

MARYLAND JUVENILE JUSTICE COALITION

Abell Foundation
Advocates for Children and Youth
American Academy of Pediatrics, MD Chapter
American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland
American Justice Institute
Annie E. Casey Foundation
Associated Black Charities
Baltimore Association for Retarded Citizens
Baltimore City Head Start Program
Baltimore Mental Health Systems, Inc.
BCCC – Human Services Institute
Bethany House, Inc.
Campaign for an Effective Crime Policy
Caroline County Family Support Center
CASA of Baltimore, Inc.
Ctr. for Study of Troubling Behavior, U. of Md.
Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice
Central Maryland Ecumenical Council
Chesapeake Center for Youth Development
Citizens Planning and Housing Association
Communities in Schools of Maryland, Inc.
Dorchester County Office of Child
and Family Services
Druid Heights Community Development Corp.
East Baltimore Youth and Family Services
Families Involved Together, Inc.
Family Tree
First Step, Inc.
Friends of the Family
Girl Scouts of Central Maryland
Greater Baltimore Committee
Harford County Dept. of Community Services
Institute for Family Centered Services
Intl. Assn. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers
Juvenile Justice Initiative - Illinois
League of Women Voters
Martin Pollak Project, Inc.
Maryland Association of Resources
for Families and Youth (MARFY)
Maryland Association of Youth Service Bureaus
Maryland Justice Policy Institute
Maryland State Teachers Association
Marylanders Against Handgun Abuse
Massachusetts Citizens for Juvenile Justice
Mental Health Association of Maryland, Inc.
Morgan State University
Mothers for Equal Justice
National Alliance for the Mentally Ill of Maryland
National Center on Institutions and Alternatives
National Mental Health Association
Network for Children
Northwest Youth Services, Inc.
Open Society Institute
Our House Youth Home
Pediatric Ambulatory Center, U. of Md.
Prevent Child Abuse Maryland
Public Justice Center
Robert A. Pascal Youth & Family Service Center
Second Chance Project, Inc.
Shaw Prison Services Program
South Dakota Coalition for Children
The Eastern Shore Taskforce
The Sentencing Project
Walden/Sierra, Inc.
Well Mind Association of Greater Washington
Youth Law Center

34 Market Place
Baltimore, MD 21202
(410) 547-9200 x3027
(410) 547-8690 fax
juvenilejustice@erols.com

September 7, 2000

Dear Juvenile Justice Advocate:

Thank you for your interest in the Maryland Juvenile Justice Coalition. We are working hard to develop and implement progressive public policy initiatives. Your participation will be of great importance to the achievement of our goals.

Please look over the enclosed material. To become a member of the Coalition, fill out the Statement of Support form and fax or mail it back to us.

This is a critical time for juvenile justice issues in Maryland. Together we can make a difference for Maryland's youth.

Sincerely,

Heather A. Ford
Director

Enclosures

Chair: Jim McComb
Vice Chair: Maceo Hallmon
Director: Heather A. Ford

Maryland Juvenile Justice Coalition

The Maryland Juvenile Justice Coalition has over 350 members – 75 organizations and 300 individuals. The Coalition meets quarterly, hosting a distinguished professional or speaker. There are five committee work groups and a steering committee, each meeting monthly. Advocates for Children and Youth is the host agency for the Coalition, and provides staff support.

The mission of the Maryland Juvenile Justice Coalition is to reduce juvenile crime and violence and ensure that all youth are treated fairly and have a reasonable chance to become self-sufficient adults

The five committee work groups and their goals are:

1. **Over-Representation of Minority Youth in the Juvenile Justice System** – To eliminate racial injustice and inequities in the juvenile and criminal justice systems. *Chair, Maceo Hallmon, Maryland Association of Youth Service Bureaus*
2. **Youth Development** – To increase program capacity and funding for community-based services that respond immediately to the onset of delinquency, and prevents its recurrence. *Chair, Ross Pologe, Fellowship of Lights, Inc.*
3. **Delinquency Prevention** – To support local solutions to delinquency prevention and juvenile crime. *Chair, Ross Ford, Martin Pollak Project, Inc.*
4. **Detention Reform** – To reduce the misuse and overuse of detention. *Chair, Stacey Shapiro, National Mental Health Association*
5. **Juvenile Court Jurisdiction** – To prevent youth from being sent to the adult criminal justice system. *Chair, Myra Sturgis, Licensed Clinical Social Worker*

Diverse participation on these committees is essential to the Coalition's success in mobilizing juvenile justice reform. If you would like to join MJJC and/or participate on issue committees, please call:

- Jim McComb, Chair, 410-974-4901, ext. 1
- Maceo Hallmon, Vice-Chair, 410-276-1100
- Heather Ford, Director, 410-547-9200, ext. 3012
- Sharon Rubinstein, Communications Director, 410-547-9200, ext. 3024
- Christina Feehan, Government Relations, 410-974-4901 ext. 7
- Teri Mackey, Program Associate, 410-547-9200 ext. 3027

Maryland Juvenile Justice Coalition 34 Market Place, 5th floor, Baltimore, MD 21202
juvenilejustice@erols.com

Statement of Support 2000
Maryland Juvenile Justice Coalition

The mission of the Maryland Juvenile Justice Coalition (MJJC) is to reduce the incidence of juvenile crime and violence in Maryland, and to help ensure that all of Maryland's youth are treated fairly and have a reasonable chance to become self-sufficient adults.

The Coalition is working to impact the following priorities:

- Expand community responsibility over juvenile justice policy and decision making.
- Reduce the overrepresentation of minorities in the juvenile justice system.
- Encourage the development of an early comprehensive response to the onset of delinquency and promote opportunities for youth development.
- Stop the improper use and overuse of detention.
- Prevent juveniles from being transferred to the adult criminal justice system.

MJJC has committees that meet monthly. All members are encouraged to participate on a committee. The MJJC Steering Committee is comprised of a Chair, committee chairs, two ad-hoc members, and Coalition staff. The entire Coalition meets quarterly with an invited speaker.

I would like to support the Maryland Juvenile Justice Coalition and receive information on juvenile justice reform:

Individual Membership Organizational Membership Mailing List Only

Signature Date

Name

Organization (if any)

Address

Office Phone Office Fax

Home Phone Home Fax

E-Mail Address

I am interested in knowing about committee meetings on:

- Over-Representation of Minorities
- Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention
- Mental Health
- Juvenile Detention
- Juvenile Court Jurisdiction

Please return this form to Heather Ford, Director, Maryland Juvenile Justice Coalition, at Advocates for Children and Youth, 34 Market Place, 5th Floor, Baltimore, Maryland 21202. Phone: 410.547.9200 x3012. Fax: 410.547.8690. E-Mail: juvenilejustice@erols.com

Maryland Juvenile Justice Coalition

Organizational Memberships

as of September 1, 2000

Abell Foundation

Advocates for Children and Youth, Inc.

American Academy of Pediatrics, Md. Chapter

American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland

American Justice Institute

Annie E. Casey Foundation

Associated Black Charities

Baltimore Association for Retarded Citizens

Baltimore City Head Start Program

Baltimore Mental Health Systems, Inc.

BCCC – Human Services Institute

Bethany House, Inc.

Campaign for an Effective Crime Policy

Caroline Cnty. Family Support Ctr. Early Head Start

CASA of Baltimore, Inc.

Ctr. for the Study of Troubling Behavior, U. of Md.

Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice

Central Maryland Ecumenical Council

Chesapeake Center for Youth Development

Citizens Planning and Housing Assn.

Communities in Schools of Maryland

Dorchester Cnty. Office of Child & Family Services

Druid Heights Community Development Corp.

East Baltimore Youth and Family Services

Families Involved Together, Inc.

Family Tree

First Step, Inc.

Friends of the Family

Girl Scouts of Central Maryland

Greater Baltimore Committee

Harford County Dept. of Community Services

Institute for Family Centered Services

Intl. Assn. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers

Juvenile Justice Initiative - Illinois

League of Women Voters

Martin Pollack Project, Inc.

Maryland Assn. of Resources for Families & Youth

Maryland Association of Youth Service Bureaus

Maryland Justice Policy Institute

Maryland State Teachers Association

Marylanders Against Handgun Abuse

Massachusetts Citizens for Juvenile Justice

Mental Health Association of Maryland, Inc.

Morgan State University

Mothers for Equal Justice

National Alliance for the Mentally Ill of Maryland

National Center on Institutions and Alternatives

National Mental Health Association

Network for Children

Northwest Youth Services, Inc.

Open Society Institute

Our House Youth Home

Pediatric Ambulatory Center, Univ. of Md.

Prevent Child Abuse Maryland

Public Justice Center

Robert A. Pascal Youth Services

Second Chance Project, Inc.

Shaw Prison Services Program

South Dakota Coalition for Children

The Eastern Shore Task Force

The Sentencing Project

Walden/Sierra, Inc.

Well Mind Association of Greater Washington

Youth Law Center

How to Stay Informed on Juvenile Justice Issues

On-Line Newsletters & List-Serves

"Giving Kids a Chance to Make a Better Choice" On-line Newsletter

Publisher: Juvenile Court Centennial Initiative

Description: Sent out two times per month with news about centennial activities, the latest juvenile justice resources and reports, effective juvenile justice program information, and stories of successful juvenile court graduates

To subscribe: Send an email request to: Secondchances@earthlink.net

"Juv Just" On-line List-serve

Publisher: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

Description: Sent out several times per week, as needed, and contains updated juvenile justice information, reports, research, national events and conferences

To subscribe:

Send an email to Listproc@ncjrs.org

Leave the subject line blank

Type "subscribe juvjust" and your name in the body of the message (Do not put any additional information other than your name)

Violence Prevention Grassroots List-serve

Publisher: Children's Defense Fund

Description: Sent out regularly and contains updated information on juvenile justice, violence prevention and youth development issues

To subscribe:

Log onto the Children's Defense Fund web site at www.childrensdefense.org.

Go to the bottom of the web page and click on subscribe to list-serves.

Click on 'CDF Violence Prevention', click 'subscribe' and enter email address.

Juvenile Justice Networks

Building Blocks for Youth: www.Buildingblocksforyouth.org

Editor: Youth Law Center

Description: Latest research and information on the impact of juvenile justice policies on minority youth

Juvenile Info Network: www.juvenilenet.org

Editor: American Corrections Association

Description: Juvenile justice practitioners data-base, updated news and reports on juvenile justice, and juvenile justice information

Juvenile Justice Policy Network: www.cwla.org/juvjustc/juvenilejustice.html

Editor: Child Welfare League of America

Description: Updated juvenile justice information, including legislative updates

Juvenile Justice State Watch: www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/statewatch.html#round

Editor: American Bar Association Juvenile Justice Center

Description: Latest information on state legislation, policies and activities

Juvenile Justice Reading List

This reading list is not meant to be exhaustive but to include some of the key books, publications and reports on juvenile justice.

- Addams, Jane. (1909). The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets. New York: Macmillan.
- ABA Presidential Working Group on the Unmet Legal Needs of Children and Their Families. (1993). America's Children at Risk: A National Agenda for Legal Action. Chicago: Author.
- Annie E. Casey Foundation. (1999). Juvenile Jailhouse Rocked. Baltimore: Author.
- Annie E. Casey Foundation. (1999). Kids Count. Baltimore: Author.
- Annie E. Casey Foundation. (1999). Pathways to Juvenile Detention Reform. Baltimore: Author.
- Amnesty International. (1998). Betraying the Young. New York: Author.
- Armstrong, Louise. (1993). And They Call It Help: The Psychiatric Policing of America's Children. New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
- Ayers, William. (1997). A Kind and Just Parent: The Children of Juvenile Court. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Borque, B., Han, M., & Hill, S. (1996). A National Survey of After Provisions for Boot Camp Graduates. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice.
- Bottcher, J. & Isorena, T. (1995). *First-year evaluation of the California Youth Authority Boot Camp*. In D. MacKenzie & E. Herbert (Eds.), Correction Boot Camps: A Tough Intermediate Sanction. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice.
- Brown, Claude. (1996). Manchild in the Promised Land. London: Cape.
- Burrell, S., DeMuro, P., Dunlap, E., Sanniti, C., & Warboys, L. (1998). Crowding in Juvenile Detention Centers: A Problem-Solving Manual. Washington, D.C.: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice.
- Butterfield, Fox. (1995). All God's Children: The Bosket Family and the American Tradition of Violence. New York: Alfred Knopf.
- Chesney-Lind, M. (1997). The Female Offender: Girls, Women and Crime. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Chicago Bar Association. (1999). A Noble Social Experiment? The First 100 Years of the Cook County Juvenile Court 1899-1999. Chicago: Author.

Children's Court Centennial Communications Project. (1999). Second Chances 100 Years of the Children's Court: Giving Kids A Chance to Make a Better Choice. CA: First California Press.

Coalition for Juvenile Justice. (1999). Ain't No Place Anybody Would Want to Be. Washington, D.C.: Author.

Coalition for Juvenile Justice. (1998). A Celebration or A Wake? The Juvenile Court After 100 Years 1998 Annual Report. Washington, D.C.: Author.

Cocozza, J. (1992). Responding to Mental Health Needs of Youth in the Juvenile Justice System. Seattle, WA: National Coalition for the Mentally Ill in the Criminal Justice System.

Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. (1996) Combating Violence and Delinquency: The National Juvenile Justice Action Plan. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice.

Donziger, Steven. (editor) (1996). The Real War on Crime: The Report of the National Criminal Justice Commission. NY: Harper Collins.

Edwards, L. & I. Sagutun (1995). Who Speaks for the Child? Chicago: University of Chicago Roundtable.

Elikann, Peter. (1999). Superpredators. The Demonization of Children By the Law. Insight Books.

Feyerherm, W., Kempf, K., & Pope, C. (eds.) (1995). Minorities in Juvenile Justice. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Flaherty, Michael. (1980). An Assessment of the National Incidence of Juvenile Suicide in Adult Jails, Lockups, and Juvenile Detention Centers. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice.

Girls Incorporated. (1996). Prevention and Parity: Girls in Juvenile Justice. New York, NY: Author.

Howell, J.C.; B. Krisberg; D. Hawkins; & J. Wilson (eds.) (1995). A Sourcebook on Serious, Violent and Chronic Offenders. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Hubner, J., & Wolfson, J. (1996). Somebody Else's Children: the Courts, the Kids and the Struggle to Save America's Troubled Families. New York: Crown Publishers.

Human Rights Watch. (1995). Children in Confinement in Louisiana. New York: Author.

Human Rights Watch. (1996). Modern Capital of Human Rights? Abuses in the State of Georgia. New York: Author.

Human Rights Watch. (1999). No Minor Matter: Children in Maryland's Jails. New York: Author.

Humes, Edward. (1996). No Matter How Loud I Shout: A Year in the Life of Juvenile Court. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Jones, M.A. and B. (1994). Krisberg Images and Reality: Juvenile Crime, Youth Violence and Public Policy. San Francisco: National Council on Crime and Delinquency.

Jones, L. & Newman, L. (1997). Our America: Life and Death on the South Side of Chicago. New York: Scribner.

Kotlowitz, Alex. (1992). There Are No Children Here. New York: Anchor Books.

Krisberg, B. and Austin, J. (1993). Reinventing Juvenile Justice. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

The Lucille and David Packard Foundation (1996). The Juvenile Court The Future of Children Vol. 6, No. 3, Winter 1996 CA: Author.

Lerner, Steve. (1990). The Good News About Juvenile Justice: The Movement Away from Large Institutions and Toward Community-based Services. CA: Commonweal.

MacKenzie, D. & Souryal, C. (1994). Multi-site Evaluation of Shock Incarceration. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice.

Males, Mike. (1996). The Scapegoat Generation: America's War on Adolescents. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press.

Males, Mike. (1999). Framing Youth: Ten Myths About the Next Generation. Monroe, ME: Common Courage.

Maniglia, R. & Temple, A.K. (1998). Female Juvenile Offenders: A Status of the States Report. Washington, D.C.: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice.

Mauer, Marc. (1999). Race to Incarcerate. New York: The New Press.

May, Dr. John. (1999). Youth Violence. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Miller, Jerome G. (1991). Last One Over the Wall, The Massachusetts Experiment in Closing Reform Schools. Ohio State University Press: Ohio.

National Center for Children in Poverty. (1996). One in Four: America's Youngest Poor. New York: Author.

National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges. (1998). A Centennial Celebration of the Juvenile Court 1899-1999 Juvenile and Family Court Journal Nevada: Author.

O'Shea, K.A. & Fletcher, B.R. (1997). Female Offenders: An Annotated Bibliography. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, (1993). Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent and Chronic Juvenile Offenders. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice.

Peters, M., Thomas, D., & Zamberlan, C. (1997). Boot Camps for Juvenile Offenders Program Summary. Washington, D.C.: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice.

Peters, Dr. Sheila R. (1998). Guiding Principles for Promising Female Programming: An Inventory of Best Practices. Washington, D.C.: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.

Puritz, P., Burrell, S., Schwartz, R., Soler, M., & Warboys, L. (1995). A Call for Justice: An Assessment of Access to Counsel and Quality of Representation in Delinquency Proceedings. Washington, D.C.: American Bar Association.

Puritz, P. & Scali, M. (1998). Beyond the Walls: Improving Conditions of Confinement for Youth in Custody. Washington, D.C.: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice.

Rodriguez, Luis. (1993). Always Running: La Vida Loca – Gang Days in L.A. CT: Curbstone Press.

Sereny, Gitta. (1998). Cries Unheard. Why Children Kill: The Story of Mary Bell. New York: Metropolitan Books.

Singer, Simon. (1996). Recriminalizing Delinquency: Violent Juvenile Crimes and Juvenile Justice Reform. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Snyder, H. & Sickmund, M. (1999) Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A National Report Washington, D.C.: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice.

Soler, M., Shotton, A.C., Bell, J.R., Jameson, E.J., Schauffer, C.B., Warboys, L.M., & Dale, M.J. (1998). Representing the Child Client. San Francisco: Matthew Bender.

Soler, M., Shotton, A.C., & Bell, J.R. (1993). Glass Walls: Confidentiality Provisions and Interagency Collaborations. San Francisco: Youth Law Center.

Ziedenberg, J. & Schiraldi, V. (1997). The Risks Juvenile Face When They Are Incarcerated With Adults. Washington, D.C.: Justice Policy Institute.

Zimring, Franklin. (1998). American Youth Violence. NY: Oxford University Press.

For a complete listing of publications from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, contact the Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse: 800-638-8736.

Federal, State & Local Government Contacts

Federal government

U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Shay Bilchik, Administrator
Address: 810 Seventh St. N.W., Suite 300, Washington, D.C. 20531
Phone: 202/307-5911 Fax: 202/307-2093
Website: www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org

To find national reports:
Justice Information Center
Website: www.ncjrs.org/ijhome.htm

To order national reports:
Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse
Address: P.O. Box 6000, Rockville, MD 20849-6000
Phone: 1-800-638-8736 Fax: 301/519-5212
Email: puborder@ncjrs.org

For national statistics:
Justice Statistics Clearinghouse
Address: P.O. Box 6000, Rockville, MD 20849-6000
Phone: 1-800-851-3420 Fax: 301/519-5212
Website: www.ncjrs.org

For national juvenile court data and state juvenile code statutes analyses:
National Center for Juvenile Justice
Address: 710 Fifth Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Phone: 412/227-6950 Fax: 412/227-6955
Website: www.ncjj@ncjj.org

State & Local Government

To obtain information on state and local officials, information is available through the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention's website at www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org first by clicking on 'Resources' and then by clicking on 'State resources' as well as through the national associations listed.

Governors and Governors' Juvenile Justice Policy Advisors

National Governor's Association
Address: 440 North Capitol Street, N.W., Suite 267, Washington, D.C. 20001-1512
Phone: 202/624-5300 Fax: 202/624-5313
Website: www.nga.org

Juvenile Justice State Advisory Groups (SAG)

As required by the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDP) of 1974, every state has a juvenile justice advisory group, appointed by the governor, which is responsible for assisting the state to meet the core protections for children under the JJDP. A list of the chairs of each state's advisory group can be found on the OJJDP website under "State Advisory Groups" or by contacting the organization which represents all the State Advisory Groups, the Coalition for Juvenile Justice.

The Coalition for Juvenile Justice
Address: 1211 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 414, Washington, D.C. 20036
Phone: 202/467-0864 Fax: 202/887-0738

State Juvenile Justice Agencies

The organization of a state's juvenile justice agency and how it implements programs – at the state or county level – varies from state to state. The agencies can be found on the OJJDP website under "State JJ Agency Representative."

State Juvenile Justice Specialists

State 'JJ Specialists' are responsible for conducting research, policy development and compiling state juvenile justice data. The list can be found on the OJJDP website under "Juvenile Justice (JJ) Specialists."

Juvenile Detention and Corrections Facility Directors

State detention and correction facilities can be found on the OJJDP website under 'Juvenile Correctional Administrators' or by contacting the Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators.

Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators

Address: Stonehill College, 16 Belmont Street, S. Easton, MA 02375
Phone: 508/238-0073 Fax: 508/238-0651
Website: www.corrections.com/juvenile

County Government

National Association of Counties

Address: 440 First Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001
Phone: 202/393-6226 Fax: 202/942-4281
Website: www.naco.org

Juvenile Court

Juvenile Court Judges

National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges
Address: University of Nevada, P.O. Box 8970, Reno, Nevada 89507
Phone: 775/784-6012 Fax: 775/784-6628
Website: www.ncjfcj.unr.edu

Juvenile Prosecutors

American Prosecutors Research Institute (APRI)
Address: 99 Canal Center Plaza, Suite 510, Alexandria, VA 22314
Phone: 703/519-1671 Fax: 703/836-3195
Website: www.ndaa.org/apri/juvenilejustice/jjhome.htm

Juvenile Defenders

American Bar Association Juvenile Justice Center
Address: 740 15th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005
Phone: 202/662-1508 Fax: 202/662-1501
Website: www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/home.html

National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers

Address: 1025 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Suite 901, Washington, D.C. 20036-3007
Phone: 202/872-8600 Fax: 202/872-8690
Website: www.criminaljustice.org

Juvenile Probation

American Probation and Parole Association
Address: P.O. Box 11910, Lexington, Kentucky 40578
Phone: 604/244-8203
Website: www.appa-net.org

Law Enforcement

International Association of Chiefs of Police
515 N. Washington Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
Phone: 703-836-6767
Fax: 703-836-4543
Website: www.theiacp.org

National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives
Address: 4609 Pinecrest Office, Park Drive, Suite F, Alexandria, VA 22314
Phone: 703/658-1529 Fax: 703/658-9479
Website: www.noblenatl.org

Minorities in Law Enforcement
Address: 1817 Capitol Avenue, Sacramento, CA 95814
Phone: 916/812-9541 Fax: 919/974-1979

National Association of Chiefs of Police
Address: 3801 Biscayne Blvd., Miami, FL 33137
Phone: 305/573-0070 Fax: 305/573-9819
Website: www.aphf.org

National Sheriffs' Association
Address: 1450 Duke Street, Alexandria, VA 22314
Phone: 703/836-7827 Fax: 703/683-6541
Website: www.sheriffs.org

Juvenile Justice Resources -- National Organizations

This list includes national organizations willing to provide information on juvenile justice issues. This is not an exhaustive list. To obtain a copy of the OJJDP Training and Technical Assistance Resource Catalog: 800-830-4031.

Alliance for Children and Families
Address: 1701 K Street, N.W., Suite 200
Washington, DC 20006
Phone: 202/223-3447 Fax: 202/331-7476
Website: www.policy@alliance1.org
Info: Legislation; Public Policy; Prevention: Social Services

American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
Address: 3615 Wisconsin Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20016
Phone: 202/966-7300 Fax: 202/966-1944
Website: www.aacap.org
Info: Mental Health

American Bar Association Juvenile Justice Center
Address: 740 15th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005
Phone: 202/662-1508 Fax: 202/662-1501
Website: www.abanet/crimjust/juvjus/home.html
Info: Alternatives to detention; children in adult jails; conditions of confinement; detention overcrowding; disproportionate minority confinement; girls; juvenile court; juvenile detention; JJDPA; juvenile justice data; juvenile justice programs; legal; legislation; minority youth; public policy; education; helath; mental health; prevention; youth advocacy; due process/representation

American Civil Liberties Union
Address: 122 Maryland Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002
Phone: 202/675-2314 Fax: 202/234-4890
Website: www.aclu.org
Info: Alternatives to Detention; Children in Adult Jails; Conditions of Confinement; Detention Overcrowding; Disproportionate Minority Confinement; Juvenile Court; Juvenile Detention; JJDPA; Juvenile Justice Data; Legal; Minority Youth; Public Policy

American Counseling Association
Address: 5999 Stevenson Ave., Alexandria, VA 22304
Phone: 703/823-9800 Fax: 703/823-0252
Website: www.counseling.org

American Humane Association
Address: 236 Massachusetts Ave., N.E., Suite 203 Washington, D.C. 20002-5702
Phone: 202/544-7780 Fax: 202/546-3266
Website: www.americanhumane.org
Info: Legislation; Public Policy

American Probation and Parole Association
Address: P.O. Box 11910, Lexington, KY 40578
Phone: 606/244-8203 Fax: 606/244-8001
Website: www.appa-net.org
Info: Alternatives to detention; children in adult jails; girls; juvenile court; juvenile court graduates; JJDPA; juvenile justice programs; public policy; prevention

American Prosecutors Research Institute
Address: 99 Canal Center Plaza, Suite 510, Alexandria, VA 22314
Phone: 703/518-4380 Fax: 703/836-3195
Website: www.nda.org/apri/juvenilejustice/ijhome.htm

Info: Alternatives to detention; children in adult jails; conditions of confinement; detention overcrowding; disproportionate minority confinement; girls; juvenile court; juvenile court graduates; juvenile detention; JJDP; juvenile justice data; juvenile justice programs; legal; legislation; minority youth; prevention

American Psychiatric Association
Address: 1400 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005
Phone: 202/682-6049 Fax: 202/682-6287
Website: www.psych.org

American Psychological Association
Address: 440 First Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002
Phone: 202/336-6064 Fax: 202/336-6063
Website: www.appa.org

American Youth Policy Forum
Address: 1836 Jefferson Place, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036
Phone: 202/775-9731 Fax: 202/775-9733
Website: www.aypf.org
Info: Juvenile Justice Programs; Education; Prevention; Youth Development; Youth Employment; Forums and publications on juvenile justice issues

Amnesty International
Address: 304 Pennsylvania Ave., S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
Phone: 202/544-0200 Fax: 202/546-7142
Website: www.amnestyusa.org
Info: Children in Adult Jails; Conditions of Confinement; Detention Overcrowding; Disproportionate Minority Confinement; Juvenile Justice Data; Public Policy; Education; Youth Advocacy; Human Rights

Annie E. Casey Foundation
Address: 701 St. Paul Street, Baltimore, MD 21202
Phone: 410/547-6600 Fax: 410/223-2983
Website: www.aecf.org
Info: Alternatives to Detention; Children in Adult Jails; Conditions of Confinement; Detention Overcrowding; Disproportionate Minority Confinement; Juvenile Detention; Juvenile Justice Programs; Public Policy

ASPIRA
Address: 1444 I Street, N.W., Suite 800, Washington, D.C. 20005
Phone: 202/835-3600 Fax: 202/835-3613
Website: www.aspira.org
Info: Public policy; youth development; youth advocacy

AVANCE, Inc.
Address: 301 South Fri Street, Suite 380, San Antonio, TX 78207
Phone: 210/270-4630 Fax: 210/270-4612
Website: www.avance.org

Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law
Address: 1101 15th Street, N.W., Suite 1212, Washington, D.C. 20005-5002
Phone: 202/467-5730 Fax: 202/223-0409
Website: www.bazelon.org

Black Community Crusade for Children
Address: 25 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001
Phone: 202/628-8787 Fax: 202/662-3570
Website: www.childrensdefense.org/bccc.html
Info: Disproportionate minority confinement; juvenile court; legislation; minority youth; public policy

Building Blocks for Youth

Address: 1325 G Street, N.W., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20005

Phone: 202/637-0377 Fax: 202/347-0493

Website: www.buildingblocksforyouth.org

Info: Alternatives to detention; children in adult jails; conditions of confinement; detention overcrowding; disproportionate minority confinement; girls; juvenile court; juvenile court graduates; juvenile detention; JJDP; juvenile justice data; juvenile justice programs; legal; legislation; minority youth; public policy; education; health; mental health; prevention; social services; youth development; youth advocacy; youth employment

Campaign for an Effective Crime Policy

Address: 1516 P Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005

Phone: 202/628-1903 Fax: 202/628-1091

Website: www.crimepolicy.org

Info: Alternatives to detention; children in adult jails; juvenile court; juvenile justice data; juvenile justice programs; legislation; public policy; mental health; prevention

Center for the Study of Prevention of Violence

Address: Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado at Boulder

Campus Box 442, Boulder, CO 80309-0442

Phone: 303/492-8465 Fax: 303/443-3297

Website: www.colorado.edu/cspv/

Info: Violence research

Center for Women Policy Studies

Address: 1211 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Suite 312, Washington, DC 20036

Phone: 202/872-1770 Fax: 202/296-8962

Website: www.centerwomenpolicy.org

Info: Girls; legislation; public policy; health

Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice

Address: 2208 Martin Luther King, Jr., Avenue, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20020

Phone: 202/678-9282 Fax: 202/678-9321

Website: www.cjcj.org

Info: Alternatives to detention; children in adult jails; conditions of confinement; detention overcrowding; disproportionate minority confinement; girls; juvenile court; juvenile court graduates; juvenile detention; JJDP; juvenile justice data; juvenile justice programs; legal; legislation; minority youth; public policy; education; health; mental health; prevention; social services; youth development; youth advocacy; youth employment

Child Welfare League of America

Address: 330 First Street, N.W., 3rd Floor, Washington, D.C. 20001-2085

Phone: 202/942-0256 Fax: 202/638-4004

Website: www.cwla.org

Info: Juvenile Justice Programs; Legislation; Public Policy; Mental Health; Prevention; Social Services; Youth Development

Children & Adults with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (CHADD)

Address: 8181 Professional Place, Suite 201, Landover, MD 20785

Phone: 301/306-7070 Fax: 301/306-7090

Website: www.chadd.org

Info: Juvenile justice programs; legislation; public policy; education; mental health; youth advocacy

Children & Family Justice Center

Northwestern University School of Law – Legal Clinic

Address: 357 East Chicago Ave., Chicago, IL 60611

Phone: 312/503-0396 Fax: 312/503-0953

Website: www.law.nwu.edu/depts/clinic

Info: Alternatives to detention; children in adult jails; conditions of confinement; detention overcrowding; disproportionate minority confinement; girls; juvenile court; juvenile court graduates; juvenile detention; juvenile justice data; juvenile justice programs; legal; legislation; minority youth; public policy; social services; youth development; youth advocacy

Children's Defense Fund

Address: 25 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001

Phone: 202/628-8787 Fax: 202/662-3550

Website: www.childrensdefense.org

Info: Alternatives to detention; disproportionate minority confinement; JJDP; juvenile justice data; juvenile justice programs; legislation; minority youth; public policy; prevention; youth development; youth advocacy

Coalition for Juvenile Justice

Address: 1211 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Suite 414, Washington, D.C. 20036

Phone: 202/467-0864 Fax: 202/887-0738

Info: Children in adult jails; conditions of confinement; disproportionate minority confinement; juvenile justice programs; legislation; public policy; mental health

Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators

Address: Stonehill College, 16 Belmont Street, S. Easton, MA 02375

Phone: 508/238-0073 Fax: 508/238-0651

Website: www.corrections.com/juvenile

Info: Conditions of Confinement; Performance-based standards

Federation of Families for Children's Mental Health

Address: 1021 Prince Street, Alexandria, VA 22314

Phone: 703/684-7710 Fax: 703/836-1040

Website: www.ffcmh.org

Info: Alternatives to detention; legislation; minority youth; public policy; mental health

Fight Crime: Invest in Kids

Address: 1334 G St. N.W., Suite B, Washington, D.C. 20005

Phone: 202/638-0690 Fax: 202/638-0673

Website: www.fightcrime.org

Info: Prevention

Girls Incorporated

Address: 1001 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Suite 412, Washington, D.C. 20036

Phone: 202/463-1881 Fax: 202/463-8994

Website: www.girlsinc.org

Info: Girls

Human Rights Watch

Address: 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th Floor, New York, NY 10017-6104

Phone: 212/290-4700 Fax: 212/736-1300

Website: www.hrw.org

Info: Children in adult jails; conditions of confinement; detention overcrowding; disproportionate minority confinement

Justice Policy Institute

Address: 1622 Folsom Street, San Francisco, CA 94103

Phone: 415-621-5661 Fax: 415-621-5466

Website: www.cicj.org

Info: Alternatives to detention; children in adult jails; conditions of confinement; detention overcrowding; disproportionate minority confinement; juvenile court; juvenile court graduates; juvenile detention; juvenile justice data; juvenile justice programs; legislation; minority youth; public policy; youth advocacy

Juvenile Court Centennial Communications Project

Address: c/o Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice

2801 Martin Luther King Jr., Avenue, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20020

Phone: 202/678-9282 Website: www.cicj.org/centennial

Juvenile Law Center

Address: 801 Arch Street, Suite 610, Philadelphia, PA 19107

Phone: 215/624-0551 Fax: 215/625-9589

Website: www.afj.org/mem/juvenile.html

Latino Civil Rights Center

Address: 2701 Ontario Road, N.W., 2nd Floor, Washington, D.C. 20009

Phone: 202/332-1053 Fax: 202/483-7460

Info: Public policy; education; youth advocacy; Latino advocacy on discrimination issues

League of United Latin American Citizens

Address: 2000 L Street, N.W., Suite 610, Washington, D.C. 20036

Phone: 202/833-6130 Fax: 202/833-6135

Website: www.lulac.org

Info: Disproportionate minority confinement; minority youth; public policy; education; youth development; youth advocacy

NAACP

Address: 4805 Mt. Hope Drive, Baltimore, MD 21215

Phone: 410-358-8900

Website: www.naacp.org

Info: Disproportionate minority confinement; minority youth; public policy; education; health; prevention; youth development; youth advocacy

National Association of Child Advocates

Address: 1522 K Street, N.W., Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20005

Phone: 202/289-0777 Fax: 202/289-0776

Website: www.childadvocacy.org

Info: Alternatives to detention; children in adult jails; conditions of confinement; detention overcrowding; disproportionate minority confinement; girls; juvenile court; juvenile court graduates; juvenile detention; JJDP; juvenile justice data; juvenile justice programs; legal; legislation; minority youth; public policy; education; health; mental health; prevention; social services; youth development; youth advocacy; youth employment

National Association of Counties

Address: 440 First Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001

Phone: 202/393-6226 Fax: 202/942-4281

Website: www.naco.org

Info: Legislation; public policy; prevention; youth development; youth employment

National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers

Address: 1025 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Suite 901, Washington, D.C. 20036

Phone: 202/872-8600 Fax: 202/872-8690

Website: www.criminaljustice.org

National Association of School Nurses, Inc.

Address: P.O. Box 1300, Scarborough, ME 04070-1300

Phone: 207/883-2117 Fax: 207/883-2683

Website: www.nasn.org

Info: Education; Health; Mental Health; Prevention; Youth Development; Youth Advocacy

National Association of School Psychologists

Address: 4340 East-West Highway, Suite 402, Bethesda, MD 20814-4411

Phone: 301/657-0275 Fax: 301/657-0275

Website: www.naspsweb.org

Info: Alternatives to detention; juvenile justice programs; legal; legislation; minority youth; public policy; education; health; mental health; prevention; school safety; social services; youth development; youth advocacy; youth employment; youth violence prevention

National Association of Service & Conservation Corps

Address: 666 11th Street, N.W., Suite 1000, Washington, D.C. 20001-4542

Phone: 202/737-6272 Fax: 202/737-6277

Website: www.nascc.org

Info: Prevention; Youth Development; Youth Employment

National Black Child Development Institute
Address: 1023 15th Street, N.W., Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20036
Phone: 202/387-1281 Fax: 202/234-1738
Website: www.nbcdi.org
Info: Education; Minority Youth; Public Policy

National Center on Institutions and Alternatives
Address: 3125 Mount Vernon Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22305
Phone: 703/684-0373 Fax: 703/684-6037
Website: www.ncianet.org/ncia

National Children's Alliance
Address: 1319 F Street, N.W., Suite 1001, Washington, D.C. 20004-1106
Phone: 1-800-239-9950 Fax: 202/639-0511
Website: www.nncac.org

National Council of Churches of Christ (USA) – Washington Office
Address: 110 Maryland Ave., N.E., Suite 108, Washington, D.C. 20002
Phone: 202/544-2350 Fax: 202/544-1297
Website: www.nccusa.org

National Council of Juvenile & Family Court Judges
Address: P.O. Box 970, Reno, NV
Phone: 775/784-6631 Fax: 775/784-6628
Website: www.ncjfcj.unr.edu
Info: Alternatives to Detention; Children in Adult Jails; Conditions of Confinement; Detention Overcrowding; Disproportionate Minority Confinement; Girls; Juvenile Court; Juvenile Detention; Juvenile Justice Data; Juvenile Justice Programs; Legal; Legislation; Minority Youth; Public Policy; Education; Mental Health; Prevention; Youth Development; Judges

National 4-H Council
Address: 7100 Connecticut Ave., Chevy Chase, MD 20815-4999
Phone: 301/961-2800 Fax: 301/961-2894
Website: www.fourhcouncil.edu
Info: Health; prevention; youth development; youth advocacy; youth employment

National Juvenile Detention Association
Address: Eastern Kentucky University, 521 Lancaster Avenue,
Richmond, Kentucky 40475-3127
Phone: 606/622-6259 Fax: 606/622-2333
Website: www.njda.com
Info: Alternatives to Detention; Children in Adult Jails; Conditions of Confinement; Detention Overcrowding; Juvenile Detention; Public Policy

National Latino Children's Institute
1412 West Sixth Street, Austin, TX 78203-5139
Phone: 512/472-9971 Fax: 512/472-5845
Website: www.nlci.org
Info: Minority Youth; Prevention; Youth Development; Youth Advocacy

National Mental Health Association
Address: 1201 Prince Street, Alexandria, VA 22314
Phone: 703/684-7722 Fax: 703/684-5968
Website: www.nmha.org
Info: Mental Health; Prevention

National Network for Youth
Address: 1319 F Street, N.W., Suite 401, Washington, D.C. 20004
Phone: 202/783-7949 Fax: 202/783-7955
Website: www.nn4youth.org
Info: JJDPA; juvenile justice programs; legislation; public policy; prevention; youth development; youth advocacy; deinstitutionalization of status offenders

National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE)
4609 Pincrest Office Park Drive, Suite F, Alexandria, VA 22314
Phone: 703/658-1529 Fax: 703/658-9479
Website: www.noblenatl.org
Info: Minority Youth

National Recreation and Park Association
Address: 1901 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Suite 900, Washington, D.C. 20006
Phone: 202/887-0290 Fax: 202/887-5484
Website: www.nrpa.org
Info: Public Policy; health; prevention; youth employment

National Youth Employment Coalition
Address: 1836 Jefferson Place, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036
Phone: 202/659-1064 Fax: 202/659-0399
Website: www.nyec.org
Info: Legislation; public policy; prevention; youth development; youth employment

Presbyterian Church USA
110 Maryland Ave., N.E., #104, Washington, D.C. 20002
Phone: 202/543-1126 Fax: 202/543-7755
Website: www.pcusa.org
Info: Alternatives to Detention; Children in Adult Jails; Disproportionate Minority Confinement; Girls; JJDPA; Juvenile Justice Data; Juvenile Justice Programs; Legislation; Minority Youth; Public Policy; Education; Mental Health; Prevention; Social Services

The Sentencing Project
Address: 1516 P Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005
Phone: 202/628-0871 Fax: 202/628-1091
Website: www.sentencingproject.org
Info: Alternatives to detention; children in adult jails; conditions of confinement; disproportionate minority confinement; juvenile court; juvenile detention; juvenile justice data; legal; legislation; public policy

The Urban Institute
Address: 2100 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037
Phone: 202/659-8985 Fax: 202/659-8985
Website: www.urban.org

Volunteers of America
Address: 110 South Union St., Alexandria, VA 22314
Phone: 703/341-5000 Fax: 703/684-1972
Website: www.voa.org
Info: Alternatives to Detention; Juvenile Justice Programs; Legislation; Public Policy; Mental Health; Prevention; Social Services; Youth Development

Women of Reform Judaism
633 3rd Ave., New York, NY 10017
Phone: 212/650-4066 Fax: 212/650-4059
Website: www.rj.org/wrj

Youth Law Center
Address: 1325 G Street, N.W., Suite 770, Washington, D.C. 20005
Phone: 202/637-0377 Fax: 202/347-0493
Website: www.childprotect.org
Info: Alternatives to detention; children in adult jails; conditions of confinement; detention overcrowding; disproportionate minority confinement; girls; juvenile court; juvenile court graduates; juvenile detention; JJDPA; juvenile justice data; juvenile justice programs; legal; legislation; minority youth; public policy; education; health; mental health; prevention; social services; youth development; youth advocacy; youth employment

Jailed black youths must be treated far more equitably

By SALIMA SILER MARRIOTT

Inequities in the treatment of African-American youths by the juvenile justice system in Maryland have been a topic of intense public discussion over the past year. It has chronicled what many already believed — that locked facilities are overused for African-American youths.

Mentally ill white youths are more likely than their minority peers to be sent to treatment facilities while mentally ill black youths are more frequently locked up in secured facilities.

One in three white youths is sent by the system into a residential treatment program. For African-American youths, only one in six has been placed in residential treatment programs.

Officials of the Maryland Department of Juvenile Justice, in deciding whether to treat mentally ill juvenile criminals or lock them away as punishment, are prescribing treatment for many of the white kids and punishing most of the black ones.

Despite several years of declining youth crime in Maryland, the population in Maryland's detention facilities continues to rise. The overuse of detention in Maryland has fallen most heavily on children of color, primarily African-American children. While arrests of African-American youths reflect their 32 percent representation of youth

statewide, they account for 48 percent of youths at the Department of Juvenile Justice intake, 64 percent of youths in detention and 72 percent of youths in secure confinement.

These findings, which define the discriminatory processing of juveniles in Maryland, first were documented in a 1995 Juvenile Justice Department report on incarcerated African-American Youths and confirmed in subsequent reports.

The report was written to comply with the federal "disproportionate minority confinement" mandate, which requires assurance that the youth in the juvenile justice system are treated equitably on the basis of gender, race, family income and mentally, emotionally, or physically disabling conditions. The department has failed to use the report to develop a plan to address the inequities.

In response to these scathing findings of the department's own research staff, Lt. Gov. Kathleen Townsend announced last year that a task force would be established immediately to study the causes and solutions to over-representation of minority youth in Maryland's juvenile justice system. But no such action has been taken.

Legislation that I sponsored to create such a body was defeated in the Maryland Senate despite receiving overwhelming support in

the House of Delegates and in the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee. The defeated legislative proposal (HB 385) would have established in Maryland statutes and administrative procedures directed by the federal Disproportionate Minority Confinement mandate.

Juvenile Justice Secretary

The overuse of detention in Maryland has fallen most heavily on children of color, primarily African-American children.

Bishop Robinson supported HB 385 and has expressed a commitment to address the over-representation of minorities. Words are inadequate for our state's executive leadership. We needed immediate action in response to the treatment of minorities in the juvenile justice system last year.

A recent report issued by the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights described the treatment of minorities in the criminal justice system as the most profound civil rights crisis facing America in the new century. Maryland needs im-

mediate action on the development of a plan to "break the cycle." We need effective intervention for our youth rather than preparation for graduation to the adult system that implements criminal law.

Mr. Robinson has the authority to move beyond the 1995 report and fully comply with the federal mandate by establishing an Advisory Council on Minority Confinement.

The council should report directly to the secretary and be responsible for the collection and analysis of data that monitors and identifies the causes of any inequity that exists in processing or disposing of cases involving juvenile offenders on the basis of race, family income, gender or a mental, emotional or physically disabling condition.

The council should develop a plan to address any such inequity for implementation by the secretary. The secretary should report annually to the General Assembly the progress of the council and the eventual implementation of the plan to address the equities in the system.


Salima Siler Marriott is a delegate to the Maryland General Assembly from the 40th Legislative District in Baltimore.

AFRICAN-AMERICAN YOUTH ARE VASTLY OVER-REPRESENTED IN MARYLAND'S JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

Our African-American youth are over-represented at every stage of Maryland's Juvenile Justice System. Some people have theorized that this discrepancy is because African-American children commit more serious crimes with greater frequency; the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) has found otherwise. For juveniles who committed similar offenses and had similar records, race proved to be a strong predictor for the severity of court sanctions*. Among all youth, with different offenses and offense histories, disparities in representation are even more striking.


DJJ itself statistically proved "a statewide pattern of over-representation" of African-American youth, while the U.S. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention has made the issue a national priority. Maryland must act now to address the challenges of over-representation in juvenile justice.

While White Youths Are Screened Out of Juvenile Justice After Intake . . .



. . . Black Youths Receive Increasingly Severe Dispositions.

Significantly Higher Percentages of Referrals of Black Males to DJJ are Sent to Juvenile Court.



White Males are More Likely to Receive 90-Day Pre-Court Supervision or to Have Their Cases Closed.

For Every White Youth Sent to a Treatment Center, Only 1 is Sent to a Juvenile Jail.

1:1
1:4

Source: DJJ, FY 1998.

For Every African - American Youth Offered Residential Treatment for Mental Illness, About 4 Are Sent to Juvenile Jails.


* For the most serious and chronic juvenile offenders, when controlled for similar charges and offense history, black youth are twice as likely as white youth to end up in secure or residential placements.

OUR AFRICAN-AMERICAN CHILDREN FACE THE TOUGHEST ODDS

Maryland's African-American children face daunting racial disparities throughout their lives - particularly in education, where various indicators reveal risks for future delinquency. The State of Maryland must meet its obligation to all children to aggressively implement policies to reduce racial disparities, gaps in learning, and overrepresentation in juvenile justice.

Early Reading Skills

Fewer Than 1 in 5 Third-Grade African-American Males Can Read at a Satisfactory Level, Compared to 1 in 2 White Males.




Source: MSDE, 1998 MSPAP.

The inability to read by third grade is considered one of the highest risk factors for children to become serious and chronic juvenile offenders.

Overall Academic Achievement

Across All Subject Areas (In Grades 3, 5, and 8) Only 1 in 5 African American Males Scored at a Satisfactory Level, While Over Half of White Males Did.




Source MSDE, 1998 MSPAP.

Persistent gaps in learning lead to reduced opportunities for many African-Americans as they move into their adolescent years.

Suspensions

Maryland Public Schools Suspended 1 Out of Every 7 African-American Students in the 1997-1998 School Year. They Suspended 1 in 17 White Students.




Source: MSDE, 1997-1998.

Forcing children out of school by suspensions and expulsions is strongly associated with negative future outcomes for kids - delinquency, substance abuse, and dropping out of school.

Failure to Complete High School

African-American Males Drop Out High School at Nearly Double the Rate of White Males.



Source: MSDE, 1998.

A factor known to prevent juvenile delinquency is the expectation of parents and students that the student will attend college.

MARYLAND'S JUVENILE JUSTICE COALITION

The Mission of Maryland's Juvenile Justice Coalition is to reduce juvenile crime and violence and ensure that all youth are treated fairly and have a reasonable chance to become self-sufficient adults.

Chair: Jim McComb
 Director: Heather Ford
 Overrepresentation Committee Chair: Maceo Hallmon
 Communications Director: Sharon Rubinstein
 Research and Writing: Don Cipriani

For more information:
 Maryland's Juvenile Justice Coalition
 34 Market Place, 5th Floor
 Baltimore, Maryland 21202
 (410) 547-9200

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Letters to the Editor

July 28, 2000

Public safety, youths brutalized again by juvenile injustice

The Sun's article "Young lives return to a vortex of crime" (July 16) ought to make every Marylander ashamed and outraged.

After being continuously brutalized by staff of Maryland's Department of Juvenile Justice, 14 pathetic youths have been savaged once again. The public has also been brutalized by the coarse negligence of the governor and lieutenant governor, as well as the director of that agency.

After The Sun reported that most of these delinquents were back on the street, dealing and using drugs and getting into serious trouble, how dare Lt. Gov. Kathleen Kennedy Townsend refuse to comment on the plight of these youths?

She and other state officials owe taxpayers an explanation for why these children, still on probation and under supervision of Juvenile Justice, were never contacted by officials.

While several boot camp staff members were removed, mistreatment and neglect of these youths on the street continued.

How dare Gov. Parris Glendening's spokesperson say: "We never saw this as being about 14 kids. This is about an entire system being changed."

Exactly how? Is such a statement plainly stupid or perhaps simply treacherous? How does Ms. Townsend now refuse Sun reporters access to that agency? Perhaps she and the governor should resign.

H.L. Goldstein

Baltimore

I have concerns after reading of the recent actions of the 14 youths of Charlie Squad after state boot camp.

My concern begins with the pizza man terrorized with a knife to his throat, and extends to the second pizza man robbed, the auto theft, assault, armed robbery and attempted murder -- for which the perpetrators have paid little consequence.

My concern also is for the lack of accountability on the part of the elected officials, Gov. Parris N. Glendening and Lt. Gov. Kathleen Kennedy Townsend, who decided to release these delinquents from boot camp. Under their watch, the boys returned to crime, suffered minimal consequences and victimized others.

How can we hold juveniles accountable for their behavior when the two adults who released them into society refuse to face the press and the people of Maryland to be held accountable for the decision?

How dare these officials refuse to discuss the situation. I want to hear, and the victims deserve to hear, that officials made a bad decision, follow-up was nonexistent and that the problems with these boys are being corrected immediately -- while the overhaul of the system itself is under way.

Patricia K. Wajbel

Phoenix

I commend reporter Todd Richissin for his July 16 article on the horribly dysfunctional Maryland juvenile justice system. There is no greater problem in our state than the reduction of crime. There is also no better example of the ineptitude of the Glendening administration than its inability to do so.

According to the story, Lt. Gov. Kathleen Kennedy Townsend "bills herself as the governor's point-person on criminal issues, [but] now says she won't discuss Charlie Squad or the department."

The administration's solution is to ram through a 16-percent budget increase for the department this year. In the real world, one doesn't throw more money at a problem until a strategic solution is well thought out and implemented.

It is time for Maryland to have leadership that is willing to tackle these types of problems head on and not duck reporters' questions when concrete answers cannot be formulated.

Replace the Glendening-Townsend duo, and get effective leadership to help all Marylanders live in safety and peace.

Thomas M. Neale

Baltimore

THE SUN

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Juvenile justice system fails to protect public

It appalls me that a young man has been involved with violent crime since 1997 at the age of 16 or 17, has been connected with three murders and the justice system has failed to protect the general public ("Arrest made in city killing," July 15).

Here we have another case of innocent lives that could have been saved had only the justice system worked properly.

As citizens, I think that we should demand to know why these predatory individuals are loose on our streets. That's the real story here, not the fact that a criminal tried to escape capture in a dress.

This was followed the next day by an article regarding the failure of the juvenile justice system. It makes me wonder what it is going to take to get the Baltimore City court system, the governor and the juvenile justice system to do the job that they are being paid to do.

Jon Tarrant
Baltimore

Still clueless on kid criminals

■ **Charlie Squad:** *Released juvenile delinquents continue to languish without proper state supervision.*

IT SEEMS like a no-brainer. The state Department of Juvenile Justice got panned nationwide last year for beating 14 delinquent teens at a boot camp and then renegeing on promises of supervised parole after the kids were released.

Wouldn't you think officials' response would have included tracking down the 14 teens to make sure they didn't inspire further embarrassing headlines?

Well, think again.

Some of the kids are back in the news for doing stick-ups, dealing drugs and generally raising hell. The few who went straight? They're doing it on their own. State officials don't even seem to know of their whereabouts.

Even worse, no state officials will talk about Charlie Squad. Most notably among them is Lt. Gov. Kathleen Kennedy Townsend, an aspiring state chief executive who has made juvenile justice one of her pet issues.

Without question, something's ferribly awry here.

The plight of 14 teens doesn't

tell the entire story of juvenile justice reform in Maryland. But it does say something about the level of dysfunction that persists in the juvenile justice department:

After-care, or follow-up, is perhaps the most important function in the juvenile justice system. It's a staple, and without it, the whole effort to reform delinquents is a cruel joke — sort of like plucking a child from traffic on one street and then letting him out of the car in the middle of another.

Gov. Parris N. Glendening and Ms. Townsend seemed to understand that when they set out to fix juvenile justice last year. They hired well-respected Bishop Robinson to run the department, then told the legislature to back off its juvenile justice imperatives so he could be free to fix things.

But here's the reality today: *Sun* reporter Todd Richissin knows more about these kids and their criminal doings than the juvenile justice department does.

The governor and the ambitious Ms. Townsend have no reasonable excuse for that truth. They have every reason now — including the fear of future damaging headlines — to rededicate themselves to deliver on their promises to help juvenile delinquents after they leave state custody.

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Young lives return to a vortex of crime

Juveniles: Months after the failures of Maryland's juvenile justice system were revealed, the state remains indifferent to the cadets of Charlie Squad.

*By Todd Richissin
Sun Staff*

Gov. Parris N. Glendening's spokesman

Maryland Juvenile Justice Coalition director

Darrell Shanklin and his boys pressed a strong shiny blade to the pizza man's jumpy Adam's apple, ready to slash a throat for \$30 and a pack of Newport 100s.

That's why Shanklin's back in jail, this time on adult charges.

No problem. He figures he'll just rat out the thugs arrested with him, cut a deal with prosecutors, strip off his orange prison jumpsuit and waltz out of jail. He'll do a year, five at most. By then, he'll be old enough to drink alcohol without sneaking it.

Shanklin was part of Charlie Squad, 14 teen-aged delinquents assaulted repeatedly by guards at a state-run boot camp in Western Maryland and then released last year with promises of "maximum supervised probation" by the state's Department of Juvenile Justice.

The promises were never kept, and the results have been predictable: more drug dealing, more drug use, more victims, more arrests.

The stories of their failings and abuse, told over four days in The Sun in December, illustrated the utter inadequacies of Maryland's probation programs for delinquents and upended the juvenile justice agency.

Top state officials quickly shut down the state's three boot camps for juveniles and promised drastic changes - giving child advocates the first real hope in decades for reform.

But almost seven months after those promises echoed from Annapolis, the agency has done little or nothing to help Shanklin and most of the other Charlie Squad "cadets," let alone carry out the changes.

Juvenile justice officials have yet to even contact many of the kids, including the most desperate of them, those pictured in the newspaper shooting up with dirty needles, using and dealing drugs.

"At the absolute very minimum, you think they would've gone after kids like that, publicly identified," says Jann Jackson, executive director of Maryland Advocates for Children and Youth.

"I've asked a lot of people about some justice for these kids who sparked all

this discussion in the first place, and I've gotten no answers. If they're not going to be compensated, at least how about some services for them? I've gotten no answers about that, either."

Lost in the system

Since their release from boot camp in March, not one of the 14 Charlie Squad cadets has lived up to the terms of his probation.

Juvenile justice officials have lost complete track of seven of the them since December. They closed one of those cases, although the teen never lived up to terms of his probation. Family members say they don't know where he is.

When the series was published, the kids had been back on the streets nine months. In that time, 11 of 14 had gotten into trouble again.

And since the official promises of reforms in December, all but one of them have been arrested at least one more time - some of them three, four and five times since December - on charges as serious as auto theft, assault, armed robbery and attempted murder.

Like Shanklin, eight of these 12 have been picked up adult charges - graduating to the adult justice system that costs Maryland taxpayers \$779 million a year.

The kid who hasn't been jailed? He tested positive for drugs in Charles County, was told by authorities not to use them any more and was sent home.

A Baltimore kid named Christopher Leight is more typical. He had been missing since one month after his release. No warrant was issued for him. No official looked for him.

This month, he was finally taken into custody - only after being charged, as an adult, with dealing drugs while packing a handgun. He now sits in a city jail.

So the teens make their own way, cutting deals after being tossed in jail, continuing their drug use, dope slinging, all kinds of crimes - all the while, supposedly still on probation, or under state control.

And Gov. Parris N. Glendening, Lt. Gov. Kathleen Kennedy Townsend and new Juvenile Justice Secretary Bishop L. Robinson now refuse to discuss Charlie Squad at all.

On their own

If a Charlie Squad cadet like Jimmy Phelps - photographed plunging heroin into his arm - is on the path to recovering from his addiction, he's going it entirely on his own. The state agency that arranged for him to be beat up repeatedly for 20 weeks last year has offered no help or sign of concern.

After a photo was published of him with a needle in his arm, no one from the state did anything to help him or to punish him - even though he was still on

probation.

As far as juvenile justice officials know, he's still wandering with the zombies in Southwest Baltimore, scratching from the dope, looking for his next fix.

But that's not the case. In a suburb of Baltimore these days, Phelps is getting ready for work.

He once looked as though he would never make it, in jail or out. Just a month after boot camp, after ignoring the terms of his probation with no penalty, he became hooked on heroin, getting the dope wherever he could find it, shooting up with any needle around, dirty or not.

Before long, he was turning 18 with a foot already in the grave - crusty with scabs, strung out, fearing AIDS, although not enough to lose the drugs.

But Phelps has been off dope more than four months now. He used methadone to break the habit, then decided he didn't want to be hooked on that drug and kicked that, too. Now he works at a fast-food restaurant, getting by, at least for the time being, without supervision.

"I done it on my own," he says.

Phelps doesn't want his picture in the newspaper again. He doesn't even want the name of the suburb he's working in known to juvenile justice officials. They haven't contacted him in months, and he doesn't want them to.

One of his biggest fears is that if officials find out where he is, he'll end up back in the system he was in when he turned into a junkie.

What of the others from Charlie Squad?

Michael Taylor, a beefy 15-year-old also from Baltimore, was jailed on charges of attempted murder 39 days after his release from boot camp.

He got out. Prosecutors finally decided, after he had spent eight months in an adult jail, not to go ahead with the charges that he shot a man four times.

But within weeks after his release, after an aunt notified juvenile justice officials that he was running wild again, he was locked up again in a state facility, the Victor Cullen Academy in Frederick County, for violating his probation.

Roland "Reno" Scott, another city kid, went back to dealing drugs within weeks after his release. He's back in now.

Last year, just months after he graduated from the Savage Leadership Challenge, the boot camp where Charlie Squad suffered the assaults, he was sent back.

On a trip away from the camp in December, he decided he'd had enough. He bolted and went on the run for a day before cops caught up with him.

The 17-year-old, who lost his mother when she crashed her car and his father to AIDS from a dirty heroin needle, is locked up at the Charles H. Hickey Jr. School, the juvenile facility in Baltimore County. He's not due to be released until next year.

What of Derrick Horrey, who got into trouble when juvenile justice officials broke their promise to get him into the Marine Corps and away from the anarchy of West Baltimore?

As soon as he was released from the Savage boot camp last year, Horrey went it alone.

Within two weeks, he picked up an adult charge of dealing crack. Following the pattern he struck in the juvenile justice system, he was then released and three days later picked up another charge in the adult system, again for dealing crack.

Horrey was released a second time, picked up a third charge three days later and was released again. He managed to go two months before he picked up his fourth adult charge. Two months later he picked up his fifth.

This is just as Horrey had feared before he left the boot camp. He didn't want to come back to Baltimore - wanted to go directly from the camp into the military, so the temptations of the corner wouldn't swallow him.

State juvenile justice workers, assuring him they'd get him right into the Marines, asked Horrey to spend just one weekend at home. He did. But the state didn't keep its promise, and Horrey hasn't helped matters.

Now 18, he's a five-time loser in just his first year of adulthood. His most recent charge, for assault, cost him 12 days in jail, far less than it could have been but, his grandmother fears, a sign of things to come.

These days, he carries his belongings from one house to another, wondering what happened.

"Sometimes I think he's safer in jail," says the grandmother, Veda Hartley. "I'm hoping to God nobody don't hurt him while he's out. The way he lives, with all them drugs, I don't know why somebody don't."

He gave up on the military, she says, after he was locked up for the third time, after his mother went back to jail, too, after he heard nothing from the juvenile justice agency about his new crimes or those promises of the military.

"They never got back to him, and he won't talk about it no more," his grandmother says. "He got disappointed and the runaround, so I think that's it for him. I think he thinks drugs is easier."

Official silence

In the wake of the revelations about Charlie Squad, state officials - from

Glendening and Townsend on down - had plenty to say about the deplorable state of Maryland's juvenile justice system and how the 14 cadets had been mistreated, inside the camp and during their probation.

But these days, Department of Juvenile Justice spokesman Bob Kannenberg says neither he nor Robinson, appointed in December to fix the agency, has any comment about "how Charlie Squad is doing, generally."

In recent months, Robinson has declined or simply not responded to a half-dozen requests for an interview about the department and its progress or lack of it, other than to issue a two-sentence written statement that reform is under way.

The governor, the lieutenant governor and Robinson will not address any aspect of Charlie Squad, why the state has not been in contact with Shanklin or Phelps or many of the other kids, or why no one from the agency even knows the whereabouts of half of them - although in theory six of the seven missing squad members are still on probation.

Mike Morrill, Glendening's spokesman, says only juvenile justice officials can speak to specific cases. But, he adds, the plight of Charlie Squad is no reflection on efforts under way to improve the agency, explaining, "We never saw this as being about 14 kids. This is about an entire system being changed, and that's what we're going about doing."

Townsend, who bills herself as the governor's point-person on criminal issues, now says through a spokesman that she won't discuss Charlie Squad or the department until Robinson does. Another spokesman says the lieutenant governor stands by the comments from the governor's office.

The juvenile justice agency gave a Sun reporter full access to the kids at the camps and to their records before the December series was published. The agency cut that off after the department's failings were outlined. The current fate of Charlie Squad was determined through adult records, interviews with kids who are not now locked in juvenile jails and through juvenile records obtained through other means.

Glendening and Townsend brought Robinson into the department after they said they were misled by top aides, and were surprised anything untoward was happening at the state's three boot camps for juvenile delinquents.

Punctuating their shock, they also closed the camps and ousted the secretary and undersecretary of the department, both their appointees, and three other juvenile justice officials. Along with critics of the department who have insisted for years on the need for reforms, Glendening and Townsend agreed that big changes were a must.

The proposed reforms were supposed to include better oversight of kids once they're released from juvenile jails. Townsend again called for a system of rewards for good behavior and punishment for bad - "graduated sanctions" - to be put in place. Long a part of her recipe for dealing with delinquents, it has never been carried out with any consistency.

But during the General Assembly session that began in January, the governor and lieutenant governor helped kill most every piece of legislation proposed for the juvenile justice system - publicly putting their faith in Robinson's appointment instead of mandating systemic change.

They did, however, win a record 16 percent budget increase for the department from the legislature, giving it a total of more than \$160 million to spend annually. And Robinson has said that with that new money, he could make the department run as it's supposed to.

'Completely broken'

But even if the agency functions as officials intend, many advocates say, kids like those from Charlie Squad will still be left on their own because the department is so intent on jailing them - instead of preventing crimes in the first place, getting them mental health help or substance abuse treatment or appropriate schooling.

Essentially, the department locks the kids up and lets them go. Over and over again.

Not one member of Charlie Squad has been locked up fewer than three times since first entering the juvenile justice system. Since being released from the camp, one, Horrey, has been locked up five times.

Statewide, about eight of every 10 kids who come into contact with Maryland's juvenile justice agency are caught committing another crime - giving Maryland one of the worst juvenile recidivism rates in the nation.

"With no intervention, no follow-up, you see these juveniles over and over going back to the life of crime," says Michael Taylor's attorney, Richard G. Berger of Baltimore. "Had they intervened - they being the juvenile justice system and the family - maybe you wouldn't see kids like him graduating to being more hard-core and more violent."

Adds Heather Ford, director of the Maryland Juvenile Justice Coalition: "This agency is completely broken, and they're still tinkering around the edges with it. I think they need to blow it up and give it a complete budgetary overhaul."

Meanwhile, officials are still promising changes.

The legislature's budget increase did not take effect until July 1, which limited the juvenile justice agency's ability to make changes quickly, its defenders note. But the specifics of when and how those funds will be put to use have not been announced.

The agency has also delayed fixing other problems that were identified even earlier, such as the need to follow higher standards at state juvenile detention facilities.

A new set of such standards was adopted by the state last year, calling for reducing overcrowding at state facilities by treating more kids in their homes

and neighborhoods - rather than in jails, where they're sometimes forced to sleep on the floor. Those standards aren't yet being enforced.

"There's no question that the reforms that are needed will take some time," says Jim McComb, chairman of the Maryland Juvenile Justice Coalition. "At the same time, there are some things they could do in the short run to inspire some confidence that these changes are going to be made.

"That confidence hasn't been inspired, not when they can't even give us a time-line for implementing the detention standards or when no attempt is being made to treat kids publicly identified as having serious drug problems."

But advocates say they have little choice but to continue pushing Glendening, Townsend, Robinson and legislators. The new secretary, they say, has been working with them to carry out some of the probation-related changes suggested by a task force appointed by the governor after the series was published in December.

They still hope Robinson's promises of reform do not go the way of those of his predecessors.

The task force recommendations went well beyond probation to a scathing assessment of the juvenile justice agency, concluding that the department had virtually no strategy for holding kids accountable for their crimes or treating their needs.

The task force asked the agency to determine which kids are truly dangerous so it could avoid locking up those who are not. It also recommended putting more money into mental health and drug-addiction treatment, family counseling and education; and it called for the development of a better information system to track kids and deal with them before they graduate to real trouble.

Daniel W. Moylan, a retired juvenile judge from Washington County who helped lead the task force last winter, says that at first he was concerned that nobody seemed to be paying any attention to his group's recommendations.

But he now adds: "What gives me hope is the department now has the leadership it never had before, and for the first time I can remember, the secretary is bringing people in from the outside and really seems interested in what we're saying. He knows he can't go it alone."

Plea bargain

But Shanklin's very much on his own.

"How're them other guys doing?" the 17-year-old asks in June from behind the thick glass at the Charles County Detention Center, an adult facility. "Anybody else locked up?"

He figures he's facing one to five years. Probably closer to one, he believes before his plea bargain is worked out. He can cut it, he insists, though his eyes flit as he speaks - never could hide his nervousness very well. He's been

in jail since March and figures he'll probably get credit for the time he's served.

And so in Courtroom A of the Charles County Courthouse last month, Pamala Shanklin, Darrell Shanklin's mother, shifts uncomfortably on the wooden pews and waits for her son to be brought in. She rests her chin on the cane she uses to walk, shakily because of her multiple sclerosis, but she is there for Darrell, says that's how it'll always be, whatever his problems.

"He's still my baby," she says. "He'll always be my baby."

She sits in the courtroom seven hours, waiting for her son's case to be called.

She waits while the judge sentences a car thief. Waits while another thug who stole Christmas presents from under a tree answers for his crime. Waits while a 17-year-old kid who raped a 12-year-old girl tells the judge that, yes, he's guilty, and wears a grin as he leaves the courtroom.

Finally, it's Shanklin's turn. His case is the last of the day.

Sheriff's deputies lead him into the courtroom. He wears a black shirt and black pants. His mother says it's a small thing but she's glad he's not in the prison jumpsuit.

But he is handcuffed and shackled, just as he was when he arrived at the Western Maryland boot camp to be rehabilitated more than a year earlier. Only now, he's in a lot more trouble.

He shuffles before the judge, and his mother looks at him, makes a moment of eye contact with her son and manages a closed smile. She has not seen him since March, except behind that thick glass at the jail, and she is nearly close enough to touch him, a blessing.

Circuit Judge Richard J. Clark asks Shanklin if he understands the charges against him.

"Yes, sir," Shanklin replies.

"And you understand the possible sentence?" the judge asks.

"Yes, sir," Shanklin replies again.

"And you still wish to plead guilty?"

"Yes, sir."

The sentence will very likely be more than five years, not the year that Shanklin was counting on. As it turned out, his partners who put the blade to the pizza man's throat - and together with Shanklin robbed a second one - pleaded guilty as well. Prosecutors never needed Shanklin's plea bargain.

Shanklin's plea deal formally calls for a maximum of 14 years, consistent with Maryland sentencing guidelines for adult offenders. There's no

mandatory minimum.

But when Shanklin is sentenced next month, the judge will be using guidelines that suggest a minimum of four years in prison. Typically in Charles County, judges sentence somewhere in the middle of the guideline range - which, in Shanklin's case, would be somewhere around nine years.

So chances are, this 17-year-old robber of two pizza men - for a total take of about \$50 and those Newport 100s - will be at least 26 years old when he's released.

Outside the courtroom, Pamala Shanklin nearly falls as she steps gingerly toward her son, now being hustled back to jail. The deputies take pity and step aside as the mother balances herself, one arm pressing down on her cane, the other wrapped around her Darrell, her face pressed against his heart.

"We love you, Darrell," she says, and there are tears from both the mother and the son.

"I love you, too," he says, and the deputies ease the teen-ager away to await sentencing, as an adult.

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Psychiatry prof gets victims and offenders to talk it out

BY GREG RIENZI

The Gazette

Picture this: You come home to find someone has left graffiti on your front steps. On further investigation, you find you're not alone, as neighbors have been victimized similarly, the perpetrator's initials left as a calling card.

As you stare at the many colored swirls smeared onto your property, you seethe and yearn for just five minutes to give the person who did this a piece of your mind. This very same feeling of indignation is perhaps shared by your fellow victims, not to mention whoever is left with the loathsome task of removing the paint.

Lauren Abramson, an assistant professor of psychiatry at the School of Medicine, understands this anger and its subsequent need for release. To that end, Abramson has provided a forum where victims of wrongful acts can get their desired five minutes—actually longer—to come literally face to face with their offenders.

In 1996, Abramson initiated the Community Conference Program, a unique approach to dealing with criminal and harmful activities by which offenders, victims and their respective supporters participate in a single meeting in order to vent their emotions and find constructive ways to repair the damage. The involved parties design their own satisfactory solution; if all abide by it, no further action is taken.

Among the incidents addressed are quality of life issues, ongoing conflicts among neighbors, trespassing and truancy.

What began on a "piecemeal and volunteer basis" has grown since into a fully sanctioned effort that has earned the support of the Baltimore City Police Department, the Department of Juvenile Justice, the Enterprise Foundation and a variety of community, justice and social service organizations. The program is funded by the Governor's Office of Crime Control and Prevention, the Open Society Institute and federal grants. More than 150 community conferences took place in Baltimore during the past two years, and there are currently plans for creating a citywide program. Other municipalities in the state have expressed interest as well.

Abramson, whose specialty is child psychology, says the program, while surely meant to discourage criminal activity, is focused primarily on the emotional well-being of people involved in harmful acts.

"I originally became interested in this



LOUIS ROSENSTOCK

Lauren Abramson

community process because I felt that when someone has been harmed, it is an opportunity for all those involved to come together and talk about how they feel and how they were affected," Abramson says. "People end up so enraged and terrorized by things that happen to them, and there is just no outlet for this rage because the courts keep the victim and offenders away from each other. We have gotten so much away from talking with one another."

The program Abramson began in Baltimore has its roots down under in Australia, where a group of her colleagues applied a similar procedure in that country's juvenile justice system. The process was created to allow young offenders to meet their victims and anyone else affected by their actions. For example, in the case of a youth caught trespassing in a zoo, the animal curators and caretakers might be present at the meeting.

Abramson says what makes the program so effective is that offenders—who often think they have hurt either nobody or just their victim—discover their actions have impacted many.

The community conference is a completely voluntary practice involving an incident in which the offender admits to the wrongdoing. For minor offenses, Abramson says, the conference can be a diversion: All parties agree to go through this process instead of sending the case to court.

"We are trying to give an immediate response to harmful activity. That is part of its effectiveness. If your kid had stayed out past curfew, for example, you wouldn't want to ground him six months later. But that is

what happens a lot of times in the criminal justice system. It takes too much time," Abramson says.

Abramson's effort began with her "cold-calling" police, juvenile justice and school officials to tell them this process exists. Today, Abramson receives referrals from these same groups.

The meetings take place in the community where the incident happened, usually in a church or a library. Abramson says it typically takes two weeks from finding out about an incident to organizing the meeting.

"It is important to find a date when everyone can attend," Abramson says. "For these meetings to be successful, you want everyone to get a chance to talk."

The atmosphere at these conferences, as one might suspect, often gets pretty heated, especially at the beginning, Abramson says. "But you want that to happen in order to deal with the negative feelings of rage, contempt and fear that keep people in conflict," she says, adding that some conferences have included more than 30 people. "The process is designed to give expression to those negative feelings, so that people can do something different with them. What actually happens, more often than not, is there is a point at the meeting when people say, 'Oh, my God. We are all responsible for this.'"

Abramson's role at these meetings, which last from one to four hours, is as a "neutral facilitator." She encourages people to say what they feel, but if they start to assassinate someone's character, she warns them and prods them to be more constructive.

She does not work alone, however.

Since 1996, Abramson has trained approximately 50 police officers, schoolteachers, clergy and interested citizens to be community conference facilitators.

The meetings end when an agreement has been reached. If the offender abides by the provisions—which could include performing community service, seeking counseling or participating in an after-school program—the victims and the authorities agree the incident will not be pursued any further.

Community conferences are not just for the benefit and satisfaction of the victims, however, but also are intended to help the offender.

Abramson gives the example of a girl caught bringing a knife to school. It was discovered at her community conference that her mother was in substance abuse treatment, her father was in jail, and she was living with her father's girlfriend.

"Basically, she really wanted some attention from her parents," Abramson says. "Everyone at the meeting realized she was in

a very tough situation, and we worked out something so that she could see them. Criminal and violent acts don't just happen out of nowhere; there are reasons why people harm other people. So we try to deal with the broader issue."

Sheila Maynor, director of community outreach for the Maryland Department of Juvenile Justice, says Abramson's program creates a positive community dialogue that embraces offenders rather than alienating them.

"It sends the message that we want to help you live in our community, and we don't want to feel afraid of people anymore," says Maynor, who has worked closely with Abramson for the past four years. "This program is not just about the offense but about neighbors getting involved and talking to each other so they can understand the situation. Wounds are healed through this process, it can be so amazing. And for us in juvenile justice, we feel this process helps reduce the number of children who come through our doors."

Philip Leaf, principal investigator of the Safe Schools/Healthy Students Initiative in Baltimore City, says these conferences work toward reconstituting community norms, including the healthy verbal interaction between residents. In particular, Leaf points to the lack of discourse between youth and adults prevalent in today's society.

"Simply interacting with one another in this way can improve a person's behavior and his or her perception of the neighborhood," says Leaf, who is a professor of mental hygiene at the School of Public Health.

Abramson says communities that have embraced the program are now offering conferences for common civil nuisances, not just juvenile misdemeanor crimes.

She eventually wants to apply the conference process to more serious offenses, not in lieu of punishment but in addition to court so that victims are allowed a time to heal and tell their offenders how their action affected others.

As for skeptics who think community conferences are giving offenders a free pass, Abramson says this type of confrontation is by no means an easy way out.

"Kids often report that it's much harder to do this, to be face to face with people who they hurt, than to go to court six months later and get a probation," she says. "And from my point of view, the very fact that people are sitting together and talking about their problems makes it a success."

For more information about community conferencing, contact Abramson at 410-955-3945.

ADVERTISEMENT

Beyond the Boot Camps

By Heather Ford and Sharon Rubinstein

It took a scandal, but if all goes well as this legislative session ends, Maryland will have moved toward a new system of juvenile justice that is both just and constructive.

With an infusion of money, new leadership, and the passage of important legislation, we can begin to craft a system that meets the following fundamental principles:

Community-based: Children are placed in secure facilities only when necessary.

Humane conditions: Facilities comply with state standards modeled after national guidelines.

Prompt placement: Children do not wait months to be sent to their designated programs.

Services: Children get needed mental health, substance abuse, and other help while in placement, and afterwards.

Equal justice for minorities: Overrepresentation of minority youth in the system is curbed.

Oversight: An independent commission monitors the Department of Juvenile Justice.

Making these changes is urgently necessary. These are the actual words of children locked up last year at Cheltenham, a juvenile detention facility:

- *Some people get beat up some people got to urinate in their rooms because they are not allowed out of their rooms...we are human too.*
- *I am lost in the system...I've been there...for almost five months now and I have received no help...*
- *Throughout the five years of juvenile commitment that I have served for one charge, which was petty theft, I've probably spent more time in Detention Centers waiting for a placement than actually serving for my offense. I haven't seen home for more than a steady weekend visit for five years.... Give us some help with our families, and let us help ourselves.*

Let's heed our children's words, and create lasting reform.

Heather Ford is Director of Juvenile Justice and Sharon Rubinstein is Director of Communications at Advocates for Children & Youth.

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Studies Slam Excessive Minority Lock-Ups, But Solutions Escape

BY JIM MYERS

A flurry of new reports charges that minority youth get unequal treatment in the criminal justice system — yet costly efforts over the past decade to rectify the problem have produced few results.

The latest report may be the most comprehensive effort ever to quantify disproportionate minority confinement (DMC), demonstrating that black and other minority adolescents are treated more severely than white youngsters across all levels of the juvenile justice system. Among the findings in "And Justice for Some": black youngsters, 15 percent of the youth population, represent 26 percent of the youths arrested. Black youths with no prior record of detention are six times more likely to be incarcerated than are white youths in similar circumstances. Thereafter, the statistical disparities between minority and white youths widen, suggesting that black youths in particular are viewed by justice decision-makers as more dangerous.

The report, released in late April, was commissioned by the Building Blocks for Youth Initiative, a coalition led by the Youth Law Center, and underwritten by (among others) the U.S. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) and foundations such as Annie E. Casey, Ford, and the George Soros Open Society Institute. It uses several data sources, including FBI Uniform Crime Reports and OJJDP reports.

Its claims have been heard before. Yet pending congressional legislation would eliminate a requirement that states try to reduce DMC ratios in their juvenile justice systems, and existing reduction efforts do not seem to have produced much change.

"Very few places have come up with a meaningful strategy, much less a change in the numbers," says Bart Lubow, senior associate with the Annie E. Casey Foundation, whose Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative supports creative alternatives to incarceration of youth.

Congressional Threat

"Youth of color are over-represented at each point in the system, and the disadvantage accumulates as they move through the system," says the report's co-author Michael A. Jones, senior researcher with the National Council on Crime

and Delinquency, based in Oakland, Calif. Jones acknowledges that his report contains little new data; its strength is that it is much wider in scope than previous efforts.

However, the weight of evidence about DMC in juvenile justice may be reaching a critical mass. In December, an OJJDP report cited similar statistical evidence of the disparities in juvenile justice. And in early May, a report on the overall criminal justice system by the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights also cited inequities faced by minority youth. "The color of a person's skin," this latter report says, "is a better indicator of whether or not a juvenile is tried as an adult than any other."

But even as statistical evidence on the DMC problem mounts, conservative Republicans in Congress are hoping to ax a Justice Department requirement that states must determine whether the proportion of detained minority juveniles exceeds their proportion in the population and if so, to develop corrective strategies. In 1992 Congress elevated the concern to a "core requirement," meaning states failing to address DMC issues could forfeit 25 percent of their annual OJJDP formula grants.

Conservatives like Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) say that raising the issue of race in this way, in effect, sets racial quotas or limits on the acceptable number of minority youths who can be detained for crimes they commit. "You still can't ignore the fact that these kids are committing crimes," Hatch said during the 1999 Senate floor debate on the issue. "It doesn't solve the problem by saying states should find a way of letting these kids out."

Republican efforts to eliminate the federal DMC requirement passed the Senate last year but were defeated 414-16 in the House. It remains among unresolved issues that have

stalled the 1999 Juvenile Justice bill in conference committee.

"Actually, the core requirement is pretty weak," says Denise Forte, legislative director for Rep. "Bobby" Scott (D-Va.). Republican efforts to eliminate the requirement leave it "always at risk," she says.

But is the requirement accomplishing anything?

Little Impact

After more than a decade of OJJDP-funded efforts, experts are hard pressed to cite more than a few local programs that have actually come close to denting DMC figures.

Since 1988, most states have undertaken studies, set up task forces or "initiatives" and hired consultants on DMC issues. OJJDP funded pilot initiatives in five states: Arizona, Florida, Iowa, North Carolina and Oregon, but only Oregon is routinely cited as close to producing an actual shift in minority confinement statistics.

"I think we're just starting to see some success, but most places, it's a little early in the process," says Marc Schindler, staff attorney for the Youth Law Center in Washington, D.C.

Lou Biondi, executive vice president of CYGNUS Corp., a Rockville, Md., firm that consults on DMC issues, is less optimistic.

He says millions of dollars are being spent on "fact-finding and overlapping programs" without producing a satisfactory DMC reduction plan for any state.


"You have to start with the premise that the system is broken; the system has been broken for 100 years," Biondi says, "and no one is approaching the issue from the perspective of true systematic change."

Says Lubow of Casey, whose alternatives to detention initiative includes Oregon's Multnomah County: "Because

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LUBOW: "Few places have come up with a meaningful strategy."



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Like Moving a Mountain: Minority Lock-Up Rates Don't Budge

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there's been such a paucity of examples where they've been able to flip the [DMC] numbers, Portland gets a lot of attention."

Striving to Be Objective

Oregon has a relatively low minority population: only 1.4 percent black and 4 percent Hispanic in the 1990 census. But the Oregon Youth Authority reports that from 1990 through 1997, the percentages of pre-trial detainees in Multnomah County, which includes Portland, dropped from 15 percent to 6 percent for whites and from 24 percent to 9 percent for blacks. For Hispanic youth, the drop was from 34 percent to 12 percent.

Lubow calls the effort "a modest first step." Among the strategies used to cut pre-trial detention figures in Multnomah County is a "risk assessment instrument," which turns out to be a simple form that attempts to bring objectivity to the screening of arrested juveniles. The form uses a point system to rate factors like the seriousness of the charges a youth faces or the youth's prior criminal record, theoretically removing biases (like a youth's clothes or home neighborhood) that might affect more subjective decision-making.

Don't most juvenile justice jurisdictions try to be objective? "Don't be so sure," says Lubow.

A 1998 University of Washington study of three counties

in that state found that probation officers consistently attributed crimes committed by black youths to aspects of their character, while the crimes of white juveniles were often blamed on negative influences or environmental factors. As a result, said the study led by sociology professor George S.



SCHINDLER: "The cycle feeds on itself" as judges avoid sending whites to detention centers where most kids are black.

Bridges, black youths were seen as more personally responsible and blameworthy, and the probation officers recommended them for harsher sentences.

Juvenile justice workers are also increasingly aware of studies pointing out how old attitudes and assumptions can affect how minorities are treated. William Feyerherm, vice provost of research at Portland State University, says assumptions that a two-parent family is more "stable" can influence decisions made about minority youth, who disproportionately come from single-parent homes.

Feyerherm, author of the "systematic analysis model" of DMC issues used by OJJDP, agrees that confinement decisions are too easily influenced by factors like the neighborhood from which a youngster comes. "The quandary for judges is when they know that putting the kid back in the same environment isn't going to help," he says.

Schindler of the Youth Law Center says judges may even hesitate to send white youths to juvenile detention centers where the overwhelming majority of the detainees are black. "So the cycle feeds on itself," he says.

And surely, families with the means (or the health insurance) to pay for alternatives to incarceration like drug treatment or emotional growth programs could influence decisions about incarceration, further affecting minority confinement ratios.

"It takes a long time to change attitudes, images and behaviors," says Buddy Howell, former director of research and program development for OJJDP, who now writes and consults on juvenile justice issues. "It's like moving a mountain."

Giving Up?

Lonnie Jackson, director of Oregon's Office of Minority Services, says his state has attempted to bring a broad range of agencies into the discussions, and other states say they are working toward the same end. Oregon holds an annual summit on the Over-Representation of Minorities in the Juvenile Justice System, bringing law enforcement, juvenile justice agencies, educators, defense attorneys, district attorneys, judges, corrections officials, churches, legislators and tribal organizations into the discussion. Other states, like Pennsylvania, also cite a broad range of agencies and community institutions that have been enlisted in their efforts. Programs like midnight basketball, billed as delinquency prevention, are listed as part of the effort to address DMC.

But proposed solutions can sometimes sound like calls for more studies, data and money. "And Justice for Some" calls for at least \$100 million in additional federal spending to combat DMC, and for a requirement that states spend 25 percent of their OJJDP formula grant money on the DMC problem.

The report's supporters — such as the Urban League, the NAACP and the League of United Latin American Citizens — say treatment of minorities in the criminal justice system will be a major civil rights issue in the new century. Since 1992, 47 states have expanded laws to send youth to adult court for violent crimes, a practice that has produced an extreme statistical disproportion between the way white and black youths are treated. White youths, 79 percent of the overall youth population, are only 25 percent of youths sentenced to adult prisons, according to the report.

"If for whatever reasons the response to delinquency is to lock minority youths up, it seems like we're giving up on them," says Jones, the report's co-author. "And I just don't see that happening in nice white neighborhoods."

Among the findings of "And Justice for Some":

- African-American youth represent 15 percent of the nation's youth population, and 26 percent of the youths arrested.
- When white youth and minority youth were charged with the same offenses, African-American youth with no prior admissions were six times more likely to be incarcerated in public facilities than white youth with the same background. Latino youth were three times more likely than white youth to be incarcerated.
- National custody rates were five times greater for African-American youth than for white youth. Custody rates for Latino and Native American youth were twice the rate for white youth.
- Among the 7,400 youths admitted to adult prisons in 1997, three out of four were minorities.
- For drug offenses, African-American youths are 48 times more likely to be sentenced to juvenile prison than are white youths.
- In 1993, African-American youths were confined an average of 61 days more than white youths. Latino youths were confined an average of 112 days more.

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When assumptions color thinking on young offenders

By ODEANA NEAL

RECENTLY, students in my juvenile justice class and I discussed a case in which a 12-year-old and some friends brought plastic bags and a medicine vial to school containing milk chips that resembled crack cocaine. Timothy distributed the milk chips to his friends throughout the school day. He did not try to disguise the fact that these were chips. He did not seek money for their distribution. None of his schoolmates thought he had or was trying to distribute crack.

Nevertheless, Timothy was found delinquent on the basis of distributing a controlled, dangerous substance.

The Maryland Court of Appeals declared this an error, stating that the facts in this case indicated that Timothy was playing a game, not trying to commit a crime. One of my students argued that even if Timothy were playing a game, the case still warranted juvenile court intervention in some way.

'It's different'

After all, she said, he was "playing" at being a criminal — and surely that does not bode well for his future. But, I responded, kids have been playing cops and robbers for years. Should the juvenile court intervene into the lives of all children who play robber? No, my student replied. So what's the difference between playing robber and playing crack dealer, I asked. My student replied, "I don't know. But it is different."

Although I may be mistaken, I believe that my student thought Timothy was African-American (even though nothing in the case indicated his race) and that this single fact played a significant role in her consideration of the situation. A young black boy playing crack dealer must mean trouble, right?

During the nine years I have taught juvenile justice, I have observed that my students' racial perceptions significantly affect how they think about the situations we study. African-American children's wrongdoing is often seen as more serious and more sinister than the wrongdoing of white children. They sometimes get nervous when I suggest that racial stereotypes may play a role in how they view a child and whether he's really delinquent; some admit that racial imagery has affected their thinking.

This does not mean that my students are racists, but it does mean that they, and all of us, are profoundly affected by our ideas about race. It's important that we try to be aware of it and check ourselves, and one another, when we make assumptions about individuals because of the racial images in our heads.

It's particularly important that we do that when the fate of another individual may depend on our images.

Juvenile justice

Many decision-makers in the juvenile justice system, like my students, may be making decisions inappropriately on the basis of race. The numbers bear that out.

The federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention recently issued a report showing that although 39 percent of victims of juvenile crime report that the perpetrators of those crimes are African-American, a higher percentage of black children are arrested and detained for juvenile crime. Maryland statistics from the Department of Juvenile Justice show arrests and detention of black youths are similarly disproportionate.

That doesn't mean that officials in the juvenile justice system — police officers, intake officers, prosecutors, masters and judges — intend to do harm, but at least some of them are making unconscious assumptions about children based on race.

Those assumptions can make the difference between whether a child is chastised or arrested, sent to counseling or to juvenile court, charged with a more serious or less serious crime, or placed on probation or confined. Those assumptions can have a devastating effect on children, their families and their communities.

Needed legislation

State lawmakers are considering legislation (House Bill 385) to examine disproportion in the juvenile justice system, find its causes and adopt remedies to eliminate it.

Such a measure is urgently needed.

Surely if our justice system is biased, we want to create one that is not. We cannot teach our children anything about justice if we are not willing to practice it.

Odeana Neal teaches juvenile justice at the University of Baltimore School of Law.

Thinking smart on juvenile justice

By VINCENT SCHIRALDI
AND JAMES MCCOMB

OVER THE PAST several months, Marylanders have had serious concerns over the state of juvenile justice in the Free State.

Following a series of scathing articles in *The Sun* about conditions in Maryland's boot camps, Gov. Parris N. Glendening and Lt. Gov. Kathleen Kennedy Townsend fired five top administrators at the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ), closed the state's boot camps, established several task forces, and allocated additional money for improvements.

While these are commendable steps, little has changed in the daily lives of the youths detained in Maryland's crowded and antiquated juvenile facilities. It will take more than money and task forces to fix what's broken.

More than 7,000 children were admitted to Maryland's detention facilities last year, a state record. Although violent youth crime declined by 16 percent over the past two years, more youths are now detained in Maryland than in 1997.

But the hammer of detention has not fallen equally on Maryland's youths. While African-American males make up 17 percent of Maryland's youth population and 39 percent of youth arrests, 81 percent of those confined in the state's most notorious detention facility — the Cheltenham Youth Center — are African-American, according to state figures.

In October, the Maryland Juvenile Justice Coalition sponsored a tour of Cheltenham, which we both attended. The fear on the youths' faces was palpable. Tensions were particularly high in two cottages designed for 27 youths — which housed over 100 each.

The effects of crowding were evident in every facet of the facility's operation. Kids talked of being beaten by overburdened staff or being left to urinate in their rooms when staff were unable to attend to them. One youth had his jaw broken in the bathroom where there was no staff supervision. Last April, a melee broke out when a large number of youths were required to sit in the day room as punishment for the acts of a few.

The youths told of agonizing waits — up to a year sometimes — before they are transferred to treatment facilities. And unlike adults, this is "dead time," not counting toward what they must ultimately spend in placement. Thirty percent of the facility's population sits awaiting placement, ratcheting up the frustration.

Fortunately, a raft of legislation has been authored this year by Del. Kenneth Montague (D-Baltimore) and Del. Selima Marriott (D-Baltimore) to improve conditions for youths in Maryland's juvenile justice system and reduce unnecessary incarcerations. One bill would require the Department of Juvenile Justice to place youths in treatment within a week of their adjudication.

Another would create standards for detention, helping to render crowded, understaffed, inadequately programmed facilities a thing of the past. These standards — developed jointly by DJJ staff and members of the Maryland Juvenile Justice Coalition — would be some of the most comprehensive in the nation.

A third bill establishes an advisory council to make recommendations on how to reduce the disproportionate confinement of minority youths, a problem plaguing the juvenile justice system.

And a fourth bill would create an oversight commission and network of ombudsmen to monitor all youths in locked facilities in the state of Maryland.

Maryland's juvenile justice system needs an overhaul, and this legislation, along with reform initiatives, is a good start.

In the year 2001, a new Baltimore detention facility is expected to open, posing an opportunity and a challenge. The department plans to keep the antiquated Cheltenham facility open, and add more than \$7 million annually to its budget to expand detention by 144 new beds. This despite the fact that most of the youth in Cheltenham are from Baltimore City, 88 percent of kids admitted to Cheltenham are detained on non-violent charges, and juvenile crime is on the decline.

The legislature and governor must now ensure that, prior to opening the Baltimore facility, the department implements a plan to reduce the number of nonviolent youth it houses and to place them in community programs that can rehabilitate them, hold them accountable and keep the public safe. Then, the governor and the General Assembly should allocate funding to raze Cheltenham and replace it with a smaller, modern facility to serve the needs of Prince George's County youth, who make up the bulk of the remainder of Cheltenham's population.

In other words, it's time that the state of Maryland got smart, and not just tough, on juvenile crime.

Vincent Schiraldi and James McComb are members of the Maryland Juvenile Justice Coalition.

M A R Y L A N D

Md. Urged to Overhaul Juvenile Justice System

Panel Cites Crowding, Lack of Services

By MANUEL PEREZ-RIVAS
Washington Post Staff Writer

A panel of juvenile justice advocates yesterday called on Maryland legislators to pass a series of changes aimed at helping to fix deep-seated problems in the state's troubled system for detaining youths.

In particular, they pointed to continuing problems at the Cheltenham Youth Facility in Prince George's County, a juvenile detention center that for years has suffered from crowding and other problems, such as a lack of mental health counseling and inadequate educational services for the youths held there.

Mark Soler, the president of the Youth Law Center, a national advocacy group based in the District, said that the Department of Juvenile Justice made some improvements to physical conditions at Cheltenham since the release of a scathing report about conditions there in 1995, but that other problems—such as crowding and the lack of services—had not been corrected.

"The department, I'm afraid, has not been able to police itself and unfortunately has lost credibility with the public," Soler said. He said the state needs to enact comprehensive changes. "Don't just put a Band-Aid on it," he said.

The package of legislation being supported by the Maryland Juvenile Justice Coalition, an umbrella organization of more than three dozen groups, includes a proposal to establish an independent oversight body to investigate reports of abuse in the Juvenile Justice Department and oversee agency functions.

Other measures include a proposal to limit to a week the time that youths can be kept in juvenile jails after a court has

sentenced them to a residential treatment program. Currently, some youths are kept in detention for weeks or months before a spot is found in a court-ordered treatment program. Another bill would require the department to implement standards for quality of care, staff training and other matters related to juvenile detention.

Conditions "in detention centers are serious, and if they aren't addressed, there will be tragedies," said Jim McComb, chairman of the Maryland Juvenile Justice Coalition.

Bart Lubow, project director at the Annie E. Casey Foundation, which funded the 1995 study of Cheltenham, said most juveniles being held in detention nationally are not in custody because of violent crimes, and he urged Maryland to fund community programs that would serve as alternatives to detention for nonviolent offenders.

Bishop L. Robinson, the acting Juvenile Justice secretary, who attended yesterday's legislative briefing, said he would try to shorten the stays of youths in detention centers and to divert more nonviolent youths into programs that would serve as alternatives to detention.

Robinson said he also believes many of the concerns that have been raised by the advocates will be relieved somewhat by a management reorganization that he is overseeing. But he did say he is opposed to legislation to establish an independent commission with authority over the department.

"I have no problem with oversight, but it would have to be advisory oversight, or else it would really usurp the authority of the secretary," said Robinson, who took the job in December after the previous secretary was ousted.

THE SUN

OPINION ■ COMMENTARY

Improving kids' lives should be state's goal

■ *Boot camps: Governor finally stops violence but must beef up supervision, after-care.*

FIRST, the no-brainer. Gov. Parris N. Glendening and Lt. Gov. Kathleen Kennedy Townsend finally took "ultimate responsibility" for the state-sanctioned child abuse at a Garrett County boot camp and cleaned house at the Juvenile Justice Department. Makes you wonder what took so long.

Now it's on to the more complex issues. The state still has a long way to go to repair these programs, this department and its credibility in dealing with tough kids. *The Sun* reported in a series of stunning articles that guards routinely inflicted severe beatings on youth inmates of a Garrett County boot camp.

The situation was either covered up or ignored by top department leaders, five of whom have been ousted.

Bishop L. Robinson, named interim secretary, will impose discipline and much-needed managerial skills. The retired public safety secretary knows law enforcement. He led a task force that detailed the abuses at youth boot camps. So he understands what must be done within the department.

During this decade, many states instituted boot camps to help turn around delinquents. Results have been mixed.

New Jersey found its graduates had a slightly lower recidivism rate; a U.S. Justice Department study found no statistical difference in teen recidivism.

We know that traditional detention centers don't work for hard-core youth offenders. Putting these kids in an isolated camp that demands strict discipline isn't necessarily a bad idea. Perhaps a re-

turn to the old forestry camps in Western Maryland, combining hard work, plenty of counseling and education classes would bring better results.

The disastrous Savage Leadership Challenge failed because guards inflicted physical abuses — and supervisors let it happen.

But abuse is not confined to boot camps. Another recent *Sun* story reported that seven guards have been fired in the past year for harming delinquents at Prince George's County's Cheltenham Youth Facility, a traditional juvenile detention center. Ongoing troubles at the Hickey School in Baltimore County indicate the breadth of this problem. Only the strictest supervision of juvenile detainees and the employees who watch them will end the abuses.

There is broad agreement on one missing ingredient in juvenile justice: community-based follow-up programs.

Mr. Robinson is a firm believer in follow-up care. He said probation officers must keep track of teens. That's not happening now. Some juveniles may need daily monitoring indefinitely, he said.

Other, costly social services will be needed to keep these kids from getting into trouble again. Mr. Glendening and Ms. Townsend, who is supposed to oversee criminal justice, must put money behind their words of concern.

And they must hire experienced managers and juvenile professionals, not political appointees.

They must get involved in overseeing the work of this important department.

The Sun's boot camp revelations exposed a juvenile justice system in tatters. The governor and lieutenant governor bear responsibility for picking up the shards and making sure these "tough kids" get better instead of tougher.

The New York Times

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SUNDAY, DECEMBER 19, 1999

Maryland Is Latest Of States to Rethink Youth 'Boot Camps'

By FRANCIS X. CLINES

BALTIMORE, Dec. 17 — In the face of a looming scandal, Maryland shut down its once ballyhooed boot-camp regimen for juvenile offenders this week, providing further evidence of grave second thoughts across the nation about the "get tough" camps avidly favored by politicians during the last decade.

After an emergency investigation concluded there was a pattern of guards' punishing teenage inmates with roughhouse abuses, Gov. Parris N. Glendening suspended the paramilitary methods and trappings at the state's three camps and removed his top five justice executives. At the same time, 14 of the quasi-drill-sergeant camp guards were suspended as criminal and civil rights investigations began. One guard has already been charged with child abuse.

"The trust of the people of Maryland has been violated," the governor declared as the scandal, spurred by a series of articles in *The Sun*, reached crisis proportions with a Baltimore judge intervening to remove 26 of his city's juveniles from the camps and expressing "grave concern" at the teenage offenders' many complaints of abusive guards.

The boot camp approach to juvenile criminals, based on enforcing rugged military obedience tech-

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Maryland Is Latest to Rethink 'Boot Camps'

Continued From Page 1

niques of verbal and physical regimentation, has been adopted in recent years in many states frustrated by youth crime. But lately some of the 52 boot camps housing 4,500 juveniles across the country are being scrutinized because of instances of excessive force and, even more, because of mounting research findings that the camps, for all their attempts at esprit de corps and rigid discipline, offer no improvement on traditional detention methods.

In Georgia, where a former marine received national attention in pioneering the boot camp approach, the state decided this month to begin phasing out its five boot camps after a stinging conclusion by the United States Justice Department that "the paramilitary boot camp model is not only ineffective, but harmful" to juvenile offenders. Colorado, North Dakota and Arizona have also dropped their programs, while Florida and California are scaling theirs back.

Official doubts have been growing in the face of some notorious examples of abuses. In South Dakota, Gina Score, a 14-year-old convicted of shoplifting, died from heat exhaustion after her drill instructors concluded she was faking illness during a forced march. Last year, Nicholas Contreras, a 16-year-old convicted of robbery, died in an Arizona boot camp after being punished for discipline violations.

"The boot camps are just the crisis of the day," said Jann Jackson, executive director of Advocates for Children and Youth, a private justice agency, who served here on the governor's emergency investigation of the camps. "It reflects far deeper systemic problems in a justice sys-

DO NOT FORGET THE NEEDIEST!

tem that has been failing kids for years from the moment of intake to after-care."

Various juvenile justice and welfare advocates said in interviews that Maryland officials had received repeated earlier warnings of widespread problems in youth detention centers but ignored them until *The Sun* reported a pattern of abuses by boot camp guards and pressed political leaders for reaction.

Governor Glendening and Lt. Gov. Kathleen Kennedy Townsend, who is charged with overseeing the criminal justice system, announced the

Research raises doubts about the effectiveness of 'get tough' programs.

firings on Thursday after a week of front-page accusations that teenagers were struck and gratuitously humiliated by overzealous guards in the three years of the program.

"The boot camp is a model that lends itself to abuses," said Jim McComb, chairman of the Maryland Juvenile Justice Coalition, a group of professional specialists that was warning of problems long before the current scandal. There is no evidence that the camps do any good, Mr. McComb said.

"Why take the risk of abusing children to defend the camps?" he asked after Governor Glendening asserted that, despite current problems, a way might yet be found to make the boot camp an effective tool.

Various members of the coalition opposed to boot camps expressed concern that the Glendening admin-

istration would retain a "get tough" philosophy to protect itself politically, while leaving unsolved large and expensive problems like crowding throughout the juvenile system.

"The answers go far beyond firing five people," said Vincent Schiraldi, executive director of the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice. For all the news media attention to the boot camps, Mr. Schiraldi said, state officials have long been warned about less dramatic problems at the Cheltenham detention center, where, he said, 100 detainees were sleeping crowded into a day room designed for recreation by 26 people.

In a national study of recidivism this year by the Koch Crime Institute, a research organization in Topeka, Kan., the rates for juveniles from boot camps ranged from 64 percent to 75 percent, while the rate for those from traditional detention centers was 63 percent to 71 percent.

"We were aware of the boot camp problem and terminated seven of the guards even before this brouhaha," said Jack Nadol, Maryland's deputy secretary of juvenile justice, who refused to resign and was fired by the governor. "I think the articles sensationalized the problem and didn't show the kids who have gone on to college or the military."

Even so, Mr. Nadol conceded in an interview that the camps failed to have on-site monitors of the guards' behavior and that a boot-camp supervisor, empowered to use force against abrasive detainees under limited circumstances, "can get carried away with his sense of influence and power."

"I think there was some abuse," Mr. Nadol acknowledged, while emphasizing that when the camps were first unveiled in an optimistic burst of publicity, the assigned detainees were "the best that was out there, and we rejected the rest."

But soon drug abusers and ever-

tougher cases were assigned to the camps, he said, increasing pressure on supervisors to maintain order.

"I'm not excusing abuses," he said, "but the real systemic problem in the agencies is that we do not have enough mental health treatment, substance abuse treatment, and a whole range of after-care that is lacking."

Mr. Nadol insisted that his was a token firing and he said he intended to pursue the cause from the private sector.

"My concern is people will get their 20-second sound bites and the whole thing will disappear," he said, echoing the concern of system

watchdogs like Mr. McComb, the head of the state juvenile justice coalition, who is also director of the Maryland Association of Resources for Families and Youth.

"The fact is, the department of juvenile justice for 15 or 20 years has done nothing to respond to all the symptoms of trouble," Mr. McComb said.

"So here's the real test: to see if they do something more than fire a secretary who never had a true background in juvenile justice," he said of the ousted state justice secretary, Gilberto de Jesus. "The systemic problems have lasted through the best and worst of secretaries."

SATURDAY MAILBOX

Young offenders face more abuses

In the recent series of reports on juvenile boot camps, *The Sun* exposed severe abuse of children committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice.

Although those cases are shocking, sadly, they are by no means isolated. Violence is pervasive in the system of confinement for children accused or found responsible for crime in Maryland.

Every child in confinement, wherever she or he may be housed, must fear abuse.

For example:

A recent report issued by Human Rights Watch detailed disturbing conditions for children being held before trial at the Baltimore City Jail.

As a routine mechanism of discipline, pairs of youths were alleged to have been placed in an 8-foot-square cage and forced to combat each other with their bare fists while staff and other prisoners cheered them on.

The report also claimed the juvenile unit was awash in homemade weapons, some provided to the youths by jail workers.

Interviews with scores of youth and staff at the Cheltenham facility reveal that fights are a daily occurrence and that staff is inadequately trained or motivated to control the violence.

One administrator reported that at least once a week a child must be removed from the facility for treatment of injuries suffered in the course of a violent incident.

And the violence at Cheltenham is not limited to violence between children. According to the Department of Juvenile Justice, in 1999, seven employees were terminated for assaults on children and 50 others were disciplined for failing to properly supervise.

Although we applaud this disciplinary action, this level of misconduct suggests a profound breakdown in the state's training and supervision of guards.

During a tour of the Waxter facility last fall, children and staff described cruel punishments for minor infractions of discipline.

Youths were sometimes placed overnight in an empty cell, completely naked, as punishment. Children were forced to sleep on a cold concrete floor with no bedding, blanket or clothing.

Removing children from the boot camps is a good first step.

But reform must not end there. We need a top-to-bottom overhaul of the juvenile justice system.

At a minimum, the state must take these immediate steps:

- Reduce overcrowding in juvenile facilities by placing nonviolent, low-risk offenders in community-based programs.

- Enhance education, mental health and drug treatment for youth who remain incarcerated.

- Increase screening, training and supervision of staff, and implement meaningful community prevention programs that support children and their families.

The systematic abuse of children by our justice system serves no social goal.

These children are in need of our care and protection. Instead, we are returning them to their families and their communities scarred by official abuse.

As a community, we should be ashamed.

Jonathan M. Smith
Baltimore

The writer is executive director of the Public Justice Center.

AFTER SCHOOL PROGRAMS REDUCE JUVENILE CRIME

Maryland's
Juvenile
Justice
Coalition

April 1999

After School Should Be A Time of Development, Not Delinquency

At least one third of Maryland's school-age children (approximately 350,000) are unsupervised each day when school lets out. Maryland law allows children as young as 8 years old to be left alone without adult supervision. Because of the need for both parents to work, fewer children have a parent to go home to after school. In Maryland, 81% of parents with school-age children work, according to the Children's Defense Fund.

It is no surprise then that more than half of all juvenile arrests occur between the hours of 2 and 8 p.m. (See Chart Below). In one study, eighth graders left unsupervised for 11 or more hours per week were twice as likely to abuse drugs or alcohol as those under adult supervision.¹

Police chiefs across Maryland and the nation say that expanding after school programs is one of the best strategies to reduce juvenile crime.² "Keeping the child[ren] occupied in the critical hours before a

parent gets home [means] they're less likely to commit or become victims of crimes," says Baltimore County Police Chief Terrence Sheridan.³

Compelling Evidence Supports After-School Expansion


Academic studies and national and local experts support what parents and police already know.⁴ "There is no doubt that one of our best investments for preventing youth crime, violence and substance abuse is expanding after-school programs," says Larry Dawson, prevention coordinator at the Maryland Governor's Office of Crime Control and Prevention.

"One significant factor in the substantial drop in crime in New York City is the expansion of after-school programs that began in 1991," says Richard Murphy, director of the Center for Youth Development and Policy Research in Washington, D.C.

Not only are after-school programs safe havens, they can provide youth with the services and supports they need to develop into successful adults. These supports include mentoring, academic remediation, opportunities to experience success, positive peer contact, training in decision-making, and exposure to career options. In particular, after-school programs can provide youth with the time and help they need to establish their own identities and resist negative peer pressure.⁵

Specific studies that support the delinquency prevention effect of after-school programs include:

- ⇒ The Quantum Opportunities Program. The program included community service, tutoring, computer-based instruction, life skills training, and career and college planning. Two years after leaving the program, participants had far fewer contacts with the police than a control group. The number of arrests was lower for the participants who had been arrested, and the number of convictions was six times lower.⁶
- ⇒ The Boys and Girls Clubs of America placed after-school programs in public housing developments and saw a 13% drop in juvenile crime and a 22%



drop in drug activity, in addition to improved school attendance and academic performance.⁷

- ⇒ In Fort Myers, Florida, juvenile arrests dropped by 28% after the city began Success Through Academics and Recreational Support (STARS), a program that included building an after-school center in the heart of a low-income community.⁸
- ⇒ In Baltimore County and Baltimore City, police athletic leagues (PAL) have helped reduce juvenile crime. In the area around the Lansdowne PAL Center, juvenile crime dropped 33% in one year.⁹ In the area around the Goodnow PAL Center, juvenile arrest rates fell by 16% during a time that juvenile arrests rose by 2% citywide.¹⁰ In both neighborhoods, juvenile victimization by crime also decreased substantially.
- ⇒ In Phoenix, Arizona, keeping open recreational facilities longer hours during the summer resulted in a 55% drop in police reports of juvenile crime. When the hours were reduced in the following fall, crime rates increased back to pre-summer levels.¹¹

The Key to Ending Latch Key

A critical issue for after-school programs is providing structured and well-designed services while attracting the youth more likely to engage in delinquent activity. Fifteen percent of juveniles commit 75% of crimes, and after-school programs must be designed to include these youth if they are to affect significantly a community's juvenile crime rate.¹²

Fortunately, well-designed programs are able to attract these children, sometimes with the help of outreach efforts. "If the program is set up correctly,

you can attract the young people who are at-risk of and may be engaging in criminal activity," says Richard Murphy. Major research underway in Maryland suggests that expanding after-school programs will reduce juvenile crime. Based on research conducted so far, "we've really shown that structured after-school programs that include an academic program can attract at-risk kids," says Larry Dawson.

Maryland's Juvenile Justice Coalition finds the evidence compelling that expanding after-school programs, in conjunction with other prevention and treatment strategies, will reduce delinquent behavior. The Coalition strongly supports efforts to provide after-school opportunities to all children in the State.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 Richardson et. al, "Substance abuse among eighth-grade students who take care of themselves after school," *Pediatrics* (1984).
- 2 Fight Crime: Invest In Kids, "Quality Child Care and After-School Programs" (1998).
- 3 Dail Willis, "Keeping children off the streets; PAL facilities part of efforts to reduce juvenile crime," *The Baltimore Sun* (Jan. 18, 1999).
- 4 Fight Crime: Invest In Kids, "After-School Crime or After-School Programs: Tuning In to the Prime Time for Violent Juvenile Crime and Implications for National Policy" (1999).
- 5 See generally, Leftert et. al, "Making the Case: Measuring the Impact of Youth Development Programs (Search Institute 1996); Joy Dryfoos, "Adolescents at Risk: Prevalence and Prevention" (1990).
- 6 Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence, "The Quantum Opportunities Program" (1998).
- 7 Schinke et. al, "Boys and Girls Clubs in public housing developments: Prevention services for at-risk youth," *Journal of Community Psychology* (1992).
- 8 Trust for Public Lands, "Healing America's Cities" (1994).
- 9 Interview with Ronald Schwartz, Baltimore County Police Department.
- 10 Baltimore City Police Department, Planning & Research Office, "Juvenile Victimization Comparison For Goodnow PAL Center Area, 1994 to 1997" (1998).
- 11 Trust for Public Lands, "Healing America's Cities" (1994).
- 12 See Heather A. Ford, "Maryland CAN Prevent Youth Violence" (Advocates for Children and Youth 1996).

MJJC is comprised of organizations and citizens who are committed to reducing juvenile crime as well as improving opportunities for youth. Our purpose is to mobilize statewide support for juvenile justice reform.

Advocates for Children and Youth

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University of Maryland

Chesapeake Center for Youth

Development

Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice

Citizens Planning and Housing Association

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MD Association of Resources for Families
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MD State Teachers Association

Mental Health Association of MD

National Center on Institutions and
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Northwest Baltimore Services, Inc.

Public Justice Center

Shaw Prison Services Program

Walden/Sierra, Inc.

Youth Law Center

Chair: Jim McComb

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*MJJC was co-founded by Advocates for
Children and Youth and Maryland
Association of Resources for Families and
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Maryland's Youth Do Not Belong In Adult Courts, Jails, or Prisons

Since 1994, Maryland has followed a national trend of sending more and more youth under 18 years of age to adult court when charged with serious crimes. Young offenders should be held accountable in a justice system that balances the interests of the victim, society and the offender. However, subjecting youth to adult courts, prisons, and jails encourages criminal behavior through association with adult inmates. The experience of being housed in an adult jail not only presents a danger to children, it provides a learning environment for criminal behavior. A Florida study showed that youth sent to adult jails were more likely to reoffend, committed more offenses after release and committed serious crimes at a greater rate than those sent to juvenile facilities.³

National and state-based research concludes that the automatic transfer of youth to the adult justice system does not enhance public safety.⁴ Independent studies in Florida and New York, the two states that lock up the most children in adult facilities, found that the children who were tried in adult court were more likely to engage in criminal behavior following release than a comparable sample of children in juvenile facilities.⁵ Ironically, despite trying more youth in adult criminal courts, New York and Florida maintain the highest and second highest rate of juvenile crime in the nation, respectively.⁶

By subjecting children to the adult criminal system we are taking a major step backward in the history of the American juvenile justice system. One hundred years ago, children's advocates created the first juvenile court. Understanding that children are inherently different from adults, the advocates' goal was to provide a specialized court staffed by professionals trained to work with children. They believed that young offenders could change with help, rather than through punishment.⁷ These principles are as sound today as they were in 1899. Unfortunately, they are under siege.

All over the country, legislators have limited the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and enacted laws to automatically transfer certain youthful offenders to adult court.⁸ The resulting rigidity in sentencing and jurisdiction has prevented the judiciary from doing what they do best: taking into consideration the offense, the evidence, the victim, the offender, mitigating

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Police are trained to charge individuals with the most serious crime possible given the situation. This approach backfires when a student throws a chair across a classroom and is automatically charged as an adult for felony assault and sent to adult jail.

Juvenile justice professionals can and must hold children accountable for their actions and

address violent behavior directly. Juvenile court personnel and local education agencies have more experience and resources to help the student change his or her behavior. The purpose and function of the juvenile justice system is to provide a range of options for rehabilitation.

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- Research Study A:** Fagan, J. (1995). "Separating The Men From The Boys: The Comparative Advantage of Juvenile Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony Offenders." In J. C. Howell, B. Krisberg, J. D. Hawkins, & J. J. Wilson (Eds.), *A Sourcebook: Serious, Violent, & Chronic Juvenile Offenders* (pp. 238-260). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Research Study B:** Bishop, D. M., Frazier, C. E., Lanza-Kaduce, L., & Winner, L. (1996). "The Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Does It Make a Difference?" *Crime & Delinquency*, Vol. 42, No (2), April 1996.
- Research Study C:** Myers, D. L. (1999). "Excluding Violent Youths From Juvenile Court: The Effectiveness of Legislative Waiver." Available online at: <http://www.preventingcrime.org>
- Bishop: 1996; Fagan: 1995.
- Coalition for Juvenile Justice. (1998). *A Celebration Or A Wake: The Juvenile Court After 100 Years*.
- Griffin, P., P. Torbet, and L. Syzanski. (1998). "Trying Juveniles As Adults In Criminal Court: An Analysis of State Transfer Provisions". Washington: DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
- Fagan et.al., (1989)
- Myers, D. L. (1999). "Excluding Violent Youths From Juvenile Court: The Effectiveness of Legislative Waiver." Available online at: <http://www.preventingcrime.org>
- Annotated Code of Maryland, Courts And Judicial Proceedings Article, Sec. 3-804

gaps in current data, and invest in Maryland-based research on what happens to children in the adult system. There is nothing to suggest that the results in Maryland are any different from the recent studies completed in New York, Florida, and Pennsylvania.

At the very least, more information is needed to decide whether the 1994 legislation improves public safety. Because of antiquated data systems employed by our criminal justice agencies, Maryland is hampered by data collection problems and cannot track youth from arrest through the adult system. In addition, the state does not have information on the recidivism rates of these youth.

Each year, an increasing number of Maryland's youth are coming into contact with the adult correctional system in the absence of proof that this protects the public or deters youth from future criminal activity.

Punishment without rehabilitation is wrong. Youth are most likely to be rehabilitated by programs that address deficits and build competencies. Juvenile courts have a substantial arsenal of sanctions that do in fact punish, perhaps even more reliably and effectively than adult courts.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- No child in Maryland should be held in an adult jail unless and until convicted and sentenced as an adult. Youth awaiting trial are presumed to be innocent and should never be subjected to the dangerous situations encountered in jail.
- The Commission on Juvenile Jurisdiction should evaluate each exclusionary offense individually to determine whether the offense was excluded from the juvenile court for the right reasons. This must be a thorough evaluation that looks closely at the youth who are ending up in the adult system, why they are there, and exactly what happens to them in the criminal justice system.
- Maryland must also create and fund a coordinated information management system that can track every youth charged as an adult from arrest through sentencing and incarceration. Only in this way can we determine the ongoing effectiveness of excluding offenses and limiting jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

MJJC organizational members:

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General Assembly 2000

Juvenile Justice Issues

The great success for juvenile justice this year was the huge budget increase for the Department of Juvenile Justice and the language in Joint Chairmen's Report that provides for oversight of the department's activities. The legislative disappointment this year was the failure of the eight bills that were intended to address serious and longstanding problems in the juvenile justice system. All eight bills passed through the House of Delegates with overwhelming support and had the support of House leadership right up to the end of the session. The bills were not voted on in the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee.

House Bill 381 - Expansion of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction – FAILED

Lead Sponsor: Delegate Marriott

The bill would have returned primary jurisdiction to the juvenile court for certain offenses now automatically waived to the adult court. Currently, youth who have allegedly committed crimes that would be punishable by death if committed by an adult automatically enter the adult criminal justice system. This bill would have given the juvenile court the option of keeping the youth in the juvenile system or waiving them to adult court.

Youth tried in adult court re-offend more quickly and are more likely to be arrested for serious crimes if convicted, children shall not be held or transported with adults accused of crimes. Youths housed with adults are five times as likely to be sexually assaulted and eight times as likely to commit suicide as youths housed in juvenile facilities.

House Bill 382 – Juvenile Law – Confinement of Children in Adult Correctional Facilities – FAILED

Lead Sponsor: Delegate Marriott

The bill would have prohibited an adult court from ordering a minor to be held in an adult correctional facility pending a determination as to whether to transfer the minor to juvenile court. The official in charge of the adult correctional facility would have been required to inform the court or the intake officer when a child arrived at the adult facility. The only way a child would

have been able to be held in an adult correctional facility or even transported with adults would have been if that child had been convicted as an adult.

House Bill 385 - Disproportionate Minority Confinement – FAILED

Lead Sponsor: Delegate Marriott

The bill would have addressed minority children's excessively high numbers -- above their proportion of the population -- in the juvenile justice system, and inequalities in treatment. It would have established an Advisory Council that would have reported to the Secretary of the Department of Juvenile Justice, and would have required the Secretary to include in the state's Comprehensive Juvenile Justice 3-Year Plan strategies for combating racial disparities. African-American males currently make up 17% of Maryland's youth population, 39% of arrests, and 81% of youths confined in the Cheltenham Youth Facility.

House Bill 1082/ Senate Bill 821 - Juvenile Detention Facilities and Nonsecure Placement Alternatives – FAILED

Lead Sponsors: Delegate Montague and Senator Green

This bill, which built upon legislation enacted last year, would have required the promulgation and implementation of regulations regarding detention standards. The regulations would have set forth a DJJ code of conduct for its personnel, and would have described standards to be adhered to in all DJJ facilities, and in facilities operated privately through contract with the state. The standards' goals would have been to ensure that children were held in humane environments with access to services, while the public's safety was also protected.

House Bill 1087 - Juvenile Treatment Service Plans – FAILED

Lead Sponsor: Delegate Montague

The bill would have mandated that DJJ report back to the juvenile court within thirty days after a youth had been adjudicated, advising the court whether DJJ's dispositional plan for the youth had been implemented. If not, the court would have had authority to make a more specific order regarding where the child would have been sent.

House Bill 1088 - State Commission on Juvenile Justice – FAILED

Lead Sponsor: Delegate Montague

The bill would have created an independent oversight body to monitor the activities of DJJ, and conditions in its facilities. The Commission would have reported to the Governor, the General Assembly, and the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals. It would also have reviewed conditions for youths charged in the adult system and held in adult facilities. States around the country have adopted citizen oversight as a means of assuring against the types of abuses that have been documented in Maryland's system.

Follow-up: The Governor's second supplemental budget allocates \$150,000 to the Office of Children, Youth and Families (OCYF) for two ombudsmen to provide independent monitoring of the facilities. The role of this staff has not yet been announced. Advocates must work with OCYF to make certain that these ombudsmen have a strong monitoring presence at DJJ facilities.

House Bill 1090 - Criminal Justice Information System -- Dissemination of Information -- FAILED

Lead Sponsor: Delegate Montague

This bill would have mandated that the Criminal Justice Information System Central Repository provide comprehensive data on juveniles charged as adults to the Maryland Justice Analysis Center, and that reports would have to be made to the Governor and General Assembly twice yearly by the Center. Data now available is inadequate to evaluate the impact of laws requiring that more youths be tried as adults.

HOUSE BILL 1095 - Pending Placement -- FAILED

Lead Sponsor: Delegate Montague

The bill would have restricted the amount of time a child can be held in detention facilities to seven days after a court has decided the child's case, unless the court specifically ordered that a fifteen day period for placement be allowed. Approximately 25% of youths in Maryland's juvenile detention facilities are awaiting placement in a group home or treatment facility, and some youths await placement for as much as a year.

Political Analysis: These eight failed bills had strong support in the Senate where seven of ten members of the Judicial Proceedings Committee were committed to their passage and where a majority of Senators were expected to support them had they gotten to the full senate for a vote. Instead, their fate was decided by Senator Walter Baker, Chairman of the JPR Committee and Senator Philip Jimeno who refused to allow the bills to be voted on in committee. The reason given for not supporting this legislative package was that the legislature, the Governor and Lt. Governor wanted to show their confidence in the new DJJ secretary and did not want to pass legislation that may impede his own efforts to address these issues.

Follow-up: Thank Delgates Marriot and Montague for their tremendous effort on all the juvenile justice legislation listed above. Advocates and policy makers must take advantage of the promise of openness and collaboration to give broad visibility to a major reform agenda among policy makers and the general public. Advocates and policy makers should work with the Administration to meet mutually determined goals and objectives.

Joint Chairmen's Report -- Senate Budget and Taxation Committee and the House Appropriations Committee -- Juvenile Justice Language

Political Analysis: In response to the failure of the eight juvenile justice bills, the Chairs of the Senate Budget and Taxation and House Appropriations Committees inserted

language into their Joint Chairmen's Report that attempts to hold the Administration and the Department of Juvenile Justice accountable for meeting some of the objectives of the eight failed bills.

The language adopted is as follows:

- **Monitoring:** The extent of public access to all facilities and programs funded by DJJ and the use of independent monitors in order to ensure that incidents of abuse, neglect and lack of programming for juveniles are promptly brought to the attention of the Secretary. Expanded access and independent monitoring should be instituted by DJJ as soon as possible.
- **Minority Over-Representation in the Juvenile Justice System:** The decision-making process at intake and the development and recommendation of treatment service plans for juveniles should be analyzed and monitored to determine those factors under DJJ's control which could be modified to address the over-representation of minority youth being determined delinquent and thus subject to placement.
- **Pending Placement:** The Committees remain concerned about the extent of time youth are detained pending placement after being adjudicated delinquent. The Committees believe that DJJ should strive to lower the time a youth spends pending [in detention] placement. To achieve this, the Committees request DJJ to coordinate with the Judiciary on the implementation of court-ordered placement through institutionalization of scheduled communication between the courts and DJJ. Further, the Committees request that where appropriate, DJJ aggressively utilize alternatives to placement as a means to reduce placement.
- **Benchmarks:** The Committees also request that DJJ establish benchmarks for reducing the length of time youth are detained pending placement after being adjudicated delinquent. DJJ should report back to the Committees on November 15, 2000 detailing monthly pending placement data from January 1, 2000 through October 31, 2000. The report should detail pending placement data by type of offense and include what additional actions DJJ is taking to meet its benchmarks.

Political Analysis: While language in the Joint Chairman's report does not have the effect of law, the Administration's failure to comply can and often does have implications for the following year's budget and it can also lead to additional legislation.

In addition to language in the Joint Chairman's Report, there is also language in the Department's budget that does have the force of law and also reflects an attempt by the legislature to hold the Department and the Administration accountable for meeting certain objectives.

Excerpts from the budget for the Department are as follows:

- **Aftercare:** "... provided that \$1,000,000 designated for new aftercare positions may not be expended until a plan detailing how the Department of Juvenile Justice is revising its aftercare programming is submitted to the budget committees for review and comment or 30 days have elapsed from its receipt."
- **Programming and Operational Changes at the Department of Juvenile Justice:** The committees are aware that all aspects of the programming and operations of the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) are being reviewed given the recent well-documented changes within the Department. The committees request that DJJ report back to the committees on the status of this review with a preliminary report on September 1, 2000. The reports shall include at least the following:
 - **Personnel:** Training and education needs, standards for personnel evaluation, and an assessment of DJJ's competitive ability to hire and retain talented staff at all levels.
 - **Caseload Ratios:** An assessment of the present and appropriate caseloads throughout the continuum of services offered by DJJ and private vendors: intake, probation, aftercare, detention and committed care.
 - **Youth Performance:** The ability to track the progress of a youth during contact with DJJ.
 - **Service Delivery:** An assessment of the appropriate service delivery mix within the DJJ system: State-run versus private; prevention programming vs. intervention; the usage of commitment placement versus community alternatives; the extent of place-based probation and aftercare; whether intake, probation and aftercare functions should be separate or integrated; and specific educational and vocational programming including who should be responsible for the delivery of that programming, e.g., DJJ, the Maryland State Department of Education, or a local education agency.
 - **Youth Assessment:** The appropriate use of state-of-the-art assessment tools: the use of assessments to screen detention admissions, to assess risks and needs for adjudicated youth, mental health and substance abuse assessments.
 - **Data Collection and Program Evaluation:** The plans to systematically improve DJJ's research capability to properly develop and implement its strategic plan.
 - **Interagency Collaboration:** In all appropriate instances, DJJ should seek interagency solutions to the complex issues that youth are faced with in the juvenile justice system in order to prevent a youth from entering the juvenile justice system, facilitate transition out of that system and reduce the recidivism back into the juvenile or adult system. This interagency collaboration should include, for example, developing a system to ensure that youth's transition back into the community with appropriate educational, job placement, health, and social service supports in place.

Political Analysis: On April 6, 2000, three days prior to adjournment of the Session, the Senate confirmed Bishop Robinson as Secretary for the Department. The Secretary asserts that the objectives of the bills that failed can be achieved without legislation. Secretary Robinson worked with the legislation's chief sponsor, Delegate Kenneth Montague, Jr., and with advocates on amendments to the bills - particularly the bill to create an independent oversight commission. He also asserts forcefully that he was in support of these bills. He has asked to meet with advocates early and often, and promises an open administration.

Follow-up: Advocates must now take advantage of the promise of openness and collaboration and to use every tool available to give broad visibility to a major reform agenda among policy makers and the general public. Advocates must put forth a cooperative effort with the administration and stay with the effort unless the administration fails to meet mutually determined goals and objectives.

Youth Development

Youth Development programs received moderate support during the 2000 legislative session. The most surprising news was the addition of \$2.5 million in the Governor's Second Supplemental Budget for Baltimore City After-School Programs. Similarly, \$1.5 million was approved to support Prevention Services for Disruptive Youth across Maryland - but no plan currently exists for how these funds will be used. Finally, legislators took no action on legislation to increase funding for the Maryland After-School Opportunity Fund.

House Bill 739/Senate Bill 730 -Maryland After-School Opportunity Act - Appropriation - Requirements - FAILED

Lead Sponsors: Senator Van Hollen and Delegate Shriver

This legislation would have required a \$20 million budget allocation for fiscal year 2002 in the Maryland After-School Opportunity Fund, a \$10 million increase over FY 2000. Both bills were heard in committees, but neither one reached a committee vote.

Follow-up: Thank Senator Van Hollen and Delgate Shriver for their strong advocacy for the needs of Maryland's children.

Budget allocation for Baltimore City After School Programs - PASSED

The Governor's Second Supplemental Budget included \$2.5 million for Baltimore City After School Programs for at-risk youth. The money will be allocated to the Child Care Administration in the Department of Human Resources, but it is unclear how it will be used. Funding comes from federal TANF (Temporary Assistance to Needy Families) monies.

Joint Chairmen's Report - Senate Budget and Taxation Committee and the House Appropriations Committee - Youth Development Issues

Prevention Services for Disruptive Youth

The Subcabinet Fund was allocated \$1.5 million for Prevention Services for Disruptive Youth that will be distributed through the Local Management Boards. This money cannot be spent until the Glendening-Townsend Administration submits a detailed plan to the Senate and House budget committees for the use of the funds. The Lt. Governor's office plans to work with interested parties to develop the plan.

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2. Flaherty, M. G. (1980). "An Assessment of the National Incidence of Juvenile Suicide in Adult Jails, Lockups, and Juvenile Detention Centers." The University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.
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gaps in current data, and invest in Maryland-based research on what happens to children in the adult system. There is nothing to suggest that the results in Maryland are any different from the recent studies completed in New York, Florida, and Pennsylvania.

At the very least, more information is needed to decide whether the 1994 legislation improves public safety. Because of antiquated data systems employed by our criminal justice agencies, Maryland is hampered by data collection problems and cannot track youth from arrest through the adult system. In addition, the state does not have information on the recidivism rates of these youth.

Each year, an increasing number of Maryland's youth are coming into contact with the adult correctional system in the absence of proof that this protects the public or deters youth from future criminal activity.

Punishment without rehabilitation is wrong. Youth are most likely to be rehabilitated by programs that address deficits and build competencies. Juvenile courts have a substantial arsenal of sanctions that do in fact punish, perhaps even more reliably and effectively than adult courts.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. No child in Maryland should be held in an adult jail unless and until convicted and sentenced as an adult. Youth awaiting trial are presumed to be innocent and should never be subjected to the dangerous situations encountered in jail.
2. The Commission on Juvenile Jurisdiction should evaluate each exclusionary offense individually to determine whether the offense was excluded from the juvenile court for the right reasons. This must be a thorough evaluation that looks closely at the youth who are ending up in the adult system, why they are there, and exactly what happens to them in the criminal justice system.
3. Maryland must also create and fund a coordinated information management system that can track every youth charged as an adult from arrest through sentencing and incarceration. Only in this way can we determine the ongoing effectiveness of excluding offenses and limiting jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

MJJC organizational members:

Advocates for Children and Youth
Center for Troubling Behaviors
University of Maryland
Chesapeake Center for Youth
Development
Center on Juvenile and Criminal
Justice
Citizens Planning and Housing
Association
Communities in Schools of Maryland
Families Involved Together, Inc.
The Family Tree
First Step, Inc.
Greater Baltimore Committee
Robert A. Pascal Youth & Family
Service Center
MD Association of Resources for
Families and Youth
MD Association of Youth Service
Bureaus
MD Chapter of National Committee to
Prevent Child Abuse

MD State Teachers Association
Mental Health Association of MD
National Center on Institutions and
Alternatives
Northwest Baltimore Services, Inc.
Public Justice Center
Shaw Prison Services Program
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AFTER SCHOOL PROGRAMS REDUCE JUVENILE CRIME

Maryland's
Juvenile
Justice
Coalition

April 1999

After School Should Be A Time of Development, Not Delinquency

At least one third of Maryland's school-age children (approximately 350,000) are unsupervised each day when school lets out. Maryland law allows children as young as 8 years old to be left alone without adult supervision. Because of the need for both parents to work, fewer children have a parent to go home to after school. In Maryland, 81% of parents with school-age children work, according to the Children's Defense Fund.

It is no surprise then that more than half of all juvenile arrests occur between the hours of 2 and 8 p.m. (See Chart Below). In one study, eighth graders left unsupervised for 11 or more hours per week were twice as likely to abuse drugs or alcohol as those under adult supervision.¹

Police chiefs across Maryland and the nation say that expanding after school programs is one of the best strategies to reduce juvenile crime.² "Keeping the child[ren] occupied in the critical hours before a

parent gets home [means] they're less likely to commit or become victims of crimes," says Baltimore County Police Chief Terrence Sheridan.³

Compelling Evidence Supports After-School Expansion


Academic studies and national and local experts support what parents and police already know.⁴ "There is no doubt that one of our best investments for preventing youth crime, violence and substance abuse is expanding after-school programs," says Larry Dawson, prevention coordinator at the Maryland Governor's Office of Crime Control and Prevention.

"One significant factor in the substantial drop in crime in New York City is the expansion of after-school programs that began in 1991," says Richard Murphy, director of the Center for Youth Development and Policy Research in Washington, D.C.

Not only are after-school programs safe havens, they can provide youth with the services and supports they need to develop into successful adults. These supports include mentoring, academic remediation, opportunities to experience success, positive peer contact, training in decision-making, and exposure to career options. In particular, after-school programs can provide youth with the time and help they need to establish their own identities and resist negative peer pressure.⁵

Specific studies that support the delinquency prevention effect of after-school programs include:

- ⇒ The Quantum Opportunities Program. The program included community service, tutoring, computer-based instruction, life skills training, and career and college planning. Two years after leaving the program, participants had far fewer contacts with the police than a control group. The number of arrests was lower for the participants who had been arrested, and the number of convictions was six times lower.⁶
- ⇒ The Boys and Girls Clubs of America placed after-school programs in public housing developments and saw a 13% drop in juvenile crime and a 22%



drop in drug activity, in addition to improved school attendance and academic performance.⁷

⇒ In Fort Myers, Florida, juvenile arrests dropped by 28% after the city began Success Through Academics and Recreational Support (STARS), a program that included building an after-school center in the heart of a low-income community.⁸

⇒ In Baltimore County and Baltimore City, police athletic leagues (PAL) have helped reduce juvenile crime. In the area around the Lansdowne PAL Center, juvenile crime dropped 33% in one year.⁹ In the area around the Goodnow PAL Center, juvenile arrest rates fell by 16% during a time that juvenile arrests rose by 2% citywide.¹⁰ In both neighborhoods, juvenile victimization by crime also decreased substantially.

⇒ In Phoenix, Arizona, keeping open recreational facilities longer hours during the summer resulted in a 55% drop in police reports of juvenile crime. When the hours were reduced in the following fall, crime rates increased back to pre-summer levels.¹¹

The Key to Ending Latch Key

A critical issue for after-school programs is providing structured and well-designed services while attracting the youth more likely to engage in delinquent activity. Fifteen percent of juveniles commit 75% of crimes, and after-school programs must be designed to include these youth if they are to affect significantly a community's juvenile crime rate.¹²

Fortunately, well-designed programs are able to attract these children, sometimes with the help of outreach efforts. "If the program is set up correctly,

you can attract the young people who are at-risk of and may be engaging in criminal activity," says Richard Murphy. Major research underway in Maryland suggests that expanding after-school programs will reduce juvenile crime. Based on research conducted so far, "we've really shown that structured after-school programs that include an academic program can attract at-risk kids," says Larry Dawson.

Maryland's Juvenile Justice Coalition finds the evidence compelling that expanding after-school programs, in conjunction with other prevention and treatment strategies, will reduce delinquent behavior. The Coalition strongly supports efforts to provide after-school opportunities to all children in the State.

FOOTNOTES

1 Richardson et. al, "Substance abuse among eighth-grade students who take care of themselves after school," *Pediatrics* (1984).

2 Fight Crime: Invest In Kids, "Quality Child Care and After-School Programs" (1998).

3 Dail Willis, "Keeping children off the streets; PAL facilities part of efforts to reduce juvenile crime," *The Baltimore Sun* (Jan. 18, 1999).

4 Fight Crime: Invest In Kids, "After-School Crime or After-School Programs: Tuning In to the Prime Time for Violent Juvenile Crime and Implications for National Policy" (1999).

5 See generally, Leffert et. al, "Making the Case: Measuring the Impact of Youth Development Programs (Search Institute 1996); Joy Dryfoos, "Adolescents at Risk: Prevalence and Prevention" (1990).

6 Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence, "The Quantum Opportunities Program" (1998).

7 Schinck et. al, "Boys and Girls Clubs in public housing developments: Prevention services for at-risk youth," *Journal of Community Psychology* (1992).

8 Trust for Public Lands, "Healing America's Cities" (1994).

9 Interview with Ronald Schwartz, Baltimore County Police Department.

10 Baltimore City Police Department, Planning & Research Office, "Juvenile Victimization Comparison For Goodnow PAL Center Area, 1994 to 1997" (1998).

11 Trust for Public Lands, "Healing America's Cities" (1994).

12 See Heather A. Ford, "Maryland CAN Prevent Youth Violence" (Advocates for Children and Youth 1996).

MJJC is comprised of organizations and citizens who are committed to reducing juvenile crime as well as improving opportunities for youth. Our purpose is to mobilize statewide support for juvenile justice reform.

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*MJJC was co-founded by Advocates for
Children and Youth and Maryland
Association of Resources for Families and
Youth*

Should Juvenile Offenders Be Tried As Adults?

A Developmental Perspective on Changing Legal Policies

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and

The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Research Network on
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I'd like to talk today about recent changes in juvenile justice policy that are being implemented despite a full consideration of what research on child development has to say about the wisdom of these changes. The changes that I am referring to are those that are resulting in more and more juvenile offenders being prosecuted and sentenced as if they were adults. I am interested in this both as someone who studies adolescent development and as the Director of the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice. This is a national initiative examining how knowledge about adolescent development can inform policy-making and practice in the justice system. Let me say a few words about the Network and its current activities.

Let me frame the issue in historical terms for those of you not familiar with American juvenile justice policy. The existence of a separate justice system within which offenders who have not yet reached the age of majority are adjudicated, sanctioned, and rehabilitated is predicated on the premise that there are significant psychological differences between adolescents and adults, and that these differences are provoked by the normal process of development, age-related, and legally relevant. For the past 100 years in the United States, the acceptance of this premise has guided juvenile justice policy and maintained a jurisdictional boundary between juvenile and criminal court. Historically, the boundary was violated only in extreme cases of dangerousness or recalcitrance, and only then when the age of the offender approached the upper bound of the juvenile court's jurisdiction.

Most reasonable people agree that a small number of offenders should be kept out of the juvenile system because they pose a genuine threat to the safety of other juveniles, because the severity of their offense merits a relatively more severe punishment, or because their history of repeated offending bodes poorly for their ultimate rehabilitation. But when the wholesale transfer to criminal court of various classes of juvenile offenders that are defined solely by the charged offense starts to become the rule rather than the exception, we need to stop and take stock of what we are doing. I say this because this represents a fundamental challenge to the developmental premise on which the juvenile court was founded: that adolescents and adults are different in ways that warrant their differential treatment under the law.

Let me briefly overview for those of you unacquainted with the law what "transfer" means and describe the different mechanisms that are used to shift the adjudication of juvenile offenders to the adult, or criminal, justice system. All states allow juveniles under certain conditions to be tried as if they were adults in criminal court. There are three broad mechanisms that can be used to accomplish this:

1. **Judicial Waiver.** A juvenile court judge may transfer the case to criminal court (called "waiving" jurisdiction), based on a variety of factors, including the seriousness of the offense, the maturity of the offender, and the likelihood of the offender's rehabilitation. Provisions for this exist in all but five states, although states vary with respect to the lower age limit for this (i.e., the age below which a judge may not transfer the case). In some states, a juvenile court judge must waive jurisdiction for certain offenses if probable cause exists that the juvenile committed the offense. In other states, a process called "presumptive waiver" exists, in which it is presumed appropriate to transfer a juvenile to criminal court unless the juvenile can prove that he/she is suited to juvenile rehabilitation. The judge makes the ultimate decision, but the burden of proof is on the juvenile.
2. **Direct File, sometimes called "Prosecutorial Discretion."** In jurisdictions in which this exists, a prosecutor has the discretion to file charges in either juvenile or criminal court. As of 1997, 15 states had direct file statutes.

3. Statutory Exclusion, sometimes called "Legislative Exclusion," "Mandatory Transfer," or "Automatic Transfer." Under statutory exclusion, certain categories of juveniles are automatically excluded from juvenile court. The categories are typically determined by some combination of age and offense (e.g., anyone accused of armed robbery who is 14 or older). As of 1997, 28 states provided for this. Some states permit what is called "reverse waiver," where a criminal court judge can waive a case to juvenile court based on various characteristics of the offender and the offense. As in cases of presumptive waiver within the juvenile court, the burden of proof in reverse waiver cases is on the offender.

It is difficult to estimate the number of juveniles whose cases are transferred to criminal court, because states vary considerably in their record-keeping, especially as it concerns direct file or statutory exclusion, and because states vary in the upper age boundary for the juvenile court. Thus, in some states, like New York, 16- and 17-year-olds are automatically processed as an adult regardless of the crime, because the juvenile court's jurisdiction ends at 15. Technically, this would not be considered a "transfer." We know that there has been a steady increase over the last 15 years in the number of cases waived by judicial discretion — the number has doubled — but that the rate of transfer by this method has not increased and is still very low. Less than 2% of cases are waived by judges.

There is still no national system of record-keeping about juvenile cases transferred through direct file or statutory exclusion, although we know that these mechanisms are replacing judicial waiver as a mechanism for transferring juveniles to criminal court. If we extrapolate from some regional studies of direct file, it appears that more juveniles are transferred by prosecutors than by judges. Rough estimates suggest that about 27,000 juveniles were prosecuted in criminal court in 1996, but this does not include adolescents who are under 18 but who are above the age of juvenile court jurisdiction in their state. Some estimates place this figure at about 180,000 per year. In other words, by one mechanism or another, more than 200,000 individuals under the age of 18 are prosecuted in criminal court each year. There are three trends in the data worth noting.

First, the proportion of juveniles prosecuted as adults is growing, primarily because states are adding more and more offenses to the list of crimes that are excluded from the juvenile court. Second, a very large number of these cases — about one-third — are for non-violent offenses, such as burglary or drug charges. Finally, Black and Hispanic offenders are more likely than White offenders to be transferred, even when they have committed the same crime. The greatest disparity is in the processing of drug charges.

I realize that there are many lenses through which one can view debates about transfer policy. As a developmental psychologist, I want to examine the evidence on the development of legally-relevant competencies, capacities, and capabilities and ask whether, on the basis of what we know about development, a jurisdictional boundary should be drawn between juveniles and adults, and if so, at what age it should be drawn.

Before I go any further, it is only fair to ask whether or why a developmental perspective on jurisdictional boundary is even relevant to contemporary discussions of transfer policy. After all, current discussions about transfer are typically not about the characteristics of the offender, but about the seriousness and harmfulness of the offense -- factors which are independent of the offender's age or maturity. The recent shift in juvenile justice policy from an offender-based focus to an offense-based focus explicitly seeks to remove developmental considerations from the discussion. "Adult time for

adult crime," says nothing about the age of the offender, except for the fact that it ought to be considered irrelevant.

I believe that it is logically impossible to make the age of the offender irrelevant in discussions of criminal justice policy. Yes, there are moral, legal, political, and practical issues that enter into the transfer debate. But the fact that some crimes are committed by individuals who are not yet developmentally mature can not be ignored. A fair punishment for an adult is unfair when applied to a child who did not understand the consequences of his or her actions or who was unable to exert control over his or her behavior. The ways we interpret and apply laws should rightfully vary when the case at hand involves a defendant whose understanding of the law is limited by intellectual immaturity or whose judgment is impaired by emotional immaturity. And the implications and consequences of administering a long and harsh punishment are very different when the offender is young than when he or she is an adult. People may differ in their opinions about the extent to which, the ways in which, and the age period during which an offender's age should be considered in decisions concerning transfer, adjudication, and sentencing, but ignoring this factor entirely is like trying to ignore an elephant that has wandered into the courtroom. In other words, if one is willing to acknowledge that the age of the offender does matter, a developmental perspective is needed to inform decisions about *how and at what points in the process* age ought to be taken into account. In my remarks today, I'd like to lay out for you what the relevant legal issues are, in light of what we know about child and adolescent development.

Transferring a juvenile to criminal court has three sets of implications that lend themselves to a developmental analysis. First, transfer to adult court alters the legal process by which a minor is tried. Criminal court is based on an adversarial model, while juvenile court is based, at least in theory, on a more cooperative model. This difference in the climates of juvenile versus adult courts is significant because it is unclear at what age individuals have sufficient understanding of the ramifications of the adversarial process and the different vested interests of prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges.

Second, the legal standards applied in adult and juvenile courts are different. For example, competence to stand trial is presumed among adult defendants unless they suffer from a serious mental illness or substantial mental retardation. We do not know if the presumption of adjudicative competence holds for juveniles, who, even in the absence of mental retardation or mental illness, may lack sufficient competence to participate in the adjudicative process. Standards for judging culpability may be different in juvenile and adult courts as well. In the absence of mental illness or substantial deficiency, adults are presumed to be responsible for their own behavior. We do not know the extent to which this presumption applies to juveniles, or whether the validity of this presumption differs as a function of the juvenile's age.

Finally, the choice of trying a young offender in adult versus juvenile court determines the possible outcomes of the adjudication. In adult court, the outcome of being found guilty of a serious crime is nearly always some sort of punishment; about 80% of juveniles who are convicted in criminal court are incarcerated. In juvenile court, the outcome of being found delinquent may be some sort of punishment, but juvenile courts typically retain the option of a rehabilitative disposition, in and of itself or in combination with some sort of punishment.

In essence, the juvenile court operates under the presumption that offenders are immature, in three different senses of the word: their development is incomplete, their judgment is less than mature, and their character is still developing. The adult court, in contrast, presumes

that defendants are mature: competent, responsible, and unlikely to change. Which of these presumptions best characterizes individuals between the ages of 12 and 17? Is there an approximate age at which the presumptions of the criminal court become more applicable to an offender than the presumptions of the juvenile court? One of the things I try to explain to judges, legal practitioners, and policy makers is that developmental research rarely yields the sorts of dichotomous boundaries that are customarily used to create bright-line age distinctions under the law. This is because development tends to be gradual rather than abrupt and highly variable among individuals of the same chronological age. Developmental research can not be used to establish a bright-line boundary between adolescence and adulthood, but it can point to age-related trends in certain legally-relevant attributes, such as the intellectual or emotional capabilities that affect decision-making in court and on the street.

I think the available evidence leads to the identification of *three*, not two, categories of individuals: *juveniles*, who should be categorically non-transferrable to criminal court; *adults*, who should automatically be charged in adult court; and, *youths*, whose transferability to criminal court should be determined not on the basis of the alleged offense, but through competence testing, clinical interviews, and so forth. This three-way classification scheme recognizes the variability in development among individuals who are in the midst of adolescence and the resulting difficulty in drawing bright-line distinctions on the basis of chronological age.

To address the issue of transfer from a developmental perspective, we must be more specific about the aspects of development in question. I think the most important questions are these:

First, when do individuals become competent to be adjudicated in an adversarial court context? At what age are adolescents likely to possess the skills necessary to protect their own interests in the courtroom and participate effectively in their own defense?

Second, when do individuals meet the criteria for adult blameworthiness? Is there an age before which individuals, by virtue of "normal" psychological immaturity, should be considered to be of "diminished culpability" and therefore held less accountable, and proportionately less punishable, for their actions?

Third, is there a point in development at which individuals cease to be good candidates for rehabilitation, by virtue of the diminished likelihood of change in the psychological and behavioral characteristics thought to affect criminal behavior or because of diminished amenability to treatment?

Let me begin with an examination of the development of adjudicative competence and the capabilities presumed to underlie it. Two specific types of competencies are needed to be tried in criminal court. The individual must be competent to assist counsel, and the individual must also demonstrate "decisional competence": the ability to make decisions about waiving rights, entering pleas, etc

There are numerous intellectual competencies that change during adolescence which are likely to underlie the development of adjudicative competence. Among them are the ability to engage in hypothetical and logical decision-making, to demonstrate reliable episodic memory, to extend thinking into the future (in order to envision the consequences of different pleas, to be able to take the perspective of others, and to understand and articulate one's own motives and psychological state. Although these abilities emerge at somewhat different ages, it would be highly unlikely that an individual would satisfy all of these criteria much before the age of 12. At

the other extreme, research suggests that the majority of individuals have these abilities by age 16.

There is ample evidence, therefore, to raise concerns regarding the competence of adolescents under age 15 to participate in criminal trials. Although the majority of 13-year-olds would likely meet the minimal competence criteria even at age 15, a significant fraction of adolescents should not be assumed competent to protect their own interests in adversarial legal settings. If an adolescent does not have the understanding, appreciation, or reasoning ability necessary to make such decisions, criminal court is an inappropriate venue for determining that adolescent's disposition.

It is my view, therefore, that no youngster under the age of 13 should be tried in adult court. On the other hand, although more research is needed — and, as I noted earlier, this research is underway — it is likely that the majority of individuals older than 16 would satisfy the broader criteria for adjudicative competence. Individuals who are between the ages of 13 and 16 should be evaluated to determine their adjudicative competence before a waiver decision is made.

Let me now turn to research on the culpability of youth. The adult justice system presumes that defendants who are found guilty are responsible for their own actions, and should be held accountable and punished accordingly. Historically, those who are guilty but less responsible for their actions receive proportionately less punishment. It is therefore worth considering whether, because of the relative immaturity of minors, it may be justified to view them as being less blameworthy than adults for the very same infractions — that is, whether developmental immaturity should be viewed as a relevant mitigating factor. If, for example, adolescents below a certain age cannot foresee the consequences of their actions, or cannot control their impulses, one should not hold them as culpable for their actions as one would hold an adult.

I am using the term “culpability” as a shorthand for several interrelated phenomena, including responsibility, accountability, blameworthiness, and punishability. In theory, these notions are relevant both to the adjudication of an individual's guilt or innocence and to the determination of a disposition or sentence. In reality, though, the threshold for culpability in the context of an adjudication is so minimal that this is not an issue in the determination of the guilt or innocence of any normal individual older than 8 or 9. In the absence of some sort of mental illness or retardation, anyone who is 9 can form criminal intent and appreciate the wrongfulness of an action. Diminished responsibility as a result of normative developmental immaturity is therefore not a reasonable claim in the adjudicatory phase of a hearing for any mentally normal individual who is 10 or older. Because the criteria for taking into account diminished culpability in the context of a sentencing or dispositional decision are less clear, however, whether adolescents should receive proportionately less punishment by virtue of inherently diminished responsibility is a legitimate question to ask when deciding how much and in what ways a juvenile should be punished.

The extent to which culpability is relevant to the transfer issue concerns the presumptions about culpability that operate within each venue and, more specifically, whether or how, during the sentencing phase of a criminal trial, a juvenile's developmental immaturity is taken into account. The rehabilitative ideal of the juvenile court argues against adjudicating a

juvenile who is characterized by sufficiently diminished responsibility in a criminal court whose only response can be punitive. The argument for keeping juveniles in the juvenile system is that rehabilitation is a more reasonable disposition than punishment for a less than fully accountable juvenile. We then need to ask if there an age below which we can presume sufficiently diminished responsibility to argue that it is a mitigating factor, and is there an age beyond which we can presume sufficient maturity of judgment to hold an individual fully accountable?

Some of the capabilities that are potentially relevant to the assessment of blameworthiness are the same as those that are relevant to the assessment of adjudicative competence. For example, logical decision-making and the ability to foresee the future ramifications of one's decisions are important to determinations of blameworthiness, just as they are to determinations of adjudicative competence. In addition to these cognitive abilities, however, blameworthiness also presumes certain capabilities that are more interpersonal or emotional than cognitive in nature. Among these, for example, are the ability to control one's impulses, to manage one's behavior in the face of pressure from others to violate the law, or to extricate oneself from a potentially problematic situation. Many of these capabilities have been examined in research on what might broadly be called "judgment."

It is clear from the little research that does exist in this area that few individuals would consistently demonstrate adult-like judgment much before age 12, and that many individuals have difficulty demonstrating adult-like judgment even at age 17. The fact that many of the psychosocial capabilities that affect judgment in antisocial situations continue to develop over the course of adolescence is one reason for the difficulty we have in predicting adult offending from adolescent delinquency. Because at least some adolescent offending is likely the result of normative immaturity, rather than moral turpitude, most adolescents "age out" of antisocial behavior as they become more mature.

Now, as I noted, children as young as 9 have the capacity for intentional behavior and know the difference between right and wrong; as such, there is no reason why children of this age must unequivocally be held blameless for their conduct. At the same time, it is also clear that the vast majority of individuals below the age of 13 lack certain intellectual and psychosocial capabilities that need to be present in order to hold someone *fully* accountable for his or her actions *under certain circumstances*. These circumstances include situations that call for logical decision-making, situations in which the ultimate consequences of one's actions are not evident unless one has actually tried to foresee them, and situations in which sound judgment may be compromised by competing stimuli, such as very strong peer pressure to violate the law. Once individuals have reached a certain age – 17 or so – it is reasonable to expect that they possess the intellectual and psychosocial capacities that permit the exercise of good judgment, even under difficult circumstances. Thus, while pressure from one's friends to violate the law may be a reasonable mitigating factor in the case of a 12-year-old, it is unlikely to be so in the case of a 17-year-old.

When the individual under consideration is younger than 17, however, developmentally-normative immaturity should be added to the list of possible mitigating factors, along with the more typical ones of self-defense, mental state, and extenuating circumstances. More importantly, the need for this additional information argues for a more individualized approach to

both transfer and sentencing of juveniles, and argues against policies that do not permit such flexibility, such as transfer via legislative exclusion.

Let me now turn to research on amenability to treatment. I noted earlier that one of the reasons that young people's offenses historically have been adjudicated in juvenile court is that adolescents are presumed to be more amenable to treatment than adults and, consequently, better candidates for rehabilitation. Conversely, adults have been seen as relatively more hardened and, accordingly, less likely to profit from rehabilitation.

In theory, amenability is perhaps the most practical basis on which to make decisions about where to draw the jurisdictional boundary, because it makes little sense to invest the rehabilitative resources of the juvenile justice system in individuals who are unlikely to change and a great deal of sense to target such resources at those individuals most likely to respond to intervention or treatment. In practice, though, judgments about amenability are made on an individualized basis, with decision-makers taking into account a juvenile's current circumstances, psychological profile, and responses to prior interventions, if any. The age of the offender, generally speaking, is less important than his or her particular history.

From the perspective of developmental psychology, however, one might ask whether there is an age below which one can presume that most individuals have the capacity to change and an age above which most people's amenability has diminished enough that they are unlikely to respond effectively to rehabilitation. If these questions could be answered definitively, at least some of the decision-making about an individual's amenability to treatment could be done on the basis of age.

Unfortunately, developmental research does not provide a satisfactory answer to these questions. Any judgment of amenability presumes not only individual malleability but at least some change in the juvenile's environment. It is impossible to evaluate an individual's amenability without considering the nature of the intervention to which the individual is going to be exposed and whether there is reason to believe that this particular intervention will be effective for this particular individual. Rather than make amenability judgments on the basis of an offender's age, therefore, developmental research would indicate that such judgments should be made on the basis of the offender's past experience. A youngster who has been exposed to certain types of interventions in the past and who has not responded to them effectively is relatively unlikely to respond to them in the future. Without such evidence, however, one would presume malleability in response to intervention.

Overall, there is no basis in the developmental literature from which to draw generalizations about differences in amenability purely as a function of age. It is incorrect to suggest that there is an age below which individuals should remain treated as juveniles because they are especially likely to be amenable to change, but it is also incorrect to assume that there is an age beyond which individuals should be categorically assumed to be too hardened to be helped. Amenability decisions should be made on a case-by-case basis and should focus on the prior history, rather than the chronological age, of the offender.

I want to conclude with a bit of humility. A developmental perspective can inform, but can not answer, the transfer debate. Even setting aside the political, practical, and moral questions that impinge on the discussion, developmental research does not point to any one age that politicians and practitioners should use in formulating transfer policies or practices.

Having said this, it appears appropriate to raise serious concerns based on developmental evidence about the transfer of individuals younger than 13 to adult court. For this reason, I believe that individuals under the age of 13 should be viewed as juveniles, regardless of the nature of their offense. At the other end of the continuum, I think it is appropriate to conclude that the vast majority of individuals older than 16 are not appreciably different from adults in ways that would prohibit their fair adjudication within the criminal justice system. My view is that variability among individuals between 13 and 16 requires that some sort of individualized assessment of an offender's competence to stand trial, blameworthiness, and likely amenability to treatment be made before reaching a transfer decision.

Regardless of the ages one uses to draw boundaries, though, research on development argues strongly against transfer policies that are solely offense-based and argues instead for a return to offender-based policies that permit decision-makers to exercise judgment about individual offenders' maturity and eligibility for transfer. To the extent that transfer via legislative exclusion is solely offense-based, however, it is a bad policy from a developmental perspective. And, as I noted earlier, this is a bad policy that is becoming increasingly widespread.

The irony of employing a developmental perspective in the analysis of transfer policy is that the exercise reveals the inherent inadequacy of policies that draw bright-line distinctions between adolescence and adulthood. Indeed, an analysis of the developmental literature indicates that variability among adolescents of a given chronological age is the rule, not the exception. In order to be true to what we know about development, a fair transfer policy must be able to accommodate this variability. One way to do this is to make sure that judges have solid information about child and adolescent development and the flexibility to use this information when making decisions about youngsters' fates that may have life-long consequences. Developmental psychologists can help with the facts. As for the flexibility, for better or for worse, we can only appeal to the wisdom of policy-makers.



National Institute of Justice

Research in Brief

Jeremy Travis, Director

July 1998

Issues and Findings

Discussed in this Brief: A congressionally mandated evaluation of State and local crime prevention programs funded by the U.S. Department of Justice.

Key issues: What works to prevent crime, especially youth violence? Out of all the hundreds of different strategies used in communities, families, schools, labor markets, places, police, and criminal justice, which ones succeed, and to what extent? What does the scientific evidence suggest about the effectiveness of federally funded crime prevention?

Key findings: Very few operational crime prevention programs have been evaluated using scientifically recognized standards and methodologies, including repeated tests under similar and different social settings. Based on a review of more than 500 prevention program evaluations meeting minimum scientific standards, the report concludes that there is minimally adequate evidence to establish a provisional list of what works, what doesn't, and what's promising. The evidence is current as of late 1996 when the literature

continued...

Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising

by Lawrence W. Sherman, Denise C. Gottfredson, Doris L. MacKenzie, John Eck, Peter Reuter, and Shawn D. Bushway

Many crime prevention programs work. Others don't. Most programs have not yet been evaluated with enough scientific evidence to draw conclusions. Enough evidence is available, however, to create provisional lists of what works, what doesn't, and what's promising. Those lists will grow more quickly if the Nation invests more resources in scientific evaluations to hold all crime prevention programs accountable for their results.

These are the major conclusions of a 1997 report to Congress, which was based on a systematic review of more than 500 scientific evaluations of crime prevention practices. This Research in Brief summarizes the research methods and conclusions found in that report.

In 1996, a Federal law required the U.S. Attorney General to provide Congress with an independent review of the

What Works?

- **For infants:** Frequent home visits by nurses and other professionals.
- **For preschoolers:** Classes with weekly home visits by preschool teachers.
- **For delinquent and at-risk preadolescents:** Family therapy and parent training.
- **For schools:**
 - Organizational development for innovation.
 - Communication and reinforcement of clear, consistent norms.
 - Teaching of social competency skills.
 - Coaching of high-risk youth in "thinking skills."
- **For older male ex-offenders:** Vocational training.
- **For rental housing with drug dealing:** Nuisance abatement action on landlords.
- **For high-crime hot spots:** Extra police patrols.
- **For high-risk repeat offenders:**
 - Monitoring by specialized police units.
 - Incarceration.
- **For domestic abusers who are employed:** On-scene arrests.
- **For convicted offenders:** Rehabilitation programs with risk-focused treatments.
- **For drug-using offenders in prison:** Therapeutic community treatment programs.

Issues and Findings

continued...

review was completed and is expected to change continually as more program evaluation findings are completed and reported.

Target audience: Federal, State, and local policymakers; criminal and juvenile justice professionals, practitioners, and researchers; educators; and leaders of community organizations promoting prevention of crime, juvenile delinquency, and drug abuse.

Updates: The most recent lists of what works, what doesn't, and what's promising are regularly updated at the University of Maryland Web site, <http://www.preventingcrime.org>. The full text of the 1997 report, this Research in Brief, and annual updates can all be downloaded from that Web site.

effectiveness of State and local crime prevention assistance programs funded by the U.S. Department of Justice, "with special emphasis on factors that relate to juvenile crime and the effect of these programs on youth violence." The law required that the review "employ rigorous and scientifically recognized standards and methodologies." Framers of the law expected that the evaluation would measure:

"(a) reductions in delinquency, juvenile crime, youth gang activity, youth substance abuse, and other high-risk factors; (b) reductions in the risk factors in the community, schools, and family environments that contribute to juvenile violence; and (c) increases in the protective factors that reduce the likelihood of delinquency and criminal behavior."¹

After an external, peer-reviewed competition, the National Institute of Justice selected the proposal of a group from the University of Maryland's Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice to perform the review.

The review defined "crime prevention" broadly as any practice shown to result in less crime than would occur without the practice. It also examined any program that claims to prevent crime or drug abuse, especially youth violence, and, in accordance with the congressional mandate, examined the effects of programs on risk and protective factors for youth violence and drug abuse.

Programs meeting any of these criteria were classified into seven local institutional settings in which these practices operated:

- In communities.
- In families.
- In schools.
- In labor markets.

- In places (such as businesses, hotels, and other locations).²
- By police.
- By criminal justice agencies after arrest.

Crime prevention programs in each of these settings are legally eligible for Justice Department crime prevention funding. However, because Congress requires that most funding decisions about specific programs be decentralized to State and local governments, no detailed breakdown of funding is available by setting or by program. The review focused on whether there is scientific evidence favoring the types of programs that are eligible for funding, showing they can accomplish their goals.

This Research in Brief describes the scientific methodologies used to perform the review as well as the limitations of the available data. It then summarizes the conclusions reached by the authors to develop three separate lists of programs for which a minimum level of scientific evidence was available: what works, what doesn't, and what's promising. The text provides more details on the evaluations of each type of program as well as citations to the sources of data the authors reviewed to reach their conclusions.

Note: The page references in brackets and italics that follow the bibliographic citations refer the reader to the pages in the printed version of the full 1997 report to Congress where the authors discuss the topics in greater detail.

The science of crime prevention

To most practitioners, crime prevention is an art. But as the U.S. Congress indicated in the law requiring this report, the art of crime prevention (like the art of medicine) can be evaluated and guided by the

science of measuring program effects. Scientific evaluations of crime prevention have both limitations and strengths. The major limitation is that scientific knowledge is provisional, because the accuracy of generalizations to all programs drawn from one or even several tests of specific programs is always uncertain. The major strength of scientific evaluations is that rules of science provide a consistent and reasonably objective way to draw conclusions about cause and effect.

Limitations

Scientific knowledge is provisional. The most important limitation of science is that the knowledge it produces is always becoming more refined, and therefore no conclusion is permanent. All of the conclusions presented in this Research in Brief, as in the report to Congress, are provisional—just as all scientific knowledge is provisional. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in its analysis of scientific evidence in the case of *Daubert vs. Merrell Dow* (1993),³ no theory (or program) of cause and effect can ever be *proved* to be true. It can only be disproved. Every test of a theory provides an opportunity to disprove it. The stronger the test and the more tests each theory survives, the more confidence we may have that the theory is true. But all theories can be disproved or, more likely, revised by new findings. All conclusions reported in this Research in Brief reflect the state of scientific knowledge as of late 1996 when the initial review was concluded. By the time this Research in Brief is published, new research results may be available that would modify the conclusions.

Generalizations are uncertain. The rules of science are relatively clear

about the way to test cause and effect in any given study—a concept known as “internal validity.” The rules are far less clear, especially in social sciences, about how to judge how widely the results of any study may be generalized—a concept known as “external validity.” The results of a very strong, internally valid test of how to reduce child abuse among rural, white teenage mothers, for example, may or may not generalize to a population of inner-city African-American mothers. The two populations are clearly different, but the question of whether those differences change the effects of the program can best be answered by testing the program in both populations.

There is a child abuse prevention program discussed below that has been found effective in both kinds of populations (Olds et al., 1988). Many prevention programs, however, have been tested in only one kind of population. Tests that have reasonably strong internal validity provide some evidence for *external* validity, but the strength of external validity cannot be assessed using standard scientific methods and rules in the same way that we can assess internal validity. The test of the external validity or generalizability of internally valid results of an evaluation is continued testing, that is, *replication*. Until replications become far more common in crime prevention evaluations, the field will continue to suffer from the uncertain external validity of both positive and negative findings.

Strengths

The strength of the scientific method is that there are widely agreed-upon rules for assessing the level of certainty that a conclusion in any one test is correct. These rules are presented in

detail in standard texts, notably Cook and Campbell (1979). In the course of preparing this review, the authors developed a shorthand means of summarizing these rules called the Maryland Scale of Scientific Methods [see pp. 2-15 to 2-19 and the Appendix]. This scale was modified from a similar system for coding evaluations in a major review of drug prevention work performed by the Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (1995) and was later found to be similar to scales used to assess the internal validity of clinical trials in medicine (Millenson, 1997, p. 131). These standards for assessing internal validity have been developed over the past century in a wide range of fields and are directly responsive to the congressional mandate to employ “rigorous and scientifically recognized standards and methodologies” in preparing the report.

Research methods

Deciding what works in the prevention of crime called for applying rigorous means for determining which programs have had a demonstrated impact on the reduction of crime and delinquency.

The search for impact evaluations

The first step was to identify and review reports evaluating the effectiveness of crime prevention programs.

Impact versus process evaluations.

The primary factor used to select such evaluations was evidence about the impact of programs on crime. Many evaluations funded by the Federal Government—perhaps the majority—are “process” evaluations describing what was done, rather than “impact” evaluations assessing what effect the program had on crime. While process

evaluations can produce much valuable data on the implementation of programs and the logic of their strategies, they cannot offer evidence as to whether the programs "work" to prevent crime. Evaluations containing both process and impact measures provide the most information, but they are rarely funded or reported.

Crime and other effects. A related issue is whether an evaluation reports the impact of a program on other measures besides crime. There are many potential costs and benefits to any program. Evidence about these costs and benefits might change the overall assessment of whether the program works. This report, however, had a focused mandate from Congress to concentrate on crime impacts. Because Congress provided neither the time nor the mandate to examine the other effects programs might have, the report generally disregarded those issues and excluded any evaluation that lacked outcome measures of crime or crime risk factors.

Published and unpublished reports. With only 6 months to produce the report, we limited our search for scientific evidence to readily available sources. Most accessible were the evaluations that had been published in scientific journals, as well as several reviews of such studies that had recently been completed. With the assistance of the National Institute of Justice, we were also able to locate some unpublished evaluations. We made every effort to be comprehensive, in that no eligible study that was located was excluded. However, there is a large "fugitive" literature of unpublished crime prevention evaluations that could not be tapped in this study, including some that undoubtedly have been published outside the

mainstream outlets in criminology, such as governmental reports in other countries.

We anticipate that as this project continues, new reports will be found that may modify some conclusions and will certainly improve the strength of the evidence. The project has clearly demonstrated the need for a central registry of crime prevention evaluations so that all findings, published or unpublished, can be integrated into the knowledge base. Because there is a widely reported bias against publishing reports of statistically insignificant differences, the existence of a registry would improve the scientific basis for the conclusions reported in this Research in Brief. This would help reinforce the value of learning what does *not* work as well as what does. Both kinds of findings are essential for the scientific method.

The Maryland Scale of Scientific Methods

We developed and employed the Maryland Scale of Scientific Methods summarized below, ranking each study from 1 (weakest) to 5 (strongest) on overall internal validity. There were a few modest differences across the seven settings cited earlier in the exact coding rules for scoring an evaluation, generally based on differences in the evaluation literature across these settings [see pp. 2-18 to 2-19]. The appendix to the full report shows the full rating instrument for seven different dimensions of the methods used in each study, but this instrument could not be used for coding studies from secondary reviews or meta-analyses.

What could be used with greatest consistency, for both individual evaluations, secondary reviews, and meta-

analyses, was an overall rating based primarily on three factors:

- **Control of other variables** in the analysis that might have been the true causes of any observed connection between a program and crime.
- **Measurement error** from such things as subjects lost over time or low interview response rates.
- **Statistical power** to detect program effects (including sample size, base rate of crime, and other factors affecting the likelihood of the study detecting a true difference not due to chance).

Research design. Exhibit 1 summarizes the key elements in the scoring of evaluations. The scientific issues for inferring cause and effect vary somewhat by setting, and the specific criteria for applying the scientific methods scale vary accordingly. Issues such as "sample attrition," or subjects dropping out of treatment or measurement, for example, do not apply to most evaluations of commercial security practices. But across all settings, the scientific methods scale does include these core criteria, which define the five levels of the Maryland Scale of Scientific Methods:

Level 1. Correlation between a crime prevention program and a measure of crime or crime risk factors at a single point in time.

Level 2. Temporal sequence between the program and the crime or risk outcome clearly observed, or the presence of a comparison group without demonstrated comparability to the treatment group.

Level 3. A comparison between two or more comparable units of analysis, one with and one without the program.

Level 4. Comparison between multiple units with and without the program, controlling for other factors, or using comparison units that evidence only minor differences.

Level 5. Random assignment and analysis of comparable units to program and comparison groups.

Threats to internal validity. The scientific importance of these elements is illustrated in the bottom half of exhibit 1, showing the extent to which each level on the scientific methods scale controls for various threats to internal

validity. The main threats to validity indicated in the four columns are these:

- **Causal direction**, the question of whether the crime caused the program to be present or the program caused the observed level of crime.
- **History**, the passage of time or other factors external to the program that may have caused a change in crime rather than the prevention program itself.
- **Chance factors**, or events within the program group (such as imprisoning a few active offenders), that could

have been the true cause of any measured change in crime.

- **Selection bias**, or factors characterizing the group receiving a program, that independently affect the observed level of crime.

As exhibit 1 shows, each higher level of the Maryland scale from weakest to strongest removes more of these threats to validity, with the highest level on the scale generally controlling all four of them and the bottom level suffering all four. The progressive removal of such threats to demonstrating

Exhibit 1: The Maryland Scale of Scientific Methods

A. Research Designs

	Before-After	Control	Multiple Units	Randomization
Methods Score				
Level 1	0	0	X	0
Level 2	X	0	0*	0
Level 3	X	X	0	0
Level 4	X	X	X	0
Level 5	X	X	X	X

B. Threats to Internal Validity

	Causal Direction	History	Chance Factors	Selection Bias
Methods Score				
Level 1	X	X	X	X
Level 2	0	X	X	X
Level 3	0	0	X	X
Level 4	0	0	0	X
Level 5	0	0	0	0

Key: X = present
0 = absent

*Except where a comparison unit is employed without demonstrated comparability.

the causal link between the program effect and crime is the logical basis for the increasing confidence scientists put into studies with fewer threats to internal validity (Cook and Campbell, 1979).

Deciding what works

The current state of the research-based evidence creates a dilemma in responding to the congressional mandate: How high should the threshold of scientific evidence be for answering the congressional question about program effectiveness? A very conservative approach might require at least two level 5 studies showing that a program is effective (or ineffective), with the preponderance of the remaining evidence in favor of the same conclusion. Employing a threshold that high, however, would leave very little to say about crime prevention, based on the existing science. There is a clear tradeoff between the level of certainty in the answers that can be given to Congress and the level of useful information that can be gleaned from the available science. The report takes the middle road between reaching very few conclusions with great certainty and reaching very many conclusions with very little certainty.

Based on the scientific strength and substantive findings of the available evaluations, the report classifies all programs into one of four categories: what works, what doesn't, what's promising, and what's unknown. The criteria for classification applied across all seven institutional settings are as follows [see more detailed definitions on pp. 2-20 to 2-21 of the full report]:

- **What works.** These are programs that we are reasonably certain prevent crime or reduce risk factors for crime

in the kinds of social contexts in which they have been evaluated and for which the findings can be generalized to similar settings in other places and times. Programs coded as "working" by this definition must have at least two level 3 evaluations with statistical significance tests and the preponderance of all available evidence showing effectiveness.

- **What doesn't work.** These are programs that we are reasonably certain from available evidence fail to prevent crime or reduce risk factors for crime, using the identical scientific criteria used for deciding what works. Programs coded as "not working" by this definition must have at least two level 3 evaluations with statistical significance tests showing ineffectiveness and the preponderance of all available evidence supporting the same conclusion.

- **What's promising.** These are programs for which the level of certainty from available evidence is too low to support generalizable conclusions, but for which there is some empirical basis for predicting that further research could support such conclusions. Programs are coded as "promising" if they were found effective in at least one level 3 evaluation and the preponderance of the remaining evidence.

- **What's unknown.** Any program not classified in one of the three above categories is defined as having unknown effects.

The weakest aspect of this classification system is that there is no standard means for determining external validity: exactly what variations in program content and setting might affect the generalizability of findings from existing evaluations. In the current state of science, that can be accomplished only by

the accumulation of many tests in many settings with all major variations on the program theme. None of the programs reviewed for this report have accumulated such a body of knowledge so far. The conclusions drawn in the report about what works and what doesn't should be read, therefore, as more certain to the extent that all conditions of the programs that were evaluated (e.g., population demographics, program elements, social context) are replicated in other settings. The greater the differences on such dimensions between evaluated programs and other programs using the same name, the less certain the application of this report's conclusions must be.

What works?

Programs similar in prevention approach and social setting to the evaluations cited for each program discussed below are reasonably likely, but not guaranteed, to be effective in preventing some form of crime or drug abuse. Each program type assessed as "working" or "effective" meets the standard of having two or more evaluations (as cited below) that were coded level 3 or higher on the Maryland Scale of Scientific Methods, and a preponderance of other evidence, in support of this conclusion.

In communities

Using this standard, there are no community-based crime prevention programs proved to be effective at preventing crime. Several, however, can be found on the list of promising programs, which have at least one evaluation at level 3 or higher showing a crime reduction effect and a preponderance of other evidence supporting the same conclusion.

In families

- Frequent home visits to infants aged 0-2 by trained nurses and other helpers reduce child abuse and other injuries to the infants (Gray et al., 1979; Larson, 1980; Olds, 1986, 1988; Barth, Hacking, and Ash, 1988) [see pp. 4-10 to 4-15].
- **Preschool and weekly home visits by teachers** to children under 5 substantially reduce arrests at least through age 15 (Lally et al., 1988) and up to age 19 (Berrueta-Clement et al., 1985) [see pp. 4-10 to 4-15].
- **Family therapy and parent training about delinquent and at-risk preadolescents** reduce risk factors for delinquency such as aggression and hyperactivity (review by Tremblay and Craig, 1995) [see pp. 4-19 to 4-24].

In schools

- **Building school capacity to initiate and sustain innovation through the use of school teams or other organizational development strategies** reduces crime and delinquency (D. Gottfredson, 1986, 1987; Kenney and Watson, 1996) [see pp. 5-15 to 5-17].
- **Clarifying and communicating norms** about behavior through rules, reinforcement of positive behavior, and schoolwide initiatives (such as antibullying campaigns) reduces crime and delinquency (Mayer et al., 1983; Olweus, 1991, 1992) and substance abuse (Institute of Medicine, 1994; Hansen and Graham, 1991) [see pp. 5-17 to 5-20].
- Social competency skills curriculums, such as Life Skills Training

(L.S.T.), which teach over a long period of time such skills as stress management, problem solving, self-control, and emotional intelligence, reduce delinquency, and substance abuse (Botvin, et al., 1984; Weissberg and Caplan, 1994), or conduct problems (Greenberg et al., 1995) [see pp. 5-29 to 5-31; 5-36 to 5-38].

- **Training or coaching in thinking skills for high-risk youth** using behavior modification techniques or rewards and punishments reduces substance abuse (Lochman et al., 1984; Bry, 1982; Lipsey, 1992) [see pp. 5-43 to 5-46].

In labor markets

- **Ex-offender job training** for older males no longer under criminal justice supervision reduces repeat

What Doesn't Work

- Gun "buyback" programs.
- Community mobilization against crime in high-crime poverty areas.
- Police counseling visits to homes of couples days after domestic violence incidents.
- Counseling and peer counseling of students in schools.
- Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.).
- Drug prevention classes focused on fear and other emotional appeals, including self-esteem.
- School-based leisure-time enrichment programs.
- Summer jobs or subsidized work programs for at-risk youth.
- Short-term, nonresidential training programs for at-risk youth.
- Diversion from court to job training as a condition of case dismissal.
- Neighborhood watch programs organized with police.
- Arrests of juveniles for minor offenses.
- Arrests of unemployed suspects for domestic assault.
- Increased arrests or raids on drug market locations.
- Storefront police offices.
- Police newsletters with local crime information.
- Correctional boot camps using traditional military basic training.
- "Scared Straight" programs whereby minor juvenile offenders visit adult prisons.
- Shock probation, shock parole, and split sentences adding jail time to probation or parole.
- Home detention with electronic monitoring.
- Intensive supervision on parole or probation (ISP).
- Rehabilitation programs using vague, unstructured counseling.
- Residential programs for juvenile offenders using challenging experiences in rural settings.

offending (Mallar and Thornton, 1978; Piliavin and Masters, 1981) [see pp. 6-10, 6-14 to 6-17].

In places

- **Nuisance abatement** threatening civil action against landlords for not addressing drug problems on the premises reduces drug dealing and crime in privately owned rental housing (Green, 1993, 1995; Eck and Wartell, 1996) [see pp. 7-11 to 7-12].

By police

- **Extra police patrols in high-crime hot spots** reduce crime in those places (Press, 1971; Chaiken et al., 1975; Chaiken, 1978; Sherman and Weisburd, 1995; Koper, 1995) [see pp. 8-13 to 8-15].

- **Repeat offender units** that reduce the time on the streets of known high-risk repeat offenders by monitoring them and returning them to prison more quickly than when they are not monitored reduces their crimes (Martin and Sherman, 1986; Abrahamse et al., 1991) [see pp. 8-20 to 8-21].

- **Arresting domestic abusers** reduces repeat domestic abuse by employed suspects (Sherman and Smith, 1992; Pate and Hamilton, 1992; Berk et al., 1992a, 1992b) as well as offenders living in neighborhoods where most households have an employed adult (Marciniak, 1994) [see pp. 8-16 to 8-20].

By criminal justice agencies after arrest

- **Incarceration of offenders who will continue to commit crime** prevents crimes they would commit on the street, but the number of crimes prevented by locking up each additional offender declines with diminishing re-

turns as less active or serious offenders are incarcerated (Visher, 1987; Cohen and Canela-Cacho, 1994) [see pp. 9-6 to 9-11].

- **Rehabilitation programs for adult and juvenile offenders** using treatments appropriate to their risk factors reduces their repeat offending rates (Andrews et al., 1990; Lipton and Pearson, 1996) [see pp. 9-15 to 9-19].

- **Drug treatment in prison** in therapeutic community programs reduces repeat offending after release from prison (Wexler et al., 1992, 1995; Martin et al., 1995) [see pp. 9-41 to 9-43].

What doesn't work?

In communities

- **Gun buyback programs** operated without geographic limitations on the eligibility of people providing guns for money fail to reduce gun violence in cities, as evaluated in St. Louis and Seattle (Rosenfeld, 1995; Callahan et al., 1995) [see pp. 3-28 to 3-30].

- **Community mobilization of residents' efforts against crime** in high-crime, inner-city areas of concentrated poverty fails to reduce crime in those areas (review by Hope, 1995) [see pp. 3-9 to 3-10].

In families

- **Home visits by police to couples after domestic violence incidents** to provide counseling and monitoring failed to reduce repeat violence in Dade County, Florida, after either an arrest had been made or after a warning had been issued (Pate et al., 1991), and in public housing projects in New York City (Davis and Taylor, 1997) [see pp. 4-16 to 4-18].

In schools

- **Individual counseling and peer counseling of students** fail to reduce substance abuse or delinquency and can increase delinquency (Gottfredson, 1986; G. Gottfredson, 1987; Lipsey, 1992) [see pp. 5-46 to 5-48].

- **Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.)**, a curriculum taught by uniformed police officers primarily to 5th and 6th graders over 17 lessons, fails to reduce drug abuse when the original D.A.R.E. curriculum (pre-1993) is used (Ringwalt et al., 1994; Rosenbaum et al., 1994; Clayton et al., 1996) [see pp. 5-28 to 5-29, 5-32 to 5-36].

- **Instructional programs focusing on information dissemination, fear arousal, moral appeal, self-esteem, and affective education** fail to reduce substance abuse (review by Botvin, 1990) [see p. 5-29].

- **School-based leisure-time enrichment programs**, including supervised homework and self-esteem exercises, fail to reduce delinquency risk factors or drug abuse (Botvin, 1990; Hansen, 1992; Ross et al., 1992; Stoil et al., 1994; Cronin, 1996) [see pp. 5-48, 5-50 to 5-53].

In labor markets

- **Summer job or subsidized work programs for at-risk youth** fail to reduce crime or arrests (Maynard, 1980; Piliavin and Masters, 1981; Ahlstrom and Havighurst, 1982) [see pp. 6-18 to 6-25].

- **Short-term, nonresidential training programs** for at-risk youth, including JTPA (Job Training and Partnership Act) and a more intensive version of JTPA called JOBSTART,

fail to reduce crime (Cave et al., 1993; Bloom et al., 1994) [see pp. 6-18 to 6-22].

- **Diversion from court to job training** for adult offenders as a condition of case dismissal fails to reduce repeat offending during or after an adult program (Vera Institute, 1970; Baker and Sadd, 1981) and increased offending in a juvenile program (Leiber and Mawhorr, 1995) [see pp. 6-16, 6-13].

In places

Using the same assessment standard, there are as yet no place-focused crime prevention programs proved to be ineffective. However, relative to other areas of crime prevention, few place-focused crime prevention methods have been studied by criminologists in the United States.

By police

- **Neighborhood watch programs organized with police** fail to reduce burglary or other target crimes, especially in higher crime areas where voluntary participation often fails (Rosenbaum, 1986; Pate et al., 1987) [see pp. 8-25 to 8-27].

- **Arrests of juveniles for minor offenses** cause them to become more delinquent in the future than if police exercise discretion to merely warn them or use other alternatives to formal charging (Farrington, 1977; Klein, 1986) [see pp. 8-16 to 8-18].

- **Arrests of unemployed suspects for domestic assault** cause higher rates of repeat offending over the long term than nonarrest alternatives (Sherman and Smith, 1992; Pate and Hamilton, 1992) [see pp. 8-16 to 8-20].

- **Increased arrests or raids on drug markets** fail to reduce violent crime or disorder for more than a few days, if at all (Sviridoff et al., 1992; Annan and Skogan, 1993; Sherman and Rogan, 1995b) [see pp. 8-20 to 8-25].

- **Storefront police offices** fail to prevent crime in the surrounding areas (Wycoff and Skogan, 1986; Uchida et al., 1992) [see pp. 8-25 to 8-29].

- **Police newsletters with local crime information** failed to reduce victimization rates in Newark, New Jersey, and Houston, Texas (Pate et al., 1986) [see pp. 8-26 to 8-28].

By criminal justice agencies after arrest

- **Correctional boot camps using traditional military basic training** fail to reduce repeat offending after release compared to having similar offenders serve time on probation or parole, both for adults (Flowers, Carr, and Ruback, 1991; MacKenzie, 1991, MacKenzie et al., 1995) and for juveniles (Peters, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c; Bottcher et al., 1996) [see pp. 9-27 to 9-31].

- **"Scared Straight"** programs bringing minor juvenile offenders to visit maximum security prisons to see the severity of prison conditions fail to reduce the participants' reoffending rates and may increase crime (Finckenauer, 1982; Buckner and Chesney-Lind, 1983; Lewis, 1983) [see pp. 9-14 to 9-15].

- **Shock probation, shock parole, and split sentences**, in which offenders are incarcerated for a short period of time at the beginning of the sentence and then supervised in the community, do not reduce repeat offending compared to the placement of similar

offenders only under community supervision and increase crime rates for some groups (Vito and Allen, 1981; Vito, 1984; Boudouris and Turnbull, 1985) [see pp. 9-14 to 9-15].

- **Home detention with electronic monitoring** for low-risk offenders fails to reduce offending compared to the placement of similar offenders under standard community supervision without electronic monitoring (Baumer and Mendelsohn, 1991; Austin and Hardyman, 1991) [see pp. 9-24 to 9-25].

- **Intensive supervision on parole or probation (ISP)** does not reduce repeat offending compared to normal levels of community supervision, although there are some exceptions; findings vary by site (Petersilia and Turner, 1993; Deschenes et al., 1995) [see pp. 9-19 to 9-24].

- **Rehabilitation programs using counseling** that does not specifically focus on each offender's risk factors fail to reduce repeat offending (from meta-analysis by Lipsey, 1992) [see pp. 9-15 to 9-19].

- **Residential programs for juvenile offenders** in rural settings using "outward bound," wilderness, challenge, or counseling programs fail to reduce repeat offending significantly in comparison to standard training schools (Deschenes et al., 1996a; Greenwood and Turner, 1993) [see pp. 9-33 to 9-37].

What's promising?

In communities

- **Gang offender monitoring by community workers and probation and police officers** can reduce gang violence (review by Howell, 1995), although similar programs can

What's Promising?

- **Proactive drunk driving arrests with breath testing** (may reduce accident deaths).
- **Community policing with meetings to set priorities** (may reduce perceptions of crime).
- **Police showing greater respect to arrested offenders** (may reduce repeat offending).
- **Polite field interrogations of suspicious persons** (may reduce street crime).
- **Mailing arrest warrants to domestic violence suspects who leave the scene before police arrive.**
- **Higher numbers of police officers in cities** (may reduce crime generally).
- **Gang monitoring by community workers and probation and police officers.**
- **Community-based mentoring by Big Brothers/Big Sisters of America** (may prevent drug abuse).
- **Community-based afterschool recreation programs** (may reduce local juvenile crime).
- **Battered women's shelters** (may help some women reduce repeat domestic violence).
- **"Schools within schools" that group students into smaller units** (may prevent crime).
- **Training or coaching in "thinking" skills for high-risk youth** (may prevent crime).
- **Building school capacity through organizational development** (may prevent substance abuse).
- **Improved classroom management and instructional techniques** (may reduce alcohol use).
- **Job Corps residential training programs for at-risk youth** (may reduce felonies).
- **Prison-based vocational education programs for adult inmates** (in Federal prisons).
- **Moving urban public housing residents to suburban homes** (may reduce risk factors for crime).
- **Enterprise zones** (may reduce area unemployment, a risk factor for crime).
- **Two clerks in already-robbed convenience stores** (may reduce robbery).
- **Redesigned layout of retail stores** (may reduce shoplifting).
- **Improved training and management of bar and tavern staff** (may reduce violence, DUI).
- **Metal detectors** (may reduce skyjacking, weapon carrying in schools).
- **Street closures, barricades, and rerouting** (may reduce violence, burglary).
- **"Target hardening"** (may reduce vandalism of parking meters and crime involving phones).
- **"Problem-solving" analysis unique to the crime situation at each location.**
- **Proactive arrests for carrying concealed weapons** (may reduce gun crime).
- **Drug courts** (may reduce repeat offending).
- **Drug treatment in jails followed by urine testing in the community.**
- **Intensive supervision and aftercare of juvenile offenders** (both minor and serious).
- **Fines for criminal acts.**

increase gang crime if they increase gang cohesion (Klein, 1968) [see pp. 3-10 to 3-19].

- **Community-based mentoring by Big Brothers/Big Sisters of America** substantially reduced drug abuse in one experiment (rated level 5 on the Maryland Scale) (Tierney and Grossman, 1995), although evaluations of other programs with mentoring as a major component did not (McCord, 1978, 1992; Fo and O'Donell, 1974, 1975) [see pp. 3-21 to 3-26].

- **Community-based afterschool recreation programs** may reduce juvenile crime in the areas immediately around the recreation center (review by Howell, 1995) [see pp. 3-26 to 3-28]. Similar programs based in schools, however, have failed to prevent crime [see pp. 5-48, 5-50 to 5-53].

In families

- **Battered women's shelters** were found to reduce at least the short-term (6-week) rate of repeat victimization for women who take other steps to seek help beyond staying in the shelter in Santa Barbara (Berk et al., 1986) [see p. 4-26].

In schools

- **"Schools within schools"** programs such as Student Training Through Urban Strategies (STATUS) that group students into smaller units for more supportive interaction or flexibility in instruction have reduced drug abuse and delinquency (Gottfredson, 1990) [see pp. 5-26 to 5-27].

- **Training or coaching in thinking skills for high-risk youth** using behavior modification techniques or rewards and punishments may reduce

delinquency (Bry, 1982), and can reduce substance abuse [see pp. 5-43 to 5-46].

- **Building school capacity to initiate and sustain innovation through the use of school teams or other organizational development strategies** worked to reduce delinquency and substance abuse in one study (D. Gottfredson, 1986) [see pp. 5-15 to 5-17].

- **Improved classroom management and instructional techniques** reduced alcohol use in one study (Battistich et al., 1996) [see p. 5-25].

In labor markets

- **Job Corps**, an intensive residential training program for at-risk youth, in one study reduced felony arrests for 4 years after participants left the program and increased earnings and educational attainment (Mallar et al., 1982), although it also produced higher rates of misdemeanor and traffic arrests [see pp. 6-23 to 6-25].

- **Prison-based vocational education** programs for adult inmates in Federal prisons can reduce postrelease repeat offending (Saylor and Gaes, 1993), although the evidence is unclear as to which of several vocational education programs had the effect and whether the effect was achieved through higher rates of employment [see p. 6-15].

- **Dispersing inner-city public housing residents to scattered-site suburban public housing** by rental of single units in middle-income neighborhoods reduced risk factors for crime, including high school dropout rates and parental unemployment (Rosenbaum, 1992) [see pp. 6-25 to 6-28].

- **Enterprise zones** with tax-break incentives in areas of extremely high unemployment reduced adult unemployment rates in the targeted neighborhoods (a risk factor for crime) in Indiana (Papke, 1994), although not in New Jersey (Boarnet and Bogart, 1996) [see pp. 6-29 to 6-35; 6-40 to 6-41].

In places

- **Adding a second clerk may reduce robberies in already robbed convenience stores** but probably does not prevent robberies in convenience stores that have never been robbed (National Association of Convenience Stores, 1991) [see pp. 7-13, 7-16].

- **Redesigning the layout of retail stores can reduce shoplifting** according to one evaluation in Great Britain (Farrington et al., 1993) [see pp. 7-18 to 7-19].

- **Improving training and management of bar and tavern staff** can substantially reduce tavern-related violence, according to one Australian evaluation (Felson et al., 1997; Homel et al., 1997) and can reduce drunk driving (Saltz, 1987) and accidents (Putnam et al., 1993) [see pp. 7-20 to 7-21].

- **Metal detectors can reduce weapon carrying in schools**, according to one study (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1993), although they did not reduce assaults within or outside schools [see p. 7-30].

- **Airport metal detectors to screen airplane passengers** appear to reduce hijackings according to several studies, one of which used scientific methods approximating level 3 on the Maryland Scale (Landes, 1978) [see pp. 7-29 to 7-30].

- **Sky marshals on airplanes** produced a slight reduction in hijacking in the period before the introduction of metal detectors for passenger screening (Landes, 1978) [see p. 7-29].

- **Street closures, barricades, and rerouting** reduced several types of crime, including burglary (Atlas and LeBlanc, 1994), homicides in Los Angeles (Lasley, 1996), and violent crime in Dayton (Newman, 1996), according to single studies [see pp. 7-33 to 7-35].

- **"Target hardening" or use of strengthened materials and designs** reduced the use of slugs in New York City parking meters (Decker, 1972) [see p. 7-39] and reduced crimes involving telephones in New York City's Port Authority Bus Terminal (Bichler and Clarke, 1996) and in one of its jails (LaVigne, 1994) [see pp. 7-38 to 7-39].

- **"Problem-solving" analysis addressed to the specific crime situation at each location** (Goldstein, 1990; Clarke, 1992) has been successful according to one experiment (rated level 5 on the Maryland Scale) in convenience stores (Crow and Bull, 1975) and in an English public housing project at Kirkholt, according to one evaluation (rated level 5 on the Maryland Scale) of a multitactic strategy to reduce repeat victimizations (Forrester et al., 1988) [see pp. 7-10 to 7-11, 7-16, and 7-44]. Negative findings from the Minneapolis Repeat Call Address Policing (RECAP) experiment (rated level 5 on the Maryland Scale), however, suggest that these strategies may not work when applied across the universe of high-crime locations in a city (Sherman, 1990; Buerger, 1994) [see p. 8-31].

By police

- **Proactive arrests for carrying concealed weapons** made by officers on directed patrols in gun crime hot spots, using traffic enforcement and field interrogations, substantially reduced gun crimes in Kansas City (Sherman and Rogan, 1995a) [see pp. 8-30 to 8-32].
- **Proactive drunk driving arrests** through systematic breath testing reduced deaths due to drunk driving in Australia (Homei, 1990), with consistent but scientifically weaker evidence from numerous evaluations in the United States [see pp. 8-20 to 8-24].
- **Community policing with meetings to set priorities** reduced community perceptions of the severity of crime problems in Chicago (Skogan and Hartnett, 1997) [see pp. 8-25 to 8-27].
- **Policing with greater respect to offenders** reduced repeat offending in one analysis of arrested offenders (Paternoster et al., 1997) and increased respect for the law and police in another (Sherman et al., 1997) [see pp. 8-26 to 8-27].
- **Field interrogations of suspicious persons** reduced crime in a San Diego experiment without harming the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of the public (Boydston, 1975) [see pp. 8-20 to 8-25].
- **Mailing arrest warrants to domestic violence suspects who leave the scene before police arrive** reduced repeat spouse abuse substantially in Omaha (Dunford, 1990) [see pp. 8-16 to 8-20].
- **Higher numbers of police officers in cities** generally reduced many types of crime (Marvell and Moody, 1996), although in some cities an

increase in the number of police officers was not accompanied by a drop in crime [see pp. 8-8 to 8-10].

By criminal justice agencies after arrest

- **Drug courts** that ordered and monitored a combination of rehabilitation and drug treatment reduced repeat incarcerations compared to regular probation among offenders convicted of a first-time drug possession felony (Deschenes et al., 1996b) [see pp. 9-47 to 9-48].
- **Drug treatment in jails followed by urine testing in the community** has been found in one study to reduce repeat arrests compared to drug-using inmates who did not receive treatment and followup (Taxman and Spinner, 1996) [see pp. 9-45 to 9-46].
- **Intensive supervision and after-care of minor juvenile offenders**, primarily status offenders like runaways or truants, reduced future offending relative to status offenders who did not receive enhanced surveillance and services in North Carolina. The finding held true for first offenders but not for those with prior delinquency in one experiment (rated level 5 on the Maryland Scale) (Land et al., 1990) [see pp. 9-37 to 9-41].
- **Intensive supervision and after-care of serious juvenile offenders** in a Pennsylvania program reduced rearrests compared to putting offenders on probation (Sontheimer and Goodstein, 1993) [see p. 9-39].
- **Fines for criminal acts** in combination with other penalties may produce lower rates of repeat offending (Gordon and Glaser, 1991), and day fines may produce lower rates of technical violations (Turner and Petersilia, 1996) than sentencing offenders to

community-based corrections without fines [see pp. 9-12 to 9-14].

Future research

The University of Maryland's Department of Criminology has established a Crime Prevention Effectiveness Program with the support of gifts and grants from private foundations and donors. The purpose is to continue the work summarized in this Research in Brief and to make it widely available through publications and the Internet at www.preventingcrime.org. More than 20,000 copies of the full report have been downloaded from the Internet, with governors, State legislatures, congressional committees, and several other nations requesting briefings on the results in the first year after the full report was submitted to Congress. The United Kingdom has relied heavily on this report in drafting its new national strategy for reducing crime. These facts suggest widespread interest in using scientific evidence about what works to prevent crime in making policy and budget decisions.

The central conclusion of the report is that the current development of scientific evidence is inadequate to the task of policymaking. Many more impact evaluations using stronger scientific methods are needed before even minimally valid conclusions can be reached about the impact on crime of programs costing billions each year. Substantial progress does not require that all evaluations reach the "gold standard" of level 5. In many areas, modifying research designs by adding a control group can raise the strength of an evaluation design method significantly, from a level 2 to a level 3. That modest change would provide far more information from which to derive more certain conclusions about what works.

Recommendations for a Statutory Evaluation Plan

Three principles for evaluating crime prevention programs emerge from the evidence reviewed for this report:

Not every grant requires an evaluation. Absent the resources and the skill needed for achieving the statutory definition of an evaluation as an impact assessment, the requirement that all crime programs be evaluated has resulted in few being evaluated. Spending adequate funds for strong evaluations in a few sites is far more cost-effective than spending little amounts of money for weak evaluations in thousands of sites.

Evaluation funds should be conserved for impact assessments. Limited funding resources have forced DOJ to choose between many descriptive evaluations or a few impact evaluations, which do not provide Congress with the information it

requires unless there is enough funding for strong science. Such studies routinely cost \$15 million or more in other agencies and are often mandated by Congress, but there is no precedent for such "big science" at DOJ, according to the study researchers.

Impact evaluations should be conducted at a level 3 scientific methods score or higher. If Congress needs to know the effectiveness of a program, it needs to know that answer to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty. The study authors suggest that just as the U.S. Supreme Court has asked Federal judges to be the gatekeepers of valid science to be placed in the hands of a jury, Congress can ask that independent peer review panels serve the same function for congressional evidence. The panels can be asked to certify that impact evaluations recommended for funding by DOJ are at least

designed with a scientific methods score of 3 or more. This model can be achieved by congressional enactment of the following recommendations, according to this study:

1. Set aside 10 percent of all DOJ funding of local assistance for crime prevention (as defined in this report) for operational program funds to be controlled by a central research office within OJP.
2. Authorize the research office to distribute the 10 percent "evaluated program" funds on the sole criterion of producing rigorous scientific impact evaluations, the results of which can be generalized to other locations nationwide.
3. Set aside an additional 10 percent of all DOJ local assistance appropriations for crime prevention as defined in this report to fund the scientific evaluation costs.

Other parts of the full report address other issues. One issue involves how the allocation of resources for crime prevention is made in relation to the geography of crime, especially given the concentration of youth homicide in a small number of inner-city areas. Another issue is the direct implications of these findings for congressional appropriations for various prevention funding streams, such as Byrne grants in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 as amended or the 100,000 community police officers in the Crime Act of 1994 as amended. A final issue addressed in the full report is the matter of Federal policy for crime prevention evaluations. The

reader is referred to the report for all these matters, especially chapters 1 and 10, as well as the final pages of chapters 3 through 9. Future reports from the University of Maryland will also address these issues in greater detail.

The need for more impact evaluations is shown most clearly by this final observation. There are 15 programs on the list of what works and 23 on the list of what doesn't. The longest list, however, is the 30 promising programs. If even half of these programs were found effective with one additional level 3 impact evaluation, the number of programs known to prevent

crime through the scientific standards employed in this report would double.

Endnotes

1. 104th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives, Report 104-378.
2. A "place" is defined here as a very small area reserved for a narrow range of functions, often controlled by a single owner, and separated from the surrounding area.
3. *Daubert vs. Merrell Dow* (1993), U.S. Sup. Ct. No. 92-102, June 28, 1993 [509 U.S. 579].

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This Research in Brief and the full report to Congress are available online at the following Web sites:

National Institute of Justice:

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A book version of the full report will be available in 1999 from the Russell Sage Foundation, 112 East 64th Street, New York, NY 10021 (tel. 212-750-6000).

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