

COPYRIGHT / USAGE

Material on this site may be quoted or reproduced for **personal and educational purposes** without prior permission, provided appropriate credit is given. Any commercial use of this material is prohibited without prior permission from The Special Collections Department - Langsdale Library, University of Baltimore. Commercial requests for use of the transcript or related documentation must be submitted in writing to the address below.

When crediting the use of portions from this site or materials within that are copyrighted by us please use the citation: *Used with permission of the University of Baltimore.*

If you have any requests or questions regarding the use of the transcript or supporting documents, please contact us:

Langsdale Library
Special Collections Department
1420 Maryland Avenue
Baltimore, MD 21201-5779
<http://archives.ubalt.edu>

PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO. 3

CASE NO. MJG 95 - 309

IDENTIFICATION: _____

ADMITTED: _____

May 3, 2003

**PUBLIC POLICY AND RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN
BALTIMORE, 1900-1968**

Arnold R. Hirsch

Department of History

University of New Orleans

Overview

Between 1930 and 1970, Baltimore's black population grew from 142,106 to 425,922; its white population declined from 662,124 to 479,837.¹ That massive demographic shift -- from a time in which whites outnumbered blacks by nearly five to one, to an era in which the populations reached a rough equivalency -- accompanied similar seismic shifts in American history. The urbanization of blacks, the suburbanization of metropolitan America, the explosion in the responsibilities and activities of the federal government, and the civil rights revolution (marked, especially, by the Supreme Court's decision in Brown and subsequent landmark legislation) not only provide context, but also connote the possibility and pursuit of racial equality. Yet with all the movement and great transformations, there was also great continuity. Baltimore reflected that experience.

It is clear that the shift in racial demographics, private market reactions, and essential activist government policies produced a city that was more segregated at the end of the twentieth century than at the beginning. Before World War I, there was clear evidence of "mixed blocks" but also open expressions of the desire -- on the part of whites -- for a greater degree of separation. By the 1980s, there was overwhelming data supporting the fact of Baltimore's "hypersegregation." What occurred in between, what facilitated the increase in segregation, involved the expansion of the American state, the increased activity of government on all levels, and the powerful implementation of public policy.² The conjunction and implementation of slum clearance, public housing, and urban renewal, to cite the pre-eminent examples, permitted authorities to act on their segregative impulses in new and more effective ways. Local officials, with explicit state and federal support, eagerly seized the new tools placed at their disposal to

uproot, consolidate, and contain Baltimore's exploding African American population in the central city. Not only was there no question that such programs reflected that white consensus from the 1930s through the mid-1950s, but there is no indication that they ever seriously considered any other course. If there were any shift in policy at all, it involved perceptions of white needs and desires. Where officials sought to manipulate the racial frontier, erect barriers, and create buffer zones within the city through the early 1940s, postwar planning recognized the growing racial segmentation of the metropolitan area and focused upon making the city more alluring to whites than beginning to flee to the suburbs.

The *potential* for real change presented itself with the dawning of the civil rights revolution and the U. S. Supreme Court's 1954 rejection of "separate but equal" in Brown. The promise, however, proved greater than the reality. Contemporaries did not universally accept Brown; "separate but equal" did not disappear. Even more important, prior site selections, tenant assignment policies, and the programmatic imperatives engendered by the Housing Act of 1954 created a set of realities that precluded any radical departures from pre-Brown policy. Federal officials elected to deal with the problems of race and housing by increasing the quantity of publicly-supported dwellings available to African Americans while simultaneously fostering and catering to the municipality's demonstrable, consistent desire for segregation. If a growing number of voices registered displeasure with this state of affairs, they produced no effective change in policy and were consistently overwhelmed by the "practical," particularly political, difficulties any corrective action would necessarily entail. The weight of the past could not be denied. More, it grew heavier with each passing day.

An examination of the past century of segregation in Baltimore compels several

interrelated conclusions. They are:

1. The private market and private choices alone could not and did not produce the degree of residential segregation evident in Baltimore by the second half of the twentieth century. Government action, public policy, the exercise of public powers, and use of public subsidies were necessary to create and sustain a “hypersegregated” city.

Indeed, the government’s role in furnishing housing or establishing a national housing policy was virtually non-existent before World War I and minimal and episodic down to the 1930s. Data available for the mid-nineteenth century, and the admittedly crude measures they permit, indicate that Baltimore ranked among the least residentially segregated cities and was, perhaps, even becoming less segregated by 1850.³

In contrast, a sophisticated and widely accepted treatment of contemporary residential segregation concludes that separate racial enclaves became a “permanent structural feature” in American cities only after World War II, peaking in the North in 1950, and in the South a decade later. By 1980, according to Douglas Massey’s and Nancy Denton’s American Apartheid, Baltimore was one of sixteen metropolitan regions in which blacks were “hypersegregated.”⁴ Atlanta and Dallas-Ft. Worth were the only other Southern metropolitan areas on that list, but Baltimore outstripped both, scoring higher than the Texas metropolis in four of the five segregation indices used, and surpassing Atlanta in three. Baltimore evidenced the greatest degree of segregation when measuring black “centralization” (“the extent to which blacks are spatially distributed close to, or far away from, the central business district”) and “concentration” (a measure of “the relative amount of physical space occupied by blacks within the metropolitan environment”).⁵ Baltimore, by any reasonable standard, then, became a highly segregated city

coincident with the establishment of government housing programs and policy.

2. Both the local and federal governments actively participated in the process of segregating Baltimore; each had a particular role to play, and neither could have done it alone. The city conected racial policy in the implementation of programs that grew out of successive national Housing Acts, and did so with explicit federal authorization, support, and ultimate approval. Assigned that authority, the federal government simply could not deny responsibility for the substance of those local racial policies. Affirmative actions on the federal level, moreover, both legislative and administrative, effectively established and sanctioned a two-tier housing policy that separated a private, largely suburban, single-family, home-owning, white program supported by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) from an overwhelmingly inner-city, multi-family, rental, non-white, public housing program. That two-tier program fostered metropolitan racial segmentation.

Initial federal policy with regard to race and housing emanated from the newly-created Housing Division of the Public Works Administration (PWA). The agency first adopted a guideline known as the "neighborhood composition rule" that gave assurances that the new federal presence would not alter the existing racial composition of any given project area. It next issued a guarantee of "equity" intended to secure a "fair share" of benefits for minorities. Programs later initiated under the Housing Acts of 1937 and 1949, which called for the creation of local housing authorities and redevelopment, respectively, retained these racial guidelines while assigning site selection and tenant admission responsibilities to the new local agencies. Even so, the federal government retained approval power. There was enough ambiguity in that local-federal arrangement so that, in Baltimore, there was a lack of consistency in application.

Baltimore could strictly adhere to the “neighborhood composition rule” when it reinforced segregation, and ignore it (as in the case of the Waverly development) when it did not. Similarly, the “equity” principle would be bent in order to sustain segregation.

There can be no doubt that Baltimore’s white residents and municipal government desired to retain segregation. The city attempted to acquire, for example, veto power over site selection during a heated 1943 controversy when the federal government threatened to use its emergency war powers to house non-white war workers. In 1950, moreover, Baltimore’s City Council adopted a “cooperation agreement” with the federal government that enabled the former to control site selection with regard to public housing. Reflexively deferential to locals on such an explosive political matter (and eager to wash their hands of all responsibility), national officials sanctioned decisions that cemented patterns of segregation in place with federal approval and material support.

Federal acts extended beyond giving local authorities virtual carte blanche over the racial policies of their public housing programs; they also encompassed urban renewal. For example, the willingness with which the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA; later the Department of Housing and Urban Development or HUD) surrendered all meaningful oversight of each city’s required “workable plan” marked a complete abdication of authority. The subsequent routine approval of renewal proposals without a substantive review of their consequences, racial or otherwise, resulted in a calculated federal refusal to discharge responsibilities fixed by law and a determination not to raise questions regarding a program known to impact non-whites disproportionately.

Federal and local public housing, slum clearance, and urban renewal policies and

practices uprooted, relocated, concentrated, and contained blacks in the inner city, thereby creating programs that, as a result, served African Americans by linking them to the urban core and making it easy to collectively consider them the “lower-tier” in what has been termed the federal government’s two-tier housing policy.⁶ The “upper-tier,” initially, remained the preserve of the FHA, which catered to private interests, including their racial preferences, as it restructured housing markets and subsidized white flight and the construction of single-family, suburban homes. The construction boom that fueled the mercurial growth of racially homogeneous communities on the metropolitan fringe forever linked whites to a program that fostered property-ownership through indirect, hidden subsidies, thus bringing thousands who could not previously afford it, into the mainstream private market. Rarely accessible to blacks (and then only on a segregated basis), the upper tier offered them little. The few housing benefits allocated to blacks came down the second track and stopped with the directly subsidized occupation of inner city public units. There was no gateway to private ownership or suburbia there. Baltimore’s experience in these area mirrored similar results elsewhere.⁷

3. The increase in racial residential segregation in Baltimore during the twentieth century was no accident. That was the clear intent of those who implemented the various housing programs as well as the clear understanding of those who authorized and approved their plans. There is no evidence that the legislative framers or executive authorities in Washington, D. C. contemplated any other result; they were explicitly aware that their delegated powers would be and were used to sustain, enhance, and legitimate the residential separation of blacks and whites. The consequences of national housing policy, in short, were not “unforeseen.”

These principles apply strongly to Baltimore's public housing. HABC and HUD established and maintained a racially segregated system. Site selection and tenant selection and assignment policies and practices through the 1960s increased and exacerbated racial segregation in Baltimore's public housing. Local and federal authorities used public housing and urban renewal to contain African Americans in certain parts of the City, exclude them from predominantly white areas, and remove black enclaves or racially mixed areas. The conjunction and consequences of local and national public housing policies and practices in Baltimore were foreseen and, indeed, intended. They ultimately facilitated the regression of the pre-Brown principle of "separate but equal" to the lesser standard of "separate and minimum decency."

It is clear that the increasing and consistently high rates of residential segregation in twentieth-century Baltimore were no "accident"; they reflected, in other words, the unmistakable intent of the political and civic leadership that controlled housing policy. Indeed, testimony taken directly from the key actors themselves, contemporaneous with policy enactments and implementation, is the most transparent indicator of intent – especially (but not solely) in the first twenty years (1934-1954) of federal involvement. Whether discussing segregation ordinances, the removal of "blight" to alter neighborhood boundaries, the earliest suggestions for redevelopment sites in the 1930s, debates over temporary wartime or more permanent postwar shelter, or the impacts of urban renewal, the desire for segregation remained manifest. We know it was intended because its architects said so.

To think otherwise – to believe that the undisputed results of official federal and local housing policy and practice were unintended, unpredictable, and unforeseen – demands not only

that we ignore an explicit link and logical connection between stated desires and subsequent results, but that we find more likely a radical disjunction between them. Individually and collectively, however, the decisions made in and for Baltimore with regard to public housing, redevelopment, and renewal served, ultimately, to further or reinforce the separation of blacks and whites. Actions, in short, spoke as loudly as words. At the very least, the institutional role played by the Racial Relations Service (RRS) within the HHFA, as a watchdog over minority interests as effected by federal programs and policy, makes it impossible for anyone associated with such programs to claim with any credibility that they were ignorant of – or not warned against – their ultimate impact. The RRS compiled such a lengthy (and obviously annoying) record of protest against objectionable plans and proposals that HHFA administrators purged its outspoken leadership and rendered the Service bureaucratically impotent before the end of the 1950s.⁸

4. The May 17, 1954 decision rendered by the U. S. Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, Topeka, Kansas forced those charged with framing and implementing the nation's housing policies to confront the issue of racial discrimination. And, although that decision might have been expected to produce actions at the national and local levels to desegregate public housing, that was not the case. A long history of popular resistance to breaches in the residential color line, including political protest, mob action, organized improvement association activity, and violence elicited a cautious response on the part of officials who employed merely a rhetoric of change (e.g. "open occupancy" and "desegregation"). In reality, federal and local authorities acted in complementary fashion to continue, albeit more covertly, the practice of racially segregating public housing. No

action by the local or federal governmental bodies resulted in desegregation. To the contrary, their "efforts" amounted to nothing more than cosmetic or token reforms that had little impact on previously established and deeply entrenched racial patterns.

Segregation in Baltimore's public housing continued and indeed, increased after Brown.

Resistance to the implications of the Brown decision and the constitutional demise of "separate but equal" for national housing policy manifested itself throughout the HHFA, extending down from the Administrator's office, through the legal staff, and deep into the bureaucracy. Typically, the RRS made a case internally for embracing an expansive application of Brown to housing policy, but was ignored. Although he had been handed a mandate to end racial discrimination in government programs or, at least, an affirmative obligation to make the effort, HHFA Administrator Albert M. Cole went no further than adopting "separate but equal" -- the very principle that the court had rejected. Willing to supply more and better housing to address the physical needs of the nation's minority populations, the administration's urban renewal program (passed just weeks after Brown was handed down) consciously and explicitly linked public housing to the need to relocate impoverished, displaced, inner city, minority residents. A burst of high-rise, inner city construction, filled almost exclusively by non-white refugees fleeing the wrecker's ball, forever changed the character and image of public housing. In the end, Cole's reflexive deference to localism on sensitive racial matters, his denial of any existing federal responsibility or authority to intervene in such areas, and his insistence upon a congressional directive before attempting to deal with questions involving segregation, led to an approach so cautious as to rely upon a fifty-eight year old doctrine that now lacked any legal standing or support.

HHFA reticence in tinkering with racial policies even after Brown found its complement on the local level in the HABC. Administering public housing on a de jure segregated basis, the HABC and its leadership knew, even before Brown, that they would soon need to adopt a new approach to racial affairs that could pass non-discriminatory muster. Officials and staff were less than enamored of the court's handiwork. They also had to deal with the prospect of violent resistance and disorder among white citizens. During the war, improvement association meetings and other mass gatherings had protested suggested sites for black workers, and in the postwar period raucous crowds had threatened City Council proceedings as that body contemplated Baltimore's public housing program.

HABC Director Oliver Winston subsequently focused on maintaining order and discerning the limits of "political" tolerance. The Authority subsequently responded to Brown by devising procedures that could be couched in the vernacular of the budding civil rights movement. The local agency's response did little to alter conditions, however. Indeed, it did nothing to challenge the prevailing pattern of segregation in the short run and actually facilitated its survival under the new post-Brown regime. With the displacement and relocation imperatives imposed by urban renewal, the HABC soon found itself with a rapidly growing waiting list of non-whites, the need to assure a smooth white-to-black transition in formerly de jure segregated "white" projects located in the urban core, and an increasing number of vacancies in a handful of outlying "white" developments that serviced what remained of a dwindling white demand. Winston's announced policy of "open occupancy" was nothing of the sort; it amounted to little more than a euphemism for "Negro housing." Focusing on the inner city and the lower track in the federal government's two-tier approach, HABC public housing operations in the post-Brown

world accentuated the racial city-suburban divide. Later programmatic innovations that labored under similar geographic restrictions – such as the leased, vacant housing, and “turnkey” programs – met the same fate with the same effect.

The racial segmentation of metropolitan Baltimore continued apace, then, without serious challenge from government on any level, whether in the pre- or post-Brown eras. Locals asserted early control over the racial policies of federally-supported housing programs, and if the power to define site and tenant selection policies did not provide enough assurance, municipalities retained the ultimate weapon in defense of localism and its prerogatives: they could simply refuse to participate in what was, in the end, a voluntary program. Suburban jurisdictions frequently seized upon this last course, opting out of any housing initiative that threatened to increase their black presence. Moreover, not content with merely preserving the racial status quo, some outlying communities continued the work of undoing racially mixed settlements to pursue racial homogeneity. Zoning and building restrictions, the provision (or denial) of basic utilities and services, and the use of government building programs and projects to forcibly root out non-white settlements of long-standing each contributed to the continued “whitening” of the suburbs at least through the 1960s.

In sum, although one may detect the workings of the private market and choice in the rise, growth, and maintenance of residential segregation in Baltimore as elsewhere, those forces simply did not produce the enduring degree of racial separation evident by the 1980s. That outcome took a team effort that included the public’s representatives (local and national), authority, and powers – and the hands of those responsible – could be seen by anyone who cared to look.

White Consensus and Segregation from the Progressive Era to the New Deal

Baltimore's pioneering role in the development of legislative supports for residential segregation early in the twentieth-century is no secret. When, in the summer of 1910, George W. F. McMechen bought and occupied the house at 1834 McCulloh, the Yale law graduate breached a popularly conceived racial dividing line and precipitated a flurry of legal activity. Between 1910 and 1913, the city enacted four successive ordinances mandating racial residential segregation in the search for a formula that would pass judicial muster. Eventually, the United States Supreme Court ruled in a 1917 Louisville case, Buchanan v. Warley, that such racial zoning ordinances were unconstitutional. Thwarted in the effort to construct municipally-sanctioned residential barriers, Baltimore's boosters of racial and neighborhood homogeneity turned to private agreements, restrictive covenants, and a range of complementary practices to accomplish the same end.

The episode illustrates two important points. The first is that a strong white consensus existed in support of racial residential segregation. Hardly evidence of the temporary dominance of an atavistic or retrograde fragment of the white population, the repeated passage of such ordinances represented the strength of "progressive" reform in the years preceding World War I. Indeed, supporters argued positively that segregation would prevent conflict, protect property values, dampen ill feeling "between the white and colored races," and -- along with the suppression of epidemic disease -- maintain good order. It was not, in other words, racial "extremists" alone who tried to quarantine blacks in the inner city.⁹

The second essential point is that the widespread political backing for the segregation

measures was born not of a desire merely to preserve or reinforce current neighborhood patterns, but to *create* a degree of racial separation that did not yet exist. There were areas of black residential concentration, to be sure, but there is no escaping the fact that, in 1910, blacks and whites lived in close proximity to one another, often shared the same blocks, and, as McMechen's foray across Druid Hill Avenue suggests, suffered the instability of perceived borders that were not universally respected. Baltimore's growing black population was expanding beyond the alleys and small streets that had earlier provided shelter and, according to one contemporary newspaper correspondent, "their advancement in education and the improvement in their financial condition . . . aroused a desire for better living conditions." Indeed, "segregation was demanded," the correspondent concluded, "as a result of a persistent invasion of the white residential section by Negroes."¹⁰ White, middle-class Baltimoreans reacted with a demonstrable desire to separate themselves from what they now considered "urban."¹¹

The ordinances themselves and the debates surrounding them gave further evidence that segregation, far from being the standing rule, was being pursued as a *potential* solution to a host of social ills. In declaring the 1911 incarnation of the ordinance invalid, one court attacked the attempt to prevent individuals from moving into blocks occupied "in whole or in part" by members of the opposite race by noting that "a great many blocks are now occupied at the same time 'in part' by colored persons and 'in part' by white persons." Enforcement of the ordinance, the judge concluded, would simply depopulate such areas by making it "unlawful for either white or colored persons to move into or remain in the block."¹² Local black attorney W. Ashbie Hawkins supported the court's contention by similarly claiming that Baltimore was "full of so-

called 'mixed blocks,' where whites and blacks can both live, or move at random."¹³

Nowhere, however, was the closeness between black and white in Baltimore more painfully acknowledged than in discussions of public health. Speaking on the eve of the Supreme Court's decision in Buchanan v. Warley, Mayor James H. Preston asserted that the "unhealthy state of the negro race" threatened whites. Citing the city's close living quarters and the service niches filled by blacks in the local economy, Preston lamented that "[t]ime and again whole families have been devastated by disease for the reason that segregation was impossible and contact unavoidable."¹⁴ Following Buchanan, and the subsequent invalidation of the last of the local segregation ordinances, Preston turned to the Chicago Real Estate Board for advice. Coping with their own rapidly growing black population, the Chicago realtors were in the vanguard of those experimenting with private means of enforcing neighborhood segregation.

Preston subsequently became an ardent advocate of racially restrictive covenants and the mobilization of public opinion on their behalf. He urged the organization of "white and public-spirited property holders" in the effort to evoke a "general condemnation" of those who would "destroy" another's property, whether with "an axe or by negroe [sic] incursions." Preston ultimately created a Committee on Segregation that brought together city officials, local realtors, and neighborhood improvement associations and complemented the new city zoning commission that, in the words of one historian, "lock[ed] poorer residents into poor neighborhoods."¹⁵

For the next half century or more, public and private forces combined in Baltimore to effect the ends desired by the outlawed racial zoning ordinances. Never explicitly articulated as a comprehensive, coherent strategy, a clear pattern of intentionally fostered segregation nonetheless emerged piecemeal, decision by decision, between the Progressive Era and the Civil

Rights Act of 1968. This systemic, concerted attack on black mobility and integrated living patterns consisted of three parts. First, given the repeated passage of the segregation ordinances, the city's elected leaders demonstrated an obvious desire to concentrate African Americans, insofar as possible, within the inner city. Second, additional efforts, applied over a long period of time, effectively curtailed the movement or introduction of new black residents into outlying and, particularly, as yet undeveloped areas. Third, to rationalize the process and clean up any "loose ends," repeated attempts were made to eliminate anomalous pockets where whites and blacks shared neighborhoods, as well as small, isolated black concentrations in or near otherwise white areas.

Finally, it is also clear that the ultimate efficacy of this tripartite formula benefited from the application of public power and resources. It was, after all, the unfettered market and individual desire that propelled George McMechen, and others like him, across the city's racial frontier. If the failed attempt to use racial zoning ordinances to arrest such change represented an initial, abortive foray into the realm of restrictive state action, subsequent public endeavors met with more success. Public housing in conjunction with slum clearance, urban renewal, and expressway construction reconfigured the face of the city, enhancing and reinforcing patterns of segregation. Generations in the making, Baltimore's incremental march toward residential apartheid represented conscious choices and deliberate policy. By 1980, sixty-three years after Mayor Preston's lamentation about the impossibility of segregation, Baltimore ranked among a handful of the most "hypersegregated" metropolitan areas in the United States.¹⁶

The New Deal and the 1930s

The opportunity to wed racial predilections and government power in housing came with the Great Depression, the New Deal, and the advent, among other initiatives, of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), slum clearance, and public housing. By the late 1930s, the federal government placed massive new resources at the disposal of state and local authorities while granting them virtual autonomy.¹⁷ In Baltimore, the desire to use government power and subsidy to segregate the races more effectively quickly became apparent.

The initial effort to establish a public housing program came with the 1933 appointment of the Maryland State Advisory Committee to the federal Public Works Administration (PWA) and its subsequent creation of a "Joint Committee" on housing. W. W. Emmart, a Baltimore architect and longtime member of the Commission on City Plan, played a key role on the Committee and in directing, at the mayor's request, a study of local housing conditions in 1934. Tellingly, his thinking on such matters had been revealed years before when, in the midst of the furor over the segregation ordinances, he made an address on city planning. Emmart suggested the demolition of poor, largely African American areas in order to protect "better neighborhoods" and, in the process, called for an attack on "blight" rather than individual black homeowners.¹⁸ Emmart's suggestion to use slum clearance as a means to redraw racial borders and insulate middle-class white neighborhoods was, in fact, made at the first gathering of the Baltimore City-Wide Congress in 1911, a convention that pulled together representatives from forty-one neighborhood improvement and protective associations from across the city and surrounding suburbs. In the words of historian Joseph L. Arnold, the City-Wide Congress endorsed both the "segregationist policies advocated by the city planner" and the racially restrictive zoning ordinances then being so widely discussed. In 1934, the Joint Committee followed Emmart's

earlier lead and selected several potential redevelopment sites intended to enhance segregation.¹⁹

Concerned exclusively with rehabilitation, the Joint Committee did not consider new construction on outlying, vacant land, and subsequently recommended six largely black-occupied sites that all fell “within the 1816 boundary of the city.” The “universal opinion” of committee members also dictated that the first projects should be undertaken on the “border line of large blighted tracts” rather than wholly within them. There is no doubt, moreover, that the report and recommendations equated black areas of residence with “blight” and used the terms almost interchangeably. Significantly, only two of the proposed sites earned continued acceptance as proper places for black residence. One, given its concentration of African American institutions and resources, was deemed well-suited for future black development; the “site has no other value except for Negro residence,” the committee concluded. The second -- given its undesirability and the fact that it had been “long since abandoned by whites” -- appeared to the Joint Committee “only usable for Negro habitation.”

Three of the remaining four targeted borderlands, however, found themselves slated for redevelopment as white communities (the exception required more study). Unable to say explicitly exactly how or where uprooted black residents would be resettled, the Joint Committee only hinted obliquely at an overall relocation strategy. Commenting on the process of racial succession, the committee lamented the “inefficiency” that attended the African American takeover of “buildings planned for a generous and village like occupancy by single white families” and suggested that the “typical Baltimore block” could house many more such residents than was presently the case.²⁰ Rational redevelopment, in other words, included the removal of such “obsolete improvements” and packing more people into less “generous” quarters in a

reduced number of designated black neighborhoods. Here was an attempt not only to redefine growing black neighborhoods geographically, but an explicit assertion that the proposed accommodation compelled separate and unequal treatment.

A special session of the legislature created the Maryland Emergency Housing and Park Commission in late 1933 to handle slum clearance, public housing, and bond issues for projects; by early 1934 architects serving on the Joint Committee had formed a corporation and began to plan for sites identified in the committee's recommendations.²¹ Issuing their own report in the wake of that released by the Joint Committee, the Associated Architects of Baltimore, Inc. explicitly stated that a "preferential value" in the ultimate selection of projects should be the "improper location of [the] population group occupying [the] site." Indeed, the architects believed that the conscious, rational redrawing of racial boundaries would "buttress property values" and protect white areas threatened with dilapidation.²²

Almost immediately, the Baltimore Urban League questioned the Joint Committee's report and its obvious intention to further, with government support, the separation of the races. Ira De A. Reid, author of the Urban League's rejoinder, The Negro Community of Baltimore, praised the Joint Committee's study of the intolerable social conditions that demanded a broad-based attack on the housing problem. But, he wrote in conclusion, the report that recommended the white re-occupation of well-settled black districts "presented not only the difficulties of living in these areas, but the philosophies of housing planners concerning Negro housing, with their absence of plans for the Negro group."²³

Most tellingly, the two specific slum clearance proposals that emerged from this spate of planning activity spoke directly to the issue of how policy-makers, both federal and local,

intended to use PWA powers and resources. The first proposal, in the Waverly area, targeted a majority-black section of what was an otherwise white community in northeast Baltimore. The plan called for the elimination of a row of houses where “white and colored live side by side” and where the “colored families are [a] higher type than the whites.” New housing for a “better class of whites paying higher rents” would replace the old “slums,” according to historian JoAnn Argersinger.²⁴

The second proposal originally encompassed one project for blacks and one for whites in the McCulloh Street area, just northwest of the central business district. Baltimore’s planners, according to an exhaustive study by Peter H. Henderson, “prized these projects because they promised to reinforce racial segregation in the area in which racial controversy had generated the Progressive-era residential segregation laws.” Officials projected the clearance of a segment of the neighborhood’s black community and the construction of the new developments as barriers to its expansion into the Eutaw Place district -- a community that remained insecure despite its coverage by racially restrictive covenants. The proposed black and white projects would be separated by a row of garages “in a manner reflecting the traditional separation of black alley housing from white dwellings in Baltimore.”²⁵

These early proposals constituted irrefutable links between the explicit racial restrictions desired twenty years earlier and the resort to planning tools and jargon that increasingly came into vogue to effect the same results. One federal official inspected the McCulloh site and labeled it “truly a blighted area immediately adjacent to a good white residential neighborhood.” Its rehabilitation, he concluded with obvious approbation, “would offer a splendid barrier against the encroachment of colored.”²⁶ First-hand observer and assistant architectural engineer W. E.

Trevvett made the point even more starkly. The proposed redevelopment sites, in his view, “did not seem to be slums.” “I feel,” he wrote of the plans, “that their purpose is not for slum clearance but rather [for] using the projects to block the negro from encroaching upon white territory.”²⁷

Economic, political, and legal complications prevented the immediate consummation of these projects, but they revealed even more than the desire to use public power to buttress segregation and uproot inconveniently located black neighborhoods. First, they demonstrated a local willingness to flout national guidelines and the federal government’s acquiescence in such evasions. Although the PWA’s “neighborhood composition rule” sought to reassure states and municipalities that no federally-supported project would alter the racial profile of the community in which it was placed²⁸ and was obviously intended to assuage fears of federally-sponsored integration, Baltimore’s planners found it could cut against their desire to impose a greater degree of segregation than presently existed. Consequently, they simply ignored it; federal officials reviewing the proposed projects offered no objection.²⁹

Second, when legal uncertainties regarding the federal government’s power to invoke eminent domain for slum clearance compelled the examination of alternative sites on outlying vacant land, it quickly became apparent that black occupancy of such locales was out of the question. Indeed, Clarence W. Perkins, a former state senator and executive director of the Maryland Emergency Housing and Park Commission, admitted that a vacant land program would only serve to provoke the “antagonism of the white people.” He still supported an inner city, McCulloh Street development for African Americans; one that would “abolish crime, eliminate the slum, give the negroes a decent place to live, and . . . protect the [white] section to the

north.”³⁰ Finally, it should be clear that racial considerations were much more than a “facet” or an “aspect” of the planning process. They lay at its heart and proved its driving force.³¹

This first, abortive stab at rationalizing the urban landscape through the application of government power and resources also brought to the surface several unarticulated assumptions. Chief among these was the belief that city officials had the power and responsibility to control the movement of a rapidly growing black population in the larger community’s interest. In pushing hard for federal approval of the McCulloh area projects, for example, Perkins emphasized the need to “divert” blacks into districts and developments that would “protect” white-owned property.³² Trevvett also noted that the displacement of blacks would make possible a development that would “block negroes from spreading westward.” In similar fashion, sites for black projects were chosen, in Perkins’s unguarded words, to “protect the whites,” or rejected because “enlightened city planning” dictated that they not stray from the path taken by the “Negro population . . . to the North and Northwest.” Proximity to existing “Negro developments” and consonance with “the movement of the Negro population” became explicit criteria for acceptance among local officials.³³ What made this all the more noteworthy was that the assumption of such power proved so unremarkable, so matter-of-fact that it became nearly invisible. Thus, Clarence Perkins could urge PWA acceptance of tandem black and white projects because the city’s government would look favorably upon the “protection assured to the large white area” nearby while at the same time asserting that the plan “involve[d] no social question or difficulty.” Unexamined -- and certainly unquestioned -- such principles awaited implementation following the false start of 1933-1937.

The passage of the Wagner-Steagall Act in 1937 led to the establishment of the United

States Housing Authority (USHA) and provided new momentum to the public housing movement. A public corporation under the Department of the Interior, the USHA provided funds for low-cost housing and stimulated the necessary and corollary creation of local housing authorities to administer the program. Baltimore's City Council passed legislation establishing the Housing Authority of Baltimore City (HABC) in December, 1937; Clarence W. Perkins served initially as executive director, with Harvard-trained architect Charles Dana Loomis advising as technical director. Together, Perkins and Loomis dominated a site selection process in which the latter replicated the procedures he employed when serving on the Joint Committee. Focusing upon a "ring of blight" parenthetically embracing the central business district, the HABC proposed developing five sites, three of which had been earlier selected by the Maryland Emergency Housing and Park Commission. Three of the public housing installations--what would ultimately become the Poe, McCulloh, and Douglass Homes--were designed for African American tenancy, while the remaining two (Latrobe and Perkins Homes) were reserved for whites. Both the federal government and the city's Board of Estimates approved the plans in 1938. Construction began with the Poe Homes in the fall, 1939, and concluded with the occupation of the Perkins Homes by white war workers in March, 1942. In all, slum clearance displaced 2,733 households from the five sites.³⁴

This original slate of public housing developments provoked little opposition. The reason, it seems clear, is that local authorities deftly dispatched the race issue after resolving -- indeed, exploiting -- an underlying tension in federal guidelines. Inheriting an ongoing program from the PWA, the USHA adopted, among other things, the "neighborhood composition rule." In discussing its site selection process, however, the USHA apparently failed to conceive of, and

did not acknowledge, the existence of racially mixed neighborhoods. Speaking only in terms of racially identifiable communities, the USHA prescribed that in order

to serve families who are predominantly of a given race, care must be exercised in selecting a site which will not do violence to the preferences and established habits of members of that race or to the community life of which they may be a part.

The aim of the authority should be the preservation rather than the disruption of community structures which best fit the desires of the groups concerned.

The same policy statement, moreover, also stated unequivocally that it was the “responsibility of the local housing authority to decide its own racial policy.”³⁵ Given these directives, the HABC found it could safely ignore the “neighborhood composition rule” in the pursuit of a more perfectly segregated city. Local persistence and clarity of purpose combined with federal ambiguity and abdication of federally-mandated responsibilities to make certain that nothing hindered the authority’s racial agenda.

Baltimore’s early public housing program subsequently failed to fulfill its promise as far as the black community was concerned. As the Associated Architects noted in their 1935 report, “practically no housing of any kind designed for colored use has been created in Baltimore since antebellum times.”³⁶ Potentially, new public housing represented a great leap forward. But HABC estimates reveal, however, that even though blacks constituted 68% (1,863 of 2,733) of displaced households, only 45% of the new dwelling units in the five projects (1,125 of 2,514) were available for black tenancy; a shelter-starved community actually saw its housing supply reduced by more than 700 units.³⁷ Such quantitative measures, though, reveal the racial imperatives moving local planners and policy-makers.

HABC struck preemptively to salve white feelings, dampen fears, and short-circuit political opposition by announcing a policy of strict segregation. Not only would it refuse to place projects on vacant land, but it would protect white neighborhoods against “negro encroachment,” and restrict the placement of public housing developments for black occupancy to “the worst Negro slum areas of the city.”³⁸ More than a rhetorical facade, HABC tangibly manifested its clear intent with the siting of the Poe, McCulloh, and Douglass Homes. Established as *de jure* segregated, all-black projects, each was placed within existing black neighborhoods.

The desire to manipulate and reinforce racial boundaries and barriers became even more apparent with the site selection for the all-white Latrobe and Perkins developments. Indeed, these projects occupied slum clearance sites earlier highlighted by the Maryland Emergency Housing and Park Commission in racially mixed “border” areas. Situated east of the Maryland State Penitentiary, the Latrobe project straddled the boundary between a receding white Catholic population and the growing black community of east Baltimore. Riding roughshod over the “neighborhood composition rule” and unashamedly engaging in the process of “Negro removal,” HABC, according to Peter Henderson, wanted to relocate the growing black population that had settled in the community and “return the area to white use.”³⁹ The authority’s application to the USHA cited approvingly the Baltimore Council of Social Agencies’ (BCSA) longstanding opinion “strongly in favor of such conversion.” Black leaders openly protested the project’s use as a barrier and the Baltimore Sun acknowledged the suspicion “that the site was selected deliberately to halt the northward expansion of the East Baltimore Negro District.”⁴⁰ In similar fashion, HABC used the location of the Clarence W. Perkins Homes to “reinforce racial

segregation in East Baltimore by removing a pocket of black residency” that was surrounded by white neighborhoods. The Joint Committee envisioned this back in 1934 when it noted that the area “should be occupied by white families.” As for the uprooted blacks, they could be shuttled, HABC determined, to “a similar development for low rental families in a more desirable location.”⁴¹

Clearly, some housing reform advocates, as well as black leaders, perceived the rationale behind the HABC’s program and objected to it. The former, however, did not want to jeopardize the clearance and rebuilding of truly dilapidated neighborhoods or their larger vision of a publicly-supported housing program. The latter also faced the grim reality that desperately needed new housing for the African American community would be provided *only* on a segregated basis. If troubled by the specific nature of the authority’s activities, the promise of more and better housing down the road apparently muted their opposition.⁴²

The Impact of World War II

Even before the United States’ entry into World War II, there were indications of the racial controversies and outcomes that would characterize the housing program during the wartime emergency. In early 1939, HABC proposed two vacant site, low-rent projects, one for blacks, another for whites. Originally slated for southwest Baltimore, the development for African Americans generated an outpouring of opposition by citizens, neighborhoods, and building and loan associations. Flooding a meeting of the Board of Estimates, the protestors claimed that the initiative would make it “dangerous for white school children and white persons going to and from work to pass through the area.” Ultimately successful in their effort to force

cancellation of the project, the opposition did not reappear when the HABC came forth with a substitute proposal for the Gilmore Homes. Jettisoning notions of developing a black project on vacant land, the authority turned its attention to another border area between black and white neighborhoods, this time in west Baltimore. Moreover, Gilmore represented an "experiment in high-density living" that would pack more households onto the site than resided there before clearance. Though there were other districts in certifiably worse physical condition, the need for a black development in west Baltimore and the opportunity to pursue what had now become customary racial goals provided rationale enough for Gilmore's construction.⁴³

Opposition to the proposed vacant land development for whites, particularly on the part of the local real estate industry, also manifested itself but proved unable to halt the project. Mayor Howard Jackson supported the construction of Armistead Gardens and helped suppress the race issue by offering public assurances that the project would be for white occupancy only. Finding the rumors of racial subversion unavailing, the opposition then turned to the courts. Beaten there, they could do nothing but watch the HABC break ground for the project in early 1940.⁴⁴ With the war crisis upon them, both the Gilmore Homes and Armistead Gardens opened their doors to war workers when completed. They proved harbingers of things to come.

World War II saw the government expand its housing activities. Not only did the USHA continue to approve low-rent projects (in 1941, HABC received authorization to build the O'Donnell Heights project for whites in east Baltimore, as well as another *de jure* segregated black development, Somerset Courts, near the Douglass Homes), but the Lanham Act (1940) provided for the construction of defense housing apart from the low-rent program. Equally important, at least in theory, the federal government enjoyed the exercise of expanded powers

during the wartime emergency and thus could, if it chose, develop units for blacks on vacant land without explicit local approval. By the beginning of 1943, however, the federal government had constructed seven war industry projects, all for whites. One of these -- the Ernest Lyons Homes in the Turners Station area in Baltimore County -- was originally intended for black occupancy, but finally opened with white tenants after a period in which it stood vacant. Along with the Talbot, Fairfield, Brooklyn, and Westport Homes, in addition to two annexes attached to the Armistead Gardens, they gave testimony to the comparative ease with which dwellings were added to the supply intended for white war workers. Blacks saw the Gilmor Homes and Somerset Courts converted for the use of their war workers, but this neither added to the number of units already available to African Americans nor provided access to housing in other than segregated areas.⁴⁵

The most telling controversies of the war years, though, involved the construction of temporary projects for black war workers and the search for a suitable vacant land site for a similar, permanent development. The deepening international crisis combined with the rapid urbanization of African Americans to produce a compelling need for minority housing that could be erected quickly on undeveloped sites in most major cities. Given the dense overcrowding of most urban cores, the construction of new housing for blacks on outlying, vacant land could not be avoided. The result was that Baltimore, along with a number of other cities, issued a string of protests against such developments that reached the White House. More than paper resolutions and prayers, the National Housing Agency (NHA) reported in 1944 that "threats of violence were employed" to deter the selection of particular sites, and that the resistance forced the government, in some instances, to use its emergency war powers to seize land and erect temporary dwellings.

Occasionally, federal authorities continued to seek permanent housing for blacks that would remain available to them after the war. "Here," the NHA commented tersely, "opposition was normally more intense."⁴⁶

Such proved to be the case in Baltimore. The Federal Public Housing Authority (FPHA) initially sought to erect some 2,000 units for blacks using a mix of temporary and permanent projects. HABC's chairman, realtor Cleveland Bealmear, personally rejected the notion of any development for blacks on vacant land, whether transient or not; he and his board proved especially vehement, though, in opposing a permanent settlement. For a host of reasons, the FPHA initially determined that a site at Eastern Avenue and North Point Road in East Baltimore County was "by far the most desirable." HABC, however, refused to approve it and expressed its opposition, according to federal officials, "because it was in a white area."⁴⁷ When federal authorities later endorsed a suggestion by the Commission on City Plan to use a site just east of Herring Run park near Armistead Gardens, the HABC board again balked. Commission on City Plan chairman J. D. Steele characterized the site as "the most ideal spot for a colored settlement located as it is on the edge of an industrial area and well removed from any white settlement." Still, the mayor and the HABC refused their assent, leading the FPHA to assert its willingness to act under its own authority in developing the Eastern Avenue site. At this point, according to a federal report, "because of threats of mob violence in the Eastern Avenue section, the FPHA Commissioner instructed the Regional Director to use the Herring Run site for temporary war housing, in lieu of the Eastern Avenue site. The threat of mob violence had apparently become a decisive factor in the selection of the site. Agreement seemed impossible."⁴⁸

When the FPHA Regional Director went to court to obtain the temporary housing site

under the War Powers Act, the city relented in its steadfast refusal to recommend acceptable sites for the development of black housing. Fierce neighborhood opposition, however, guaranteed that Herring Run would not be one of them. Indeed, in objecting to that site, the Harford Oaks Improvement Association informed city officials plainly that "Negroes have a right to proper housing, but not at the expense of communities which have been developed and maintained for years by the white residents and owners." By October 1943, the city had readied one temporary project (the Banneker Homes) expressly for black occupation and recommended three additional sites for temporary housing -- those at Turners Station, Holabird Avenue, and Sollers Point. It also, finally, selected a location for permanent black housing in south Baltimore at Cherry Hill.⁴⁹

The final disposition of the 2,000 units intended for use by African Americans had been delayed for nearly a year as, in the eyes of critics, "the FPHA and the local agencies have been buffeted about by neighborhood, real estate and political interests."⁵⁰ Little time was wasted, however, discussing the quality of the temporary apartments. Intended to be quickly torn down at war's end, units such as those comprising the Banneker Homes suffered from "flimsy construction" and the use of "'ersatz' material."⁵¹ Much more time was lost in disputes over the proper mix of temporary and permanent units and site selection: issues that bore directly on the postwar growth and containment of Baltimore's black population. The placement of the Banneker Homes and the Turner's Station projects ultimately demonstrated the principles driving the wartime program. The former site, less than a mile from Cherry Hill, was isolated, poorly served by public transportation, and virtually devoid of community facilities. The latter (combined with the adjacent Soller's Point development), in contrast, was grafted on to an existing "Negro community" that came complete with its own schools, stores, and churches. If

no white community proved willing to tolerate a new, permanent black presence in the coming postwar period, local authorities pursued alternate strategies of isolation and concentration in their determination to minimize the impact of even the temporary occupation of emergency units.⁵²

Explicit, self-conscious postwar concerns also brought the HABC to Cherry Hill. Unable to forestall any longer the construction of a permanent, vacant land project for African Americans, HABC selected a site that contained a city-owned cemetery and incinerator, and one that was bordered by the polluted Patapsco River, marshlands, and a railroad right-of-way.⁵³ The authority rendered its reasoned judgement, it claimed, only after an “exhaustive study of all available sites.” Citing private plans to place more African American housing in the area, HABC’s Bealmear informed mayor Theodore McKeldin that development of a permanent public housing project would allow the city “to participate in the planning and development” of the neighborhood. This was especially important, Bealmear went on, “in view of our desire, as a part of our Post-War Planning, to proceed with the . . . elimination of slum dwellings” in particular black districts. Chosen with an eye on postwar racial arrangements, the development of Cherry Hill made permanent public housing for blacks “available for the future program of the Housing Authority of Baltimore City in a location which our staff and the Commission feel is most suitably located for that purpose.”⁵⁴

A desolate and isolated setting, the Commission on City Plan had earlier rejected Cherry Hill as a potential park, and the site now drew the opposition of George Murphy, the HABC board’s sole black member, as well as that of local black organizations such as the NAACP and the Urban League. It “would be a criminal waste of public funds to attempt to set up a permanent

housing development on a site which suffers from as many liabilities as those which characterize Cherry Hill," the latter complained. The FPHA, however, along with the Commission on City Plan, dropped its previously expressed reservations. Acknowledging its proximity to the African American community at Mt. Winans, J. D. Steele now concluded that "this whole area might be designed for and developed as a large colored section, which could house a large colored population without overcrowding." Two developers confirmed and reinforced that concept when they obtained Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage insurance for a private black development on the site. Though FHA would not ordinarily consider such a location for homes to be occupied by whites, its support, in this case, contributed to the creation of a self-contained black community housed in a mix of public and publicly-supported private units. Such developments led the FPHA's Regional Director to drop earlier "objections" and to affirm his agency's willingness to cooperate with the HABC. "[W]e are enthusiastic about the possibilities in such a controlled and preplanned neighborhood," he wrote. The successful resolution of the controversy reflected the FPHA's self-expressed "policy of working closely with local groups, particularly with the Local Authority, in order to adjust all our activities and decisions to local opinion."⁵⁵ Under enormous pressure, Baltimore provided *some* vacant land housing for its black residents--but only on an institutionalized, separate, and unequal basis. That it took a national emergency, a war against Nazism, and the ultimate selection of a single permanent site that could not have been calculated to be more isolated to win the assent of local authorities is testimony to the tenacity of the resistance to the black occupation of undeveloped, outlying land in metropolitan Baltimore. Despite having special powers in wartime that would have permitted an override of local authority – and an undisputed and desperate need for more black housing –

federal officials, after much delay and controversy, surrendered, rather than exercised such powers.

The end of the war brought only further confirmation that controlling the pattern of black settlement remained a priority of public policy. First, authorities moved with unseemly haste to demolish the temporary wartime units built for African Americans beyond their traditional neighborhoods, thus destroying hundreds of apartments during a time of continued housing shortage.⁵⁶ Second, HABC itself began to sketch out a postwar program that reaffirmed the racial agenda that had governed the agency since its inception. In 1945, the authority announced that it was planning "a large amount of demolition" in slum areas to stabilize inner city neighborhoods and stimulate renovations that, along with new public projects, would increase the black housing supply. "[R]acial and group movements within the City will thus be arrested," HABC concluded in an interesting choice of words, "removing one of the important causes of blight." Developing large vacant tracts for African American occupancy seemed out of the question, however, for not only were such sites difficult to find, but they were, according to the HABC, "almost invariably contiguous to white residential developments" where "very violent neighborhood resistance to any in-migration of Negroes" could be expected. At most, then, black Baltimoreans could expect an effort to upgrade their existing communities. As the authority itself put it, "the least [HABC] can do to carry out its legal function is to use every effort to convert the obsolete and low rent areas from squalor to minimum decency, and to put such areas to their most complete and beneficial use." The goal was not even "separate but equal." It was separate and then -- perhaps -- "minimum decency."⁵⁷

Finally, even the broader plans discussed for Baltimore's redevelopment as the war drew

to a close displayed racial values and projections that would have been familiar to those conversant with the studies produced in the 1930s. In the summer of 1945, the Commission on City Plan produced a document entitled Redevelopment of Blighted Residential Areas in Baltimore that contained a blueprint for the postwar era. The programmatic *leit motif* of the work emphasized a policy of containment regarding the city's African American population. Referring to the recent struggles over the siting of emergency war housing for blacks, the Commission recounted its opposition to the FPHA's initial suggestions "on the ground that such development on the proposed sites would be incongruous with the neighborhoods in which they were to be placed." Tellingly, the isolated Cherry Hill location proved "desirable" to the Commission precisely because it could become a wholly self-contained community. "To make this project's proper permanent addition to the City, and to hasten its accomplishment," the Commission noted, "the local F.H.A. officials and a number of private builders worked with the Commission's staff in producing a plan in accordance with which all concerned could cooperate to develop a community complete with all neighborhood essentials."⁵⁸ A blend of public and private initiative virtually guaranteed that Cherry Hill's population and community would be as self-contained as possible.

Equally revealing was the Commission's stated intention of providing needed services, particularly school facilities, to "blighted" inner-city areas to contain a war-swollen, black population. Commenting favorably upon the Board of School Commissioners' plans to build "new colored elementary schools" in West, Southwest, and East Baltimore, the Commission on City Plan believed that "[t]hese projects, together with transfers of pupils in existing schools, would take care of the 'blighted areas.'" Again equating black residential communities with

“blight,” the Commission concluded that the location and capacity of the new facilities meant that “all the blighted areas are reasonably served by schools.” “Blight,” in this connection, was not something to be removed, but, rather, something to be serviced in place.⁵⁹ Even more important, such projected containment enabled the Commission to think once again in terms of reclaiming neighborhoods of mixed racial occupancy for exclusive white use.

Nowhere was this aspect of the city’s postwar racial agenda more starkly evident than in the Commission on City Plan’s call for redevelopment. In addition to the Latrobe area, the Commission studied five other districts that were, it concluded, “likewise capable of being recaptured and preserved, to the east, southeast, and west of the central business district.” The Commission’s report characterized three of the five as consisting of “mixed uses and races,” the fourth as merely containing “mixed races,” and the fifth as “mostly residential, mostly colored.” Proposed development in the first three districts -- South Waverly (census tract 9-4), the University area (tract 4-2), and the Camden area (tract 22-2) -- would root out existing black populations to protect white homes, a white shopping area, and the central business district. The Commission believed further that the rehabilitation of the fourth neighborhood, the Armory area (tract 11-4), would “create a buffer and stop further decay of the better region next to it.” Collectively, the Commission wrote, these projects “would be most instructive to the City in fixing future procedures applicable to one part or another of the blighted area, or perhaps as defensive . . . measures to other parts of the city.”⁶⁰ By mid-June, 1945, the mayor and City Council passed a resolution creating a Redevelopment Commission to facilitate and oversee the private reconstruction of the city’s blighted areas in accord with the Commission on City Plan’s stated public purposes.⁶¹

The Housing Act of 1949

While analysts and policy-makers contemplated a massive redevelopment program even before the end of the war, it remained for the passage of the federal Housing Act of 1949 to actually trigger the next round of building. Title I of the new law provided support and federal subsidies for slum clearance and private redevelopment, while Title III authorized, nationally, the construction of up to 810,000 units of public housing to aid in relocation and ease the housing plight of the poor. According to one of the bill's sponsors, Senator Robert F. Wagner of New York, the Act directly raised the issue of "whether we shall solidify or break down the ghettos of segregation in our cities." In its final form, however, the law failed to prohibit segregation and contained what economist and housing expert Robert C. Weaver called a "triple threat" to minorities. Planning and redevelopment initiatives, in both public and private housing, could be used, he noted, "as a guise for displacing minorities from desirable areas" or for "breaking up established racially democratic neighborhoods." They could also be used "to reduce even further the already inadequate supply of living space available" to African Americans.⁶² Baltimore's implementation of the new federal program realized the worst of Weaver's fears.

The first two redevelopment projects undertaken included the long-contemplated Waverly development and the Hopkins-Broadway proposal. The Waverly plans called for the displacement of nearly 200 families, more than half of them black. All of the 291 new homes to be built in the area, however, were reserved for white occupancy. Similarly, 1,138 of the original 1,175 families residing on the Hopkins-Broadway site were African American; plans compelled 956 to flee the wrecker's ball, with only 178 "moderately" priced units intended for black use out

of the 656 apartments and 506 "other dwelling units" to be built. In this instance, blacks represented about 90% of those displaced, while 85% of the new dwellings were set aside for whites.⁶³ Complaints were not long in coming. Predictably, the Urban League objected that the "segregation of colored families in the Waverly area, the limited access of Negro tenants to the Hopkins project and the creation of added blight by rehousing displaced Negro families in areas which are now overcrowded does not constitute redevelopment." Instead, such offensive plans merely "focus[ed] attention upon the restrictions being placed on the community most sorely in need of adequate housing."⁶⁴

Tellingly, echoes of such observations began to be heard within the offices of the federal government as well. George Nesbitt, a race relations advisor within the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA -- the predecessor to the Department of Housing and Urban Development), noted that the two Baltimore projects would fulfill every aspect of Robert Weaver's "triple threat." Not only would they effect "Negro clearance," but they would also convert a racially "flexible" area to "one of racial exclusion" while reducing the land area accessible to blacks. HHFA's new Division of Slum Clearance and Urban Redevelopment (DSCUR) needed, Nesbitt concluded, a policy "to protect Negro families from the three-fold risk such as is inherent in the Baltimore program."⁶⁵

Federal authorities looked particularly askance at the Waverly project inasmuch as it targeted an area where whites and blacks had lived "harmoniously" in nearly equal proportions for a half century. Indeed, in considering the city's loan and grant application, DSCUR officials were "faced with the question as to whether or not it is to be the policy of the Housing and Home Finance Agency to finance the displacement of any racial group from a project area which is to

be redeveloped with housing from which members of that racial group are to be excluded." In short, Nesbitt summarized, "the Waverly project poses the issue of Federal facilitation of 'Negro clearance' about as sharply as is conceivable." In the end, he recommended that Baltimore's application be disapproved. "We cannot over-emphasize," he argued

the dangerous implication inherent in governmental subsidy of the conversion of an area occupied by white and Negro families to one of white residence exclusively. Such a step not only underwrites retrogression, but, in the instance of the Waverly project, and in view of its particular history, leaves HHFA open to the charge of leveling-downward its policy so as to embrace projects actually planned in advance of and without regard to the highest implications of the Housing Act of 1949 as well as of the covenant decisions.

Nesbitt's arguments did not prevail. As HHFA Administrator Raymond M. Foley finally advised the NAACP's protesting Clarence Mitchell, his agency did "not have the authority to compel any local public agency to establish requirements governing the racial characteristics of the families to be rehoused in redevelopment projects."⁶⁶ Work proceeded as planned -- with federal assistance -- on both the Waverly and Hopkins-Broadway developments. In the words of one critic, the Baltimore program merely "confirm[ed] the worst fears of those who sought to place specific safeguards against racial discrimination in the basic legislation."⁶⁷

Redevelopment represented, at best, however, only half the problem. It still remained to select sites for the new public housing authorized under Title III of the Housing Act of 1949. Moreover, by displacing hundreds, if not thousands of individuals, slum clearance complicated the process. Not only did the refugees fleeing redevelopment need to be accommodated, but to

the extent that new public housing construction itself forced the relocation of impoverished, inner city families, the procedure would be slowed and rendered much more difficult. The result was that the HABC, as during the war emergency, *had* to consider vacant land sites once again in order to facilitate the initial stages of Baltimore's postwar rehabilitation.

HABC's Director of Development, Philip Darling, wrote that, with the passage of a new federal housing program widely anticipated, the search for suitable vacant sites "for Negroes" became "one of our principle concerns" as early as the summers of 1948 and 1949. He also noted that, within the authority, there had "always been . . . a feeling that it would be advantageous to have two Negro vacant sites, preferably on opposite sides of the City." After a thorough examination of some 39 possible locations, however, the HABC determined that two -- both in the Cherry Hill neighborhood -- "were the only ones which could be selected for Negro occupancy with some degree of assurance that a political storm would not ensue." The other possibilities, the authority concluded, "would either be highly undesirable from a planning point of view or would precipitate a major political controversy."⁶⁸

The easy acceptance of additional public housing in Cherry Hill stood in stark contrast to the opposition aroused by the proposal to introduce nominally white projects in southwest Baltimore's Violetville area and northeast Baltimore's Belair-Edison district. HABC's suggested placement of public housing in these neighborhoods provoked, in Peter H. Henderson's words, "bitter local protest." Thousands -- most coming from Belair Road area improvement associations -- jammed City Council chambers during a February 17, 1950 public hearing, and, in a series of subsequent meetings, the Council established explicit limits and parameters for HABC's program. First, after the people's elected representatives capped the total program at

10,000 units, the Council decreed that no more than 1,550 of that number could be located on vacant land; the remaining 8,450 apartments had to be confined to slum clearance sites. Substituting vacant land sites near existing public housing concentrations at Armistead Gardens and Westport for the disputed Belair-Edison and Violetville locations, the Council exhausted its quota of vacant land units. That meant that all future public housing had to be placed in existing slum areas. Finally, and most significant of all, the Council asserted its authority to veto any potential development; each public housing site now required explicit Council approval.⁶⁹

The vehicle for such restrictions was the "cooperation agreement" concluded between the federal government and the City Council with the concurrence of the HABC. Before the war, approval of public housing sites in Baltimore was vested in the Board of Estimates, a body that had to approve all city expenditures. In early 1950, however, the City Council -- as mandated in the Housing Act of 1949-- had to agree to the terms under which the local housing authority received federal aid and managed the program. In restricting all future developments to existing slum areas and reserving the right to eliminate any particular site, the Council imposed its will on a compliant HABC. Indeed, the authority viewed such restrictions as the price for the city's acceptance of the first three (vacant land) sites and went so far as to inform the Council in a letter that the HABC did not object to the elective body's seizure of such oversight. An apparent insider's account noted, in fact, that the Authority "had no hope whatsoever" of obtaining the Council's assent unless it acquiesced in the latter's assumption of that power, and so the HABC offered no resistance, opting not only to "accept the inevitable gracefully," but to "take the initiative" with its letter to the Council. The implications of the Council's exercise of these prerogatives were so profound, however, they prompted the resignation of HABC chairman Dr.

Don Frank Fenn. Fenn criticized the Council's "interference" with the low-rent housing program, and believed its restrictions would impose an "impossible burden" on the authority. Future squabbles over siting would produce, he predicted, "endless delays." More, he concluded the HABC "could easily become a political football and a political tool that would ruin the public housing program of this city and the nation." Believing the Council's stringent control of vacant land developments had already fatally weakened the overall program, Fenn opted to leave.⁷⁰

Hammering out an acceptable cooperation agreement reflected unavoidable racial realities. "Whispering campaigns" reverberated through targeted neighborhoods suggesting that the willing acceptance of a little "white" public housing now might be but the opening wedge to a larger number -- given the projected impact of the Supreme Court's recent Shelley v. Kraemer decision -- of black-occupied units later. And if the program's opposition complained most loudly about creeping socialism, tax burdens, and the federal government's meddling in local affairs, it is not immediately apparent why the Cherry Hill site should have escaped such principled condemnation. The costs, both ideological and economic, of segregating and isolating blacks did not, it seems, appear quite so onerous. The central problem, instead, remained the need to control the site selection process in order to assure the maintenance of (or, in fact, increase) existing levels of segregation. That imperative apparently led the Baltimore Sun to conclude that the "most important" amendment attached to the cooperation agreement directed that all future public housing be located "in slum areas, replacing slum housing." The editors deemed that measure crucial because it bound "both the Housing Authority and the Council, which reserved the right to pass on future sites."⁷¹

Finally, the race issue emerges most clearly if the City Council's aggressive use of the

cooperation agreement is placed in historical context. The assumption of its new powers actually fulfilled longstanding desires. As early as July 30, 1943, the City Council, in the midst of the racially-charged Herring Run controversy, passed an ordinance that attempted to limit federal authorities to developing sites authorized by the mayor and City Council of Baltimore. Though the Regional Director of the FPHA accurately responded that his agency "was not bound by any requirement to have its sites selected," the city solicitor still complained that the federal government was "proceeding illegally and improperly and under the guise of the war emergency to accomplish the avowed purpose of permanently altering the traditional plan for the development of Baltimore City, without consultation with the authorities selected by the Municipal Corporation itself." The mayor agreed. Before the selection of Cherry Hill dampened the political conflagration, he stood ready to let the courts determine the validity of the ordinance and if, in fact, the city had the power it claimed.⁷² In the postwar period, the federal government willingly gave municipalities the authority Baltimore so desperately desired just a few years before. The city remained free to adhere to its "traditional plan."

With the limited number of vacant site units committed to project extensions at Cherry Hill and Westport, and the construction of the (white) Claremont Homes near Armistead Gardens, attention turned to the development of four high-rise, slum clearance projects -- three intended for black occupancy, and one intended for whites. The resort to tall, elevator buildings on slum clearance sites enabled authorities to increase population densities, and thus relieve some of the pressure for more vacant land development. The first of these new high-rises, Lafayette Courts, found itself cheek-by-jowl with the Douglass Homes, Somerset Courts, and the Broadway redevelopment site in a rapidly expanding "island" of public housing in east

Baltimore. HABC executive director Oliver C. Winston explicitly stated that the Fayette Street site emerged after a careful review of "all possible Negro slum sites." His report also listed nine schools, all serving "Negroes," as "available for children in the proposed project" and concluded that since "Negro women are frequently employed in domestic employment, the fairly central location in relation to the predominantly residential section of the City is of advantage."⁷³

The second high-rise, also in east Baltimore, was Flag House Courts. Intended for whites, the selection of this site presented a different set of considerations. According to Winston, "the shortage of housing of any kind for Negroes in Baltimore" made it "undesirable to locate any housing projects for white occupancy within present Negro slum areas."

This meant that in its search for suitable sites for white projects in slum areas, the Authority was limited to present white slum areas. Unlike Negro slum areas in Baltimore, white slum areas are much more limited in extent, on the average are not as bad in housing quality, and are usually interspersed with a considerable number of dwellings occupied by Negroes.

With unintended irony, Winston had indicated that "white slum areas" were neither exclusively white, nor necessarily slums. The site ultimately chosen contained 213 white families, and 75 black families. An area undergoing racial transition, the projected occupancy of the development called for 490 white units, with none allocated for African Americans. If poor whites could not previously afford the luxury of racially exclusive neighborhoods or living quarters, this plan brought it within the reach of some. "In this case," HABC concluded, "the loss in accommodations for Negroes . . . is more than compensated for by the gain in Negro accommodations to be provided at the Fayette Street site." There, 33 white and 468 black

families were to be cleared off a site that would later contain 805 units designed exclusively for black use.⁷⁴ State assistance allowed for calculated and unparalleled -- indeed, complete -- racial separation.

The two subsequent slum clearance projects undertaken during this phase of Baltimore's public housing program "fit like pieces into the jigsaw puzzle of redevelopment on the west side," according to Peter H. Henderson. Both, moreover, followed the same formula of increasing population density through the use of high-rise elevator buildings. One, Lexington Terrace, sat just east of the Poe Homes on Fremont Avenue; opened in 1958, it replaced 357 structures housing 561 predominantly black families with 677 units in four eleven-story buildings. The second, the George Murphy Homes on George Street, replaced 473 structures and another 561 families with 758 new units. Segregated, all-black developments, the projects made it clear that, under City Council oversight, public housing in Baltimore would be a "predominantly inner-city program."⁷⁵ They also displayed a level of "efficiency" in housing African Americans that probably surpassed that envisioned in the Joint Committee's 1934 report.

The 1950s -- The National Context

The mid-1950s brought a succession of national, political events that had enormous local consequences, in Baltimore as elsewhere. First, the election of Dwight D. Eisenhower ended a two-decade Democratic ascendancy marked, in terms of domestic policy, by Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal and Harry S Truman's Fair Deal. An era of activist, liberal reform (within obvious political, ideological, and structural limitations), the 1930s and 1940s gave way to a more consciously conservative epoch. Housing policy, consequently, also took on a more

conservative cast in the 1950s, and, indeed, even the most momentous counter-movement of the decade -- that launched by the Supreme Court's school desegregation ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, Topeka, Kansas -- proved powerless to halt it. If anything, in fact, Brown produced a reaction within the housing agencies that cut short embryonic efforts at liberalizing racial policy that struggled against long odds since the Shelley v. Kraemer decision rendered restrictive covenants unenforceable in 1948. Finally, it is important to consider the Eisenhower administration's major housing initiative, the Housing Act of 1954. Enacted within weeks of the Supreme Court's landmark ruling, the new law pioneered the concept of "urban renewal" and enabled a further restructuring of America's inner cities at a time when racial issues intruded forcefully on the national consciousness.⁷⁶

The first indicators of the new administration's direction came with the nomination of Albert M. Cole, a recently defeated congressman from Kansas, to replace Raymond M. Foley as HHFA Administrator. Cole had close ties to the real estate and home building industries and had played the role of implacable foe to public housing in congressional debates over the Housing Act of 1949. NAACP research into Cole's record failed to "reveal his attitude toward Negroes," but his "completely negative" voting record on public housing proved alarming enough. As Clarence Mitchell noted, the public housing program was the only part of the federal housing agenda that provided benefits to minorities. Though Mitchell acknowledged that PHA policies were "far from satisfactory in that they permit segregation," he also knew that they were "superior to the policies of the FHA and Urban Re-development programs." The NAACP subsequently opposed, but failed to derail, Cole's confirmation as HHFA Administrator.⁷⁷

If the NAACP wondered whether the agencies to fall under Cole's control would

“continue to underwrite, support and extend racial segregation in housing,” it received an answer at Cole’s Senate confirmation hearings. Though he disavowed any personal affinity for segregation, Cole, when asked point blank by South Carolina’s Burnet Maybank whether he would “violate the State laws where the colored people and the white people want such segregation,” he responded simply, “No.” Admitting it was a “very, very difficult problem,” he did not want, he said in a rejoinder that reached beyond the deep South, the federal government to “tell the community what they shall do.”⁷⁸ Localism remained unfettered.

The Supreme Court’s May, 1954 ruling on school desegregation directly challenged the adequacy of that approach and sparked a spirited debate within the HHFA. Internal legal counsel questioned whether the ruling that rendered the principle of “separate but equal” unconstitutional applied to housing at all, and certainly argued that the “factual situations” presented in Brown and the redevelopment programs were “not analogous.” HHFA and the Division of Slum Clearance and Urban Redevelopment (DSCUR) attorneys believed, at the least, that a new requirement that “private redevelopers and owners of property . . . use and administer their private property free of racial discrimination” would represent a dubious “extension of Federal Authority.”⁷⁹

Officers attached to the Racial Relations Service (RRS) in the same bureaucracies dissented and took a more expansive view of Brown’s potential reach. They wanted to bring agency practice “into line with the public policy underlying the United States Supreme Court decisions.” In sum, they called for all multi-family residential projects and related facilities developed through federal subsidies, insurance, or other such powers to be rented or sold to families without regard to race, religion, national origin, or political affiliation. The policy

would apply to federally-aided public or private developments, as well as related community facilities on land assembled through federal grants and loans.⁸⁰ As one such officer, Frank Horne, put it, the “opportunity is here for this Administration to remove all restrictions from the housing market and restore it to . . . free, open competition.” In concluding, Horne specifically warned Cole against the creation of special “minority group programs” or “equity” proposals; the previous fifteen years had clearly demonstrated, to his eyes, the “practical impossibility of attaining substantial equality of opportunity through these special devices.”⁸¹

In July, 1954, Cole met with the President’s advisers and staff, along with the heads of PHA, FHA, and DSCUR. An announcement heralding the creation of an Advisory Committee on Minority Housing soon followed, as did an explicit rejection of using federal leverage to enforce non-discrimination. “It has been suggested that perhaps we ought to crack down,” Cole said, and “use our government aids as financial clubs and say that if building is not carried out for minorities no building will be permitted for anyone.” In attacking such straw men, he asserted the impossibility of “legislat[ing] acceptance of an idea,” and comfortingly reassured all that government assistance would not “be misused to block housing opportunities for anyone.”⁸²

It quickly became clear that Cole intended to increase the quantity of government-aided black housing without initiating a threat or challenge to racial segregation. While expanding opportunities for African Americans, such a course -- throughout the 1950s -- merely accelerated the trend toward federally-sponsored racial concentrations. More, it seemed as though the administration believed that by finally addressing the physical housing needs of minorities, the pressure to dismantle “separate but equal” might be diminished -- or, at least, safely ignored. It was an approach that echoed and implicitly endorsed the strategy earlier articulated by

Baltimore's officials -- although the theoretical embrace of "equality" raised a higher standard than the city's espousal of "minimum decency."

Cole demonstrated his approach in several ways. First, he announced that an expansion of minority housing would now become a "top objective" of the FHA. Next, obviously spurning Horne's admonitions regarding separate "minority" programs, Cole organized a Minority Housing Conference in December, 1954. The two-day conclave brought together concerned private citizens along with representatives from government and industry to "develop practical positive lines of continuing action" for the improvement of minority housing. The most notable recommendation emanating from the conference called for a 10% "minority" quota in all new housing "if suitable sites" could be identified. The NAACP's Walter White flatly rejected the idea, asserting that the suggestion had potentially "appalling consequences" because it was "so similar to the South African Government's program of building separate communities for colored people." The conference's plans, in White's estimation, "boil[ed] down to . . . 'more housing for minorities, but on a segregated basis'."⁸³

Ultimately, however, the passage and implementation of the Housing Act of 1954 revealed, more than anything else, the administration's thoughts on housing policy. Passed just two months after the Supreme Court handed down its verdict on school desegregation, the Housing Act of 1954, as opposed to that of 1949, emphasized rehabilitation rather than mass demolition in its approach to urban revitalization. Dubbed "urban renewal," the program sought slum prevention as well as clearance, and promised to spread resources to healthy, but threatened, neighborhoods, not just those already gripped by decay. In linking now liberalized FHA provisions to the rehousing of those to be displaced, it tied, in part, the program's prospects

to the expansion of the private minority housing market. Most significant in illustrating the fate and nature of the program, however, was the role assigned to public housing by its earlier ardent opponent, Albert M. Cole.⁸⁴

Rejecting public housing as social reform or a redistributionist effort benefiting the poor, Cole preferred to emphasize its utility in making life better for those living beyond its confines. In the autumn of 1953, Cole addressed the annual meeting of the National Association of Housing Officials and asserted that “public housing for low-income families must be better integrated into a larger program . . . to improve the living standards and housing opportunities of all segments of the community.” “Only in that way can it command the community support it must have,” he added, citing political reality. “It cannot survive as a mission apart.” Referring to his own opposition to the Housing Act of 1949, Cole derided the earlier law’s mere “theoretical tie” between public housing and slum clearance, and the fact that the two subsequently maintained nothing more than a “nodding acquaintance.” Things would be different under the 1954 law.⁸⁵ Public housing, in the words of the Administrator (who had earlier said it could destroy American government), was now “an integral part of the Administration’s overall housing program” and “directly linked to the clearance of slums.”⁸⁶ It was the very position that had already been reflexively embraced by the Baltimore City Council.

As for the program’s racial dimension, Cole expected that each locality would face the problem of “displacement” and that a “very large part” of the public housing now organically linked to urban revitalization would “go to minority families.” He would not, however, countenance a federal mandate for non-discrimination. Those who sought to couple federal activity to desegregation would not be allowed, he asserted, “to strangle broad national progress

until every last extreme aim has been satisfied.”⁸⁷ Instead, public housing became almost exclusively a “minority” program intended solely to service redevelopment. Cole knew that the total number of units requested by the President could not meet the “probable total need,” though it would still “make possible major progress in clearing the slums and rehousing the lowest income groups.” He also knew, as reported by DSCUR’s staff, that the “insufficient supply of rehousing resources available to nonwhite families [was] the core planning and relocation problem in most communities.”⁸⁸

Cole remained sensitive to -- but rejected -- charges that the implementation of urban renewal resulted in federal support and sanction for racial discrimination. Indeed, he contended that the 1954 changes in the housing law that authorized public housing “based entirely upon the needs of families displaced by slum clearance and other governmental action” was an unmitigated boon to African Americans. “Since racial minorities constitute a high proportion of slum dwellers,” he informed Senator Prescott Bush, “these circumstances orient the low-rent program significantly to serve their needs.” Such reasoning led Cole to conclude that non-discrimination policies were already “in effect,” and that additional tinkering was unnecessary. In complementary fashion, Cole believed that problems of racial discrimination were “peculiarly local” as well as “complex and deeply rooted in local traditions, institutions and emotions.” It was precisely here, he asserted, that “we should rely heavily on local responsibility and local wisdom.” Beyond such arguments, he fell back upon the lack of an explicit Congressional directive to desegregate, such “achievements” as his conference on minority housing, and “practical” economic and political considerations to explain his position. “For a number of reasons,” he concluded with regard to federally-enforced desegregation, such a “drastic step” was

not "possible or desirable."⁸⁹

By 1955, a racially identifiable two-tier federal housing program had emerged. The upper tier consisted of FHA single and multi-family insurance programs that financed the development of new communities for whites, most of them in the suburbs. At the same time, public housing, the lower tier's signature program, evolved from an experimental social reform that provided well-designed shelter for the working, transient poor into a relocation tool that ultimately warehoused impoverished non-whites displaced by urban renewal. By the end of the decade, it had become identified as a problem-plagued, inner city "black program."

It would be difficult to overstate the radical nature and impact of this transformation. At the end of World War II, despite the reality of segregation, public housing did not embrace the "poorest of the poor," nor was it racially exclusive. It serviced, instead, a mixed-income clientele of all races (black participation hovered around an "equitable" 30%-35% through its first fifteen years) in projects that contained a surprising number of soundly planned structures and amenities. In the early 1950s, however, the increasing demand for redevelopment and relocation housing contributed to the eventual eviction of the "over income" tenants who were permitted to stay on after the war despite their technical ineligibility. Such tenants provided models of respectability and moderated public housing's working-class character. Subsequent reductions in Congressional authorizations and municipal reluctance to accept "too much" public housing placed an additional premium on such units as were built; employees who previously lived on-site to provide ready service and maintenance thus also found themselves forced out of the desperately needed public apartments. Finally, the mandated linkage to renewal and the high priority assigned those displaced also meant that project managers lost the opportunity to screen

applicants for potential “problems” and had to accept as tenants many the program would not have admitted earlier. The result was that, by the 1960s, the federal government’s lower tier housing program acquired the image of a publicly subsidized, inner city, minority-dominated, low-rent refuge where the displaced poor and “problem” families gathered in cheaply constructed, increasingly dilapidated, dangerous towers. It stood in stark contrast to the realm of the upper tier where the public subsidy remained largely hidden and the private owners of single, detached homes in virtually all-white suburbs enjoyed the benefits not of their hard work alone, but also those of public policy.

The Eisenhower administration, then, faced a specific problem and left a particular legacy. Fearful of a recession, or worse, a devastating depression such as followed World War I, and perceiving the need to rebuild the nation’s rapidly aging cities, the President viewed urban renewal, as a means of revitalizing the nation’s economic engine while modernizing the country’s urban, physical plant. The difficulty, however was that he was compelled to face these problems in the midst of an exploding demographic revolution (the second Great Migration sent African Americans out of the rural South to cities in every region, but particularly the North) and the early stirrings of the budding civil rights movement. Pursuing redevelopment and renewal even as metropolitan racial balances were being radically altered, proved a daunting task. The Administration had to be aware of increasing black dissatisfaction, but also, more important, it had to be cognizant of an implacable white resistance to integration and black mobility (a resistance manifested, in large part, by white flight to the suburbs, outbreaks of collective and individualized violence in “changing” neighborhoods, and, now, the desire to use government power and public policy to reinforce and even enhance residential segregation). In sum, the

federal government in the 1950s tried to devise a formula that would accommodate the new demographic realities, the first hints of black militancy, and majoritarian racial sentiment within a single plan to revive metropolitan America and sustain the economy. The result – primarily urban renewal and a transformed public housing program – established new barriers and packed more densely the monoracial concentrations of African Americans contained in large urban “ghettos” even as the Supreme Court knocked the legal props out from under a segregated society. Thus, with regard to housing, the philosophical and legal rejection of “separate but equal” predated even the weak attempt to apply the discredited doctrine.

The 1950s – The Local Context

The increased emphasis placed on federal supports for the private market by urban renewal and its direct linkage to public housing meant that the program’s possibilities and consequences would be deeply conditioned by FHA and local housing authority operations. An examination of the Baltimore housing market by an FHA analyst undertaken as the Housing Act of 1954 sailed through Congress revealed both the persistence of the agency’s restrictive assumptions and its projections regarding black housing in the mid-1950s.⁹⁰ Concluding that the construction of 20,000 new units would be needed to satisfy metropolitan Baltimore’s housing demand over a two-year period extending to mid-1955, the FHA analyst estimated that 2,600 (13% of the total) would suffice for non-whites even though, according to the 1950 census, they comprised nearly 20% of the metropolitan population and 24% of city’s. Strikingly, the report described the housing needs of whites and blacks in near opposite terms. Reflecting “the recent strong trend to suburban building with its accompanying implications for increasing home

ownership," the FHA called for 88.5% (16,000) of the 17,400 new units intended for whites to be single family homes. In contrast, 77% (2,000) of the new black-occupied units were expected to be centrally-located rental housing. Most significantly, the agency explicitly reaffirmed that "the bulk of new building for nonwhite occupancy should be within the city limits of Baltimore." Subsidized homeownership on the metropolitan fringe was a white prerogative; the "general objective of promoting close-in development" for blacks remained the cornerstone of FHA racial policy in Baltimore.⁹¹

Apart from the agency's historic antipathy to racially diverse neighborhoods, the FHA articulated several reasons for its reluctance to support new construction of single family homes for blacks in the burgeoning suburbs. First, there is no doubt that the federal government questioned the economic competence of most blacks. Utilizing the concept of a family's "effective income," FHA analysts (undoubtedly anticipating the postwar return of women to traditional domestic niches) adjusted their figures downward to "eliminate incomes of the secondary members of the family that are considered only temporary and not expected to be available for family expenses over a prolonged period." As a higher proportion of black families regularly depended on multiple sources of income, the Baltimore market analysis had to concede that the disqualifying recalculation "may be too restrictive in the case of minority group families."⁹² Second, the FHA's subsequent assessment of black housing needs led to the corollary conclusion that "the greatest demand is for additional rental units in the lower brackets" -- a situation aggravated, the agency acknowledged, by the fact that new construction for blacks had "been negligible except for public housing projects."⁹³

Finally, the FHA's postwar study took account of the "tremendous movement of Negroes

into West and Northwest Baltimore.” The transfer of existing housing stock from white to black hands not only relieved “the pent-up requirements of the nonwhite population for additional dwelling space,” but “the bulk of the housing transferred has been by sale” thus, in the agency’s judgement, further “minimizing the requirements for new construction . . . in the minority group market.” Such observations should have vitiated notions regarding the economic ability of blacks to become homeowners. Instead, the “trickle down” phenomenon and white flight to the suburbs contributed to the racial segmentation of the metropolitan area. To the extent that the takeover of older white-occupied housing remained unable to quench the demand of black buyers and renters, the FHA had little to offer. In the sales market, the agency could only express concern that the “non-availability of suitable sites may be a serious limitation” in fostering continued black settlement in the urban core; suburban placement was nowhere mentioned and there is no evidence of its consideration. As for the renters, aside from public housing, the FHA believed that “much of the minority group building will be centered in the urban redevelopment areas of the city.”⁹⁴ Again, the sites selected for such projects (both public and private) anchored black housing to the center of the city.

On January 1, 1957, the city created the Baltimore Urban Renewal and Housing Agency (BURHA), a new entity that joined the HABC, the Baltimore Redevelopment Commission, and the Housing Bureau of the city’s Health Department. The institutional embodiment on the local level of the national desire to enlist public housing as a subordinate, though necessary, support for urban renewal, nothing illustrated better the former’s mission as a relocation program. Even more important, public housing’s nearly exclusive role as the refuge of last resort for soon-to-be uprooted poor, inner-city minorities combined with the local reaction to the Brown ruling to

provide a one-two punch that would transform the program's content and character. Forced to accept the most impoverished and divided families, public housing projects "pulled" in an overwhelmingly African American client base once urban renewal got underway. At the same time, the adoption of a nominal "open occupancy" policy in the wake of Brown that was qualified only by the top priority given relocatees fleeing before the wave of new development, led to the serial transition to black occupancy of the remaining white projects in the city's core. For their part, white renters and homeowners found themselves drawn not to the city center by the centripetal pull of slum clearance, renewal, and public housing programs felt so keenly by blacks, but instead responded to the centrifugal push of, among other forces, virtually racially-exclusive FHA operations that subsidized and facilitated the white-only occupancy of new subdivisions on the city's outskirts or in its suburbs. The restricted site selection process (in the synergistic joining of urban renewal and public housing) combined, then, to "push" whites out of the city -- or, at the least, to provide them with few housing alternatives within it.. The result, within a relatively short period of time, was the production of a troubled, inner-city public housing program identified with minority populations, while a dwindling proportion of whites remained concentrated in a handful of outlying projects.

Change seemed inevitable in the spring of 1954, but the outcomes appeared uncertain. Even before the Brown decision overturned Plessy v. Ferguson, HABC Director of Management Ellis Ash asked the authority's General Counsel, Eugene M. Feinblatt, for a summary of cases from around the nation that had already found "segregation in low-rent projects . . . unlawful."⁹⁵ The Supreme Court's rendering in Brown just a few weeks later, coupled with the quick and compliant action taken by Baltimore's Board of Education, should have provided additional

momentum for desegregation. Despite the lack of a direct, legal challenge to HABC racial policies and procedures, Feinblatt subsequently advised the agency that he found "present tenant selection policies to be illegal." The burden of recent court decisions was such that it "obligate[d] us legally to change our admission practices as soon as possible, even though such a change would require us to abandon or substantially alter our present racial occupancy practices," Feinblatt concluded.⁹⁶

A small staff committee subsequently appointed by Executive Director Oliver C. Winston investigated the authority's "racial occupancy policies" and reported to the Commissioners in late June, 1954. Seeking to identify "reasonable" alternatives, the five-member committee remained divided and offered simply its "best judgment at the moment" rather than unanimously supported recommendations. First, the committee considered the full range of possible actions, from literally "doing nothing" to implementing complete and immediate integration. Discussions soon narrowed the prospective strategies to two. One would stress that the HABC -- for the present -- bore no legal compulsion to integrate. Instead, the authority would develop criteria "to be used in a 'neighborhood pattern' approach, anticipating that integration would be applied to specific projects which satisfy such criteria." Resurrecting a concept used to reassure nervous whites back in the 1930s (and one recently struck down by a California court), the adherence to neighborhood patterns clearly did "not contemplate integration for all projects" and restricted the addition of racially-mixed developments to changing, racially-mixed areas.⁹⁷

The second alternative would have the HABC announce the adoption of a desegregation policy "as soon as possible." The policy would be applied as quickly as the authority could prepare to administer it and employ "intensive efforts to enlist community and neighborhood

understanding.” Proponents of this course argued that its acceptance would almost certainly save the agency the “embarrassment of attempting to defend a test suit . . . when it appears that no real defense is possible.” Even more important, however, was the belief that a pre-emptive voluntary move toward integration would allow the HABC the “maximum degree of latitude” in implementation. Echoing counsel Feinblatt’s earlier expressed desire for “flexibility,” the committee asserted that under a program of voluntary desegregation the authority would “have the freedom to determine the speed and manner in which the policy is carried out.” “We will,” they averred, “have more opportunity to maneuver to avoid trouble.” Conversely, if forced to integrate by an adverse court decision, outside “pressure groups,” the staff believed, would “breathe down our necks to make sure that we do not attempt to evade the effect of the decision.” “This lack of freedom in carrying out an enforced integration policy could lead to trouble,” they concluded.⁹⁸

On June 25, 1954, the HABC commissioners adopted a resolution calling for the elimination of “the factor of race in the selection of eligible tenants.” Acknowledging the “events of the past few months,” the authority explicitly recognized “a clear trend toward the abandonment of policies sanctioning segregation” and the mounting number of legal opinions that made it “extremely difficult” to maintain “existing policies.” The executive director followed up with a June 30 speech before all HABC employees in which he, too, asserted the growing perception that “racial segregation is a violation of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the Negro as an American citizen.” “I am well aware,” Oliver Winston realistically added, “that it is not a feeling all of you share.” That being so, he warned against the expression of “contrary personal opinions” when dealing with tenants, and later offered a two-week “institute”

to train and educate the staff in human relations.⁹⁹

Despite the articulation of an "open occupancy" policy, the bold rhetoric was matched only by tepid, timid action. Even before the promulgation of the new policy, advocate Ellis Ash informed Winston that it was "not contemplated that the policy would be applied immediately" and admitted the possibility that "there would be variations . . . in application."¹⁰⁰ For his part, Winston embodied the determination to "avoid trouble." Indeed, in the neutral language of the social scientist, the HABC's executive director later offered guidance to other officials and agencies based on the Baltimore experience. In what could best be seen as the raising of cautionary flags, he admonished that policy makers "should be realistically sensitive to the local political climate."¹⁰¹ Such an explicit acknowledgment reinforced his earlier, emphatic staff warning that the adoption of a nominal desegregation policy did not mean that the HABC had embarked upon a "crusade." Meeting six months after Brown, HABC officials reaffirmed Winston's deliberate approach with the insistence that desegregation still required "a period of preparation prior to initiation." Exactly when the announced policy would be applied, they could not say. But whenever that day arrived, they reassured, it would not be invoked "promiscuously" or "have application for every family." "We are not going to require anyone," the HABC concluded in a foreshadowing of the "freedom of choice" option, "to live anywhere against their wishes."¹⁰² Such ambidexterity permitted Ellis Ash to state without equivocation in January 1955 that "the Housing Authority is now operating under a policy of desegregation in its low-rent projects" even as he acknowledged, in the next breath, that "a change in racial composition has occurred in only one project to date."¹⁰³

What did this mean on the street level? The process of "desegregation" that ensued

hardly deserved the appellation. An internal HABC memorandum indicates that Winston's June 30 address "lent an air of vital importance to the policy and an expectation of implementation within a reasonable time period." But nearly eight months later, the same memorandum observed, "the obvious failure to follow through is causing an undue amount of suspicion among agencies and individuals as to the true intentions of this public agency in the matter of desegregation." Actual application of the policy, to that point, had been limited to the Fairfield and Lafayette projects, locations the authority's critic labeled "atypical." The former, originally a war project for white workers, was in the process of being converted to a low-income project for "Negro occupancy" before the Supreme Court's decision in May, 1954; by 1957 no more than eight of its 293 units were occupied by whites. The latter, a slum clearance project, opened under the new guidelines, but served, as originally intended, an African American clientele; within a couple of years, whites held no more than four of its 817 units. More to the point, these operations left HABC with two policies: nominal "desegregation" in the virtually monoracial Fairfield and Lafayette homes, and unvarnished "segregation for all other projects." Though the memorandum acknowledged that "[n]o precise timing can or should be fixed" for a broader implementation, it also insisted that authorization to proceed was essential and that the Latrobe and Perkins Homes appeared the most likely candidates.¹⁰⁴

HABC extended the policy of "open occupancy" to Latrobe and Perkins, in fact, in May, 1955, though the projects integrated only gradually and proceeded, ultimately, to virtually all-black tenancy. The application of the new policy, in short, resembled the old "neighborhood composition" strategy more than any new departure in racial programming. In selecting the Latrobe and Perkins projects to receive an initial group of carefully chosen black families, the

HABC deliberately selected centrally located developments in the urban core. In the end, the housing agency simply proved that it did not need to choose between the two alternatives presented by its staff committee following Brown; it pursued both courses: it announced a policy of “immediate” desegregation but implemented one rooted in the “neighborhood composition” principle.

The Authority next opened Westport to black applicants; like Fairfield, Westport was a white war housing project located in an isolated, industrial area next to Mt. Winans, a black enclave. At the same time, the three outlying white projects (Brooklyn, O’Donnell, and Claremont) avoided being chosen for “desegregation,” as did all of the de jure black projects. Indeed, there were no similar efforts undertaken to introduce “other race” families into any of those units. Despite such realities, the measured introduction of the first black tenants into previously all-white structures saw the HABC exuberantly inform Governor Theodore R. McKeldin that “integration is an accomplished fact in four of the Authority’s projects [Lafayette, Latrobe, Perkins and Westport]” Though three of the projects “formerly were reserved for white occupancy,” the “transition has been accomplished without friction or difficulty,” the authority proudly announced.¹⁰⁵ Given the long view, black access to such previously all-white developments appears to herald less the dismantling of a racially dual system than just another step in the racial transition of Baltimore’s core neighborhoods and an appropriation of low-cost, inner city rental units for those displaced by a host of public construction programs of which the FHA would readily approve.

In their delayed and transient experience as integrated projects, Latrobe and Perkins demonstrated the fate of the inner-city “white” developments under HABC control. By 1960,

Latrobe was 60% black, and Perkins was up to 43.7%. When Westport extension opened on a “non-discriminatory” basis in 1960, 88.9% of that project’s residents were African American. And Flag House, originally designed as a “white” slum clearance endeavor, opened under the new rules in 1955; it was 48.4% black by the end of the decade. The trend emerged even more clearly by 1964. By that time, Latrobe was more than 78% black, Perkins was nearly 57% black, and Flag House 75% black. Westport and its extension, at the same time, housed but 13 white families (3%) in contrast to 414 (97%) black families. Surveys conducted of whites leaving the system in the 1950s indicated that the introduction of black families into the project played a “central role” in their decision. Indeed, the reason most often given for rejecting proffered units was that “Negro families were too close.” Reflecting urban renewal realities, others increasingly believed that the program was now “only for Negroes” or serving “only the very poor.” Overall, in the few, short years between Brown and the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the proportion of whites served by HABC dropped nearly by half, from 41.7% to 22.5%; conversely, the number of blacks served jumped from 58.3% to 77.5% of the agency’s tenant base at the same time. Five years later, in 1969, both Latrobe and Flag House were more than 90% black (91% and 94.5%, respectively), and Perkins was nearly 77% African American.¹⁰⁶ It was the public sector analogue to the private market-led transition then taking place on the West Side.

The possibility that the demise of an overtly dual system would result in resegregation rather than desegregation -- or, given some time, a virtually all-black program -- could be detected from the outset. Ironically, that trend resulted not from the feared adversarial suit and court order, but from the juxtaposition of the announced “reforms” and the process of urban renewal. The tight controls the HABC wished to place on “integration” procedures to maintain

the peace and reassure white tenants clashed with the imperatives of massive relocation. When combined with inner city site selection policies and the announced "freedom of choice" program that emerged from the authority's struggle to devise a new approach to racial affairs, that confrontation produced a growing, increasingly black program that shepherded a shrinking number of whites to a handful of outlying projects.

In what seems now a quaint exercise, Ellis Ash requested the HABC's Research and Statistics Division to develop criteria to be used in hand-picking the first black families to be placed in formerly all-white projects. The resulting list of desirable qualities generated indicates that management believed a high degree of selectivity was essential to a successful outcome. The Division prescribed taking only stable, adult, standard families. Veterans were preferred as heads of households, but current servicemen who did not live at home were not. Children proved desirable, but only if they were not too many, or too old. Families had to display "emotional maturity" and give evidence they would not become "a disturbing element in a project." Past experience in a variety of interracial settings would be helpful, as would congruence with the community "in terms of educational and cultural background." Hardly a prescription for accommodating the masses to be uprooted by renewal, the tight controls over black access could not survive.¹⁰⁷

The ultimate control, of course, involved numbers rather than personal characteristics. Significantly, it was the head of the Tenancy and Relocation Section of the HABC who informed Ash that tenant selection based exclusively on "need" could "well re-establish segregation." Reflecting on the housing demands and markets produced by a century of neglect and contemporary programs, Harry B. Weiss believed (as Albert M. Cole intended) that the "literal

interpretation of legal requirements would tend to fill vacancies, as they occur, with a high preponderance of Negro families."¹⁰⁸ Indeed, in a later discussion of "desegregation policy," Weiss reported that the "most penetrating question" concerned the agency's future direction "if we find the complexion of a particular project swinging too much in one direction." "There was general acceptance of the principle," he reported, "that some controls would be necessary in order to prevent ultimate segregation" (discrimination, he acknowledged, for the "higher purpose" of integration).¹⁰⁹

If the desire for controls was ubiquitous, it remained contested -- and to that extent the authority's ability to retain a white constituency was compromised. In the weeks following the Brown decision, HABC attorney Feinblatt apparently recognized and implicitly addressed the problem in his call for "limited integration." Faced with the escalating black demand for public housing, and the legal necessity now of providing it on some non-discriminatory basis, he suggested a complex plan that divided the city into sectors and met, in his estimation, the minimum requirement that "applicants be afforded substantial equality of treatment in choice of general location." Hardly a clarion call for the disestablishment of the dual system, Feinblatt's memo instead pointed the way toward "freedom of choice" tenant assignment policies consonant with the persistence of racially identifiable projects. It was a principle picked up and echoed by Oliver Winston in his June 30, 1954 address to HABC employees. Urged by counsel to forestall an adversarial lawsuit and potentially more radical policy shifts that might be imposed by court order, the new approach demonstrated a serious desire to placate white tenants.¹¹⁰ It also demonstrated how deftly the concept of desegregation could be separated from the fact of integration.

HABC's announced "desegregation" plan was presented as a "freedom of choice" policy not unlike the discredited "freedom of choice" approach adopted by Southern school systems to forestall effective integration measures. In fact, however, it was a policy of carefully negotiated and planned transition of selected projects from white to black occupancy to accommodate the need for black expansion into white neighborhoods as the latter searched for more and better housing. Of the projects that would remain racially distinct, Brooklyn, O'Donnell, and Claremont remained as white preserves as late as 1966. As might be anticipated, blacks gained access to such housing in the attempt to meet needs arising from urban renewal. The local implementation of this federal program worked consistently and comfortably within the traditional racial framework its framers' intent. In Baltimore, as in Chicago and elsewhere, "open occupancy" became a euphemism for "Negro housing."

Desegregation in the 1960s

By the late 1950s, the rapidly growing black presence in the public housing program reinforced the longstanding tendency to select new public housing sites on the basis of their racial suitability. In 1959, Harry Weiss concluded that future projects, then being planned, were "likely to be substantially Negro in occupancy, if not completely so." It was precisely for that reason the HABC approved a 232-unit extension at Westport and a much larger project on George Street in an existing black neighborhood.¹¹¹ Indeed, in 1960, Assistant Director of Planning Ellick Maslan informed BURHA that there were nearly 4,000 eligible and "predominantly Negro" applicants awaiting final review or referral, and another 3,000 expected to be displaced in the next two years. To meet that demand, he proposed a scattered site program

that emphasized, first, new construction on "the fringes of certain existing projects." Not only would such an approach "minimize the relocation problem" and furnish low-rent housing "where it is already accepted," but it would dampen "controversies over site selection." Second, Maslan suggested developing land cleared in urban renewal areas "to lend economic and social balance in the upgraded neighborhoods and to provide relocation resources for low-income displacees." While it is not immediately self-evident why such "balance" was desirable only in urban renewal areas, it seems clear that such inner city communities lacked the resources needed to resist being used for relocation purposes. Additional suggestions hinting at the rehabilitation of existing homes (no more than an "experimental" PHA program at the time) and the resurrection of the vacant land alternative (which would have to await as yet unauthorized "detailed studies" as well as an infusion of political will) was treated as impractical and remote.¹¹²

It quickly became evident, in fact, that the placement of "extensions" on existing developments and the utilization of designated urban renewal tracts would furnish the only politically acceptable new sites. Within months of Maslan's memorandum, BURHA's Director of Architectural Design, Edward C. Minor visited all proposed new public housing sites save one, and raised as red flag warning of the long-term consequences of this public housing site selection policy. A "serious review" was needed, he admonished, to determine what impact "the continuing policy of ringing the center of the city with permanent economic ghettos" was having on Baltimore and its people. In examining a number of proposed additions to existing projects, Minor noted that an extension of the McCulloh Homes would serve well if there were "no objection to the growing concentration of public housing" in the area.¹¹³ Similarly, he warned that a suggested Somerset Court extension would produce "an almost solid public housing and

public use neighborhood.” The production of such “extended ghetto[s],” he believed, could not help but generate “serious” consequences. When McCulloh and Somerset additions were finally approved by the City Council in 1964 -- virtually in tandem with the Civil Rights Act of that same year and two years after John F. Kennedy had issued an executive order banning discrimination in federally-supported housing -- the HABC noted that the former would be placed alongside five all-black projects containing 2,754 units. In its proposal for federal support the agency simply (and blandly) reported that displaced persons “tend to remain fairly close” to their former addresses and that this new stock of concentrated units would be a “valuable asset in the relocation process.”¹¹⁴ Obviously intended for a black clientele and to service urban renewal, the new projects hardly invited white interest -- indeed, the selection of sites next to former de jure and still all black projects precluded it.

External critics augmented the questions raised internally. In late 1966, the Activists for Fair Housing, a civic group of mixed racial composition, charged that the city failed to develop “relocation housing . . . outside those areas usually occupied by the Negro population.” By the spring of 1967, BURHA’s selection (and HUD’s approval) of prospective public housing sites led the Activists to doubt “the sincerity of both agencies” and their use of federal funds to “further entrench patterns of housing segregation.” None of the sites -- given their location in “Negro or fringe neighborhoods” -- complied with the requirements of President Kennedy’s executive order or subsequent HUD directives, the civic group alleged. Baltimore officials seemed ready to concede that “Baltimore had not done enough,” but they were also quick to point to politics and the City Council as the major stumbling block and excuse.¹¹⁵

Robert C. Weaver, the first secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban

Development, acknowledged, in effect, the validity of the Activists' claims even as he indicated a desire (if not the ability) to change course. In his response to the Activists, his expressed wish that policy would "limit the number of future projects" that would "represent large concentrations of low-income families on cleared land close to the center of the city," was undercut by the allowance of exceptions where "absolutely essential to achieve a broader balance in project planning concept." Similarly, in further articulating his position in barely penetrable bureaucratic jargon, Weaver claimed that HUD was "unequivocally committed to meet its responsibilities in the administration of Federal renewal and housing programs, within the fullest sense of their regulations, and of related legislation and Executive Orders, while at the same time exercising a full regard for the prerogatives of the municipal governments concerned." In short, HUD would not take on Baltimore's City Council.¹¹⁶

Significantly, the whites remaining in the system were now increasingly concentrated in a handful of exclusively white projects located, according to Harry Weiss, on the "fringe of the City limits." Without even a single black tenant until 1966, the O'Donnell Heights (881 units), Brooklyn (496 units), and Claremont (290 units) homes housed 1,667 white families. By 1964, three out of every four HABC units (74.3%) occupied by whites could be found in just these three developments. The remainder were being abandoned in the orderly retreat whites had undertaken from the Latrobe, Perkins, Westport, and Flag House projects.¹¹⁷ The existence of these all white projects in 1966 also drew the harsh criticism of the Activists.

There could be no doubt that the hinge connecting HABC's posture of "non-discrimination" and its maintenance of racially exclusive developments was its implementation of "freedom of choice." As one HABC official acknowledged in 1957, "even though the

desegregation policy applie[d] uniformly to all housing projects . . . there are projects which do not have mixed occupancy." "This is due solely," he claimed, "to respecting applicant preferences." More than a decade later, the authority also admitted that not only were applicants provided a choice, but that they were also "advised of the reality or unreality of their choices in terms of being housed within a reasonable time." The result was that even though HABC insisted that, since 1954, race had not been "a factor in determining where any eligible family might live," it could also claim that no blacks had requested residence in a white project. Despite such "steering" efforts, urban renewal's impact on the racial composition of HABC waiting lists and federal demands following the passage of civil rights legislation undermined the agency's ability to maintain the *status quo*. Indeed, "conscious efforts to stimulate applications from white families" did not prevent the accumulation of vacancies in the white projects. In response to the Activists' complaints that HABC was maintaining all white projects more than a decade after Brown, Secretary Weaver ordered HABC to desegregate the three white projects. By the end of 1966, BURHA Director R. L. Steiner wrote that "Negroes would soon be moving into" the Brooklyn Homes "as a result of insufficient [white] applications."¹⁸

The relocation burdens imposed on the city by urban renewal, public housing, and school and highway construction clearly entailed such disproportionate racial impacts that they ultimately overwhelmed all efforts to maintain exclusively white enclaves within what had become, by the late 1950s, clearly a "minority" program. Undertaking an analysis of relocation in Baltimore between 1951 and 1971, the Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD) calculated that some 16,505 households were uprooted. Of those, the lion's share were due to urban renewal (10,012 or 60.6%) and public housing (2,834 or 17.2%). In racial terms,

nearly 81% (8,091) of urban renewal's displaced households were black and more than 88% (2,508) of those forced to move by new public housing construction were African American. DHCD merely stated the obvious when it concluded that relocation "primarily" affected blacks, but it also had to acknowledge that the "[s]ocial policies behind various government programs" "confined" urban renewal to such areas. Similarly, "resistance to public housing construction by residents of higher income neighborhoods" restricted the site selection possibilities for that program, tied it to the inner city, and pushed the proportion of blacks displaced by it to 97% for the period after 1965. As for the highway program, choosing routes, at least in part, by selecting the path of least political resistance, according to DHCD, "result[ed] in non-white households living in low-income neighborhoods being relocated to a far greater extent than white households." Finally, DHCD concluded, school construction comprised the "bulk" of public improvements programs causing displacement, and there "recent governmental policies have stressed construction in inner city areas which are predominantly non-white."¹⁹

The mutually reinforcing nature of "freedom of choice" tenant assignment policies and residential segregation in the context of urban renewal was evident to federal authorities by the mid-1960s. A retrospective analysis undertaken by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in the 1980s concluded that the "'freedom-of-choice' plan was widely adopted by local authorities, but it did not produce significant changes in public housing occupancy patterns." "In some areas," HUD analysts wrote, "it may be doubted that the plan was operated in complete good faith." In larger urban areas, it went on, "a serious impediment to change was the geographic location of many of the projects." This, HUD had to admit, was "sometimes the result of consciously segregative site selection" and often aggravated by "slum

clearance relocation mandates” and “subsequent demographic changes.” Though initial HHFA regulations issued under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “contained no specific provision regarding tenant selection in public housing” and a subsequent PHA circular “implicitly endorsed freedom-of-choice tenant assignment policies,” by 1967 HUD ordered the replacement of the “freedom of choice” formula with a policy of “first come, first served.”¹²⁰ Baltimore’s response is instructive.

Desiring to “cut down on vacancy loss and eliminate discrimination,” HUD offered two variations of an “assignment plan” for prospective public housing tenants. Plan A consisted of a simple “take it or leave it” offer of a suitable unit in the location with the greatest number of vacancies; rejection moved the applicant to the bottom of the waiting list. Plan B allowed the consideration of appropriate dwellings in up to three projects with the highest vacancy rates; three such rejections earned a prospective tenant a spot at the end of the line. Believing itself to have been “operating free of discrimination under its voluntarily adopted policy of desegregation” since 1954, and convinced that such compulsory assignment plans would lead to greater vacancies and “further segregation,” Baltimore’s public housing officials asked for a waiver under HUD guidelines. Unsuccessful in its appeal, the agency then proposed its own variant of Plan B.¹²¹

The plan shared a number of features with attorney Feinblatt’s proposal of fourteen years before. Designed in 1954 to preserve choice for white applicants and to “limit” integration, the initiative called for the regional grouping of public housing projects. That idea was now apparently dusted off in 1967 and resurrected in the framework of a “three choice” approach similar to HUD’s suggested Plan B -- except that the “choices” in the local plan would involve

clusters, rather than individual projects. Federal guidelines had to be “broadly interpreted” to countenance the city’s proposed alternative. Key to the plan was the creation of an identifiably “white” cluster. Though miles apart, O’Donnell Heights and the Claremont Homes found themselves joined together in their own “group”. No longer exclusively white, they remained largely so and represented a “choice” for whites seeking accommodations. Such extraordinary measures were apparently necessary to maintain even the semblance of white participation in the program.¹²² Federal authorities found the new Baltimore procedures acceptable.

The results proved striking. In 1977, the Brooklyn Homes housed but 73 black families in its 499 occupied units; Claremont and its extension sheltered 110 such families among their 444 leased units, and O’Donnell Heights placed only 201 African American families in a development containing 898 rented apartments. Where blacks represented 86.0 % of all families served by Baltimore’s public housing program, they constituted no more than 20.9% (384 of 1841) of those housed in the outlying, previously-designated “white” projects. The whites gathered in these developments totaled 86.5 % of all white families remaining in the program.¹²³

The 1960s – City and Suburbs

By the late 1960s, the pattern and practice of using governmental power to intensify and reinforce racial residential segregation extended beyond the establishment of high-rise, low-rent public housing projects in Baltimore’s urban core, and, in fact beyond the city’s limits themselves. New federal programs, ostensibly developed in part to counteract the now visibly doleful effects of past public housing policy, could not escape the racial imperatives that drove local authorities and misshaped the original endeavor. And the suburbs, perched precariously on

the city's borders, found their own ways to enlist public policy and power in the pursuit of greater racial homogeneity. In the first instance, the creation and implementation of the Leased Housing Program proved that the impulse to preserve segregation controlled more than building initiatives. In the second, the move toward "expulsive zoning" employed city planning to achieve in outlying areas what slum clearance and urban renewal accomplished in the city.

The Leased Housing Program opened in April, 1967 to complement and give added flexibility to the public housing program that was so heavily invested in conventional projects.¹²⁴ Originally authorized to procure 250 units (including 165 "large" apartments), HABC found their operations "hampered" from the outset by a City Council ordinance that restricted their operations specifically to "designated urban renewal areas." Van Story Branch, Acting Director for Housing Management in the Department of Housing and Community Development, noted that the "restriction was contrary to the wishes of this Department and undeniably not in the best interest of the Baltimore community." More, he wrote, the "restricted area" was "predominantly" black, leading the federal government to withhold of approval of the city's application for almost a year."¹²⁵ Indeed, HUD relented only after local officials insisted that the program would not, necessarily, "be restricted to all non-white neighborhoods." HUD warned, however, that the locals would be "expected to be constantly alert to prevent leasing in areas which will perpetuate Negro concentration."¹²⁶

The Washington, D. C. bureaucrats' fears proved well-founded. By the spring of 1968, DHCD had placed 75 units under lease -- all of them in areas 80% to 99% black. "This is," HUD tersely informed the City of Baltimore, "a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."¹²⁷ City officials protested to no avail, but suffered no greater penalty than a reduction of

100 units in their leased housing allocation. In denying their appeal, HUD acknowledged that it was aware that the Baltimore City Council had restricted "the location of Leased Housing units to a certain well-defined section of the city." Still, it reminded BURHA'S Acting Executive Director, Robert S. Moyer, that "we were assured by your Authority that this area was sufficiently large (2,750 acres) to permit the location of the leased units outside of areas of nonwhite concentration." Under these circumstances, the federal agency concluded with good reason that the punitive allocation reduction was "most liberal." DHCD could only agree that the need existed "for expanding into areas of the city where better quality housing could be found as well as areas in which Negro concentrations are not predominant."¹²⁸

Against this backdrop, the Used Housing Program, with the same intent and results, opened its doors in the fall of 1967, six months after the launching of the Leased Housing Program. Here, the HABC purchased rehabilitated dwellings and made them part of the city's public housing stock. Like the Leased Housing Program, its operations were also confined geographically to specific urban renewal project sites, but apparently drew no complaints from HUD. By 1971, four years into the program, HABC concluded that the constricting geographical limitations provided only a "small inventory" of available units (but 87 such dwellings had been acquired) and constituted "a major obstacle to the program."¹²⁹ Similarly, the Vacant House Rehabilitation Program (including "turnkey" units) opened in late 1969 and, though not explicitly restricted geographically, such developments still required the City Council's assent and failed to alter the prevailing pattern. The units made available initially came from city-owned properties seized in tax foreclosures. Though efforts were made to cast a wide net, the numbers served were small and HABC conceded that "most of the early acquisitions were confined to properties

in the inner-city abandoned by their owners.”¹³⁰ In effect, HUD allowed HABC to accomplish with the Vacant Housing Program what it had not allowed HABC to do with the Leased Housing Program.

One additional noteworthy – but unsuccessful – attempt to break the pattern of state-supported segregation involved the search for “vacant or largely vacant” sites for a handful of “turnkey” developments. In the late 1960s, authorities recommended four such sites in west Baltimore; proposed construction in the Hilton, Dukeland, Braddish, and Rosedale neighborhoods was presented in a single public housing development package to an agreeable city council which approved the measure in July, 1965. Individual and organized citizen opposition soon manifested itself, and was echoed by local governmental representatives. The Hilton site proved particularly controversial and attempts to placate the resistance included reducing the project’s size and number of units in the proposal. Indeed, following a series of “meetings and exchanges” with neighborhood representatives, DHCD officials decided to “relinquish” 2.8 of the site’s 7.3 acres and cut the number of apartments from 117 to 84 so that a school might be built that would adequately serve the development and “assure” the surrounding neighborhood that the educational and recreational facilities previously lacking in the proposal would now prevent the newcomers from “overcrowding” community facilities already in use. Despite such maneuvers, in a move characterized by DHCD commissioner R. C. Embry, Jr. as a “serious retrogression in the Administration’s efforts” to supply all Baltimoreans with “a decent home” and “a clear violation of the Cooperation Agreement,” the city council adopted an ordinance in 1969 that “voided” the Hilton site’s earlier approval. Officially rejected, the Hilton site at least enjoyed the certainty of a coup d’ grace; the remaining projects simply disappeared

into a legislative black hole that recorded no final disposition or action.¹³¹

In the suburbs, the determination to confine African Americans to the inner city, prevent their movement to outlying areas, and, in fact, expel those long-settled in now desirable areas found other means of expression. In Baltimore County, for example, the practice of exclusionary zoning enlisted the power of local government in an ostensibly race-neutral manner to stifle any significant minority in-migration. By 1970, roughly 90% of its undeveloped residentially-zoned land permitted no more than one house per acre -- a measure that effectively excluded the poor and, not coincidentally, most non-whites. Such devices, however, left untouched some twenty black residential enclaves scattered across the county, some of which had established their roots in the mid-nineteenth century. Ranging in size from a mere handful of homes to nearly 1,500 black households, these settlements became the target of what planner and housing expert Yale Rabin has called "expulsive zoning."¹³²

Expulsive zoning, according to Rabin, "has been used to permit -- even promote -- the intrusion into black neighborhoods of disruptive incompatible uses that have diminished quality and undermined the stability of those neighborhoods." In studying Baltimore County in the 1960s, he determined that over 350 houses formerly occupied by blacks had been demolished, and that most of it occurred in two of the region's largest black communities: Turners Station and Towson. "Expulsive zoning," he concluded, "was a significant factor in both places."¹³³

Interestingly, Baltimore County adopted the practice of zoning in 1955, just one year after Brown. In Turners Station, the area where whites maintained homes was zoned for residential use and the black community, consisting largely of apartments, was zoned "industrial." Under such circumstances, the black residential component could not grow and, in 1966, 244 such

families were uprooted in a wave of redevelopment. Their homes demolished, the area was converted to industrial use. The county made no relocation housing available, and most of the refugees moved back into the city. In Towson, different sectors of the African American residential community were zoned, respectively, for business and industry. Commercial development placed constant pressure on the community, and the county's condemnation of additional properties to make way for new public construction had an additional impact as well. By 1970, Towson's original black population (610 in 1960) had been reduced by about one-third. Events in Turners Station and Towson, moreover, proved hardly unusual. Four other black communities in Baltimore County were similarly "downzoned" and could not replace or construct new housing. Their populations also declined.¹³⁴ When combined with the denial of basic public services (such as sewer and water connections) and an isolation enforced by patterns of road and highway construction, the remaining black residents of Baltimore County could be forgiven for detecting a concerted effort at displacement. Indeed, in 1950, Baltimore County had a total population of 220,273, of which 18,026 (8%) were black; by 1964, the county had grown to accommodate roughly 541,600, even as the black community had been *reduced* to 16,580 (3%).¹³⁵

It seems clear, then, that the cumulative effect of countless decisions, including those made at every level of government, served as a social centrifuge, "pulling" African-Americans into Baltimore's metropolitan core, even as it spun whites centripetally towards the suburban fringe. If both public and private determinations combined to produce a "hypersegregated" city in the second half of the twentieth century, the very chronology of its development indicates that

the workings of the private market alone did not -- and could not -- produce such a result. It was private inclination embodied in and expressed through the public arena that provided the powers and resources that enabled, especially after 1950, a much more thorough separation of racial groups. Public housing, slum clearance, redevelopment, urban renewal, zoning, even the construction of highways and public institutions such as schools, served not only their manifest purposes, but played an integral role in Baltimore's social transformation. In sum, Baltimore's status as a "hypersegregated" city was no historical "accident," nor were the hands involved in its creation merely the proverbial "invisible" ones associated with an unfettered market. They are there to be seen if only we care to look.

1. W. Edward Orser, Blockbusting in Baltimore: The Edmondson Village Story (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1994), 2.
2. This is not to say that the public sector *by itself* was responsible for residential segregation; it does assert, however, that the pace and degree of such segregation was conditioned, in important ways, by that public presence. The private sector could not -- and had not -- produced the results evident by the end of the century without assistance. For relevant private sector activity, see Orser, Blockbusting in Baltimore.
3. Leonard P. Curry, The Free Black in Urban America, 1800-1850: The Shadow of the Dream (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 58.
4. Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 46, 74-78. Massey and Denton measure five geographic dimensions (unevenness, isolation, clustering, concentration and centralization) to determine the severity of segregation. Any metropolitan area that merits a "high" score on four of the five indicators is considered "hypersegregated."
5. *Ibid.*, 74-78.
6. Gail Radford, Modern Housing for America: Policy Struggles in the New Deal Era (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). See also Gail Radford, "The Federal Government and Housing During the Great Depression," in John F. Bauman, Roger Biles, and Kristin M. Sylvian, eds., From Tenements to the Taylor Homes: In Search of an Urban Housing Policy in Twentieth-Century America (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 102-20.

7. For a look at this process in another city, see Kevin Fox Gotham, Race, Real Estate, and Uneven Development: The Kansas City Experience, 1900-2000 (Albany: State University Press of New York, 2002); see also, Marc A. Weiss, The Rise of the Community Builders: The American Real Estate Industry and Urban Land Planning (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).
8. To cite just a single example, see Charles C. Beckett to Richard E. Kline, April 25, 1951 and Warren R. Cochrane to Commissioner, PHA, May 3, 1951. After a first-hand field inspection, an RRS officer evaluating redevelopment proposals reported flatly that "it is the opinion of this office that the Public Housing Administration should not participate in the Baltimore program." Despite the determination that the plans violated stated policy principles, two specific projects already "had been cleared and sent to the Administrator's office for submission to the President."
9. Garrett Power, "Apartheid Baltimore Style: The Residential Segregation Ordinances of 1910-1913," Maryland Law Review 42 (1982), 289-328; Peter H. Henderson, "Local Deals and the New Deal State: Implementing Federal Public Housing in Baltimore, 1933-1968" (Ph. D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1993), 65-73; Roger L. Rice, "Residential Segregation by Law, 1910-1917," The Journal of Southern History 34 (May 1968), 179-99; Gilbert T. Stephenson, "The Segregation of the White and Negro Races in Cities," The South Atlantic Quarterly 13 (1914), 1-18.
10. Baltimore Afro-American, February 19, 1916 (clipping in author's possession). The local black newspaper denounced the segregation law as "viciously obnoxious" and rejected published speculation that Baltimore's African Americans did not object to it. "It is well known," the paper claimed, "that colored Baltimoreans are not satisfied with the law as it is unduly discriminatory,

prevents legitimate outgrowths for increases in population and wealth, and places the race at a constant disadvantage in matters affecting its civic and economic progress. The present law makes it practically impossible for the opening up of new territory for colored people, especially if the same has been hitherto undeveloped."

11. Joseph L. Arnold, "The Neighborhood and City Hall: The Origin of Neighborhood Associations in Baltimore, 1880-1911," Journal of Urban History 6 (November 1979), 3-30.

12. New York Age, May 1, 1913 (clipping in author's possession). The Maryland Court of Appeals did not accept Judge Elliot's interpretation of the law in State v. Gurry, though it found the law unconstitutional on other grounds. The point at hand, however, relates not to the interpretation of the law, but to the undisputed fact of the existence of racially mixed blocks. See Power, "Apartheid Baltimore Style," 305-06.

13. W. Ashbie Hawkins, "A Year of Segregation in Baltimore," The Crisis 3 (November 1911), 27-30. Contemporary observer Gilbert Stephenson simply said of Baltimore that "most of the blocks of the city are mixed." Stephenson, "Segregation of White and Negro Races in Cities," 16.

14. Baltimore Municipal Journal, March 16, 1917 (clipping in author's possession).

15. Power, "Apartheid Baltimore Style," 314-16. In the spring of 1917, the Chicago Real Estate Board (CREB) appointed a Special Committee on Negro Housing and adopted a policy that stated that "Inasmuch as more territory must be provided [for blacks], it is desired in the interest of all, that each block shall be filled solidly and that further expansion shall be confined to contiguous blocks, and that the present method of obtaining a single building in scattered blocks, be discontinued." For the actions of the CREB, see Alan B. Anderson and George W. Pickering,

Confronting the Color Line: The Broken Promise of the Civil Rights Movement in Chicago (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986), 46 and Allan H. Spear, Black Chicago: The Making of a Negro Ghetto, 1890-1920 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 209. For Preston's response, see Stephen Grant Meyer, As Long as They Don't Move Next Door: Segregation and Racial Conflict in American Neighborhoods (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 27-28 and James H. Preston to Allen J. Graham, September 19, 1918, Baltimore City Archives (BCA).

16. Massey and Denton, American Apartheid, 75-76.

17. Radford, Modern Housing for America; Arnold R. Hirsch, "'Containment' on the Home Front: Race and Federal Housing Policy from the New Deal to the Cold War," Journal of Urban History 26 (January 2000), 158-89.

18. Henderson, "Local Deals," 141.

19. Henderson, "Local Deals," 99-104, 141-43; JoAnn E. Argersinger, Toward a New Deal in Baltimore: People and Government in the Great Depression (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 94; Arnold, "The Neighborhood and City Hall," 19, 22-3.

20. "Report of the Joint Committee on Housing in Baltimore," March 19, 1934, Document no. 432. PL 029615-029632.

21. Henderson, "Local Deals," 101-04; Arnold, "Neighborhood and City Hall," 22-23.

22. "Report of the Associated Architects of Baltimore, Inc. to the Maryland Emergency Housing and Park Commission," (n.d.), Defendant's document no. 204. NA 00222-00229.

23. Ira De A. Reid, The Negro Community of Baltimore: A Summary Report of a Social Study Conducted for the Baltimore Urban League (Baltimore: BUL, 1935).

24. Argersinger, Toward a New Deal, 95-96; Henderson, "Local Deals," 108-09.

25. Henderson, "Local Deals," 105-09.
26. Homer Phillips to H. Tudor Norsell, July 30, 1934, #4 in Thompson v. HUD. PL 029043-029044.
27. W. E. Trevett to E. H. Klaber, April 2, 1934, #5 in Thompson v. HUD. PL 029550-029555.
28. Radford, Modern Housing, 104-05.
29. Henderson, "Local Deals," 106.
30. Henderson, "Local Deals," 117.
31. The turn toward race-based planning in the wake of the legal demise of racial zoning ordinances is discussed in Christopher Silver, "The Racial Origins of Zoning in American Cities," in June Manning Thomas and Marsha Ritzdorf, eds., Urban Planning and The African American Community: In the Shadows (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1997), 23-42.
32. Public Works Authority-Federal Housing Division, Meeting Record Re: Project for Baltimore, August 30, 1934, 6, 20, Doc. No. 448. PL 029480-029509.
33. Mr. Trevett to Mr. Mitchell, June 27, 1934, Doc. No. 452, PL 029523-029524; Walter E. Trevett to Robert B. Mitchell, September 17, 1934, Doc. No.401, PL 029058-029060; Report of the Advisory Committee on Location of Federal Housing Project for Negroes in Baltimore, August 6, 1935, Doc. No. 406, PL 029080-029081.
34. Argersinger, Toward a New Deal, 93-112; Henderson, "Local Deals," 153-64.
35. Federal Works Agency (USHA), "Site Selection: A Discussion of the Fundamental Factors Involved in Selecting Sites for USHA-Aided Projects" (February 13, 1939), #3 in Thompson v. HUD, PL 034731-034736. For the "neighborhood composition rule" see also Martin Meyerson and Edward C. Banfield, Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest: The Case of Public Housing in Chicago (New York: The Free Press, 1955), 121-22 and Devereux Bowly, Jr., The Poorhouse:

Subsidized Housing in Chicago, 1895-1976 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978), 27.

36. Argersinger, Toward a New Deal, 93.

37. Henderson, "Local Deals," 164.

38. Argersinger, Toward a New Deal, 105.

39. Henderson, "Local Deals," 172.

40. *Ibid.*, 167-70.

41. *Ibid.*, 172-73.

42. *Ibid.*, 166-67.

43. *Ibid.*, 212-15.

44. *Ibid.*, 215-18.

45. *Ibid.*, 221-41. HABC-owned low-rent projects, including those converted for war use, provided what could arguably be called a "fair share" of units for black occupancy; African Americans tenanted 2,132 such apartments while whites held 2,289. *All* of the 4,085 units, however, managed by the HABC for the Federal Works Agency (FWA) were occupied by whites. See also, Kenneth D. Durr, Behind the Backlash: White Working Class Politics in Baltimore, 1940-1980 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 16-17, 23-24.

46. [n. a.], "Special Note on Site Selection," May 20, 1944, #61 Thompson v. HUD, PL 034908-034911; [NHA], "Problems of Site Selection During the War Housing Program (Preliminary Draft, Oct.-Nov., 1944)", #62 Thompson v. HUD, PL 034765-034889.

47. [NHA], "Problems of Site Selection."

48. *Ibid.*; Henderson, "Local Deals," 242-47.

49. *Ibid.*, 247; [NHA], "Problems of Site Selection."

50. The Joint Committee on War Housing to Herbert R. Emmerich, July 2, 1943, Memorandum re "Housing for Negro war workers," Def. doc. no. 212, Thompson v. HUD. NA 00249-00250.
51. Ellis Ash to Oliver C. Winston, April 21, 1952, Memorandum re "Disposition of Banneker Homes," Doc. no. 834, Thompson v. HUD. PL 032461-032464.
52. C. A. Mohr to Cleveland R. Bealmear, October 3, 1943, Doc. no. 409, Thompson v. HUD, PL 029090-029091; Ash to Winston, April 21, 1952.
53. [NHA], "Problems of Site Selection"; Henderson, "Local Deals," 247.
54. Mohr to Bealmear, October 3, 1943; Cleveland R. Bealmear to Honorable Theodore R. McKeldin, October 12, 1943, Doc. no. 409, Thompson v. HUD, PL 029092-029094.
55. [NHA], "Problems of Site Selection."
56. Union leaders, among others, appealed to PHA to halt evictions from the Sollers and Turner Homes because of the "acute shortage of housing for Negroes in Baltimore which is being aggravated by current and proposed clearance jobs." Ultimately authorities in Baltimore County where the projects were situated refused to take over administration of the housing from the federal government, declaring (given the lack of their own local housing authority) that they lacked the political infrastructure to do so. As for the Holabird Homes, "the City expressed no interest in the acquisition of this project." For the Turner and Sollers Homes, see Neal J. Hardy to Albert M. Cole, June 17, 1954, Doc. no. 740, PL 031770-031771, Thompson v. HUD; Paul R. Boesch, "Summary of Meeting Re Sollers and Turner Homes, February 16, 1954, in Commissioner's Conference Room," Doc. no. 851, PL 032504, Thompson v. HUD. For Holabird Homes, see Housing Manager to Resident, March 20, 1953, Doc. no. 730, PL 031735, Thompson v. HUD; Ellis Ash to Charles L. Levy, February 17, 1954, Doc. no. 704, PL 031645,

Thompson v. HUD.

In the city of Baltimore it also seems clear the political considerations worked against the local takeover of federally-operated housing projects and, especially, the temporary Lanham Act developments. In 1947, shortly after World War II, local officials “had been advised that they would not be reappointed” following an upcoming election in which the incumbent mayor was not a candidate; they “therefore were not interested” in working with federal representatives. In 1950, early in the Korean conflict, and as the city considered a massive public housing program following the passage of the Housing Act of 1949, the HABC elected not to raise the issue of the Lanham units with the City Council for fear of endangering “our plans for seeking Council approval of additional sites in connection with the new program.” Despite an expressed desire to take over both permanent low-rent projects and temporaries for relocation purposes, HABC took a “calculated risk” and missed a deadline for transition requests in order to placate the Council.

See Oliver C. Winston to Charles L. Levy, December 6, 1950, Doc. no. 844, PL 032494,

Thompson v. HUD; Charles G. Reichert to Arthur M. Blaine, March 18, 1947, Doc. no. 717, PL 031683-031684, Thompson v. HUD.

57. HABC, “Effects of the Post-War Program on Negro Housing,” September 25, 1945, #7 in Thompson v. HUD, PL 029085-029088.

58. Commission on City Plan, Redevelopment of Blighted Residential Areas in Baltimore, July 1, 1945, 59, #65 Thompson v. HUD, PL 031589-031623.

59. *Ibid.*, 7.

60. *Ibid.*, 15.

61. *Ibid.*, 58.

62. Robert C. Weaver, The Negro Ghetto (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1948), 6, 324, 361n. See also Richard O. Davies, Housing Reform During the Truman Administration (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1966).
63. Henderson, "Local Deals," 372-73; Frank S. Horne to Carl Feiss, December 1, 1950, folder 1, box 263, General Subject Files, 1949-1960, Record Group (RG) 207, National Archives (NA). Henderson notes that FHA later canceled the plans for the 178 "moderate income" units.
64. Baltimore Urban League to Mayor and City Council, July 6, 1950, #79 Thompson v. HUD, PL 033809-033812.
65. George B. Nesbitt to N. S. Keith, August 30, 1951, #80 Thompson v. HUD, PL 035564-035569.
66. Horne to Feiss, December 1, 1950; George B. Nesbitt to N. S. Keith, October 29, 1951, folder 4, box 749, Program Files, RG 207; Raymond M. Foley to Clarence Mitchell, November 16, 1951, folder 11, box 269, General Subject Files, 1949-1960, RG 207.
67. Elmer W. Henderson to Raymond Foley, January 14, 1952, folder: Racial Relations, box 59, General Subject Files, 1947-1960, RG 207.
68. Philip Darling to Oliver G. Winston, July 16, 1951, #6 Thompson v. HUD, PL 031528-031531. "Since the site for the proposed project is part of a new planned community, and its location next to an existing low-rent project will result in economies in operation," Winston wrote, "the selection is believed excellent from every point of view. Another weighty reason for the selection is that this site is at the present time the only politically acceptable vacant Negro site in the City." See Oliver C. Winston, "Development Program, Project No. MD 2-17 for 362 Dwelling Units," July 19, 1951.

69. Henderson, "Local Deals," 348-60.
70. Baltimore Sun, May 2, 1950, clipping, #12 Thompson v. HUD, PL 033973; Henderson, "Local Deals," 359-62. The anonymous "insider's" account is in [?], "The Fight for Public Housing in Baltimore," 13-14, #132, Thompson v. HUD, PL 021041-021109.
71. [?], "The Fight for Public Housing in Baltimore," 1-22, #132 Thompson v. HUD, PL 021042-021064; James W. Rouse to Philip Darling, November 30, 1949, PL 021064-021074; Philip Darling to O. C. Winston, February 1, 1950, PL 021084-021090; clipping of Baltimore Sun editorial "The City's Housing Program Received Prompt Consideration," March 14, 1950, PL 021108, all attachments to Doc. # 132.
72. (NHA), "Problems of Site Selection During the War Housing Program."
73. Oliver C. Winston, "Development Program, Project No. MD 2-15 for 805 Dwelling Units," August 24, 1951; Henderson, "Local Deals," 376-77.
74. Oliver C. Winston, "Development Program, Project No. MD 2-16 for 490 Dwelling Units," March 14, 1951; and "Development Program, Project No. MD 2-15." Approved for white occupancy in 1950, the project did not open until 1955, well after the Brown decision altered the racial landscape. In the wake of that judicial imperative, HABC converted the development to one tenanted, nominally, on the principle of "open occupancy." See Henderson, "Local Deals," 380.
75. Henderson, "Local Deals," 380-83.
76. For a more detailed discussion of the impact of these national events on housing policy, see Hirsch, "'Containment' on the Home Front."
77. "Statement of Clarence Mitchell," March 2, 1953, and R[obert] W[eaver?] to W[alter] W[hite], February 18, 1953, both in Reel 6, NAACP Papers, Part 5: The Campaign Against

Residential Segregation.

78. "The New Housing Administrator," (typescript, March 2, 1953), 1-2, and NAACP, Press Release, March 5, 1953, both on Reel 6, NAACP Papers, Part 5: The Campaign Against Residential Segregation.

79. B. T. Fitzpatrick to Mr. Cole, June 10, 1954, folder 5, box 20, Subject Correspondence Files, Albert Cole, Administrator, 1953-1958, RG 207; Joseph Guandolo to J. W. Follin, August 24, 1954 and J. W. Follin to Albert M. Cole, May 28, 1954, both in folder: Racial Relations, box 284, General Subject Files, 1949-1960, RG 207.

80. Joseph R. Ray to Albert M. Cole, July 14, 1954, folder: Racial Relations, box 96, General Subject Files, 1947-1960, RG 207.

81. Frank S. Horne to Albert M. Cole, June 29, 1954, folder 1, box 748, Program Files, Racial Relations Files, 1946-1958, RG 207; see also the attached "Observations Regarding Implications of Decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court for HHFA Programs and Policies." Frank S. Horne to Albert M. Cole, August 12, 1954, folder: Racial Relations, box 96, General Subject Files, 1947-1960, RG 207.

82. "Address by Albert M. Cole at the Luncheon Meeting of the National Urban League, Pittsburgh, Pa., September 8, 1954," 4-5, in Reel 6, NAACP Papers, Part 5: The Campaign Against Residential Segregation.

83. Ibid.; Norman P. Mason to Directors of All Field Offices, March 30, 1955, folder 5, box 4, RG 196, NA; Maxwell Rabb to Robert W. Dowling, October 28, 1954, folder: Racial Relations, box 96, General Subject Files, 1947-60, RG 207; Walter White to Herbert Brownell, December 22, 1954, Reel 6, NAACP Papers, Part 5: The Campaign Against Residential Segregation.

84. For the origins of the Housing Act of 1954, see Arnold R. Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
85. "Address by Albert M. Cole to the Annual Convention of the National Association of Housing Officials, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, October 15, 1953," in Reel 6, NAACP Papers, Part 5: The Campaign Against Residential Segregation.
86. Albert M. Cole, "The Slum, the City, and the Citizen" (typescript speech delivered to the St. Louis Chamber of Commerce, February 24, 1954; "Address by Albert M. Cole to the Annual Meeting of the Ohio Association of Real Estate Boards, September 15, 1954," both in Reel 6, NAACP Papers, Part 5: The Campaign Against Residential Segregation.
87. "Address by Albert M. Cole to the Meeting of the Ohio Association of Real Estate Boards," 8.
88. Albert M. Cole, "Address to the Mid-Atlantic Conference, National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials, New York, April 1, 1954," 11 in Reel 6, NAACP Papers, Part 5: The Campaign Against Residential Segregation. See also DSCUR, "Racial Relations Workshop: Report" (typescript, June 4, 1954), folder 12, box 745, Program Files - Racial Relations Files, 1946-1958, RG 207.
89. Albert M. Cole to Honorable Herbert H. Lehman, February 2, 1956; Albert M. Cole to Honorable Charles G. Diggs, Jr., March 14, 1956; Albert M. Cole to Honorable Prescott Bush, May 3, 1956, all in folder 7, box 134, General Subject Files, 1947-1960, RG 207. The one rationale left unarticulated in the battery of arguments Cole brought to the table was, not surprisingly, the political. That such considerations played a role in determining his actions is at

least suggested by historian Robert Burk's observation that Cole "discouraged" attempts at desegregation in the South and "directed the Agency's Southern race relations officials to minimize their efforts." Housing expert and administration critic Charles Abrams also believed that there were "strong groups in Washington who felt that segregation in the expanding American neighborhoods was essential to the building boom and that the more liberal policy espoused by the Racial Relations Service was becoming a political liability." He also noted that Republicans hoped that "dissident elements on the Southern fringe might be won over by a slow-down policy on integration." See Robert Burk, The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1984), 121; New York Times, August 23, 1955, p. 22. See also Michael J. Klarman, "How the Brown Decision Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis," The Journal of American History 81 (June 1994): 81-118.

90. Ralph S. Weese, "Report on the Housing Market: Baltimore, Maryland, Standard Metropolitan Area as of September 1, 1953," (typewritten, n.d.), folder 11, box 748, Racial Relations Program Files, HHFA, RG 207. The Advisory Committee recommending urban renewal legislation reported to the President in December, 1953; the Housing Act of 1954 was passed the following July. Based on data complete through the summer of 1953, Weese's report reached RRS files on October 5, 1954 and, in all likelihood, was prepared in the wake of both the Brown decision on desegregation and the urban renewal debate.

91. Weese, "Report on the Housing Market."

92. *Ibid.*, 6, 20.

93. *Ibid.*, 13-14.

94. *Ibid.*, ii, 16-20.

95. Ellis Ash to E. M. Feinblatt, April 26, 1954, Box 5, RG 48S13, BCA, Doc. no. 575. PL 030578.
96. Eugene M. Feinblatt to Ellis Ash, July 16, 1954, Box 5, RG 48S13, Doc. no. 533. PL 030220
97. Staff Committee, "Report on Racial Occupancy Policies of the Housing Authority of Baltimore City (typescript, June 24, 1954), Box 5, RG 48S13, Doc. no. 571. PL 030505-030534.
98. Ibid. Oliver Winston embraced the committee's reasoning. The HABC, he wrote, "preferred not to be in a position of being forced by a directive of the court, but decided to proceed in a voluntary manner which would permit flexibility of application. If there was specific court direction, it would probably say that segregation should cease and desist forthwith, thus delimiting and rendering impossible the kind of planning and flexibility which . . . is so necessary to initiate a program of this kind successfully." See Oliver C. Winston to The Reverend Joseph Noll, May 26, 1955 in Box 5, RG 48S13, Doc. no. 572. PL 030550-030551.
99. "Background Notes on Desegregation Policy for Use in Planning and Executing Training Program to be Conducted as Part of Applying Policy," (typescript, July 26, 1954[?]), Box 5, RG 48S13, Doc. no. 529. PL 030151-030156.
100. Ellis Ash to Oliver C. Winston, June 24, 1954, Box 5, RG 48S13, Doc. no. 588. PL 030685-030691.
101. Oliver C. Winston, "Foreword," in Human Relations in Interracial Housing: A Study of the Contact Hypothesis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955), v.
102. HABC, "Meeting of Staff on Visiting Community Agencies," (typescript, Nov. 5, 1954 [?]), Box 5, RG 48S13, Doc. no. 556. PL 030322-030325
103. Ellis Ash to Allan Rhynhart, January 11, 1955 in Box 5, RG 48S13, Doc. no. 576. PL 030589.

104. HABC, Criticism of Desegregation Efforts, February, 1955, #177 in Thompson v. HUD. See also Henderson, "Local Deals," 400; Ellis Ash to Evelyn Merson, February 4, 1957, #18 in Thompson v. HUD, 0023-0024. Such a critical perspective clashed with that of Ellis Ash, who flatly announced in January, 1955 that "the Housing Authority is now operating under a policy of desegregation in its low-rent projects." He immediately followed that declaration, however, with the admission that "a change in racial composition has occurred in only one project to date." The co-existence of such facts and perceptions speaks to contemporary views as to what constituted "desegregation." See Ellis Ash to Allan Rhynhart, January 11, 1955, in Box 5, RG 48S13, Doc. no. 576. PL 030589.
105. Chairman to Honorable Theodore R. McKeldin, June 17, 1955, in Box 5, RG 48S13, Doc. no. 576. PL 030592-030593.
106. Henderson, "Local Deals," 400-03, 422-24; see tables attached to Sara Hartman to Margaret M. King, April 17, 1964, #20 in Thompson v. HUD, 0030-0034. In one of the tables, the percentage of blacks among HABC households is reported at 48.3% for 1955; internal mathematical evidence reveals this to be a typographical error. The figure should be 58.3%.
107. Morton Hoffman to Ellis Ash, September 21, 1954, in Box 5, RG 48S13, Doc. no. 547. PL 030293-030296.
108. Harry B. Weiss to Ellis Ash, July 27, 1954, in Box 5, RG 48S13, Doc. no. 538. PL 030258-030261.
109. Ibid.; Harry B. Weiss to Ellis Ash, December 14, 1954, in Box 5, RG 48S13, Doc. no. 531. PL 030190.
110. Eugene M. Feinblatt to Commissioners of the Housing Authority of Baltimore City, June

- 16, 1954 (?), #90 in Thompson v. HUD, PL 030610-030618; Henderson, "Local Deals," 400-01.
111. Harry B. Weiss to Edgar M. Ewing, November 5, 1959, #120 in Thompson v. HUD, PL 030752-030753.
112. Ellick Maslan to R. L. Steiner, March 4, 1960, Def. doc. no. 1063, HA 09243-09247.
113. Edward C. Minor to Ellick Maslan, August 12, 1960, Def. doc. no. 1062, HA 09236-09238.
114. HABC, "Development Program, Project No. MD-2-23, Program Reservation No. MD 2-A," 11, Def. doc. no. 614, HA 12648-12672.
115. "Notes on Meeting with the Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D. C., [Nov. 18, 1966], Def. doc. no. 773, HA 09311-09316; Cleveland Chandler and Shirley Bramhall to Robert C. Weaver, January 27, 1967, Def. doc. no. 156, NA 00025-00027; Chandler and Bramhall to Richard L. Steiner, March 28, 1967, Def. doc. no. 151, NA 00016-00018.
116. Robert C. Weaver to Mr. Sampson Green, December 12, 1966, Def. doc. no. 157, NA 00028-00030; Weaver to Mr. Cleveland Chandler, March 13, 1967, Def. doc. no. 154, NA 00023; Weaver to Chandler, March 22, 1967, Def. doc. no. 153, NA 00021-00022.
117. See the tables attached to Sara Hartman to Margaret M. King, April 17, 1964, 0030-0034; Harry B. Weiss to Edgar M. Ewing, November 5, 1959, #120 in Thompson v. HUD, PL 030752-030753.
118. Ellis Ash to Evelyn Merson, February 4, 1957, 0023-0024; Van Story Branch to R. C. Embry, Jr., October 16, 1968, #100 in Thompson v. HUD, HUD 01637-01647; R. L. Steiner to Resident, December 22, 1966, # 183 in Thompson v. HUD, 0035.
119. Department of Housing and Community Development, "Residential Displacement Activity Analysis, 1951-1971," May, 1971. #129 in Thompson v. HUD, PL 031032-031042. The long-

term implications of such renewal, relocation, and public housing policies are made manifest by a 1991 monitoring review. In that year, HABC owned and managed 48 public housing developments; of those, 45 were racially identifiable. Of the 37,846 individuals housed in the projects, 34,791 were minorities (91.9%). Minorities also comprised 93.9% of the HABC waiting list. See Harold E. Jackson to Dr. Robert Hearn, September 30, 1991, #24 in Thompson v. HUD, 0109-0118.

120. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), "Public Housing Tenant Assignment," (Appendix to November, 1985 report on "Subsidized Housing and Race") attached to Harry L. Carey to Peter Kaplan, August 30, 1991, #106 in Thompson v. HUD.

121. Van Story Branch to R. C. Embry, Jr., October 16, 1968, PL 036166-036184.

122. Ibid. Complementary policies included the ongoing search for "standard" or desirable black families (and only such families) to sustain a tokenist approach to integrating these "white" projects and the waiving of occupancy rules to maximize the white presence. When officials found themselves holding a surplus of two-bedroom units, for example, they "reviewed all eligible applications of white couples requiring one-bedroom dwellings, for the purpose of offering them two-bedroom accommodations in O'Donnell Heights and in Brooklyn Homes. We wrote them, we visited them, we telephoned them, we interviewed them in our office," wrote Van Story Branch. When such efforts failed to fill the vacancies, the authority turned next to "a review of all-white lone, eligible persons who have indicated interest in the above projects." Eventually, the Director waived accepted standards and "approved the practice of housing single, lone, elderly persons, regardless of race, in two-bedroom apartments at Brooklyn and O'Donnell." Evidently less threatening than their younger counterparts, elderly blacks thus

gained access to these developments as officials cast a wider net in their hunt for acceptable tenants. No mention was made in this discussion of the number of black families waiting for one- or two-bedroom units. See Van Story Branch to R. L. Steiner, March 6, 1967, PL 031213-031215; Van Story Branch to Esther Frank Siegal, March 9, 1967, PL 031222; and Van Story Branch to R. L. Steiner, February 17, 1967, PL 031223-031224, all part of Doc. no. 595.

123. These aggregate numbers are derived from the tables attached to Van Story Branch to Dean K. Reger, August 23, 1977, Def. Doc. no. 3014, 0069-0108. They include data on the traditional "projects," but omit those concerning the used housing, leased housing, and scattered site programs.

124. The Leased Housing Program was itself further complemented by a "used" housing program (implemented in October, 1967) and a "vacant house rehabilitation" program (funded in October, 1969). See HUD, "The Experience with the Leased, Used and Vacant House Program in Baltimore," August, 1971, #85 in Thompson v. HUD, PL 030856-030863.

125. Van Story Branch to R. C. Embry, Jr., October 25, 1968, #127 in Thompson v. HUD, PL 030810-030818.

126. Don Hummel to Richard L. Steiner, March 10, 1967, #103 in Thompson v. HUD, PL 030760.

127. Vincent Marino to Robert S. Moyer, May 22, 1969, #125 in Thompson v. HUD, 0461-0462.

128. Ibid.; Van Story Branch to R. C. Embry, Jr., October 25, 1968. See also HUD, "The Experience with the Leased, Used and Vacant House Program in Baltimore."

129. HUD, "The Experience with the Leased, Used and Vacant House Program in Baltimore," 2.

130. Ibid., 1-7; R. S. Moyer to R. L. Steiner, June 19, 1967, PL 046214.

131. Alexander Stark (City Council, 5th dist.) to Robert C. Embry, Jr., August 12, 1968

(HA13627); Carl L. Friedler (State Senator, 5th dist.) to Donald Hummel, January 10, 1969, PL 050443-050444; R. C. Embry, Jr. to Donald Hummel, January 17, 1969, PL 050445-050446; R. C. Embry, Jr. to Calvin B. Quill, January 27, 1969, HA 13618-13619; R. C. Embry, Jr. to William D. Schaefer (President, City Council of Baltimore), February 6, 1969, PL 050449-050450; L. S. O'Gwynn to R. C. Embry, Jr., June 12, 1969, HA 13524; R. C. Embry, Jr., Draft Memorandum to (?) Marino, October 31, 1969 (HA13342-13343); R. C. Embry, Jr. to Thomas J. D'Allesandro III, December 31, 1969 (HA13641-13642); HABC, Minutes of the Special Session, April 6, 1970, PL 050406-050408; Frank W. Dunton to R. C. Embry, Jr., January 11, 1971 (HA 13532).

132. Yale Rabin, "Expulsive Zoning: The Inequitable Legacy of *Euclid*," in Charles M. Haar and Jerold S. Kayden, eds., Zoning and the American Dream: Promises Still to Keep (Chicago: Planners Press, 1989), 101-21.

133. *Ibid.*, 101, 117.

134. *Ibid.*, 117-18.

135. *Ibid.*, 117; Sherry Olson, Baltimore (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1976), 57.

April 1, 2003

Arnold R. Hirsch

BACKGROUND

Education: Ph. D., University of Illinois at Chicago, 1978
M. A., University of Illinois at Chicago, 1972
B. A., University of Illinois at Chicago, 1970

Experience: Ethel and Herman L. Midlo Endowed Chair for New Orleans Studies, University of New Orleans, 2000-
University Research Professor, Department of History, University of New Orleans, 1997-
Professor, Department of History, University of New Orleans, 1995-1997
Chair, Department of History, University of New Orleans, 1991-1996
Professor, Department of History and College of Urban and Public Affairs, University of New Orleans, 1988-1995
Visiting Associate Professor, Department of History, Harvard University, Fall 1988
Associate Professor, Department of History and School of Urban and Regional Studies, University of New Orleans, 1983-1988
Assistant Professor, Department of History and School of Urban and Regional Studies, University of New Orleans, 1979-1983
Visiting Lecturer, Department of History, University Michigan, Winter Term, 1979
Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of History, University of Illinois at Chicago, Fall 1978

SCHOLARLY AND CREATIVE PRODUCTIVITY

1. PUBLICATIONS

A. Books

a. (I.) Scholarly/Refereed

Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960, 2nd ed., With a New Foreword (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

Urban Policy in Twentieth-Century America (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1993). Edited with Raymond A. Mohl.

Creole New Orleans: Race and Americanization (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992). Edited with Joseph Logsdon.

Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

B. Refereed/Invited Publications

a. Book Chapters

"Harold and Dutch Revisited: A Comparative Look at the First Black Mayors of Chicago and New Orleans," in African-American Mayors: Race and Politics and the American City, edited by David R. Colburn and Jeff Adler (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2001), pp. 107-29. Invited, 23 pages. (Revised and expanded version of the chapter originally appearing in The Making of Urban America.)

"Choosing Segregation: Federal Housing Policy Between Shelley and Brown," in Tenements to the Taylor Homes: In Search of an Urban Housing Policy in Twentieth Century America, edited by Roger Biles, John Bauman, and Kristin Szylvian (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), pp. 206-25. Invited, 20 pages.

"Race and Renewal in the Cold War South: New Orleans, 1947-1968," in The American Planning Tradition: Culture and Policy, Robert Fishman, ed. (The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000), 219-39. Invited, 21 pages.

"Historical Perspectives on the American 'Underclass'," in The Angelo State University Symposium on American Values, 1984-1997, Kenneth L. Stewart, ed., (San Angelo, TX: Angelo State University, 1998), 175-83. Invited, 9 pages.

"Harold and Dutch: A Comparative Look at the First Black Mayors of Chicago and New Orleans," in The Making of Urban America, Raymond A. Mohl, ed., (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1997), 265-81. Invited, 17 pages.

"With or Without Jim Crow: Black Residential Segregation in the United States," in Urban Policy in Twentieth-Century America, Hirsch and Mohl, eds., (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1993), 65-99. Invited, 35 pages.

"Simply a Matter of Black and White: The Transformation of Race and Politics

in Twentieth Century New Orleans," in Creole New Orleans: Race and Americanization, Hirsch and Logsdon, eds., (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 262-319. Invited, 58 pages..

"Black Ghettos" in The Reader's Companion to American History, Eric Foner and John A. Garraty, eds., (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), 109-13. Invited, 5 pages.

"Chicago: The Cook County Democratic Organization and the Dilemma of Race 1931-1987," in Snowbelt Cities: Metropolitan Politics in the Northeast and Midwest Since World War II (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1990), pp. 63-90, Richard M. Bernard, editor. Invited, 27 pages.

"Martin H. Kennelly: The Mugwump and the Machine," in The Mayors: Chicago Political Tradition (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987), pp. 126-143, Melvin G. Holli and Paul M. Green, eds. Invited, 17 pages.

"The Causes of Residential Segregation: A Historical Perspective," in Issues in Housing Discrimination: A Consultation/Hearing of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Washington, D. C., November 12-13, 1985; Vol. 1: Papers Presented (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1986), pp. 56-74. Invited, 18 pages.

"The Black Struggle for Integrated Housing in Chicago," in Ethnic Chicago (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Inc., 1984), pp. 380-411, Melvin G. Holli and Peter d'A. Jones, eds. Invited, 32 pages. (Reprint of the chapter originally appearing in The Ethnic Frontier.)

"New Orleans: Sunbelt in the Swamp," in Sunbelt Cities: Growth and Politics Since World War II (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983), pp. 100-37, Bradley R. Rice and Richard M. Bernard, eds. Invited, 38 pages.

"Race and Housing: Violence and Communal Protest in Chicago, 1940-1960," in The Ethnic Frontier: Essays in the History of Group Survival in Chicago and the Midwest (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Inc., 1977), pp. 331-68. Invited, 38 pages.

b. Journal Articles

"Second Thoughts on the Second Ghetto," The Journal of Urban History 29 (March, 2003): 298-309.

"Searching for a 'Sound Negro Policy': A Racial Agenda for the Housing Acts

of 1949 and 1954," in Housing Policy Debate 11 (Summer, 2000), 393-441. Invited, 49 pages.

"The Race Space Race," in the Journal of Urban History 26 (May 2000): 514-22. Invited, 9 pages.

"Containment on the Home Front: Race and Federal Housing Policy from the New Deal to the Cold War," in the Journal of Urban History 26 (January 2000): 158-89. 32 pages.

"Urban Democracy," in the Journal of the American Planning Association 63 (Summer 1997): 397-98. Invited, 2 pages.

"Massive Resistance in the Urban North: Chicago's Trumbull Park, 1953-1966," The Journal of American History 82 (September 1995): 522-50. 29 pages.

"On the Waterfront: Race, Class, and Politics in Post-Reconstruction New Orleans," Journal of Urban History 21 (May 1995): 511-17. Invited, 7 pages.

"Unsettling Settlements," in Reviews in American History 22 (September 1994): 480-85. Invited, 6 pages.

"A Tale of Three Belts: Sun, Snow, and Tight," Reviews in American History 20 (1992): 78-83. Invited, 6 pages.

"Academia Ain't Ready for Reform," in The Journal of Urban History 18 (November 1991): 98-108. Invited, 11 pages.

"Race and Politics in Modern New Orleans: The Mayoralty of Dutch Morial," Amerikastudien/American Studies 35 (1990): 461-85. Invited, 25 pages.

"The Politics of Race in Chicago, 1930-1980," Americana: Tijdschrift voor de studie van Noord-Amerika 4 (Zomer 1990): 104-14. Invited, 11 pages.

"The Last 'Last Hurrah'," The Journal of Urban History 13 (November 1986): 99-110. Invited, 12 pages.

c. Refereed Monographs

"New Orleans" in The Oxford Companion to United States History, ed. Paul S. Boyer (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 550-51. Invited, 1 page.

"New Orleans" in The Encyclopedia of Violence, ed. Ronald Gottesman (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1999), II, pp. 473-76. Invited, 4 pages.

"New Orleans," in Encyclopedia of Urban America: The Cities and Suburbs, Neil Larry Shumsky, ed. (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC Clio, 1998), pp. 525-28. Invited, 4 pages.

"Ghettos," in The Young Reader's Companion to American History, John Garraty, ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), pp. 347-49. Invited, 3 pages.

"Race Riots," in The Young Reader's Companion to American History, John Garraty, ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), pp. 683-84. Invited, 2 pages.

"New Orleans," in Encyclopedia of Southern Culture (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), pp. 1464-465. Invited, 2 pages.

d. Refereed Proceedings

"Statement of Arnold Hirsch," in Issues in Housing Discrimination: A Consultation/Hearing of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Washington, D. C., November 12-13, 1985; Vol. 2: Proceedings (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1986), pp. 13-17. Invited, 5 pages.

C. Other Publications

a. Non-refereed academic journal articles

b. Others

"The L. A. Riots," The Urban History Newsletter, October 1992.

"Duke, the South, and the '92 Election," The Atlanta Journal/The Atlanta Constitution, November 22, 1991.

"David Duke in the U. S. Senate? Unabashed Racism Could Elect Louisiana's Ku Klux Candidate," Washington Post, September 23, 1990.

"Youthful Indiscretion: David Duke's Dodges and Parries About his Career in KKK, Nazis," Shreveport Journal, August 31, 1990.

"Dutch Morial: Old Creole in the New South," Working Paper no. 4 (October 1990), Division of Urban Policy and Research, College of Urban and Public Affairs, UNO.

"A History of New Orleans: Life on the Mississippi," Vignette (1989): 5-11; reprinted in Vignette (1990): 28-33.

"How Political Reforms Can Backfire," Chicago Tribune, January 27, 1987.

Invited Book Reviews:

From the Puritans to the Projects: Public Housing and Public Neighbors by Lawrence J. Vale in the American Journal of Sociology 106 (May 2001): 1818-1820.

Suburbs Under Siege: Race, Space, and Audacious Judges by Charles M. Haar in Law and History Review (Summer 2001): 466-68..

American Project: The Rise and Fall of a Modern Ghetto by Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh in the Chicago Tribune, January 14, 2001.

Changing Plans for America's Inner Cities: Cincinnati's Over-the-Rhine and Twentieth-Century Urbanism by Zane L. Miller and Bruce Tucker in American Historical Review 105 (December 2000): 1759.

The Hidden War: Crime and the Tragedy of Public Housing in Chicago by Susan J. Popkin, Victoria E. Gwiasda, Lynn M. Olson, Dennis P. Rosenbaum, and Larry Buron in the Chicago Tribune, August 6, 2000.

Challenging Chicago: Coping with Everyday Life, 1837-1920 by Perry R. Duis in Urban Affairs Review 35 (September 1999): 149-51.

The South Side: The Racial Transformation of an American Neighborhood by Louis Rosen in the Chicago Tribune, August 16, 1998.

Revolution, Romanticism, and the Afro-Creole Protest Tradition in Louisiana, 1718-1868 by Caryn Cosse Bell in the William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, LV (April 1998), 306-08.

Creoles of Color in the Gulf South edited by James Dormon, in the Journal of Southern History 63 (May 1997): 455-56.

The Separate City: Black Communities in the Urban South, 1940-1968 by Christopher Silver and John V. Moeser, in American Historical Review 102 (April 1997): 562-63.

Between Justice and Beauty: Race, Planning, and the Failure of Urban Policy in

Washington, D. C. by Howard Gillette, Jr. in The Journal of American History 83 (September 1996), 613-14.

Blockbusting in Baltimore: The Edmondson Village Story by W. Edward Orser in The Journal of American History 82 (September 1995), 832-33.

On the Edge: A History of Poor Black Children and Their American Dreams by Carl Husemoller Nightingale in the American Historical Review 100 (February 1995), 259.

Black San Francisco: The Struggle for Racial Equality in the West, 1900-1954 by Albert S. Broussard in The Journal of American History 81 (June 1994), 307-08.

Building a New Boston: Politics and Urban Renewal, 1950-1970 by Thomas H. O'Connor in American Historical Review 99 (June 1994), 996-97.

Black Dixie: Afro-Texan History and Culture in Houston edited by Howard Beeth and Cary D. Wintz in the Southwestern Historical Quarterly (January 1994), 584-85.

Property Rules: Political Economy in Chicago, 1833-1872 by Robin L. Einhorn in The American Journal of Legal History 37 (July 1993), 381-82.

The Great Migration in Historical Perspective: New Dimensions of Race, Class, and Gender edited by Joe William Trotter, Jr. in The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 24 (Autumn 1993), 368-70.

The Dispossessed: America's Underclasses from the Civil War to the Present by Jacqueline Jones in The Journal of Southwest Georgia History 7 (1989-1992), 152-53.

Black Migration in America from 1915 to 1960: An Uneasy Exodus by E. Marvin Goodwin in The Journal of Southern History 58 (February 1992), 163-4.

Boston Against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s by Ronald P. Formisano in American Historical Review 96 (December 1991), 1638-39.

New Men, New Cities, New South: Atlanta, Nashville, Charleston, Mobile, 1860-1910 in American Historical Review 96 (June 1991), 966-67.

Land of Hope: Chicago, Black Southerners and the Great Migration by James Grossman in The Journal of Southern History 57 (February 1991), 133-34.

Shades of the Sunbelt: Essays on Ethnicity, Race, and the Urban South, edited by Randall M. Miller and George E. Pozzetta, in the Journal of American Ethnic History 10 (Fall 1990-Winter 1991), 150-51.

In Search of the Sunbelt: The Black Urban Experience in the 1970s and 1980s, edited by Robert D. Bullard in The Georgia Historical Quarterly 74 (Summer 1990), 352-53.

The Dream Long Deferred by Frye Gaillard in The Journal of Southern History 56 (February 1990), 160-62.

Public Housing, Race and Renewal: Urban Planning in Philadelphia, 1920-1974 by John F. Bauman and Housing Desegregation and Federal Policy, edited by John Goering in the Urban History Review 17 (October 1988), 134-136.

Confronting the Color Line: The Broken Promise of the Civil Rights Movement in Chicago by Alan B. Anderson and George W. Pickering in the American Historical Review 93 (June 1988), 797-98.

Spirit of Vengeance: Nativism and Louisiana Justice, 1921-1924 by John V. Baiamonte, Jr. in Criminal Justice History 9 (1988), 217-19.

Black Milwaukee: The Making of an Industrial Proletariat by Joe William Trotter, Jr. in the Journal of American Ethnic History 7 (Fall 1987), 114-16.

The World of Marcus Garvey: Race and Class in Modern Society by Judith Stein, in the Journal of Southern History 53 (February 1987), 129-30.

Power and Society: Greater New York at the Turn of the Century by David C. Hammack in Chicago History 15 (Fall 1986), 71-72.

Main Street to Miracle Mile: American Roadside Architecture by Chester H. Liebs, in Visions 2 (Spring 1986), 190.

Race Relations in Wartime Detroit: The Sojourner Truth Housing Controversy by Dominic J. Capeci, Jr., in the Journal of American Ethnic History 5 (Spring 1986), 105-107.

Farewell to the Party of Lincoln: Black Politics in the Age of FDR by Nancy J. Weiss, in Chicago History 14 (Spring 1985), 50-51.

The Making of the Mayor: Chicago, 1983 edited by Melvin G. Holli and Paul M. Green, in the Indiana Magazine of History (March 1985), 76-77.

Death in the Promised Land: The Tulsa Race Riot of 1921 by Scott Ellsworth, in the Journal of Southern History 49 (February 1983), 136-37.

The Education of an Urban Minority: Catholics in Chicago, 1833-1965 by James W. Sanders, in American Studies 21 (Spring 1980), 107.

2. ITEMS ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION BUT NOT YET PUBLISHED

A. Books

Segregating Cities: Policy and Practice in Mid-Twentieth Century America (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, forthcoming)

B. Book Chapters

C. Journal Articles (Refereed/Invited)

"E Pluribus Duo: Learning Race on the Local Level in Chicago, 1900-1930," Journal of American Ethnic History (forthcoming)

D. Monographs (Refereed/Invited)

"Harold Washington," in the Encyclopedia of the Midwest (The Ohio State University Press, forthcoming)

"Martin H. Kennelly," "Restrictive Covenants," "Blockbusting," "The Cook County Democratic Organization," and "Urban Renewal," in the Encyclopedia of Chicago History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming).

E. Invited Book Reviews

Kevin Fox Gotham, Race, Real Estate, and Uneven Development. The Kansas City Experience, 1900-2000 in American Studies (forthcoming)

Alexander von Hoffman, House by House, Block by Block, in the Chicago Tribune (forthcoming)

3. ARTISTIC OR OTHER CREATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS

Consultant to and interviewed for National Public Radio (NPR) documentary on "Transforming Chicago Public Housing," Andrea DeFotis and Sudhir Venkatesh, producers, 2001.

Consultant to Bruce Orenstein (producer) on the Chicago Video Project, 2001- .
(Documentary on Race and Housing in Chicago)

Consultant to Chester Hartman and the Poverty and Race Research Action Council (PRRAC) on "Housing and School Segregation" project, 2001- .

Consultant to Terri Landry (producer) on PBS documentary on "Italians in New Orleans, broadcast on WYES, 2001.

"Racial Discrimination in Washington Park and Federally-Supported Public Housing" (with Christopher Silver, 24 pp.), consultant's report submitted to National Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, 1999

Consultant to Arnold Shapiro Productions on "The 100 Greatest Accomplishments of the 20th Century" (2-hour television special broadcast on The Learning Channel), 1999

Panelist on National Public Radio (NPR) broadcast on public housing, "Talk of the Nation," October 21, 1998

"Public Policy and Residential Segregation in Baltimore, 1900-1968," (57 pp.), consultant's report submitted to American Civil Liberties Union, Maryland Foundation, 1998

"Federal Housing Policy and Residential Segregation, 1933-1963: A Preliminary Reconnaissance" (98 pp.), consultant's report submitted to Poverty and Race Research Action Council, 1996.

Consultant on "The Freeway Movie," produced by Chris Craton, 1992.

Consultant on documentary films produced by Paul Stekler: "Hands that Picked Cotton" (1984), "Among Brothers: Politics in New Orleans" (1986), and "Louisiana Boys: Raised on Politics" (1991).

Consultant and on-camera interviewee for documentary film produced by Bess Carrick and Chris Wiltz: "Backlash: Race and Reaction in the '90s" (1991).

4. PARTICIPATION AT PROFESSIONAL MEETINGS

"Commentary on Lawrence Powell's *Troubled Memory: Anne Levy, the Holocaust, and David Duke's Louisiana*," presented at the meeting of the Louisiana Historical Association, New Iberia, Louisiana, March 8, 2002.

"Second Thoughts on the Second Ghetto: The View from Washington, D. C.," an invited paper presented at the conference on "African Americans in the Post-Industrial City," Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, October 27, 2001.

"Integrating Public Housing in the Age of *Brown*: Art and Artifice in Chicago, Baltimore, and New Orleans," presented at the meeting of the Organization of American Historians, Los Angeles, California, April 27, 2001.

"The Federal Role in Creating the Segregated Metropolis," presented at the FannieMae Foundation Roundtable on the "Legacy of the 1949 Housing Act: Past, Present, and Future of Federal Housing and Urban Policy" at the meeting of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning (ACSP), Chicago, IL, October 20, 1999.

"Race and Renewal in the Cold War South: New Orleans, 1947-1968," presented at the meeting of the Workshop on the Heritage of American Regional and Urban Planning, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D. C., September 22, 1995.

"The Siege of Trumbull Park: Chicago Confronts the Civil Rights Era, 1953-1963" presented at the meeting of the Urban Affairs Association, New Orleans, La., March 3, 1994.

"Creoles of Color and the Franco-African Protest Tradition in New Orleans," presented before the W. E. B. Du Bois Institute, Harvard University, November 13, 1991.

"The Rise of Harold Washington and Dutch Morial: Contemporary Black Politics in Comparative Perspective," presented at the Department of History Seminar, Harvard University, December 7, 1990.

"Black Religion and Politics in Twentieth Century New Orleans," presented with Joseph Logsdon at the W. E. B. Du Bois Institute Conference on Afro-American Religion and Politics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, October 20, 1990.

"Dutch Morial: The Last of the Radical Creoles," presented at the meeting of the German Association for American Studies, Bonn, West Germany, June 7,

1990.

"The Collapse of American Cities After World War II," presented at the UNO/Innsbruck Symposium, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria, May 29, 1990.

"Twentieth Century New Orleans: The American City?" was presented at the session on "Race and Cultural Confrontation in New Orleans" at the meeting of the Southern Historical Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, November, 1987.

"The Chicago Political Tradition: Martin H. Kennelly," presented at the conference on Chicago's Political Tradition at the Chicago Historical Society, December 2, 1985.

"Black Leadership and the Civil Rights Revolution in New Orleans, 1940-1980," presented at the meeting of the Organization of American Historians, Minneapolis, Minnesota, April 19, 1985.

"Politics and the Interracial Struggle for Living Space in Chicago after World War II," presented at the meeting of the American Historical Association, Chicago, Illinois, December 29, 1984.

"New Orleans: Metropolitan Growth and Political Change, 1945-1980," presented at the meeting of the Southern Historical Association, Louisville, Kentucky, November 13, 1981.

"Ethnicity and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960," presented at the Duquesne History Forum, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, October 19, 1978.

"Defending the Community: The Ethnic Woman as Activist," presented with Dominic Pacyga at the Conference on the History of Women, St. Paul, Minnesota, October 22, 1977.

"Friends, Neighbors, and Rioters: Chicago Enters the Civil Rights Era, 1940-1960," presented at the meeting of the Great Lakes Regional History Conference, Grand Rapids, Michigan, April 23, 1976.

5. OTHER SCHOLARLY OR CREATIVE ACTIVITIES

A. Service in the role of discussant, critic, reviewer for professional meetings or publications

Commentator on the session on "Race, Migration, and Community in

Philadelphia, 1890-1970" at the meeting of the Urban History Association, Pittsburgh, PA, September 28, 2002.

Chair of the session on "Color Lines: Racial Frontiers in the Modern American Metropolis" at the meeting of the American Historical Association, San Francisco, California, January 4, 2002.

Chair and commentator on the session entitled "Beyond the Urban Crisis: Narrating the Postwar City and African American Politics" at the meeting of the Organization of American Historians, Los Angeles, California, April 28, 2001.

Chair of the session on "Political Culture and Urban Space in the Era of Deindustrialization, 1945-1980," at the meeting of the Organization of American Historians, Toronto, Canada, April 25, 1999.

Commentator on the session on "Race, Restrictive Covenants, and the Neighborhood," at the meeting of the Organization of American Historians, Indianapolis, Indiana, April 2, 1998.

Chair and discussant on the panel on "Anti-Discrimination Policy," at the meeting of the Social Science History Association (SSHA), Washington, D. C., October 18, 1997.

Chair of the session on "African Americans in Louisiana," at the meeting of the Southern Historical Association, New Orleans, La., November 10, 1995.

Chair of the session on "Orthodoxy in the South: An Historical Overview," at the meeting of the Southern Jewish Historical Society, New Orleans, La., October 27, 1995.

Commentator on the session on "Race, Class and Power in Postwar Urban America" at the meeting of the Organization of American Historians, Atlanta, Georgia, April 14, 1994.

Commentator on the session on "Constructing the Boundaries of Difference: Racial Identity, Institutions, and Neighborhood Change in the Urban North, 1940-1990" at the meeting of the American Historical Association, San Francisco, California, January 9, 1994.

Invited participant in the conference on "Economic and Cultural Change Among Inner City Blacks in the United States," Boston University, April 2-3, 1993.

Commentator on the session on "Racial Violence in the Twentieth-Century Urban South" at the meeting of the American Historical Association, Washington, D. C., December 28, 1992.

Commentator on the session on "Racial Reform in Twentieth-Century New Orleans" at the meeting of the Southern Historical Association, Atlanta, Georgia, November 6, 1992.

Member, Working Group on Afro-American Religion and Politics, W. E. B. Du Bois Institute, Harvard University, 1988-1991.

Commentator on the session on "Historical and Geographical Approaches to Race, Place, Class, and Ethnicity in Shaping Reactions to Desegregation" at the meeting of the American Historical Association, New York, New York, December 29, 1990.

Commentator on the session on "Politics as a Way to Social Mobility," at the meeting of the American Italian Historical Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, November 3, 1990.

Served as panelist in discussion on "Urban Black Politics" at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, December 1, 1988.

Discussed "Black Politics in Chicago" and Making the Second Ghetto before the Working Group on Afro-American Religion and Politics, W. E. B. Du Bois Institute, Harvard University, October 29, 1988.

Chaired the session on "The Immigrant Experience in New Orleans: Two Case Studies," at the meeting of the Social Science History Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, October 31, 1987.

Commentator on the session on "Control and Disorder in Times of Upheaval," at the meeting of the Social Science History Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, October 30, 1987.

Organized and chaired the session on the "Chicago Mayoralty: 1987" at the meeting of the American Historical Association, Chicago, Illinois, December 29, 1986.

Chaired the session on "Contemporary Politics and Elections" at the conference on "The Sunbelt: A Region and Regionalism in the Making?" held in Miami, Florida, November 2-6, 1985.

Commentator on the session on "Congressional and Municipal Politics" at the conference on "The Sunbelt: A Region and Regionalism in the Making?" held in Miami, Florida, November 2-6, 1985.

Author, two television scripts in a documentary series on Chicago, produced by Loyola University-Chicago, 1985: "The Rise of Richard J. Daley" and "Patterns of Reform in Chicago Politics, 1960-1983."

Served as panelist at the Delta Assembly Conference on "The Farm and the City," in Many, Louisiana, October 18-20, 1982.

Commentator on the session on "Legalized Jim Crow," at the meeting of the Association for the Study of Afro-American Life and History, New York, New York, October 26, 1979.

Served as panelist at several meetings of the Urban History Group, Chicago Historical Society, 1977-78.

Commentator and Chair at the session on "Urban Social History," at the Great Lakes Regional History Conference, Grand Rapids, Michigan, April 23, 1976.

Reviewer of book manuscripts for:

Cambridge University Press
D. C. Heath Co., Inc.
Harvard University Press
Louisiana State University Press
Northern Illinois University Press
Princeton University Press
Temple University Press
University of California Press
University of Chicago Press
University of Georgia Press
University of Illinois Press
University of Michigan Press
University of Missouri Press
University of Pennsylvania Press
University of Tennessee Press
Yale University Press

Referee for:

American Historical Review

American Quarterly
American Studies
The Historian
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research
Journal of American History
Journal of American Ethnic History
Journal of Policy History
Journal of Social History
Journal of Urban History
Journal of Planning Education and Research
Pacific Historical Review
Social Science History
Virginia Magazine

Reference for the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, 1998, 2000.

Reviewer of proposals for the National Endowment for the Humanities, 1987, 1994.

Reviewer of fellowship applications for the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1994, 1995, 1997.

Reviewer of fellowship applications for the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, 1996.

Reviewer of fellowship applications for the American Council of Learned Societies, 1996.

D. Professional Society Membership

American Historical Association
Organization of American Historians
Urban History Association
(Chair, Best Book Prize Committee, 2000; Member, Nominating Committee, 1995-98; Chair, Nominating Committee, 1996-97, 1997-98)
Immigration and Ethnic History Society
(Member, Nominating Committee, 1992-95; Member, Program Committee, 1996)
Journal of Urban History
(Member, Editorial Board, 1993-98)

6. AWARDS, LECTURESHIPS, OR PRIZES

A. Awards and Prizes

Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960 was recognized on the twentieth anniversary of its publication by a special forum that assessed its influence in The Journal of Urban History 29 (March, 2003): 231-309.

Gustavus Myers Center designated Creole New Orleans an "Outstanding Book" in the area of human rights, 1993

Amoco Foundation, Inc. Outstanding Undergraduate Teaching Award, presented by the LSU System Distinguished Faculty Fellowship Committee, 1986.

DeBlois Faculty Fellow, School of Urban and Regional Studies, UNO, 1986

Frederick Jackson Turner Prize (Honorable Mention-2nd Place) of the Organization of American Historians, 1984 for Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960. The award is given each year to a distinguished book in American history published by a university press.

B. Invited Lectures

"The Imposition of the New Racial Order," presented as part of the Louisiana Purchase Bicentennial Lecture Series, University of New Orleans, November 5, 2002.

"Massive Resistance in the Urban North: Housing, Politics, and Public Policy in Chicago, 1950-1970," address at the 2nd Annual African-American Leadership Conference, Northern Illinois University, April 20, 1995.

"The Social and Political Context of Lorraine Hansberry's Chicago" presented at the DuSable Museum of African American History, Chicago, Illinois, February 26, 1994.

"Historical Perspectives on the American 'Underclass'," presented at the Angelo State University Symposium on "American Values and the Urban 'Underclass': A Clash of Cultures?", Angelo State University, San Angelo, Texas, October 11-13, 1992.

"The Chicago Political Machine and the Dilemma of Race, 1931-1987" presented at the John F. Kennedy-Institut, Freie Universitat Berlin, Berlin, West Germany, June 11, 1990.

"Dutch Morial and Harold Washington: A Comparative Look at Contemporary Black Politics," presented at the University of Munich, Munich, West Germany, May 28, 1990.

"Black Mayors and the Dilemmas of Racial Politics: The View from Chicago and New Orleans," presented at the University of Gottingen, Gottingen, West Germany, May 23, 1990.

"Race Relations and Machine Politics in Chicago, 1930-1990," presented at the University of Leiden, The Netherlands, May 22, 1990.

"Urban Race Relations in the United States," presented at the Amerika Instituut, Universiteit van Amsterdam, The Netherlands, May 22, 1990.

"Kelly to Kennelly to Daley: The Irony of Machine and Reform Politics in Chicago After World War II," presented before the Chicago Historical Society Urban History Seminar, September 26, 1985.

7. GRANTS AND CONTRACTS

Poverty and Race Research Action Council (PRRAC) consultancy, \$10,000, 2001-2001; \$18,000, 1996.

Fannie Mae Foundation, contract, \$5,000, 1999.

American Civil Liberties Union Maryland Foundation, consultancy, \$7,500, 1999.

American Civil Liberties Union Maryland Foundation, consultancy, \$5,000, 1997.

American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) Fellowship, \$20,000, 1993-94.

National Endowment for the Humanities, Travel to Collections Grant, \$500.00, 1984.

8. THESIS/DISSERTATION COMMITTEE SERVICE

Eight theses directed, 1979-1998. Served as reader and committee member on many other thesis exams in the same period for the Department of History.

Directed Ph. D. dissertations (Alan Maclachlan, 1998; Lake Douglas, 2001) in the College of Urban and Public Affairs.

Served as co-director of Ph. D. dissertation (Janice Johnson) in the College of Education, 1996.

Since beginning of the Ph. D. program in the College of Urban and Public Affairs, have served as Ph. D. committee member on twelve dissertation defenses. Have directed two dissertations and have co-directed two others. I have served on six comprehensive exam committees, and have chaired three qualifying exam committees, while serving as a reader on several others. Am presently serving on Ph. D. committees at Rutgers University, Tulane University and the University of Illinois at Chicago.

Served as Ph. D. committee member at University of Illinois at Chicago (Wendy Plotkin, 1999); Tulane University (Mark Souther, 2002)

9. MAJOR AREAS OF CREATIVE OR RESEARCH INTEREST

20th Century U. S. History
Urban History
African American History
Immigration and Ethnicity
Politics and Race Relations

10. OTHER PROFESSIONAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

B. Course/Program design and development

Contributor to the creation of the interdisciplinary urban studies Ph.D. program, UNO.

Contributed to proposal setting up Ethel and Herman Midlo International Center for New Orleans Studies.

Courses recently created: Civil Rights Revolution in Modern America (Taught as "special topics" course, HIST 4991, it has now been proposed, accepted, and placed in the catalog as HIST 4555; it has also been upgraded and taught as an American History Proseminar, HIST 6501, 6503); Proseminar in Urban History (HIST 6803, 6805); Seminar in Urban History (HIST 6804, 6806).

Organized lecture series on "Urban Policy in Twentieth Century America," Spring Semester, 1990.

C. Special Recognition for Teaching

See section 6, above.

D. Academic Service

1. On-campus

Member, UNO Research Council, 1998-2001

Member, College of Liberal Arts Ad Hoc Committee on Summer Awards, 2000

Member, Faculty Senate, UNO, 1998-2000

Member, Department Committee on Promotion and Tenure Guidelines, 1997-1998

Member, Department Grade Appeal Committee, Summer, 1997

Member, Department Planning Committee, 1997-

Chair, Department of History, 1991-1996

Reviewer for Faculty Development Fund Awards, 1995-1996

Sponsor for Fulbright Scholar, Prof. Miguel Goonatilleka, University of Kelaniya (Sri Lanka) under the auspices of the Council for the International Exchange of Scholars (CIES), January 15, 1991-April 15, 1991.

Member, Curriculum Committee, Urban Studies Ph.D. program, 1988-

Member, College of Liberal Arts Planning Committee, 1990.

Member, Screening Committee for Candidates for Dean, College of Liberal Arts, 1989-90.

Member, Committee on Student Publications, 1988-90.

Member, University Committee on Courses and Curricula, 1984.

2. Off-campus

Consultant to the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law on Washington Park Lead Committee, et al. v. EPA, et al., 1999-.

Consultant to the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Maryland on Thompson v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1996- .

Member, Workshop on the Heritage of American Regional and City Planning, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D. C., 1994-96.

Invited lecturer at the Delta Assembly Conference on "Interwoven Destinies: Cities and the Nation," Baton Rouge, La., November 18, 1993.

Lecturer and Tour Guide for the German Marshall Fund Fellows tour of "Ethnic New Orleans," March 8, 1993.

Panelist on Metropolitan Area Committee's program on "Human Relations Perspectives," Xavier University, New Orleans, November 10, 1992.

Consultant to the U.S. Department of Justice on State of Louisiana v. United States of America, Janice Clark, et al., 1991-93.

Consultant on "The Freeway Movie," Chris Craton, producer, 1991-

Consultant on "Louisiana Boys: Raised on Politics," a documentary produced by Paul Stekler, 1991.

Consultant and on-camera interviewee for "Backlash: Race and Reaction in the '90s," a documentary produced by Bess Carrick and Chris Wiltz, 1991.

Member, Metropolitan Area Leadership Forum, New Orleans, Louisiana, 1989-90.

Director, Seminar on "The American Experience" for the Louisiana Endowment for the Humanities, Summer 1989 (Algiers Public Library) and Fall 1989 (Latter Public Library).

"New Orleans in the Nineteenth Century," presented before the Friends of the Cabildo, 1989.

Member, Working Group on Afro-American Religion and History, W. E. B. DuBois Institute, Harvard University, 1988-91.

Member, Advisory Committee, Alliance for Affordable Energy, New Orleans, Louisiana, 1988-

Member, Advisory Board, Citizens' Committee for Equity and Excellence in Louisiana Universities, 1988-

"The Gumbo Pot: Ethnic Diversity in New Orleans," presented before a visiting group of Fulbright Scholars, New Orleans, Louisiana, Summer 1988

Lecturer and tour guide, United States' Information Agency (USIA)-Temple University program for Fulbright Scholars, 1987-90.

Consultant on "Among Brothers: Politics in New Orleans," a documentary produced by Paul Stekler, 1986.

Consultant to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Hearings on Racial Segregation in Housing, Washington, D. C., November 12-13, 1985.

Consultant on "Hands that Picked Cotton: Black Politics in the Rural South," a documentary produced by Alan Bell and Paul Stekler, 1984.

Member, Architectural Guidelines Committee, Vieux Carre Commission, 1984.

"Machine Politics in New Orleans," presented before the Louisiana Historical Society, New Orleans, Louisiana, October 18, 1983.

"Modern New Orleans Politics: The Curse of Incoherence," presented before the New Orleans Area History Seminar, February 25, 1982.

Consultant to the Chicago Metro History Fair, 1977-78.

E. OTHER SERVICE

Consultant to the Department of History, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 2002; asked to review materials of a candidate for promotion and tenure.

Consultant to the Department of History, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1999; asked to review materials of a candidate for appointment to professorship with tenure.

Consultant to the Department of History, Rutgers University, Camden, New Jersey, 1998; asked to review materials of a candidate for appointment to professorship with tenure.

Consultant to the Politics Department, Mount Holyoke College, 1998; asked to review materials of a candidate for promotion and tenure.

Consultant to the Department of History, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 1997; asked to review materials of a candidate for promotion and tenure.

Consultant to the History Tenure Committee, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, 1997; asked to review materials of a candidate for promotion and tenure.

Consultant to the Department of History, University of Pennsylvania, 1996; asked to review materials of a candidate for promotion and tenure in the department.

Consultant to the Department of History, North Carolina State University, 1995; asked to review materials of a candidate for promotion and tenure in the department.

Consultant to Middlebury College, Middlebury, Vermont, 1995; asked to review materials of a candidate for promotion and tenure.

Consultant to the Department of History, University of Maryland Baltimore County, 1994; asked to review materials of a candidate for promotion in the department.

Consultant to the Department of History, University of Illinois at Chicago, 1992; asked to review materials of a candidate for tenure in the department.

Consultant to the Department of History, Harvard University, 1991, 1996; asked to review materials of a candidate for promotion in the department.

Asked to submit letter to Brandeis University with regard to the search to fill the Meyerhoff Chair of Environmental Studies, 1991.

Consultant to the Department of History, Columbia University, 1991; asked to review materials of a candidate for tenure in the department.

Asked to submit a letter with regard to competition for a distinguished research award, Florida Atlantic University, 1991.

STATEMENT OF COMPENSATION
ARNOLD HIRSCH

Dr. Hirsch's hourly rate fore report preparation is currently \$125, which was raised from \$100 a few years ago. To date, he has billed plaintiffs' counsel approximately \$22,000, plus costs and expenses, for preparation of his report.