army they belong to or which church or religious affiliation they claim," the statement said. They called for the immediate freeing of all war prisoners and civilian hostages in "this evil war" and for all refugees and people forced from their homes to be allowed to return.

In their statement, the two church leaders did not accuse any one group of "ethnic cleansing," whereby groups of people are forced out of disputed territory. United Nations investigators have largely blamed the Serbs while saying Croats and Moslem bore some responsibility.

Reis-ul-ulema Jakub Selimoski, a leader of the Slav Moslems of Bosnia, was due to have attended the meeting but was unable to leave the republic's capital of Sarajevo which has been under siege by rebel Serbs for nearly six months. In a message to him, the Patriarch and the Cardinal said they were convinced he would agree with the views expressed in their joint statement.

Objective: Attempt to satisfy - as realistically feasible - claims to territories and sovereignty, and the desire of people to live with one's own kind in one's own state.

Due to the stated claims and counter-claims, there can be no perfect solution to the present crises, which would simultaneously satisfy maximal demands of the contestants. The solution suggested herewith would enable all contestants to claim a victory of sorts and to save faces; to lay foundation for an economic recovery and for political and economic cooperation; and to start building bridges so sorely needed for a durable good-neighbors policy of the future.

Starting Point: The United Nations plan presented in Annex III to the Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the UN Security Council, S/2380, dated 11 December 1991.

A Role for the United Nations

To achieve peace and acceptable fair settlement, it is recommended that renown men/women--presently outside and/or opposing the warring ruling bodies--be brought into negotiations, directly or indirectly. The ruling bodies proved themselves, so far, unwilling and/or unable of settling the contested claims through peaceful negotiations. Therefore, they should no longer be trusted. A gradual, but finite, switch-over should be effected. There are many capable, qualified, and honest men and women outside the ruling apparatus of the Yugoslav republics who prefer negotiation to war and who could contribute to a fair and satisfactory settlement.

It is extremely painful to the author of this proposal to admit the existence of mutual hatred and mistrust among the warring sides, which was initiated by the primordial sin of genocide against the Serbs--and Jews and Gypsies--in the Independent State of Croatia (1941-1945), and which is pushed by the present civil war to a blinding level. The only solace to his heart is the common human experience that time finds a way to heal wounds and to renew hope.

Obsessions of the ruling warring bodies with their plans and designs, their unwillingness and/or incompetence to settle the contested claims peacefully among themselves--without foreign intervention--is most regrettable and irresponsible. So are also those moves by members of the international community which were motivated primarily by their own interest, instead of by a sincere desire to unselfishly contribute to a fair and lasting solution of the problems in Yugoslavia.

The present situation being what it is, perhaps an active role of the United Nations, especially in Bosnia, might have a salutary effect during the initial stage of the healing process--provided such role is motivated by an even-handed approach and a sincere effort to help people equally on all warring sides.

The following suggestions are offered in search for a negotiated settlement.

A. THE UNITED NATIONS PROTECTED AREAS IN CROATIA

1. Transform the "UNPA Eastern Slavonia" into Common Territory of Croatia and Serbia.
2. Transform the "UNPA Western Slavonia" into Common Territory of Croatia and Bosnia.
3. Divide the "UNPA Krajina" into two parts:
 - a. Make the counties of Gracac, Obrovac, Benkovac and Knin Common Territory of Croatia and Bosnia.
 - b. Annex to Bosnia the counties of Donji Lapac, Titova Korenica, Slunj, Vojnic, Vrginmost, Glina, Petrinja, Kostajnica and Dvor.
4. Provide dual citizenship / Croatian-Serbian and Croatian-Bosnian, respectively / to all residents of the Common Territories.

Purpose: In addition to the expression of sovereignty--so dearly loved at this time--the dual citizenship would also present legal protection so badly needed to allay fears of mistreatment. This feature would be a potent inducement to the displaced population to return to their domiciles, and a powerful assurance absolutely essential for their future there.

Return of the displaced persons to their homes is a major goal of the UN protection plan.

5. Provide guaranty and opportunity to the residents of the annexed territory, who do not want to live in Bosnia, to resettle elsewhere.
6. Demilitarize the Common Territories.
7. Administration of the Common Territories:
 - a. Structure the local administration, including police, to reflect national/ethnic composition of the local population.
 - b. Structure the territorial administration likewise and administer it according to agreement which will be worked out among the respective states and United Nations.
8. Free movement of people, goods, and services within and through the Common Territories should be guaranteed by the Constitutions of Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia, respectively, and should be additionally backed up by the United Nations.
9. Individual, human and national rights of the Serbian population remaining in Croatia should be explicitly protected by the Constitution of Croatia, and safeguarded by the United Nations. Such protection is needed to assure the Serbs against dreadful experiences of the past which, by itself, would immensely contribute to the stability and peaceful development of Croatia.
10. Keep the presence of the UN in the Common Territories during the recovery and reconstruction period, i.e. during the transition to the self-sustaining administration.

B. BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

1. Annex to Croatia the counties of Livno, Tomislavgrad (Duvno), Prozor, Prosusje, Grude, Listica, Citluk, Ljubuski, Caplijina, Odzak, Orasje and Bosanski Samac.
2. Annex to Serbia the counties of Bijeljina, Ugljevik, Lopare and Rudo.
3. Annex to Montenegro the counties of Kalinovik, Gacko, Nevesinje, Bileca, Ljubinje and Trebinje.
4. Provide guaranty and opportunity to the residents of the annexed territories, who do not want to live in Croatia, Serbia or Montenegro, respectively, to resettle elsewhere.
5. Keep the remaining counties, with those annexed from Croatia, in the state of Bosnia. Provide constitutional guaranties for an autonomous or special status for those enclaves in Bosnia that may wish to have it. Safeguard such constitutional provisions with additional guaranties by the United Nations.
6. This state of Bosnia should enter into a confederal relation with the present Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

This arrangement would satisfy--as much as realistically feasible at this time--the desire of the Serbs and Muslims to live with their own kind in one state.

7. Internal organization of Bosnia would be left to the will and agreement of the Bosnian Muslims and Serbs.
8. Cultural, political, and economic bonds between Bosnia and other member states of the Confederation should be reflected in the Constitutions of the Confederation and of each constituent member state.
9. As a significant portion of the Croats of the present Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Table B.1.) would be annexed to Croatia, the remaining Croatian population should be protected by the provision of Item B.5., above.

C. NEW CONFEDERATION

1. The Republic of Macedonia should join Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia in forming a new Confederation.
2. The Constitution of the new Confederation should not preclude Croatia and Slovenia to join the Confederation or to enter with it into some other formal administrative-organizational relationship(s).
3. Internal borders of the members of Confederation--accepted at the peace conference--may be adjusted by mutual consent of the members upon completion of the recovery and reconstruction phase.
4. This new Confederation should hold free democratic elections for the Constitutional Assembly. The elected representatives would then establish the Constitution of the Confederation which would define its internal organization, prerogatives of the Confederation and its member states, and all other aspects of the functioning of the common state. (Among others: the name of the Confederation, the site and status of its capital city, conduct of external affairs, monetary and fiscal policies, organization of the military, etc.)
5. Each member state should be free to organize itself according to its own will but within the framework of the Confederal Constitution.

6. Special attention should be given to the mutual economic cooperation and assistance in order to facilitate economic recovery, particularly in the areas ravaged by the war.
7. Protection of minorities, their individual, human and national rights, ought to be guaranteed by the Confederal Constitution and, likewise, by the Constitutions of each member state.

D. POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION

1. The post-war reconstruction and economic recovery should be financed by:
 - a. the Confederation itself, to the extent possible;
 - b. grants and aid by the European Community; and
 - c. grants and aid by the United States of America, as well as by other members of the United Nations who, until now, took part in the decisions affecting territories of former Yugoslavia.
2. The funds needed for the reconstruction and recovery would be those which would, otherwise, be spent of the displaced people, care for them, maintenance of their centers or camps, etc.

Supporting the displaced over a prolonged period of time might become even more costly than providing them means to rebuild their homes, farms, shops, schools, hospitals, etc. Their return to their home would free the host countries of potentially undesirable, embittered and possibly disruptive political, social and psychological consequences in the host countries themselves. A lesson ought to be learned from the fate of the Palestinians and the social and political upheaval in Germany due to the presence of foreigners.

3. A joint Commission--composed from the representatives of the Confederation, member states, and all fund-contributing nations--should be formed to:
 - work out an overall plan of recovery and reconstruction,
 - set priorities,
 - insure proper use of funds in strict adherence with the plan.
4. Prompt and generous support by the international community would trigger overall economic recovery, particularly in Bosnia. That, in turn, would tend to sway people's attention from the war enmities to more positive aspects of future life and coexistence.
5. After so much bloodshed, destruction and evil-doings, coexistence of the Serbs, Muslim Slavs and Croats in one state seems impossible to many people. Yet, if this is accepted as a valid premise, then the logic leads us through the "need" for "ethnic cleansing", to a future life in "ethnically pure" state. Why, then, the domestic (Yugoslav) and international outcry against the "ethnic cleansing"? Just because of unacceptable methods it has been carried out?

On the other hand, if the "ethnic cleansing" is to be abhorred, condemned and rejected--as it should be, and as it was done by the religious leaders--then the coexistence is a logical consequence and conclusion.

The Croats and the Muslim Slavs can not have it both ways: condemn the "ethnic cleansing" before the international community, and at the same time, create,

at home, an atmosphere of persuasion that the coexistence with the Serbs is impossible. Ditto for the Serbs.

Return of the displaced to their homes is the centerpiece of the UN plan. The displaced were not only the Muslims and Croats but the Serbs also. Making possible their return means accepting the premise of their coexistence. Hardships will be unavoidable, of course, but the alternatives might be much worse. Ethnic, religious and/or civil war is not a human tragedy experienced uniquely by the South Slavs. Many European nations, for example, have passed through and survived such bitterness and successfully left it behind. Why could the South Slavs not do the same?

The sooner the first step is taken, the better.

6. In order to help healing wounds, all paramilitary forces should be disarmed and disbanded; all crimes condemned and criminals brought to justice; and only a nominal military force be maintained under control of the Muslim-Serbian government of Bosnia.

E. RATIONALE

1. No government of Croatia could consent to the partition of its area into two or more territorially separated parts, unless it is militarily defeated and forced to accept such a condition. Under the existing circumstances, such military defeat of Croatia is unlikely.

This is the main reason for the suggestion in Item A.3.a. (please see text) to make the southern Krajina counties the Common Territory of Croatia and Bosnia, rather than to annex them to Bosnia together with the Krajina's northern counties. Such partition of Croatia would become a permanent casus belli, a veritable time-bomb awaiting an opportunity to explode, plunging the area into another bloody war.

The author of this proposal wishes to state emphatically that the above suggestion is made without malice and prejudice, in the belief that such arrangement would be preferential to another round of fighting, killings and destruction. After all, what is the sense in "establishing our borders, once and for all", even at the price of "fighting to the last man"? If the "last man" survived, he could only sorrowfully watch other people(s) cross those borders and ask himself: Why did all the others die? The suggestion of Item A.3.a. ought to be viewed within the context and spirit of the entire proposal, and not as an isolated feature.

2. The suggestion in text Item A.3.a. would secure the road and rail links between Dalmatia, Lika and the northern parts of Croatia. Obvious economic advantages due to this link (commerce, travel, tourism, ...) would benefit the local Serb population as well as the Croatian.
3. Northern Krajina counties (text Item A.3.b.), the location of which represents no threat of territorial partitioning of Croatia, are suggested for the annexation to Bosnia for two major reasons:
 - a. to satisfy the desire of a sizable section of the Serbian population from Croatia to live with their own kind, which is prevalent in Western Bosnia;

- b. to spare Croatia from potential instability in the future.
- 4. Same reasoning applies for the annexation of Western Herzegovina counties to Croatia (Item B.1.) and those of the Serbian-majority counties of Eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina to Serbia and Montenegro (Item B.2. and B.3., respectively).
- 5. Although Neum's county population (only 4,030 in the 1981 census) is largely Croatian, it is suggested that the county be retained in Bosnia in order to provide Bosnia with an exit to the Adriatic Sea. Neum's more populous neighboring counties (Stolac, Ljubinje and Trebinje) are predominately inhabited by the Serbs and Muslims.
- 6. Kiseljak and Kresevo counties (total area of 314 km², total population / 1981 census / of 27,805) have an absolute Croatian majority. However, the counties are separated from the other "Croatian" counties and, therefore, not suggested for the annexation to Croatia.

To "compensate" Croatia for the "loss", it is suggested that the county of Bosanski Samac--situated between the "Croatian counties" Odzak and Orasje in Northern Bosnia--be annexed to Croatia. (Area: 219 km²: population / 1981 census / 32,320--Croats 44.3%, Muslim Slavs 5.3%, Serbs 41.2%).

- 7. Why the annexation of the Northern Krajina's counties to Bosnia and the "sharing" of the Common Territories between Croatia and Bosnia, and not Croatia and Serbia? Because of the territorial adjacency with Bosnia. However, as Bosnia is envisaged to be in a confederal union with Serbia and Montenegro, the said annexed and Common Territories would be indirectly bound with Serbia and Montenegro as well.

For this bond to be beneficial and durable, Bosnia's, Serbia's and Montenegro's entry into the Confederation should be bona fide, without any mental reservations; a permanent arrangement without hidden intentions of separation or majorization at a future date. Anything that would rekindle old suspicious and animosities which, in turn, would work against the stability of any member state, should be avoided. Safeguards against separation and/or majorization should be provided for in the Constitutions.

- 8. Impacts due to the suggested territorial changes--
 - a. From its present area of 57,090 km², Croatia would cede to Bosnia (see Table A.3.a.) 5,045 km², would acquire from Bosnia 4,725 km² (Table B.1.)--for a net loss of 320 km²-- or approximately 0.56% of the present area.
The new area would be 56,770 km².
 - b. Bosnia-Herzegovina's present area of 51,183 km² would change as follows:

cede to Croatia	4,725 km ²
cede to Serbia	1,706 km ²
cede to Montenegro	4,555 km ²
acquire from Croatia	5,045 km ²
for a total loss of	5,941 km ² , or almost 11.6%.

 Bosnia's new area would be 45,242 km².
 - c. To the Serbia's area of 78,452 km² would be added 1,706 km²-- or about 2.18%--for a new area of 80,150 km².
 - d. Montenegro's area of 13,666 km² would be augmented the most, by 4,555 km² or approximately 33.3%. Although the gain would be substantial relative to the

present area, the new area of 18,221 km² would still make Montenegro the smallest state in the new Confederation.

- e. Two major results due to the suggested territorial changes would be:
- (1) partitioning of Herzegovina, and
 - (2) reducing the number of principal ethnic groups in Bosnia from three to two (Muslim Slavs and Serbs).

The population of Western Herzegovina feels very much "Croatian", while that of the Eastern considers itself very strongly Serbian, akin to the population of Montenegro.

After ceding the Herzegovina counties to Croatia and Montenegro, the present-day Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be, if effect, transformed into the state of Bosnia. If the population of the ceded counties should care to continue identification with Herzegovina, they could make such arrangements with Croatia and Montenegro, respectively.

The reduction from three to two political factors would make administration of Bosnia less complicated, as there would be eliminated a potential of collusion of two against the third factor.

9. Impacts due to the suggested population changes--

- a. Detailed data from the March 31, 1991 census are not available to the author of this proposal. Therefore, the data from the March 31, 1981 census are used herein to illustrate the points discussed and not as definitive data to be used in settlement of the contested claims.

Even if the 1991 census data were available, the war, displacement of the population, uncertainty of return of the displaced, the number of war victims, etc. would make such data unreliable as a major criterion of solution of the crises.

- b. On the area of 51,183 km², the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina lived (in 1981) in 100 counties--counting metropolitan Sarajevo as one. The number of counties and area, for each ethnic group, were as follows:

Without absolute majority	23 counties,	12,117 km ² ,	or 23.67387%
With the Muslim absolute majority	32	14,112	27.57165%
With the Serbian absolute majority	31	19,904	38.88791%
With the Croatian absolute majority	14	5,050	9.86655%
Total	100 countries	51,183 km²	100.00%

- c. Sarajevo had an area of 2,049 km² and 448,500 inhabitants.
 d. Distribution of major ethnic groups is shown below--

	1981 Census		1991 Census	
	Number of Inhabitants	As % of Total	Number of Inhabitants	As % of Total
Total population (B-H)	4,124,008	100.0	4,359,911	100.0
Croats	758,136	18.38347	754,265(1)	17.3(1)
Muslims	1,629,924	39.52281	1,905,281(1)	43.7(1)
Serbs	1,320,644	32.02331	1,369,012(1)	31.4(1)
Yugoslavs	326,280	7.91172	239,000(2)	5.48(2)

(1) Computation based on the percentages given by Storer R. Rowley, *Chicago Tribune*, May 21, 1992.

(2) Estimated, based on newspapers' reports.

e. Population and ethnic distribution (in terms of 1981 census) of the counties suggested for transfer among the states involved are presented in Attachment I as follows:

Table A.3.b. Nine (9) counties in Croatia to be annexed to Bosnia

Table B.1. Twelve (12) counties in Bosnia-Herzegovina to be annexed to Croatia

Table B.2. Four (4) counties in Bosnia-Herzegovina to be annexed to Serbia

Table B.3. Six (6) counties in Bosnia-Herzegovina to be annexed to Montenegro

Summary:

	Table	Population	Croats	Muslims	Serbs	Yugoslavs
(1) Loss to Bosnia	B.1.	306,267	230,779	31,054	31,240	10,293
	B.2.	164,718	2,136	50,049	98,340	9,488
	B.3.	81,289	2,727	16,572	53,659	6,052
Total Loss		552,274	235,642	97,675	183,239	25,833
(2) Gain to Bosnia	A.3.b.	160,693	49,054		92,598	14,789
Net Loss		391,581	186,588	97,675	90,641	11,044

f. Had such an exchange taken place shortly after the 1981 census date, the demographic picture of the Bosnia's major ethnic groups would have been as follows:

	1981 Census	Hypothetical Loss	Adjusted Figure	As % of Total
Total Population	4,124,008	391,581	3,732,427	100.0
Croats	758,136	186,588	571,548	15.31303
Muslims	1,629,924	97,675	1,532,249	41.05223
Serbs	1,320,644	90,641	1,230,003	32.9545
Yugoslavs	326,280	11,044	315,236	8.44458

As seen from this summary and the preceding data, such an exchange would have tended to decrease the participation of the Croats in Bosnia's population,

while increasing it in Croatia. Participation of the Muslims and Serbs would have been somewhat increased.

- g. Brutal realities of the wars, however, drastically altered the assumed hypothetical scenario. The actual impact on the ethnic distribution can not be anticipated because it can not be estimated, at this time, how many of the displaced people would actually return to their homes and how many would resettle elsewhere

While the displacement will impact the Yugoslav population and regions the most, it may also be very grave on the international community, and particularly on the European Community. But, instead of preventing the fragmentation of Yugoslavia--admittedly not an easy task, but recommended nevertheless, at the time, by far-seeing statesmen--the European Community helped the fragmentation along. The USA, and some other countries, subsequently followed suit. The consequences are apparent: now one has to cure what should and could have been prevented.

10. Before the recognition of its individual republics, former Yugoslavia had only one seat in the international forums, as its six republics were not internationally recognized independent entities. Boundaries of the republics served the purposes of internal administration and were not international borders for the purposes of the Helsinki Final Act, for example. Recognition of the internal boundaries as external borders of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, etc., for the purposes of defining the states' territories, was, therefore, an arbitrary political act. The right to self-determination which, supposedly, was the guiding principle in defining the new states' territories, was not consistently applied. Referendum on the federal--Yugoslav--level was not held, nor the referenda on the county level. Why? The referenda on the county level would have most closely expressed the will of the population as to which state it would prefer to live in. Had that been done, then internal Yugoslav negotiations--*bona fide* supported by the international community--could have resulted in peaceful settlement more acceptable to all concerned.

In this proposal, therefore, an attempt is made to express--as realistically feasible--the will of the population on the county level. Although a precise delineation among the Serbs, Muslims and Croats is impossible--due to centuries-old intermixing and intermarrying--this proposal matches states' borders with the ethnic distribution more closely than the presently recognized states' borders do. In addition, it provides better safeguards for the ethnic enclaves within the states. Therefore, adjustments to the presently recognized borders ought to be made.

11. If the UN plan of returning the displaced should succeed to a reasonable degree, Bosnia would again become a "composite state", a "smaller Yugoslavia". Is it not paradoxical and illogical to actively support a smaller "Yugoslavia", while actively resisting a larger one?

Should the aforementioned UN plan fail, "ethnically pure"--or almost "pure"--Balkan states loom as a probability. Admittedly unwillingly, in such a case the

West would have to share in the blame and responsibility for such a state of affairs. Blaming only Slobodan Milosevic will not do; blaming Serbia and/or Serbs, as a whole, will do even less.

Military intervention against "the main aggressor"--on the side of "lesser" culprits--would certainly add to the bloodshed and devastation and could even facilitate creation of "ethnically pure" state of the "smaller" malefactors.

12. The suggested provision of dual citizenship for the residents of the Common Territories should not scandalize anyone. Dual citizenship exists elsewhere. The Republic of Croatia itself recognized validity and legitimacy of dual citizenship by allowing--and, actually, inviting--participation, for instance, of the American citizens of Croatian parentage, in the August 2, 1992, Croatian election. *Chicago Tribune* reported (August 4, 1992) that tens of thousands living overseas were allowed to vote in 111 special polling places abroad.
13. The idea of Common Territory should not be rejected just because such arrangement does not presently exist. Nowhere in Europe exists a situation like the one in (former) Yugoslavia. Why not apply a unique solution to a unique situation?

Croats, Slavic Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbs speak the same language (now under two names), hail from the same region or were merged on their journey through time and space into one broad "ethnic" community, settled into the Balkans during the same period in history. According to these criteria, they are one ethnic community, one people. Usage of two names, Croats and Serbs, does not negate their commonness, just as the names of Bavarians and Prussians do not negate their German commonness.

Slavic Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina are descendants of the Serbs and Croats. Only recently--three censuses ago--the term "Muslim" was used also as a "national" identification implying a separate "nationality"--which is now used as a basis for "national selfdetermination". This apparent ethnic triad differs basically not in ethnicity but in religious affiliation. Process of national unification, basically accomplished in the Western Europe during the nineteenth century, was impeded for the South Slavs by the presence of two non-Slavic empires, the Austria-Hungarian and Ottoman. This unfinished process, coupled with religious affiliation, resulted in the present coidentification: Croat-Catholic, Serb-Eastern Orthodox, Muslim-Islamic. And this spotlights the religious component to the civil war in Yugoslavia.

The question for the peace negotiators is how to end this civil war without planting--unwillingly--seeds for another one?

All three components of this South Slav triad have lived in Bosnia for centuries; likewise, the Serbo-Croat components in the areas now under the UN protection. This gives them rights to consider these areas as "their own" territories. This bond to the land was fortified by intermarriages, natural cultural and economic integration, knowledge of their commonness and of the foreign influences which effectively retarded or impeded unification processes similar to those which occurred in Western Europe. To them, these areas are "home", "homeland", their common homeland.

The stated goal of the UNPA plan is to return all displaced persons--not the Croats only, the Serbs only, or the Muslims only--to their homes. This means: to return them to their common territories. Why not, then, give these territories administrative-regulatory status and forms which will reflect this commonness?

Should the integrating processes of the European Community continue--even on a bumpy road with significant obstacles--new administrative-regulatory status and forms will come into being for "common European home". Why not implement a similar concept for the UN Protected Areas in Croatia?

Indeed, a similar concept may be useful and applicable to other, potentially dangerous, areas of the world, beset with ethnic problems and strife. The classical "national sovereignty" is gradually but effectively losing its original meaning and purpose through the global economic reach, interdependence and integration. New realities will impose new administrative-regulatory forms.

The concept of Common Territories among Croatia-Bosnia-Serbia would not actually eliminate the sovereignty, but would cause sharing it. As Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia have expressed willingness to join the European Community, they already have implied their willingness to share their sovereignty with the other members of the EC, as will be required. Why not, then, share it with each other?

14. Hoping to be substantially assisted primarily by the Islamic countries' military intervention, the Bosnian Muslims may not, at this time, be receptive to this proposal.

However, should such military intervention take place, probability is very high that it would lead to wide confrontations in the Balkans, transforming the present Yugoslav civil war into an international one and destabilizing the South-Eastern Europe.

Such intervention--featuring the Islamic countries in a leading role--could be interpreted by the non-Islamic, primarily Slavic, peoples of the former Soviet Union--for example--as an indication of a trend that might affect their areas. In their preventive reaction, they might actively side with the Serbs.

A military intervention by the Islamic countries--with or without active support by the West--may be interpreted by the Serbs, and by the Croats as well, as primarily politically motivated: to take advantage of a civil war in order to advance the Islamic political, cultural, economic and religious influence in Europe. Such interpretation may not be limited to the Serbs and Croats only; it might be shared by other peoples of the Balkans and Europe. The UN/EC peace negotiations should keep in mind that the Eastern Europe nations still remember the presence of the Ottoman Empire in their lands.

Prolonging and/or widening the war in Bosnia may exact huge numbers of victims, especially among the male population. Given the existing demographic numerical ratios, proportionate losses may be crippling to the Serbs and Croats, but unrecoverable to the Bosnian Muslims.

And once such "victory" is achieved, what then? Create own "ethnically pure" state(s)? Deny individual, human and national rights to the vanquished? Take away his land(s) as war reparations or punishment?

15. This proposal is in the interest of the West as well. Its acceptance would preclude a possibility of the West being sucked into a military quagmire for an unforeseeable length of time. Otherwise, active military participation would call for a military

victory, achievable only through decimation of the Serbs and a huge destruction of Serbia and Montenegro. Is this what the West really wants?

One should hope it is not. If not, then the alternative is to stop the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina by negotiating a political settlement which will take into account legitimate claims of all warring sides and which will safeguard rights and freedom of the minorities. It would be more humane and just, less costly and painful, and therefore better, to endure hardships of negotiation until a satisfactory solution is reached for all three sides, than to continue fighting in the name--and under the guise--of selective moral standards and/or "national interest".

ATTACHMENT I.

	County	Area (km ²)	Population	Croats	Serbs	Yugoslavs
Table A.1. "UNPA Eastern Slavonia"- Common Territory of Croatia and Serbia	Beli	1,147	53,409	19,120	12,872	8,385
	Manastir					
	Vukovar	606	81,203	30,126	25,173	17,215
	East of Osijek city					
	Eastern parts of Vinkovci					

Table A.2. "UNPA Western Slavonia"- Common Territory of Croatia and Bosnia	Grubisno	435	15,756	5,672	4,553	2,143
	Polje					
	Daruvar	610	31,424	8,924	9,521	5,593
	Pakrac	567	27,903	8,483	10,715	5,860
	Western parts of Nova Gradiska					
	Eastern parts of Novska					

Table A.3.a. "UNPA Krajina" Southern Counties-- Common Territory of Croatia and Bosnia	Gracac	1,016	11,863	2,147	8,577	985
	Obrovac	509	12,362	4,178	7,430	544
	Benkovac	640	33,549	13,453	17,781	1,711
	Knin	1,079	43,731	4,154	34,504	4,461
		<u>3,244</u>	<u>101,505</u>	<u>23,932</u>	<u>68,292</u>	<u>7,701</u>

Table A.3.b. "UNPA Krajina" Northern Counties-- Annex to Bosnia	Kostajnica	365	15,548	4,307	8,629	2,286
	Petrinja	390	33,570	14,637	12,622	5,069
	Dvor	505	16,307	1,533	13,192	1,337
	Glina	543	25,079	8,953	14,220	1,530
	Vrginmost	447	18,841	4,126	13,452	791
	Vojnic	237	8,908	125	7,892	463
	Slunj	802	21,732	13,017	6,411	1,413
	Titova	1,150	12,261	2,305	8,485	1,275
	Korenica					
	Donji	606	8,447	51	7,695	625
	Lapac					
		<u>5,045</u>	<u>160,693</u>	<u>49,054</u>	<u>92,598</u>	<u>14,789</u>

	County	Area (km ²)	Population	Croats	Muslims	Serbs	Yugoslavs
Table B.1. Annex to Croatia	Livno	994	40,438	28,913	4,408	3,882	2,669
	Tomislav-grad	967	30,666	26,710	2,883	675	245
	Prozor	477	19,108	12,095	6,707	57	191
	Posusje	372	16,455	16,290	16	33	66
	Grude	218	17,767	17,607		36	36
	Listica	388	26,076	25,633		183	156
	Citluk	181	14,101	13,805	127	14	99
	Ljubuski	289	27,603	25,340	1,491	83	524
	Capljina	249	26,032	13,927	6,768	3,462	1,562
	Odzak	205	27,895	15,426	5,384	5,356	1,199
	Orasje	166	27,806	20,715	1,557	4,143	1,057
	Bosanski Samac	219	32,320	14,318	1,713	13,316	2,489
			4,725	306,267	230,779	31,054	31,240
Table B.2. Annex to Serbia	Bijeljina	734	92,808	464	24,316	56,056	8,167
	Ugljevik	199	24,540	24	9,399	14,061	515
	Lopare	429	33,769	1,621	11,954	19,518	507
	Rudo	344	13,601	27	4,380	8,705	299
			1,706	164,718	2,136	50,049	98,340
Table B.3. Annex to Montenegro	Kalinovik	732	6,597	26	2,678	3,688	145
	Gacko	736	10,279	21	3,423	6,219	349
	Nevesinje	923	16,326	278	3,853	11,591	522
	Bileca	633	13,199	40	1,808	10,190	726
	Ljubinje	326	4,516	54	406	3,839	149
	Trebinje	1,205	30,372	2,308	4,404	18,132	4,161
		4,555	81,289	2,727	16,572	53,659	6,052

Sources: *Statisticki kalendar Jugoslavije 1983*, Savezni savod za statistiku, Beograd
 Jure Petricevic, *Nacionalnost stanovnistva Jugoslavije*, Verlag Adria, Brugg, 1983

Note: Computations based on percentages of ethnic distribution given by Petricevic.

CROATIA AND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA - Ethnic declarations by counties
(Census of 1981)



Administrative territorial boundaries
as of January 1, 1983

County legends on majority population :

1. without absolute majority
2. with Croatian absolute majority
3. with Moslem absolute majority
4. with Serbian absolute majority

5. Illustration of ethnic mix : GOSPIĆ - Croats 59.3 %
Serbs 30.0 %
"Yugoslavs" 9.1 %

ONE-MAN COMMANDO

Here's one free-booting "Balkan terror" who'll be Johnny-on-the-spot any time they want to start something in Yugoslavia.

by ray brock



The locomotive rose slowly, weirdly, from the tracks above the reddish glow of the blast and we heard the *whoomp!* as the locomotive up-ended and plunged downward into the ravine of the river, dragging its tender and a tangled mess of passenger and freight cars behind it.

We could hear the screaming begin and the *pop-pop* of firing up the line beyond the demolished railroad bridge. Then the locomotive's boiler must have blown, for there was a tremendous flash and a roar from the ravine that lighted up the sky like daylight.

"Good show!" chuckled a voice at my elbow and, lowering my big night-glasses, I saw it was Marko. "*Hayde!*" he snapped in Serbian to the little band of guerrillas. "Come on, let's bag it," he added in English. "*Brzo!* Jerry's going to be cross about this." The big Englishman slung his carbine over his massive shoulder and turned toward the pathway up the mountain. Around the shattered bridge, some 2,000 yards away, German troopers were massing with a confusion of whistles, shouting and burp gun firing.

"*Hayde!*" snapped Marko again. "*Napret!* Forward!" And we started up the mountain.

This was not the first time I had seen Marko in action against the Jerries. Tonight he had used plastic explosive and dynamite caps to blow the bridge over the Morava River, blowing with it one more German troop and ammo train bound South from Belgrade for Salonika and trans-shipment to Rommel in Cyrenaica. The first time, the really memorable time, I had seen Marko swing into action, he had used only the dynamite in his fists.

That was the previous Winter and Belgrade and Yugoslavia were still peaceful, uneasy and swarming with Germans—diplomats and *commerçants*, tolerated spies and SS men out of uniform—but technically, peaceful. A couple of us correspondents were sitting around the corner table in the Srpski Kralj bar with Sandy Glenn, the adjutant to

the British naval attaché, and John Bennett, one of the British Legation press secretaries. Rommel had captured Derna the day before and the Jerries were still celebrating. North Africa looked pretty bleak for the British.

"*Derna!*" they were yelling now. "*Sieg Heil! Heil Deutschland! Heil der Fuehrer! Heil Rommel! Seig Heil!*" And across the room from the crowded tables at the other end of the bar, the crowded, drinking Germans responded, "*Sieg Heil!*"

"Filthy swine!" muttered Sandy Glenn. Sandy was a combative little Scotsman who was already under a cloud for a brush with an Italian journalist at the Majestic Hotel. Now, John Bennett leaned over and spoke to Sandy.

"Take it easy, old chap," he cautioned.

"*Sieg Heil!*" the Germans roared again, slopping down their whiskies and howling for Milan at the bar to bring more whiskies. Sandy fumed with rage.

"*Gospodin Bennett, molim!*" It was the big night porter. John looked up. "Telephone, Gospodin Bennett," said the big Russian. John rose and went out. He came back, looking more worried than ever and had a hurried colloquy with Sandy Glenn. Then Glenn got up.

"*That tears it,*" he said to Bennett. "I'm off. Goodnight, you chaps." And he left, hurriedly.

John, grinning now, leaned across to me. "Sandy ducked," he said, "because Tom Hudson is on his

way up here from the station, and—" I interrupted to ask who Hudson was. "Hudson," said John, "is the toughest son-of-a-bitch you'll ever want to meet. King's Messenger, y'know. Just down from Zagreb. Transfer. Got into some sort of scrape up there. The Italians charged he had something to do with the blowing up of that Italian tanker three weeks ago at Split. And he probably had.

"But why should Sandy—?" I started to cut in.

"Duty officer," said John. "Sandy's duty officer at the Legation. Tom Hudson has just come through from Athens, locked in an unheated compartment—stuck there with a dozen diplomatic bags. For 56 hours."

"I still don't get it," I said.



The biggest, bravest, toughest guy you'll meet is Tom "Marko" Hudson—soldier.

"As duty officer, Sandy had to send a message to the station tonight by the Legation chasseur," John explained. "The King's Messenger from Istanbul failed to arrive. Sandy had to send orders to Tom Hudson to take the midnight train tonight back to Salonika with another load of diplomatic bags! So Hudson is on his way up here right now to tear Sandy apart. And wise old Sandy has done a bunk." John peered through the French doors toward the main entrance. Then he hurriedly set down his glass.

"Here we go!" he said. I looked through the French doors. A massive figure in a dripping trenchcoat, under a rain-soaked slouch hat, had come through the revolving door. The big, dark man scanned the lobby and headed straight for the bar. He walked swiftly, lightly, on the balls of his feet, like a boxer, his big shoulders swinging with each stride, and stopped beside Bennett.

"Where's that mucker, Bennett?" he demanded. His voice was low-pitched but perfectly distinct. John Bennett shoved out Sandy Glenn's recently vacated chair.

"Sit down, Hudson," he said. "Oh, this is Ray Brock and this is Wadsworth Kay—Americans—Journalists." I got up, shook a massive wet hand and sat down. Hudson remained standing.

"Where," he demanded, "is Glenn?" John spread his palms and shrugged. Hudson glowered. "The dirty, mucking, little bastard!"

"Duty, old man," said John soothingly. He hated to send you back to Greece again on that damn, awful trip. But what could he do? The chap from Istanbul is hung up in Sofia or somewhere and—"

"What?" Hudson cupped an ear.

"I said the Istanbul laddie didn't arrive and we—" Hudson had turned toward the uproarious table of Germans in the far corner of the bar. Feet wide apart, his slouch hat and trenchcoat still dripping puddles onto the tiled floor, Hudson studied the shouting, singing, celebrating Germans. Then he spoke.

"Shut-tup!" he roared. The bar fell silent, momentarily; then there was an indignant murmur from the women with the Germans, Croatian prostitutes who hung about the bars




Fighting a hit-and-run guerrilla war of their own were Mikhailovitch's phantom Chetniks—bolstered by rugged volunteers from every Allied army and country.

until they were picked up by the well-heeled Jerries. A chair scraped back in the corner and a big, blond German in a grey tweed suit got unsteadily to his feet. I shifted my chair back, but Bennett put a big hand on my forearm.

"Steady," said Bennett. "This is Hudson's show. Reckless he needs to work off steam!" I looked toward a man coming speaking, slowly, distinctly across the hall, "you bloody swine," he entreated him, "you dirty Boche, you mucking, cowardly—" and here Hudson slid easily into German, good German of the foulest, four-letter words. As he spoke, Hudson was slipping out of his sopping trenchcoat. He thumbed his hat right off the back of his head and crouched.

"Schweinhunde!" screamed the big German, uncorking a roundhouse right. "Englischer schwein—" Hudson, ducking under the bolo, threw a short left into the German's belly, *thunk!* then a murderous right hook on his jaw. The big German's feet went up in the air and he landed on the back of his neck—out cold. The women screamed. A bottle came hurtling from the far corner table on the left, missed Hudson's head by a foot and smashed two panes of the French doors behind him. The tall, blond Jerry who had thrown it had circled (Continued on page 68)

Believed to be the only photo of Mikhailovitch after his execution, this picture was taken with a camera strapped to the photographer's leg and through a hole in his trousers—then smuggled out of Yugoslavia and into the United States.





ONE-MAN COMMANDO

(Continued from page 13)

the table to get elbow-room. Growling, Tom Hudson bounded into him in two leaps. A shattering, straight right, driven by Hudson's massive shoulder, caught him on the bridge of the nose. He fell backward over his table upsetting glasses and a siphon bottle which exploded as it hit the tiles. The women, sobbing and screaming, skittered around Hudson for the lobby. Wads Kay and John Bennett had shoved their chairs alongside mine and we sat like spectators at ringside.

One of the women, bolder than the rest, turned in the doorway and lifted a rolled umbrella to take a swipe at Hudson's back. Bennett, sitting next to the door, snatched the umbrella from her up-raised hand. She turned to flee. Bennett swung, accurately, catching her right on her ample behind. She squealed and vaulted into the lobby where she sat down, hard, on the lobby floor. Hudson, meantime, was carrying the fight to the enemy. Infighting, he had backed two paunchy Jerries against the bar where he was belting them with short, body blows. They collapsed together. That left four, two of whom were cowering now behind the bar from which Milan had disappeared. The other two, Mutt and Jeff types, had armed themselves with beer bottles and a flanking movement to the left.

"Come on, you mucking Boche!" yelled Hudson, leaping at the taller one. As the Jerry swung his bottle, Hudson stepped back, caught the man's arm and twisted his body across a bar stool. There was the crack of breaking bone and the man screamed with agony. The stocky German was boring in and Hudson kicked him carefully in the crotch. He sat down and began to vomit.

On the floor, the lanky German with the broken wrist was crawling through the mess of broken glass and cigaret stubs, on his knees and elbows. He reached out with his good arm for Tom's legs and snapped, like a mongrel dog, at Hudson's shin. Hudson, in one continuous movement, stepped past the German, seized his left forearm with both hands and swung him up over his back, into the locked French doors.

Tom, panting a trifle, looked over the carnage in the sudden quiet and stepped to the bar. "Come on, chaps, a drink," he said quietly. "Milan!" Milan's round, pale face popped up from behind the bar. "Whiskies," said Hudson. "Brzo!" Milan silently mopped some shattered glass from the bar, set up four shot glasses and poured four Scotches.

Milan reached behind him, fetched a bottle of slivovitz, and poured himself a double hooker. He lifted his glass. "*A nos Allies, Messieurs! L'Angleterre, l'Amériquie, la Grèce, la France, la Belgique et toute les autres—même les Polonais!*"

Hudson drank off quickly. "I've got 40 minutes," he said, retrieving his trench-coat and his hat from the floor by our table. "Just time to get the bags and make the midnight. Give Sandy my best. Wouldn't have missed this for jam. So long, you chaps!" He went, through the swinging doors, humming a tune.

Topping the rise and approaching the glade on the plateau where he had left the horses before the business of the train tonight, I watched Marko assemble his little column, sending his flankers out, posting two Chetniks with sub-machine guns to trail the rear. He was humming to himself as he checked his saddle-cinch, slipped a handful of grenades back into his saddle bags and gentled his horse.

"*Hayde!*" Marko commanded softly, "*Napret, Chetnici!*" We moved off through the mountains.

Long months and years later, forced by War and State Department orders to leave Yugoslavia—barred from returning by parachute to Mihailovich's guerrillas by the Big Powers' deal, abandoning Mihailovich and supporting the Communist Tito—I nevertheless followed Marko Hudson, from Turkey through the intelligence dispatches of the Serbian spies who wormed their way through hostile Bulgaria, into Istanbul. After the United States came into the war, Marko Hudson's guerrillas, under Mihailovich, saved more than 600 Allied airmen as they parachuted over Yugoslavia.

And, coolly, methodically, murderously, Marko Hudson became the will-o'-the-wisp of the Balkans. He led his raiders in nocturnal strikes against the enemy—German and Italian barracks, ammo trains, troop convoys, supply dumps, airfields, prisoner stockades and road-blocks. Marko became the scourge of the enemy-occupied Balkans with a million-dinar price on his head. He frequently worked alone on special sabotage or intelligence missions—or in *troika*, the three-man team so fabled in Balkan history. Bearded as the pard, lean and hardened, Marko Hudson's figure, under the fur *chubara*, grenades slung from the hip, became as familiar as that of "Chicha," Uncle Draja Mihailovich, himself.

Marko Hudson was, and is, a soldier under orders. Operating with Partisan forces, Marko continued to kill Germans and traitorous Croats, to blow bridges, dynamite trains and destroy the enemy. But he stubbornly refused to engage in the internecine warfare between Croat and Serb, or to undertake any mission designed to damage the Mihailovich *Chetnici*. Like another extraordinary lone wolf fighting man—T. E. Lawrence of Arabia—Marko Hudson felt that his Serbs, like Lawrence's Arabs, had been betrayed by their wartime Allies. ♦♦♦

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

December 14, 1992

JOINT STATEMENT
BY
THE UNITED STATES
AND
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
AT THE

CSCE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING
Monday, December 14, 1992

Russia and the United States share a long friendship with Serbia, and both countries deeply regret that the policies of the current government of Serbia have resulted in the estrangement of Serbia from Russia and the United States, as well as from the rest of the world. In this connection, Russia and the United States are awaiting with great interest the outcome of the Serbian elections of December 20, 1992. Both countries hope that the people of Serbia will be given a free and fair opportunity that day to embark upon a new course which can open the way to the restoration of the close relations they previously enjoyed with that country.

Russia and the United States hope that the people of Serbia will weigh the alternatives carefully. The choice is of returning to the community of nations or remaining in a pariah status, politically isolated and economically devastated because of the policies of the present regime. If the correct choice is made, Russia and the United States pledge to work with the Government of Serbia to restore its position in the world. If such a choice is followed by the fundamental change of policies for which Russia and the United States devoutly hope, the eventual relaxation and removal of the sanctions would be possible. Then Serbia, together with Montenegro, would be welcomed as a member of the UN, CSCE, and other institutions.

GEORGE MILLER
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AND OFFSHORE ENERGY RESOURCES

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR

SELECT COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN,
YOUTH, AND FAMILIES

1115 - 1993
Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-0507

January 5, 1993

CONDEMN MASS RAPE IN BOSNIA

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TTY (202) 225-1904

Dear Colleague,

This week, we will introduce a resolution to strongly condemn the systematic rape of women in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and express the sense of the House that rape is a crime against humanity punishable under an international war crimes tribunal.

Numerous national news reports document that thousands of women and girls -- perhaps as many as 30,000 -- have been raped in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The United Nations Security Council has condemned the systematic rape of women in Bosnia. According to the Security Council, most of the victims are Muslim, ranging in age from 6 to 60-years-old. Most of the perpetrators are Bosnian Serbs. Some of the rape victims have been killed, others released. Still others were detained by the Serbs, raped repeatedly and held beyond the medically acceptable point of having an abortion.

Soldiers in every war have raped women in the cities and towns they conquered. That is deplorable. In the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the world already has witnessed unspeakable atrocities, rape has become a weapon. It must become clear that rape is an illegal weapon in war.

The resolution we will introduce sends three clear messages:

■ to strongly condemn the systematic rape of women and girls in Bosnia-Herzegovina and call for its immediate cessation;


■ to appeal to the United Nations to pursue an international tribunal to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity and to include mass rape as a crime against humanity in that tribunal;

■ to encourage all countries involved in humanitarian relief efforts in Bosnia to devote resources to the physical and psychological treatment of rape victims.

Please call x5-2095 by Wednesday at 12:00 pm to be an original co-sponsor of this resolution.

Sincerely,


George Miller, M.C.


Nancy Pelosi, M.C.



January 15, 1993

JAN 19 1993

The Honorable Helen Delich Bentley
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Bentley:

The United Nations will soon begin debate on formal recognition of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

In recent months the world has watched in horror as the breakup of the former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia has led to civil war, bloodshed, "ethnic cleansing", the death of thousands of persons and economic damage in the billions of dollars. The premature recognition of some of these republics by the international community has instigated the worst violence on European soil since the Second World War.

There is a general fear that the worst is yet to come. Formal recognition of a "republic of Macedonia" at this time by the international community may invite a broadening of war and conflict in the Balkans. It will certainly create greater political instability in this region. There is no doubt that political leaders in Skopje, the capital of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, have territorial ambitions on other Macedonian lands, particularly those in Greece. It is largely for this reason that the European Community, as well as most other nations around the world, has to date refused to formally recognize the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as an independent nation.

The Greek Population is firmly united against recognition of a Macedonian state. The history of Greece in the 20th century has been one of defense against attempts by neighboring countries to dispossess her of her northern provinces, particularly Greek Macedonia. An independent Macedonian nation, bordering on Greece, would certainly continue a 40-year crusade of annexing Greek territory in the name of "Macedonian nationalism". In addition, recognition may open a new front in the Balkans as competing regional powers fight for control of a small, ethnically-diverse and economically weak independent state of Macedonia.

The Citizens' Movement, a non-profit grassroots organization based in Athens, Greece, and not affiliated with either the Greek government or any political party, has prepared a paper that provides an historical perspective to this crisis. We are pleased to provide you with a copy of this publication in an effort to assist you and your government to more fully understand the complexity of this issue and its important implications for the world community.

THE CITIZENS' MOVEMENT

7, Zalokosta Str., Athens 106 71, Tel. 3635 252, Greece

Borders Symbols Stability

ISSUES RELATING TO THE RECOGNITION OF
THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

THE CITIZENS' MOVEMENT
Athens, January 1993

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The Citizens Movement

THE CITIZENS' MOVEMENT
is a grassroots, non-profit organization
aiming to promote values of civil society
in the framework of European integration.

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Borders Symbols Stability

ISSUES RELATING TO THE RECOGNITION OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

The Yugoslav crisis

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe was seen as the dawn of a new era. On the ashes of the former totalitarian regimes, new democracies were expected to flourish. The dream of a new Europe, as a community of free nations from the Atlantic to the Urals, sharing Western democratic values, respect for the rule of law and free market economic principles appeared to be shaping on the horizon.

It was not meant to be. For almost half a century, totalitarian communist rule had shattered the material and spiritual foundations of Eastern European nations. The new political forces, emerging in these states, found themselves struggling first and foremost for the economic survival of their peoples. Social chaos brewed explosive situations. Worse yet, old inter-ethnic vendettas and claims, long suppressed, came to the foreground with the force of thunderstorms. The ugly face of nationalism, challenged traditional state boundaries, thus jeopardizing one of the most sacrosanct principles of the post-World War II international order.

Nowhere were such developments so painful as in the former Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. In less than a year, one of the most stable edifices of the 40-year old East-West Cold War, disappeared in ruins. In its place, five new

states – and probably more in the future—are selfishly vying for the spoils. Civil war has erupted in three of them, and more are waiting in line. Human losses are already numbered in tens of thousands, the uprooted are in the millions and the material losses are counted by billions of dollars. There is a general fear that worse is yet to come. Inevitably, the question is raised: What can be worse than the carnage in Croatia and the rape of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Those who have a good knowledge of the region, of the people and their histories, focus their attention on two new potential, and by far more explosive trouble spots. One is Kosovo and the other the former Yugoslav “Socialist Republic of Macedonia”. If trouble breaks out in these regions, then the whole Balkan area may come up in flames.

Whereas the independence of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina did not touch on the external boundary delimitations of neighboring states, Kosovo and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia might well do. For economic, geopolitical, ethnological and historical reasons, neither of these regions can survive for a long time as independent entities. Either automatically—as in the case of Kosovo—or within a short time—as in the case of Yugoslav Macedonia—a struggle is bound to commence for the annexation of these regions to neighboring

POST-WAR YUGOSLAVIA (1945-1991)



MAP 1

states. Thus, external boundaries may be challenged and existing political and strategic balances may be upset. Ensuing conflicts and even guerilla warfare may not be limited to the confines of the regions concerned but may well affect neighboring peoples, Albanians, Bulgarians, and Serbs. (MAP 1)

In the latter case, Greece a member of the EC and NATO, could also be involved in one way or another. Such an involvement could be caused by an influx of uncontrolled numbers of Albanian and Slav refugees which would tax to its limits a vulnerable Greek economy already burdened by approximately 400,000 refugees and illegal foreign workers. If this influx were to continue over the next months or years, a new and serious situation might arise whereby neighboring countries could claim minority or even autonomy rights for these refugees for obviously

self-serving purposes. Greece may also become involved as a result of attempts by neighboring states to alter existing balances in the region by violent means. The possibility of intervention by outsiders (foreign powers, or Islamic fundamentalists) could similarly create intolerable situations. It may give rise within Greece to a perception of encirclement from the north as well as from the east.

Coping with the crisis

The premature recognition of some of the republics –Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina– instigated the bloodiest clashes on European soil since the Second World War. While Greece kept all lines of communication open, with all belligerents, others tried to stop the conflict by pointing the finger in one direction. It was a convenient way of covering up their own

mistakes and ignoring the true causes of the crisis. In summary, most peacemakers have sought to reach an armistice; Greece, on her part, has strived for a settlement of a more permanent nature.

Regrettably, the same mentality still guides peacemakers vis-a-vis the two new potential trouble spots, namely, Kosovo and the former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Macedonia (also referred to as Skopje). As in the case of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the nationalist leaders in both of these regions are receiving mixed signals from abroad.

Kosovo

In the case of Kosovo, recognition of independence could be tantamount to an open invitation to bloodshed. Kosovo borders on Albania; its population today is almost 90% ethnic Albanians and clamors for self-determination which is another way of saying that they seek independence and eventual union with Albania. Yet the Serbs consider Kosovo as the cradle of their nation and have stated repeatedly that they shall resort to arms rather than allow it to secede. The two positions are irreconcilable and tension grows by the day.

Despite such grim prospects, voices on both sides of the Atlantic are increasingly encouraging the Kosovar Albanians to declare their independence. Until now, the Albanians have shown admirable restraint, even in the face of repressive Serbian measures. Foreign encouragement to the Kosovars to agitate for independence is suspected of furthering alien interests, not necessarily those of the Albanians however. Europeans and Americans would be wise to reject partisan advice, motivated merely by anti Serbian exigencies. The prospect of a large-scale war, which could eventually involve Serbia-Montenegro and Albania, with further spill-over effects, should not be taken lightly.

The situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

As regards the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, its population is ethnically disparate

with a predominant Slavic component (of just a little over 50%) an important ethnic Albanian minority (35-40%) and a sprinkling of other nationalities (Serbs, Turks, Gypsies, Vlachs and Greeks). The Albanians have a strong feeling of their distinct national identity, claiming descent from the ancient Illyrians. They are Muslim, whereas the Slavic-speaking population is Orthodox Christian. Politically, the Albanians seek autonomy within the boundaries of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, a claim that it wouldn't be too bold to construe as a first step towards self-determination and eventual union with Kosovo and Albania. The latter is of course supporting those claims.

Among the Slav majority, it was originally of Bulgarian ethnic affiliation, but intensive communist propaganda, relentlessly conducted over half a century with utter disregard for the feelings of the people and historical truth, has to a degree succeeded in creating among some a sense of a "Macedonian" national consciousness. But ties with Bulgaria remain as evidenced by the fact that the leading political party of the republic, the VMRO, (first in popular votes and parliamentary seats) is linked with Bulgarian nationalist circles. For that matter, Mr Gligorov, the republic's president, is himself of Bulgarian descent.

Bulgarian policy towards the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Bulgarian nationalists by no means concede the existence of a separate "Macedonian" ethnicity. As a matter of fact, under their pressure, the Bulgarian government went so far as to reject it explicitly. When in January, 1992 Bulgaria extended recognition to the new republic, its government was careful to distinguish between statehood and ethnicity. While recognizing the first they specifically rejected the latter. In simple language they told the Slav population of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: "You are not Macedonians. There is no such thing as a Macedonian nation. You are Bulgarians and don't you forget it". For whoever has the



Figure 1. The "Vergina Sun" emblem of the Royal Dynasty of Macedonia, engraved on King Philip's larnax (4th century B.C.), and underneath Skopje's new national flag reproducing the ancient Macedonian emblem.

slightest knowledge of Balkan politics, this statement carries an ominous connotation of possible territorial claims in the near or not too distant future.

European policy toward FYR Macedonia

In the case of former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as in the case of Kosovo, voices in Europe and the United States are sending mixed signals to the leaders in Skopje. Repeatedly, the European Community has been on record that it will eventually recognize that republic, provided it meets certain prerequisites. All the countries of the world, with a very few exceptions, have

aligned themselves with the EC in withholding recognition. Nevertheless, following an active international press and lobbying campaign, Skopje has hardened its position vis-a-vis EC resolutions, believing apparently that EC objections will be lifted and their republic will be unconditionally recognized.

What have been the European Community's prerequisites for recognition?

On 16 December 1991, the Council of Foreign Ministers by the "Declaration on Yugoslavia," had asked Skopje to provide the necessary legal and political guarantees that it will nurture no territorial claims against an EC member (Greece),



Figure 2. VMRO electoral poster (November 1990) portrays all Macedonian regions as a unified state. The poster is adorned with the Ancient Macedonian dynasty emblem (Vergina Sun). Text on map reads: "Its fate is in your hands" (i.e. the fate of a United Macedonia is in the hands of the voters of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).

Македонија

MACEDONIA



Figure 3. Car sticker on sale in Skopje kiosks, depicting all three Macedonian regions as a unified Macedonian state.

Figure 4. (Below) Souvenir banknote issued in Skopje on 15 January 1992, depicting the "White Tower" of Thessaloniki.

that it will abstain from any hostile propaganda against that member, and that it will not use a name for the republic implying territorial claims.

Skopje failed to comply. For six months, diplomatic efforts to convince the political leaders of that Republic that it was in their true interest to abandon once and for all territorial claims and propaganda tactics nurtured under the previous, communist regime, bore no results. Thus, the 12 leaders of the EC at their Lisbon

summit meeting of 27 June 1992, issued a new declaration reiterating their readiness to recognize the new republic provided it did not use the term Macedonia in the state's denomination. At the next meeting of the European Council at Edinburgh, on 12 December 1992, the European leaders in essence reiterated their Lisbon decision.

Skopje failed to comply, thereby delaying its own recognition.

Skopje's attitude toward Greece

It is worth reviewing Skopje's response to EC's prerequisite for recognition.

Despite a legalistic amendment to the Skopje Constitution, which stipulated that the new






Figure 5. A 1992 calendar printed in Skopje showing Macedonia as a unified state and placing Greece's border south Mount Olympus.
 Figure 6. (Facing page) A 1991-92 Christmas card by the so-called Macedonian National Liberation Army, demanding the annexation of the Greek Macedonian province to a unified Macedonian state.

republic would raise no territorial claims against neighboring states, basic points in the Constitution implying territorial claims (Preamble, Articles .3 and 49), have remained unchanged in substance.

On the issue of hostile propaganda, the government in Skopje has done absolutely nothing to indicate any intention of abandoning the 40-year old campaign against Greece. It continues to usurp Greek history and heritage, to manipulate Greek cultural objects, to monopolize the Macedonian name, to kindle hatred among its own people for Greece, to disseminate worldwide allegations of human rights violations by Greece, and to misrepresent even the bitter history of the Greek Civil War (1946-1949) in order to portray Greece (the victim of Tito's aggressive designs) as the culprit of wrongdoings against the "Macedonians".

President Gligorov has made repeated statements that the Slavs of Skopje are the descendants of the early Slav tribes that migrated to the southern Balkans in the 7th century A.D. and that they have no claims to the heritage of Ancient Macedonians, a Greek people. In spite of that the Skopje parliament passed a resolution in August, 1992, which the government endorsed, adopting as the flag of the republic, the emblem of the ancient Macedonian dynasty: a 16-point golden sun found a few years ago in the royal tombs in Vergina, Greece and dating back to the 4th century B.C.! (Figure 1)

On the issue of territorial claims, the old ghosts of the 1940s have re-emerged. The leading political party of the republic, VMRO conducted its election campaign on the slogan for the "unification" of all Macedonian regions, i.e. the annexation of Greek, Bulgarian and Albanian territory. (Figure 2) VMRO's popular following is increasing and so is its influence in government circles. Throughout the Republic irredentist literature is fanning the flames of nationalism, encouraged by the government's stand. In the course of 1992, numerous calendars, maps, tourist mementos, car stickers and other paraphernalia have appeared everywhere in the republic and foreign countries where emigrants

from Skopje live. (*Figures 3, 4, 5, 6*)

Late in 1992, the government-affiliated publishing firm "Nova Makedonija," published a new school map depicting the geographic and ethnic boundaries of Macedonia as encompassing the entire Greek Macedonian region including Thessalonike, the monastic community of Mount Athos and Mount Olympus! (MAP 2)


That this mentality is not merely a popular whim, but is shared by responsible officials in Skopje, is evidenced by the fact that Gligorov's government has refused to remove from the new constitution a concrete reference to a 1944 declaration by the then communist regime. That declaration clearly calls for the "unification" of neighboring territories in Greece and Bulgaria with the "Macedonian Republic". (Appendix, Document A)

These are precisely the reasons why Greece has asked, and the EC has, concurred, that the new republic should not use the Macedonian name, as a state denomination. But they are not the only ones having aspirations to Greek Macedonian lands. For more than a century these lands have been the objects of expansionist policies implemented by neighboring states.

A HISTORICAL EXCURSUS

The Legacy of San Stefano

To take Bulgaria first. This country gained its independence in 1878 at the successful conclusion of the Russo-Turkish war, which was sealed by the Treaty of San Stefano. The victorious Russians saw an opportunity of solving the Eastern Question in their favour and gaining access to the Mediterranean, albeit through a client state. Thus Greater Bulgaria was carved out of the European possessions of the Ottoman Empire. To the South the boundaries of the new state extended to the shores of the Aegean and included the better part of the Ottoman vilayets (provinces) of Monastir (Bitola) and Thessaloniki. But Greater Bulgaria was not to be. The European powers reacted and, at the Congress of Berlin (July 1878), the Bulgarian



THE SUN SHALL CERTAINLY DAWN
UPON THE STATE OF MACEDONIA
FIGHTING FOR INDEPENDENCE

LONG LIVE INDEPENDENT MACEDONIA

ДА ЖИВЕЕ СЛОБОДНА МАКЕДОНИЈА



HAND IN HAND TOWARDS FUTURES IN FREEDOM

ДА СЕ ДРУЖИМЕ ЗА СЛОБОДНА ИДНИНА

MERRY CHRISTMAS

AND

A HAPPY NEW YEAR

1992

borders were pushed back to the Balkan mountain range and the continuity of the European section of the Ottoman Empire was restored (MAP 3). The Treaty of San Stefano was dead. But its memory lingered on...

Ever since the Treaty of Berlin, Bulgarian foreign policy has aimed at recuperating the San Stefano lands i.e. the greater part of what is known as geographical Macedonia. This policy

МАКЕДОНИЈА



MAP 2

remains constant during the latter part of the 19th and all of the 20th century, but its implementation adopts a twofold approach: Whenever international conditions are propitious the outright annexation of these territories is sought by force of arms. When these attempts are frustrated, the creation of an autonomous or independent "Macedonian" state at the expense of neighboring countries, is advanced, in the hope, that in time, such a state

would become a client of Bulgaria and may even be absorbed by her.

Thus, during the last decade of the Ottoman rule (1902-1912) the Bulgarians sought to prepare conditions for acquiring full control over the whole geographical region of Macedonia, by instigating uprisings and persecuting other ethnic groups in the region inhabited mainly by Greeks.

BOUNDARY CHANGES IN THE BALKANS AT SAN STEFANO AND BERLIN (1878)



MAP 3

During the first Balkan war (1912), Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro expelled Turkey from most of her possessions in Europe, thus liberating the region of Macedonia after 500 years of Ottoman rule. The Bulgarians, however, unsatisfied with the division of formerly Ottoman-held lands, attacked their allies, but were defeated (1913).

Once again, during the First World War, Bulgaria attempted to annex the Macedonian regions of her neighbors, Greece and Serbia, by espousing the cause of the Central Powers and Turkey. Indeed, she managed to occupy Greek Eastern Macedonia where ethnic cleansing-type tactics were applied against the Greek population. (MAP 4). The defeat of Germany and

Austria-Hungary terminated Bulgarian occupation. Having failed to annex the coveted territory, Bulgaria subsequently sought to promote the idea of an autonomous Macedonian state.

During the Second World War, Bulgaria allied herself to Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy and was given in exchange the right to occupy large parts of Greek Macedonia and Thrace all the way to the Aegean coast, as well as of Yugoslav Macedonia (MAP 5). Once again the Bulgarian occupation authorities reverted to their familiar policy of ethnic cleansing. The collapse of the Axis terminated the second Bulgarian occupation of Greek Macedonia.

WORLD WAR I AND 1919 PEACE TREATY



MAP 4

The legacy of Stalinism

It is interesting to note that this was not only the policy of the Bulgarian ruling elites of the time, but also that of the Bulgarian Communist Party, thus assuming the character of a truly national policy. Indeed, during the inter-war period, the Soviet Union, under Stalin, through the Comintern, endorsed a proposal by Bulgarian Communists for a united and independent Macedonian state in the framework of a Balkan Communist Federation (Appendix, Document B)

In 1944 Tito a Croat by birth set up the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. The federal form of the state was meant to solve the problem of quarreling nationalities and ethnic minorities within Yugoslavia. It was also designed to cut Serbia down to size. Hence the boundaries between the federated republics were drawn

arbitrarily. Thus came into being the "People's Republic of Macedonia" (formerly known as the "Province of the Vardar"), essentially as a province of Yugoslavia.

This artificial creation was to serve also another purpose, namely the territorial access of Yugoslavia to the Aegean sea through the port of Thessaloniki (Appendix, Document C). This was to be brought about by the incorporation into the "People's Republic of Macedonia" of Greek and Bulgarian territories, allegedly inhabited by a "Macedonian" population. (MAP 6)

From 1944 to 1948 the Soviet Union supported the irredentist territorial claims of its two Balkan communist clients: those of Yugoslavia on the Macedonian regions of Greece and Bulgaria, and those of Bulgaria on Greek Western Thrace. The Greek Civil War of that period was

WORLD WAR II
GREEK AND YUGOSLAV PROVINCES UNDER BULGARIAN OCCUPATION (1941-1944)



Bulgarian occupation of Yugoslav and Greek territories.
 Italo-Albanian occupation of Yugoslav territories.
 German occupation of Greek territories.

MAP 5

fomented by Tito, among other things, with a view to annexing Greek Macedonia to Yugoslavia. Bulgaria, then under the rule of Georgi Dimitrov, consented to the cession of its own part of Macedonia (the Pirin district) to Yugoslavia. It received in return blanket Soviet and Yugoslav support for its claims on Greek Thrace. (Appendix, Document D)

With the break of Tito with the Soviet bloc and his expulsion from the Cominform in 1948, Bulgaria reverted to its traditional policy with regard to Macedonia and pursued it actively until the death of Stalin.

The lesson to be learned from this short historical review is that all attempts by neighboring states to dispossess Greece of her

northern provinces were carried out with the active military and political support of non-Balkan Powers intent upon furthering their own selfish designs. (Czarist Russia in 1878, the Central Powers in 1917-19, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in 1941-44 and again the Communist Soviet Union in 1946-49).

Moreover, when not pursued in the form of outright annexation, these attempts were made by proxy in the name of an alleged autonomous or independent "Macedonian" state purportedly inhabited by a fictitious "Macedonian" nationality.

If the international community were to recognize now the existence of such a state under the name "Macedonia," it would be laying the foundations

YUGOSLAV TERRITORIAL CLAIMS

Map Published in «Borba» (Belgrade 26-27 August 1946).



Historical - geographical boundary of Macedonia.

Boundaries of Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, Bulgaria.

Extent of Yugoslav claims against Greece.

MAP 6

for the destabilization of the whole Balkan area in the short and longer term, in spite of its profession to the contrary. For it would be lending unwitting legitimacy to past and future irredentist claims against Greece, a NATO and EC member, thus opening a Pandora's box of calamitous developments.

The lethal ingredients are already in place. Albanian and Bulgarian revisionist designs are all too obvious and it is most unlikely that recognition by itself would make them vanish overnight into thin air. They have been nurtured for too long and Balkan passions are known to die hard.

Should the international community throw an additional destabilizing factor into an already

explosive witches brew? Would it not be wiser to give a clear and unequivocal message of international backing for stabilizing policies and for honest efforts towards peaceful coexistence?

APPENDIX: DOCUMENTS

Document A: Proclamations of the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM), Skopje, August, 1944

MANIFEST ISSUED AT THE FIRST SESSION OF THE ANTI-FASCIST COUNCIL NATIONAL LIBERATION OF MACEDONIA TO THE PEOPLE OF MACEDONIA

August 2, 1944

Macedonians under Bulgaria and Greece,

... The unification of the entire Macedonian people depends on your participation in the gigantic anti-fascist front. Only by fighting the vile fascist occupier will you gain your right to self-determination and to unification of the entire Macedonian people within the framework of Tito's Yugoslavia, which has become a free community of emancipated and equal peoples. May the struggle of the Macedonian Piedmont incite you to even bolder combat against the fascist oppressors!

PROCLAMATION TO THE PEOPLE OF MACEDONIA ISSUED BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF MACEDONIA

August 4, 1944

People of Macedonia!

... In the course of three years of combat you have achieved your unity, developed your army, and laid the basis for the federal Macedonian state. With the participation of the entire Macedonian nation in the struggle against the fascist occupiers of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Greece you will achieve unification of all parts of Macedonia, divided in 1915 and 1918 by Balkan imperialists.

Source: The University of "Cyril and Methodius", *Documents on the struggle of the Macedonian people for independence and a nation-state*, volume two (Skopje, 1985)

Document B: Declaration of the 6th Balkan Communist Conference (March 1924) issued under the directives of the Comintern for a United Republic of Macedonia and Thrace

A united and autonomous Macedonia is now the slogan of the Macedonians in all corners of their Fatherland, which is covered with ruins. It is under this slogan that they are organizing and conducting the struggle

In setting up the ideal of a workers' and peasants' government, the communist parties and the Communist Federation of the Balkans will assure peace, independence and liberty of development of all the peoples of the Peninsula, that it will be a voluntary union of independent Balkan Republics, including the Republic of Macedonia and Thrace.

Source: Text in *International Press Correspondence*, May 1, 1924

Document C: Confidential circular sent by Secretary of State Edward Stettinius to U.S. missions (December 1944) considering talk of a "Macedonian" nation or state to be "unjustified demagoguery" and a cloak for aggressive intentions against Greece".

U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations vol. viii

Washington, D.C., Circular Airgram, (868.014/26 Dec. 1944)

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers

The following is for your information and general guidance, but not for any positive action at this time.

The Department has noted with considerable apprehension increasing propaganda rumors and semi-official statements in favor of an autonomous Macedonia, emanating principally from Bulgaria, but also from Yugoslav Partisan and other sources, with the implication that Greek territory would be included in the projected state. "This Government considers talk of Macedonian 'nation', Macedonian 'Fatherland', or Macedonian 'national consciousness' to be unjustified demagoguery representing no ethnic nor political reality, and sees in its present revival a possible cloak for aggressive intentions against Greece".

The approved policy of this Government is to oppose any revival of the Macedonian issue as related to Greece. The Greek section of Macedonia is largely inhabited by Greeks, and the Greek people are almost unanimously opposed to the creation of a Macedonian state. Allegations of serious Greek participation in any such agitation can be assumed to be false. This Government would regard as responsible any Government or group of Governments tolerating or encouraging menacing or aggressive acts of "Macedonian Forces" against Greece. The Department would appreciate any information pertinent to this subject which may come to your attention.

Stettinius

Document D: Excerpt of secret minutes of Stalin's talks with a Bulgarian communist delegation headed by Georgi Dimitrov on June 7, 1946, for the unification of Macedonia under Tito and the annexation of Greek Thrace by Bulgaria.

Excerpts from the minutes of conversations at the Kremlin (June 7, 1946), between delegations of the Soviet Union (Stalin, Molotov, Zdanov), Yugoslavia (Tito, Ranković, Nešković), and Bulgaria (Dimitrov, Kolarov, Kostov). (Translation from Bulgarian)

Stalin to the Bulgarian delegation (on Macedonia):

"Cultural autonomy must be granted to Pirin Macedonia within the framework of Bulgaria. In view of the present situation no haste should be displayed in this regard. . . . You do not want to grant autonomy to Pirin Macedonia. The fact that the population has yet to develop a Macedonian consciousness is of no account. No such consciousness existed in Belorus either when we proclaimed it a Soviet republic. However, later it was shown that a Belorussian people did in fact exist". . . .

Stalin to the Bulgarian delegation (on Bulgarian access to the Aegean):

"We and the Americans were not parties to the drawing of the borders [in 1919] and do not recognize them as just. You should demand territorial access to the Aegean, and if this is not accepted, you should demand economic (access). You have the right to demand territorial access, but it is difficult to count upon obtaining it today. Such demand can be fulfilled only through the use of force. But in any case you should prepare yourselves for the future". . . .

Source: The text of these minutes was taken from the Archives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bulgaria. It was published in the Sofia newspaper *Otečestven Vestnik*, June 19, 1990.

“It was once again clear to me as it has been clear to me in so many parts of the world on so many occasions that we so often make decisions without even turning over the carpet to see what is under it.”

Peter Jennings — ABC Television

“Rape has become part of a vicious propaganda campaign ...”

Peter Jennings — ABC Television