REPORT ON
BALTIMORE CITY CIVIL DISORDER
RELIEF AND SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

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JUNE 15, 1968
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INTRODUCTION

Civil Defense over the years has undergone many changes in concept and acceptance by the Baltimore City government. The mission of Civil Defense has always been the development of plans for the continuity of government and the protection of life and property in the event of disaster. The organization that exists today was initially created in 1951 as the result of the development of the Federal Office of Civil Defense and the requirement by Federal legislation for state and local political sub-divisions to develop Civil Defense organizations based on the afore-mentioned areas of responsibility.

Before February, 1968 the only plan that existed to take care of a civil emergency was the Baltimore City Operational Survival Plan. This Plan was formulated primarily to handle protection of life and property resulting from nuclear attack or natural disasters. At this time Civil Defense in Baltimore was also developing the National Public Fallout Shelter Program, started under President Kennedy in 1961, which resulted in public fallout shelters to accommodate 1.2 million people in the City. During the period 1964-1968 the Civil Defense Division of
Baltimore along with the various Agencies of Baltimore, conducted numerous tests and exercises of its planning, both for natural disaster and nuclear disaster, but not for civil crisis.

In 1963 there was a nation-wide movement to abolish Civil Defense. This was predicated on the concept that since the primary mission of Civil Defense was protection of life and property against nuclear attack there was some question as to whether such protection was actually possible in the light of the advanced technology in nuclear weaponry. Locally, this skepticism resulted in a total reorganization of the Civil Defense Agency in Baltimore. As a result, the 23-member Civil Defense organization was relegated to a Division of the Baltimore City Fire Department, and the personnel reduced to seven permanent staff members, and a Director.

Major changes were necessary in total Civil Defense planning, due to this reorganization. The volunteers in categories such as emergency welfare service, health, logistics, were disbanded, and the responsibilities given to professionals. The only volunteers now used are the Auxiliary Fire Fighters, Communications and Rescue
volunteers. The reason for these exceptions was that the City has an insufficient number of Communications personnel on hand to man all emergency communication facilities within the City government, and the need for additional Fire Fighters to augment the existing force during emergencies. This organizational structure has remained up through the present.

On February 2, 1968, the Mayor issued an Executive Order directing all related City agencies to fully cooperate with Civil Defense in drawing up a workable plan for handling any kind of crisis situation which might occur to, and within, the City of Baltimore. At the same time, the Mayor asked for a report from each Agency relating the status of that Agency's plan, with a completion deadline of March 1st. Within a matter of a few days the Civil Defense Division issued guidelines around which the other departments would write their reports. The plan was called the Baltimore Civil Emergency Plan, which represented a modus operandi to be used in every crisis, other than nuclear.

On the 27th of March a test exercise, named "Hi-C" was staged, based on a hypothetical disaster involving a hydrocyanic tank car exploding in a rail yard. This duplicated practically every kind of problem, such as fire, rioting, looting, critical food supplies and medical
supplies, etc., that occurred during the civil disorder of April 6th. What the exercise could not cover was the number and content of incidents which did occur during April.

The Plan provides for the mobilization of all City resources, materiel, and manpower, to support the front-line elements of: Police, Fire and National Guard, and at the same time establish relief facilities for persons who have been affected by civil disorders, including persons who are in need of temporary feeding and shelter; clothing, medical aid, and subsequent relocation. It also provides for distribution of donable foods to persons in the affected areas, during such time as normal food supplies are exhausted. The basic plan appears in Appendix I.
THE DISTURBANCE

Thursday, April 4, 1968

About 5:00 p.m., Thursday, April 4, Dr. Martin Luther King was shot in Memphis, Tenn. Reports came in from other cities throughout the country of increased tension within the Negro and White Communities, and rioting started in some cities that same evening, including Washington, D.C., 40 miles from Baltimore. Throughout the night, and all of the next day, reports continued to come to Baltimore that tensions were ever increasing throughout the larger cities in the United States, including Baltimore.

The possibility existed for an influx of people from these rioting cities into Baltimore, and if not themselves bent on consciously spreading the riots, by the very act of talking about these riots to local inhabitants they would increase the possibility of civil crisis breaking out in this city. Therefore, the initial phase of the Civil Disaster Plan was set into motion at the close of the working day on Friday afternoon, although the first overt act of severe disorder did not take place until more than 24 hours later, early Saturday evening.
Friday, April 5, 1968

At 4:00 p.m., Friday, the Adjutant-General activated the personnel of the Maryland Military Headquarters at the Fifth Regiment Armory, which is located in the core of the City.

At 4:30 p.m., Friday, the Civil Defense Main Control Center was manned by a Civil Defense Duty Officer. The Civil Defense Director notified all heads of participating agencies to put their agencies on a standby alert basis, which was in accordance with the first step of the Baltimore Civil Emergency Plan. The Main Control Center was also staffed by volunteer Communications personnel, who monitored Police, Fire and National Warning System networks throughout the night. The Telephone Company completed modifications in the Control Center telephone system that same night (these modifications were scheduled to have been completed the following week.)

At 10:15 p.m., a report was received in the Civil Defense Control Center that 3,850 National Guard and Federal troops were on the streets of Washington, D.C., with 8,000 additional troops put on standby alert. An hour later the Governor of Maryland activated the National Guard in the City of Cambridge, Maryland, 100 miles southeast
of Baltimore.

Throughout the night Baltimore Civil Defense got requests through the Control Center for support material for personnel at the Military Headquarters at the Fifth Regiment Armory. Civil Defense Headquarters directed these requests to the 1st Army Headquarters at Fort George G. Meade, located 20 miles south of Baltimore.

Saturday, April 6, 1968

At 1:58 a.m., Saturday, the National Guard requested a list of Fire Department equipment, and the location of this equipment. This request was received and answered, as were all other requests throughout the developing crisis situation.

From 2:00 a.m. on Saturday, April 6th, until 6:15 that evening, the volunteer personnel manning the communications equipment at Civil Defense Headquarters noted nothing more than the normal every-day activity which goes on in a City the size of Baltimore. However, the Civil Defense Duty Officer did receive, throughout the day, via telephone, intelligence reports keeping him abreast of the developing situation regarding the impending crisis.

At 6:40 p.m., Saturday, April 6, the Police Department
notified the Civil Defense that a large scale disturbance had broken out in the Gay Street and Monument Street area. The Baltimore Civil Emergency Plan was put into effect and all department heads reported immediately to Civil Defense Command Headquarters. It took no more than an hour for total response; all City personnel of related agencies were put on a ready alert basis; and certain specific City personnel were mobilized and reported to their pre-designated duty stations; and all volunteer Communications personnel were ordered to report to the various assigned emergency centers spread strategically throughout the City.

From this time on until the following Wednesday at 12:00 noon, the Civil Defense Control Center was manned around-the-clock by all department heads, or their designates, to handle the multiplying outbreaks of civil disorders which started at this time.

At 7:00 p.m., upon arrival at the Civil Defense Main Control Center, the Director of the Health Department initiated coordination plans with all city hospitals for reporting casualties.

At 7:30 p.m., Johns Hopkins Hospital, located in the inner city, requested Police protection.

At 8:00 p.m., Governor Agnew proclaimed "State of
Public Crisis, Emergency and Civil Disturbance exists within the City of Baltimore."

At the same time a number of buses from the Department of Education were assigned to the National Guard to bring troops in from outlying area armories to the central Fifth Regiment Armory.

At 8:00 p.m., Saturday, the Director of Civil Defense for the City of Baltimore held a meeting with representatives from the Mayor's office, Red Cross, Department of Education, Bureau of Purchases, Department of Public Welfare, and the Salvation Army, to determine which school would be used as a place for the feeding and housing of persons displaced by the effects of the growing civil disturbances, as spelled out in the Baltimore Civil Emergency Plan. This school was in operation within the hour, and social workers were assigned for the purpose of registering displaced persons.

Much of the food used to feed the people during this crisis came from the supplies on hand for use in the City School System, and, as per the Plan, were diverted to use in the emergency at this time.

As a result of the meeting, the following actions were taken: Department of Transit and Traffic established mobile
radio communications from the relief center to the Civil Defense Main Control Center. Cafeteria workers of the Department of Education were ordered to report to the relief center to prepare and serve the food. Trucks of the Department of Public Works were sent to a Civil Defense supply depot to take cots and blankets to the school. Twenty buses of the Department of Education, and drivers, were sent to the school and placed on standby for use as refugee transportation. The Salvation Army sent over a shelter manager to the school to assist.

The Bureau of Purchases, in cooperation with the Department of Public Works, delivered to the shelter various quantities and types of food to be used for the feeding of shelterees.

As the intensity of the disturbance grew in proportions, the mobilization of the Civil Emergency Plan grew with it, to cope with this situation.

About 9:00 p.m., Saturday, a representative of the churches stationed at the Control Center coordinated with approximately 17 refugee pickup centers to take displaced persons within the affected areas to the already established feeding and housing shelter set up in the afore-mentioned school.

The standby buses already at the school were sent to
the pickup centers to bring the people back to the school.

A curfew was initiated from 11:00 p.m., Saturday to 6:00 a.m., Sunday. Subsequent curfews were in effect.

Sunday  April 7 - 4:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.  Monday
Monday   April 8 - 4:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.  Tuesday
Tuesday  April 9 - 7:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m.  Wednesday
Wednesday April 10 - 10:00 p.m. to 4:00 a.m.  Thursday

The incidents of fire and looting dropped off markedly during the hours of curfew and then increased again during those daylight hours in which there was no curfew in effect. In addition, the incidence rate diminished considerably between the hours of Noon and 1:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m.

At midnight the Department of Education established a feeding station to feed all emergency personnel involved in the disturbance. This feeding station was under the supervision of the Police Department, and food was taken from there to the men in the field by the respective departments.

Also, at midnight a specified number of buses from the Department of Education were assigned to the Police Department for use in transportation of prisoners from the riot areas to Police compounds throughout the City.
Sunday, April 7, 1968

At 12:25 a.m., Sunday, National Guard troops were dispatched to protect the refugee feeding and housing shelter established in the high school.

At this time trucks from the Department of Public Works were dispersed to Civil Defense supply depots to pick up 1200 cots and blankets, which were distributed to personnel of the Fire and Police Departments on duty throughout the City.

At 1:27 a.m., the Civil Defense Division set up additional radio communications at the Fifth Regiment Armory to coordinate public information between the National Guard and Civil Defense Headquarters.

At the same time the Health Department issued a report listing 36 minor casualties, 7 critical, and 1 fatality, due directly to the disturbance. These were all handled through the local cooperating hospitals.

The first refugees arrived at the feeding center at 2:37 a.m.

Throughout the night, and continuing up until Wednesday afternoon, innumerable problems of the same type as previously
described were received and acted upon at the Civil Defense Headquarters.

Beginning at 6:00 a.m. Sunday, April 7th, the Department of Public Works began to clean up the rubble in the streets and board up the looted and burned-out buildings in the riot areas.

Sunday evening the Governor requested that Federal troops be brought into the City of Baltimore. They set up bivouac areas within one of the public parks in the City and command headquarters at the Fifth Regiment Armory.

As of midnight Sunday, the casualties continued to grow, and 313 persons were treated, of whom 196 were treated and released, 13 were determined to be critical, with 4 fatalities, and the rest were admitted.

Monday, April 8, 1968

The Commander of the Federal troops, who also took command of the National Guard and the over-all direction of the Baltimore City Police Department, issued an order early Monday morning, which stated that only those persons who held Federal Military passes would be authorized on the streets during curfew times, and all others would therefore be arrested. This might have caused total
paralysis of all other functions of relief and recovery, as coordinated by the Civil Defense Division, if this order had not been shortly changed, to include passage of persons with Municipal employee payroll identification.

The arrests for curfew violations grew from hundreds into the thousands, as the days went on, and contributed to the re-establishment of authority and stability within the City. Emergency courts were set up and manned around the clock to expedite the disposition of these curfew violators, and buses were assigned from the Department of Education to transport the accused from the places of detention to those courts.

As of 4:00 p.m. Monday, the casualties increased by 96, which included 1 gunshot wound, 4 admissions, and 3 Fire Fighters who were treated and released.

During the day on Monday, the Community Action Agency opened a number of distribution centers to distribute food and clothing to those people in need. This food and clothing came from donations by the public, as well as from outlying Community Action Agency centers.

Monday night, the first school used for feeding and housing refugees was closed and the War Memorial within the City Hall complex was activated to take over this
this function, and all personnel and materiel were transferred there. It became apparent that at no time would the refugee problem become anything more than nominal. This was because the majority of burnings and lootings took place in business establishments, and only when fires went out of control did they burn actual dwellings of inner city residents. However, the availability of food within the inner city riot areas became critical, in spite of public donations, and the U. S. Department of Agriculture was contacted. They sent 82,000 lbs. of donable foods into the city, from surplus supplies located in depots outside the State of Maryland. The food was transported into the City by trucks, which were met at the City line by Police escort and taken to City warehouses, where a complete inventory was made. The distribution of this food was determined by the Bureau of Purchases, in conjunction with the Community Action Agency. It was then taken to Community Action Agency Centers throughout the affected areas, and distributed to those people in need.

Tuesday, April 9, 1968

The total casualties reported as of Tuesday, April 9th at 12:00 p.m. were 718 consisting of: 684 treated and released, 22 critical, 5 fatalities, 7 admitted.
All non-emergency City personnel were to remain home until Wednesday morning, noting that Monday was a holiday declared by the Mayor of Baltimore, in deference to the death of Dr. Martin Luther King.

The crisis seemed to recede for the first time during the day Tuesday, April 9th. Civil Defense Headquarters continued to be manned around-the-clock by all departments involved in the crisis. The Department of Public Works continued to clean up streets, and board up buildings which had been damaged or destroyed. When needed, emergency power was supplied by Civil Defense trailer-mounted generators.

By Tuesday evening, arrests of curfew violators rose to more than 5,000, and was a contributing factor to the recession of the turmoil.

Wednesday, April 10, 1968

Civil Defense Headquarters was de-activated from an operational basis as of Wednesday, April 10th at 12:00 Noon. With the return of most Municipal employees to work, Department representatives returned to their own regular bases of operation and resumed near normal activity.
PUBLIC INFORMATION

The important facet of informing the public as to what was going on during this crisis was handled by a single Public Information Officer at the Control Center for all City Agencies. This in contrast to the normal procedure, where each department head would issue information through his own public information officer. The purpose of this channeling of all information through one source was to eliminate confusing and duplicate reports and to insure that the public could get as true a picture as possible. The Public Information Officer at Civil Defense Headquarters coordinated closely with the Public Information Office set up at the Headquarters at the Fifth Regiment Armory which disseminated information and reports of Military and Police actions. This coordination was also established to see that no conflicting information got out to the public.

CIVIL DEFENSE EMERGENCY OPERATING CENTER

A description of the Control Center might be helpful at this point, and will include the actual operation of the Center under the crisis which occurred from April 4th to 10th, 1968.

The Civil Defense Main Control Center is a bunker-type
installation located underground. On the surface directly above the Control Center is a fire house. This complex is situated in a residential area, in the Northeast section of Baltimore City, 3 1/2 miles from the center of the most densely populated area, or core of the City, in which the highest incidence of riots occurred. The Control Center covers an area of 3,845 square feet and is divided into the following rooms:

The main Operation Room which is the nerve center of the complex: In this room the department heads sit at desks divided by low partitions, and which are elevated on a dais-type platform above the floor. Each desk is equipped with a multi-channel telephone, which has a four light, priority ring, signal indicator. Directly across from the dais are located operational maps, one of which showed the location of every single incident of fire, looting, and disturbance, as it occurred and as it was received in the radio communications center.

Next to the main Operations room is a room designated as the Action room, in which are duplicated the telephone and desk layouts, on a smaller basis. At these desks sit subordinates of the department heads, who see to it that the decisions and directives made by the department heads are carried out.
There are two radio communications rooms. One is used exclusively by the Baltimore City Fire Department, consisting of several Fire Department radio transmitters and telephone call directors, connected with Fire Department communications centers located in the inner city. This room is used for monitoring fire reports, which are delivered to the Operations Center, and as a backup to the Fire Department's main communications center. From here Fire vehicles can be dispatched throughout the City.

The second communications room contains all Police Department radio equipment; State Civil Defense radio and radio-teletype; National Warning System hookup; Civil Defense local government and also emergency radio equipment tied to the district Emergency Operating Centers; the Fifth Regiment Armory; Department of Transit and Traffic; as well as Civil Defense mobile equipment. Another unit is used for communication with the Department of Public Works, as well as all other local government radio units. Finally, there is a transmitter tied in with the amateur radio and citizens radio frequencies. All of these units are transceivers and all were manned during the civil crisis by qualified volunteer operators who possess a thorough training given by an experienced signal officer.
BASIC CIVIL EMERGENCY PLAN

A. TITLE

The title of this plan, including the annexes thereto, is "The Baltimore City Civil Emergency Plan," effective March 1, 1968.

B. MISSION

To alleviate suffering, protect life and property, and provide for continuity of legally constituted Government, in Baltimore City, during the period of such emergency.

C. SCOPE

The following listed agencies, organizations and bureaus are responsible for the implementation of this plan as ordered by the Mayor:

Baltimore Police Department
Department of Public Welfare
Department of Transit and Traffic
Department of Education
Baltimore City Fire Department
Department of Health
Bureau of Purchases
Department of Public Works
Baltimore City Civil Defense

D. RESPONSIBILITIES

1. An emergency telephone call-list, including three (3) personnel to be contacted, will be made available to the Office of Civil Defense no later than March 1, 1968.

2. Each agency will, in addition, submit to the Office of Civil Defense a copy of their own internal telephone call-up list no later than March 1, 1968.

3. Each agency will further furnish to the Office of Civil Defense names of individuals assigned to each of the eight Civil Defense Districts; i.e.: Northern, Northeastern, Eastern, Southeastern, Southern, Southwestern, Western and Northwestern.
4. The Office of Civil Defense will initiate mobilization of the agencies, organizations and bureaus in accordance with the steps outlined on the Chart which will be Attachment #1 to this Plan.

E. PROCEDURES

1. Upon implementation of Step "A", the agencies, organizations and bureaus listed above, together with the Civil Defense Staff, will be alerted on an "information only" basis.

2. Upon implementation of Step "B", the agencies, bureaus and organizations will be put on an operational alert status and will be prepared to implement their individual Annexes to this Plan, on immediate order, as required by the situation. At this time, the main Emergency Operating Center of the Civil Defense Office will be completely activated and liaison personnel from the above mentioned agencies, organizations and bureaus will report thereto. District Emergency Operating Centers will be activated as required.

3. Upon implementation of Step "C", all agencies will either have implemented their plans or will remain operational on a twenty-four hour basis, as will district Emergency Operating Centers that have been previously activated.

4. In addition to the agencies, organizations and bureaus mentioned above, the Water Department facilities at both Prettyboy and Liberty Dam will be alerted for possible standby activity throughout the Steps of this Plan.

F. COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. Overall responsibility for the activities of the agencies, organizations and bureaus listed will rest with the Mayor. The Director of Civil Defense will coordinate their activities.

2. All methods of communication will be utilized with priority being given to the use of telephones, if available. In the event that it would be more expedient, radios that are available will be employed.
G. **REPORTS**

1. Activation Report:

    Each of the agencies, organizations and bureaus indicated above will report promptly time of activation and readiness status.

2. Special Reports:

    Activities listed will furnish special reports as required by the Director of Civil Defense.

H. **TERMINATION**

Termination of activity will be announced by the Director of Civil Defense and will be made to the individual agency, organization and bureau heads.

February 6, 1968

[Signature]

ROBERT H. OSBORNE
DIRECTOR
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* Also notified by Police Department